

OCTOBER 28 -- (1)

*advised*  
Project Director inovated a new meeting which would be held weekly to discuss various problems of the project. There was a radical departure from ordinary meetings; the personnel requested by the Director to attend the meetings included evacuee administrators. Those present this morning were Burdick, the acting Project Steward in absence of Snelson, Horn, the new Transportation and Maintenance Officer detailed from Washington, Cassily, the Personnel Officer, John Powell, the Assistant Director, Arthur Harris, the Director of Education, Scott Rowley, the Project Attorney, Robert Rupkey, the Assistant Director in charge of Operations, Mrs. Brown, the Reports Officer, and C. Carter, the Assistant Relocation Program Officer slated to succeed James Crawford. The evacuees present were Sumida, Nishimoto, Uyeno, the Unit II Administrator, and Yoshimine, the Unit III Administrator.

First, Mills explained the purpose of the meeting. He said that all major project problems should be discussed here and information on major issues should be exchanged. These people present should know what were going on in other sections to facilitate coordination <sup>in</sup> of project operation.

Mills, then, explained that a drastic curtailment of use of motor vehicles would be ordered effective ~~of~~ November 1. In the past six months, on three different occasions, the WRA Washington office called the attention of Duncan Mills that the uses of motor vehicles at Poston must be controlled and regulated. In each of these instances, Poston was criticized for misuses, abuses, and rough use of motor vehicles. Private uses during and after the working hours were noted in these criticisms. Even during the office hours, cars were not <sup>utilized</sup> ~~used~~ to the maximum; that



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is, too many cars were left idle.

In order to correct these faults and to live up to the Washington instruction, one Horn was hired as Supervisor of transportation maintenance work. He had studied problems existing in Poston for the past two weeks, and made several recommendations, which would be put into effect from November 1. Some of these recommendations are as follows:

1. No passenger cars will be assigned to either Caucasian workers or evacuees for their exclusive uses. A pool of five or six passenger cars will be established near the Administration Building. Wherever and whenever a Caucasian or an evacuee needs to use a car on official business, he goes to the pool and signs for the use of a car, designating the nature of the business and the destination.

2. The number of trucks distributed among the sections will be lessened to a minimum. The regulations as to the uses of trucks will be enforced at the Motor Pool.

3. Servicing and repairing of the cars will be controlled more rigidly.

Mills, then, called on Nishimoto to make a report on the recruiting of the Subsistence warehouse crew. Burdick, acting for Snelson, requested a right to reject some of these workers sent out by the blocks. But Nishimoto objected to this on the ground that the Subsistence Section had failed to recruit its own workers, and the Local Council had assumed the responsibility of recruiting. By the resolution of the Council it became mandatory by mutual consent among the Councilmen to send one worker from each block. Therefore, the Subsistence Section could not challenge any worker sent out by the blocks. Mills' approved

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Nishimoto's contention and requested him to explain the reasoning more in detail to the other Caucasian staff in the Subsistence Section by having a conference with them in the afternoon.

At the end of this conference Mills decreed that all the members present today would be required to attend ~~the~~ meetings *of this sort* every Wednesday in his office.



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During the past two months, many A. P.'s left Poston. It is quite noticeable, because their replacements could not be found in most of these cases. The following list contains most of the more prominent workers in the administration that have left Poston during the period:

*Admin*  
Allan Cushman, the Leave Officer

W. A. Barrett, the Property and Warehouse Officer

Moris Burge, the Deputy Project Director

T. D. Culbertson, the Cost Accountant

Lucille Hardcastle, Mills' secretary

Fred Haverland, Supply Officer

Lloyd M. Johnson, the Assistant Personnel Officer

Charles A. Popkin, the chief of Construction and Maintenance

A. Pressman, the chief Medical Officer

R. H. Schoenhut, the Assistant Procurement Officer

Robert Vatcher, the Warehouse Officer

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James D. Crawford, the former Unit II Administrator and the present Relocation Program Officer, is leaving Poston sometime next week. He is slated to succeed a retiring Superintendent of an Indian Reservation in Montana.



October 23

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*Admin*

Duncan Mills left for San Francisco on October 21. He is to look for some men who would fill the vacancies among the appointed personnel. He is especially anxious to find someone who can act as Assistant Project Director in charge of the Administrative Management (the Budget and Account Section, the Cost Accounting Section, etc. come under this division.). Mills has been taking charge of this division since Len Nelson left Poston. But now Moris Burge has left Poston, and Mills is required to handle more evacuee matters, which have been taken care by Burge.

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*October 19* Unit Administrator of Poston III

*Adm*  
After a series of farewell parties and the like, Gerald Wumino, Administrator of Camp III, left for Detroit on October 3. The man that has been chosen to succeed him, Henry Yoshimine, has displayed the necessary executive ability in his work in the Stewards Department and as a member of the Food Committee of the Community Council. He will meet with some members of the project administration on October 18, to ensure mutual acquaintanceship and to discuss current problems in Unit III.

The position of Unit Administrator is an extremely difficult one. Whenever the wishes of the project administration differ from those of the people, the evacuee administrator must decide among: supporting the (appointed) administration, supporting the people, resigning, or "ducking the issue". There are hazards to each course; a wise administrator in Poston I would probably make the last-named choice, if the issue is crucial, and let others in less vulnerable positions work out the problem with the appointed staff. In the other two units, however, the project administration is too distant and there are too few people, aside from the administrator, that are in a position to meet with the project administration. The responsibility cannot be avoided or divided; consequently, the evacuee administrator must have a great deal of ability to continue functioning without alienating himself from either his people or the project administration. The system, however, is sound enough; since January 1, 1944, the units have



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been successfully administered under it.



OCTOBER 12 -- (1)

*Admission  
Counselor*

Rapidly spreading rumors regarding opening of California and the liquidation of the WRA are producing varied reactions. These rumors, of course, are varied in their details, but the opening of California and the liquidation of the WRA have been connected inseparably, probably because the Project Director told the Councilmen that the announcement of the liquidation would be made either simultaneously with or at the heel of the announcement of the opening. To many evacuees, therefore, the opening of California has become synonymous with the liquidation of the WRA. Lifting of the evacuation orders would normally mean a good news to the Japanese. But the lifting has become a source of anxiety because it will also mean the end of these centers. There are many appointed personnel, Burge and Balderston, for instance, are opposed to the idea of announcing these two steps at the same time or about the same time. They believe that the announcement of the liquidation should come after a great many evacuees have gone back to California.

As mentioned above, the rumors are reacted in many different ways. On the one extreme, some evacuees are expressing a joy, although they are decidedly a minority. To these people, the lifting of the military orders seems to have <sup>a</sup> much greater importance and the imminent closing of the centers ~~are~~ <sup>is</sup> not evidently significant. Most of the Nisei, especially those of early twenties and of high school age, are found in this group. They began to plan their future in terms of return to California. In this group also is found older Nisei and Issei. These older men seem to be characterized by the capability of leaving the centers and of living comfortably without worries on the outside. Most of real property owners are found among these people. It was told



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that a family which owns a real property in California (evacuated from the free zone) has already begun packing their belongings in preparation for their return. (The lifting of the military orders is more popularly accepted among those that evacuated from free zones.)

On the other hand, a vast majority of evacuees are found on the other extreme. To them the liquidation of the centers is a great threat. It undermined their sense of security. Most of these people are worried. They, however, showed efforts to disbelieve these news, instead of becoming visibly worried. On the surface, at least, most of them refuse to believe that the centers can be closed. Their general argument is that the WRA cannot liquidate these centers when the evacuees refuse to relocate. In this group are found most of the older men who were not economically endowed before evacuation. They are usually without any appreciable amount of savings or property. They are not either skilled or trained in any trade or profession. Families with many children, especially small children, are usually found in this group. People expressing disbelief or antagonism towards the rumors of imminent closing of the WRA centers are not to be benefitted by return to California. It is significant to note that those that are enthusiasts of oversea short-wave news are mostly found in this group. (These news and rumors are looming larger than the war news at present. The Japanese "success" at the <sup>a</sup>Plau Islands (the slowness of American progress is considered by them as a success nowadays) and reported sinkings of American naval vessels are taking a back seat right now.)

At this early stage, it might be dangerous to make any generalization as to the reactions of these people. A generaliza-



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tion, however, can be made safely --- i. e. a dichotomy of reactions is clearly observed along the demarkation of "haves" and "have nots". Those that are not prepared economically to relocate or those who believe that they cannot support themselves on the outside are very nervous and jittery <sup>within</sup> ~~in~~ themselves, if not visibly apparent. Their future, they believe, is to become very insecure and precarious, if they are "thrown out" of the centers. Therefore, they are "opposed" to the lifting of the evacuation orders. This opposition is manifested in various ways. Some of them claim that it will be too dangerous to return to California, and their lives will be at the mercy of mobs. Some others claim that no Japanese should return to California until their property losses at the time of evacuation have been indemnified. Some others argue that no Japanese will be able to make living in California at this time. Still some others outrightly refuse to believe that the Army would lift its <sup>c</sup>exclusion orders.

Many discussions are heard among these people. "Have nots" are jittery and bellicose to any person who expounds the idea of returning to California or who believes that the WRA centers would be closed in the near future. They are jumpy to these remarks (especially remarks pertaining to the liquidation) and take them as personal affronts. I have seen many of these "have nots" become pugnacious while discussing these subjects lately, resulting at the end in quarrels and near fights. These persons reminded me of those persons who vehemently and bellicosely maintained that the Army could not evacuate Japanese from the West Coast in the beginning of 1942. Developments in the days to come will be very interesting.

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OCTOBER 6 -- (1)

There are many rumors spreading throughout the camp, which are credited to Duncan Mills as saying in the meeting of the Community Council on October 5. Some of these rumors are as follows:

"Mr. Mills said that California will be opened the first of January."

"Mr. Mills said Poston will be closed very soon."

*Adm.*  
"Mr. Mills said that all centers will be closed next summer."

"Relocation centers will be closed before the war is over. That's what Mr. Mills said to the Councilmen."

"Mr. Mills said that all the Japanese will be kicked out of the centers before long."

It is evident that the Community Councilmen have started a new wave of rumors as to the future of Poston and the WRA. Since there were so many different versions being accredited to Mills, Unit Administrator Sumida and I called on Duncan Mills to hear his own version.

"There are so many rumors flying around based on your statements to the Community Council. Just what did you say to them?"  
~~XX~~ I asked.

Mills began to laugh heartily. "I told them a few things in confidence," said Mills and kept on laughing heartily.

"When you tell politicians something in confidence, that elevates their ego," said I. "They will immediately spill them to others, because revealing something of a confidential nature gives them prestige here. No wonder these rumors are spreading so fast. In two or three days, we should expect that your original statements would be distorted to have weird aspects."

Mills, then, explained that he had read a part of a recent



OCTOBER 6 -- (2)

instruction from Myer to the Project Directors pertaining to the future of the WRA. Mr. Myer, during the Denver conference, allowed the Directors to reveal the contents to the residents. The instruction in part said:

1. The orders establishing the military zones would be rescinded and the loyal Japanese will be allowed by the Army to return to the Pacific Coast soon. The decision and the date rest with the Army.

2. The WRA has for sometime been preparing for such an eventuality. It will accelerate such preparations. Myer instructed the Directors to warn the evacuees to prepare to return to the Coast. The National Director believed that it was essential for the evacuees to make plans immediately.

3. Neither the Army nor the WRA <sup>is</sup> ~~are~~ publicizing the lifting of the ban to the Japanese, lest some intensive anti-Japanese agitation might begin in the Coast States, thereby adversely affecting the WRA's future plans. Both the Army and the WRA are quietly laying ground work.

4. The return to California will be handled by the WRA just like relocation to any other part of the United States. The returning evacuees will be given travel grants and other aids specified in the WRA Manual.

5. When the military zones are declared open to the Japanese, some definite announcement will be made as to the probable date of the closing of these centers. It is contemplated that all eight centers (exclusive of Tule Lake) will be closed at the same time. However, if the population dwindles and it becomes economically unfeasible to operate all the eight centers until the



OCTOBER 6 -- (3)

announced date, some of them will likely be closed in advance.

As to the date of the liquidation of the WRA centers, several questions were asked by the Councilmen, Mills reported. One of them asked whether the centers will be closed at the end of the war. To the question, Mills replied that he was certain that the centers will be closed before the end. Another Councilman, then, asked whether the centers will be closed next spring. Mills answered that the next spring was a little too early. Still another Councilman asked the date will be at the end of next year. Mills said he did not know exactly when the date would be, but it would be a good idea for the evacuees to be prepared.

The Councilmen wanted to get a definite reply from Mills as to the date the evacuation orders be rescinded. Mills told them that he could not give any answer to that question, because the matter was to be decided by the Army alone.

Director Mills, too, realized that many false rumors would be circulating. He knew that many statements were put into "his mouth". In order to give a credence, speakers were likely to give ~~his~~ <sup>their</sup> own opinions as those of the Project Director, Mills thought. He wanted to correct the false impressions, and promised that he would appear before the Block Managers next week. ~~xx~~ ~~xx~~

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John Powell believed that it would be a good scheme to let the people talk about the future of the WRA even though what they said might be false. He remembered Myer's reaction, when the Director was warned that there were too many false rumors regarding which center would be closed when he had announced that one of the centers would be closed in one month. (Early this year) Myer was advised to announce <sup>the location of</sup> the center to be closed in



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mediately to avoid confusion. Myer replied that he was pleased to hear that so many rumors were being circulated. He thought the people would be psychologically ready if the name of the center was kept secret and <sup>if</sup> they speculated about it for a month or so. When the name was announced, the people would not be shocked, Myer thought.

SEPTEMBER 12 -- (4)

Peterson of the WRA office at Salt Lake City had made an arrangement with the Tooele Ordnance Depot to receive an inspection party of five evacuees. It was planned to send two evacuees from Gila and three from Poston. They are to see the working conditions and housing accommodations at the plant.

*Admission*

Unit I had a great difficulty in finding a delegate willing to accept the trip. A feeler was first sent to Mas Kawashima, then to Dick Nishimoto, then to James Yahiro. Everyone of them declined, because they realized the obligation after the trip to aid in recruitment of workers for the ordnance depot. None of them wanted to make speeches afterwards in support of the WRA relocation program. The assignment finally went to M. Hayano, the Assistant Director of Education, at the last minute, as the party was to leave this morning. Hayano unexpectedly accepted the duty willingly, and the difficult task of finding the delegate in Unit I was settled.



October 5

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*Administrative*

Moris Burge told me strictly in confidence that he would be transferred to Fort Ontario on November 1. He must report to the New York center by that date to take the position of the Assistant Project Director. Mills had received two requests previously to release Burge from Poston, but had refused. When Mills was in Denver for the conference, Myer asked him to transfer Burge to Fort Ontario. Mills could not refuse for the third time. <sup>Since</sup> ~~as~~ he did not find a good excuse to keep Burge here any longer, he consented to the request. If he refused, as Burge put, "Mr. Myer would think what the hell Mr. Mills has been doing here for the last seven months. He expects Mr. Mills to be well acquainted with Poston by this time."

Burge knew it is an advancement to be transferred there, but he hated to leave Poston. He believed his task with the refugees would be more difficult than what he has been facing here.

<sup>l</sup>Taking of his experience here, he stated that he had his efforts reward<sup>ed</sup> well during his first year in Unit III. "The people came from the free zone, and they were anxious to build a model community here. But after one year, things went ~~to~~ haywire." He was especially regretful that Unit III has produced seven Nisei who refused to be sworn in at Phoenix on September 28.

The names of the boys who refused induction at Phoenix are as follows:

Frank Fujimoto, Block 308  
Takashi Naito, Block 307  
Minoru Yasuda, Block 325

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Shigeo Mori, Block 316  
Albert Fujimoto, Block 308  
Masakazu Nakayama, Block 317  
Jimmie Hatakeda, Block 316

It was reported by a Nisei who was at the induction station with them that they said "no" almost simultaneously when a soldier in charge told all the Nisei <sup>present</sup> to raise their right hands for <sup>e</sup>swearing in. He believed that they had talked among themselves in advance and had been prepared as to what to do. All of them were prepared to post the bail bonds of \$1,000 each. (One hundred dollars fees for each of them.)

Among those listed to leave for Phoenix on September 28, John Yoshihiko Yoshimura, Block 43, failed to report.



August 28

cc to: Mr. Head

Taken from weekly report of April 8, 1943, Donald T. Horn  
Project Attorney, Granada, Colorado.

*Administration*  
"A number of the retail merchants in Lamar have been complaining because more evacuees are not allowed to shop there. A few evacuees are allowed to go into Lamar each day but not nearly as many as were allowed to for a few months after the establishment of the center. Some of the merchants acting through the retail division of the Chamber of Commerce decided that they could obtain results by writing the Colorado senators and representatives.

Last evening I was shown a letter which had been prepared to be sent to a Colorado Senator, but I explained our position and I am trying to show them that we had several very good reasons for limiting the number of passes. I suggest to these interested parties that if they want more of the evacuees to shop in town that

AUGUST 28 -- (e)

(Continued)

they should see the farmers and housewives on this idea. Further more, if they would help relocate the evacuees over the county, that then the evacuees could shop more in Lamar anytime they wanted and without first obtaining permission from any of the WRA officials. Some of them thought this was much more sensible than trying to put pressure on our agency through the Colorado senators and representatives.



AUGUST 28 -- (f)

April 21, 1943

Mr. D. S. Myer  
Director, WRA

Dear Mr. Myer:

The joint TCC committees representing units 1, 2 and 3 have prepared the following list of questions concerning basis WRA policy that we would like clarified and explained a little more fully.

Since we have a long list of questions, it might be impossible for you to answer them all. We will forward to your Washington office the minutes of the original meeting when the questions were being framed. Will you kindly give us a written reply on these matters at your earliest convenience?

Very truly yours,

/s/Franklyn S. Sugiyama  
Franklyn S. Sugiyama, Chairman TCC 1

1. The food should be raised to the maximum of the Army allowance.
  - a. Is the rationing program undertaken voluntarily by the WRA?
  - b. Some authorities have interpreted the status of Japanese aliens as "prisoners of war", if so, would rationing be applied to them?
2. We recommend an monthly appropriation of \$1500 for recreational purposes for Poston in the new budget.
  - a. If that amount has not been included in the budget, as an alternative, we recommend that the surplus of the unused existing budget be expended before the expiration date to purchase \$18,000 recreational equipment and supplies.
3. Raise cash advances to \$30, \$40, \$50 a month.
  - a. If this cannot be done clothing allowance be paid every person without limitation to the sum of \$7.50 per month.
4. Why is it that Gila residents all have iron cots while here wooden frame cots are used.
5. Why is it that the clothing allowance for June 1942 cannot be paid from the surplus of the existing budget.
  - a. Why is November, December, January, February, and March clothing allowances delayed?

*Why do April May & June always follow each other?*
6. We recommend a WRA sponsor student relocation program paying \$500 per year per person.
7. Rental of tools furnished by the evacuees for Project work be paid at the rate of 10% of their value per month.
8. Camouflage workers' subsistence charge should be used for strictly improvements.



AUGUST 28 -- (g)

9. We recommend replacement parts of stoves and the stoves themselves be available on hand.
  - a. Three refrigerators be furnished each kitchen.
  - b. Four coolers be furnished each kitchen, as in other centers.
10. Why was the \$10,000 appropriation for tubercular patients on this Project refused by the WRA.
  - a. We recommend that 125 additional iron cots be purchased for hospital use.
  - b. We recommend that the WRA appropriate \$25,000 for the purpose of building and maintaining a rest home for chronic hospital cases.
11. We recommend additional appropriations for educational purposes.
  - a. More books and supplies needed.
  - b. Shortage of qualified teachers.
  - c. Physical Education equipment and facilities needed.
12. We recommend that fire insurance on evacuee personal property be paid by the WRA.
13. The California State Legislature is attempting to confiscate evacuee property. What is the WRA policy for evacuee defense?
14. What is the WRA policy in control of press propaganda injurious to evacuees.
  - a. DeWitt statement
  - b. Hindrance by press of relocation
15. We recommend that the WRA urge haste in unemployment compensations due evacuees.
16. Other centers have free newspaper service. Why does Poston pay?
17. Would it be possible for those going outside to purchase their blankets?
18. Since stress is being laid on relocation, why isn't Civil Service standards adopted to retain qualified evacuee teachers?
19. Why aren't the evacuees given a hand in forming the WRA policies in Washington?
20. Why isn't the WRA policy consistent?
  - a. Relocation is stressed but yet real improvements are being made.
  - b. WRA invites other agencies to hire evacuees but the WRA turns around to hire Caucasians in places that the evacuees could fill.
21. What plans are being made to use the surplus appropriation now existing in Washington?



AUGUST 28 -- (h)

22. We recommend that provisions for special diet be made.
  - a. For children and invalids.
23. We recommend that the present grant for needy families be doubled.
24. We recommend that three washing machines be allotted for each block.
  - a. Children's play facilities be supplied.
25. After relocation has reached its peak, what is the WRA policy for those remaining in the centers?
  - a. Is it planned to make life so uncomfortable and disagreeable that everyone will be forced to relocate?
  - b. Will the centers be maintained on the present level?
26. Hospitals and schools are considered community service organizations. Under the interpretation of community service we recommend that community enterprises be freed of rent, clothing allowance, and advance payments.
27. We recommend the following equipment and supplies for the dental clinic:
  - 8 operating Ritter (or equiv.) units
  - 8 operating chairs
  - 3 dental cabinetsalso, facilities and materials for bridge and plate work.

Very truly yours,



AUGUST 26 --(1)

*Administrative*  
Arthur Harris, the Director of Education, left for Santa Monica with his family --- his wife and three children. She found the house~~ing~~ keeping at Poston very difficult and decided to send the children to school in California. It is also said that the children found it very hard to adjust themselves among the Japanese children.

This seems to be common among the appointed personnel with their families. The wives find the life here very monotonous and boresome becu~~ase~~ of the lack of recreational activities, ~~here~~.

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AUGUST 25 -- (1)

Walter Bladerston and Arthur Harris believed that Hugo Wolter, who was transferred to Washington to take charge of the Relocation Division, was eased out of Gila by Bennet and Terry.



AUGUST 21 -- (h)

(Undated)

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. W. W. Head

FROM: F. Sugiyama

SUBJECT: How can we speed up the Clothing Allowance?

In a preliminary meeting held yesterday, the TCC committees representing Units 1, 2, and 3 request clarification, information and cooperation in regard to clothing allowances on the following points:

1. The residents desire clothing allowance payments within a reasonable time. The present allowances are 5 months behind. How can this be speeded up?
2. Is it possible to pay clothing allowances without limitations?
3. What will be the Project policy for Unit I in regard to November and December when all work was temporarily halted after the incident in spite of the willingness to work?

Will you kindly be present at a meeting to be held on April 2, at 2:30 p.m. in the conference room next to Mr. Evans' office, where we can iron out the kinks?

Very truly yours,

/s/ F. Sugiyama  
Chairman, TCC 1



AUGUST 21 -- (f)

FEBRUARY 29, 1943

Dillon S. Myer  
Director of WRA  
New Interior Building  
Washington, D.C.

Subject: The ability of "teen age" boys and girls to make up  
their minds

Dear Mr. Myer:

*Answer*  
In regard to Form 304 - A and 126, revised, concerning questions #27 and #28, relative to combat service and allegiance: somehow it seems unfair to ask minors to answer those questions intelligently and then expect them to assume the consequences at a later date. The matter of allegiance is difficult. A mature mind will ponder over the question.

In case of enlistments to the armed service, the permission of the parents is obtained in cases of 17-year olds; yet, in the above-mentioned questions, the "teen age" boys or girls must make his or her decision independently. The civil law recognizes the incapacity of minors in matters concerning contracts, marriages, and other obligations. It might be interesting to note that the legal age for voting is 21. Because of the immaturity of the youths in question, it seems that the law recognizes the incompetence of minors.

The law considers the lack of judgment in youth; and by the same interpretation, it would seem that if the "teen age" youngsters answer questions #27 and #28 incorrectly, it should not be held against them. For persons over 21 years of age, the reply to these questions should be held as final. But for minors, another opportunity should be given them when they have attained majority to make their own decisions.

cc to: W. W. Head

Very truly yours,

TEMPORARY COMMUNITY COUNCIL, I

/s/ Franklyn S. Sugiyama, 2  
Franklyn S. Sugiyama, Chairman

/s/ Dr. N. Mizushima,  
Dr. N. Mizushima, Acting Chairman  
Issei Advisory Council



AUGUST 6 -- (a)

Feb. 1, 1943.

MEMORANDUM TO: MR. ~~W~~W. HEAD, Project Director  
MR. J. G. EVANS, Assistant Project Director

FROM: FRANKLYN S. SUGIYAMA, Chairman, TCC

SUBJECT: LACK OF STOVES IN BLOCK 31; LOW FLYING PLANES

*Adm*  
I spoke to Mr. Evans some time back about the lack of stoves for the whole of Camp 1. At that time, Mr. Evans said that the problem was being handled by the U.S. Army Engineers. Since these same Engineers are still here, I understand on the camouflage project, I think you can get me some additional information. I am enclosing you a copy of memo that reached me.

Jan. 28, 1943

MEMORANDUM TO: F. S. SUGIYAMA, chairman, TCC

FROM: Block Manager 31

Block #31 is still in need of 23 stoves, and I understand that there are at least 10 other blocks in Camp 1 at Poston that are somewhat similarly situated. The residents in my block have been suffering from the cold and I have been explaining to them to be a little more patient.

*[Wade Head]*  
I would appreciate it very much if you will check into this situation for me and advise me whether I can hold any further hopes for getting the stoves, then I would appreciate it if you would so advise me as there is no sense in continually holding out hope for relief when as a matter of fact there will be no relief. If, however, there is still hope; then I wish you would find out just what the situation is so that I can relay to the residents of my block more details.

Any information you can give me will be greatly appreciated.

(Signed) James Fujimoto

On Saturday, Jan. 30, 1943 a silver colored, single winged, probably a training plane flew over Block 27 about 6 o'clock in the evening. The people in that block say that its elevation was about 500 feet. The number painted in black figures on the body was 20.

Very truly yours,

/s/Franklyn Sugiyama  
Franklyn Sugiyama



JULY 26 -- (1)

The committee to select a successor to Nomura (Cf: July 24, page 1) visited Block 16 last night and successfully prevailed on Sumida to accept the position. The members, then, met the chairman of the Block Council and asked him to release Sumida from his block position. Chairman Yamaguchi promised them that he would call a meeting of the Block Council and would convey <sup>to</sup> them <sub>1</sub> the result of the Council's deliberation soon.

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July 25

*Adm*  
Nagai reported that a considerable pressure was brought upon the Community Council circle and the Executive Board from Units II and III to hurry in selecting a successor <sup>to</sup> ~~for~~ Numura for Unit Administrator's position. These in the other Units were afraid that their Unit Administrators might soon <sup>be</sup> abolished should Unit I be able to get along smoothly without <sup>its</sup> ~~the~~ Unit Administrator.

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JULY 24 -- (e)

Staff Meeting Minutes  
May 25, 1942

. . . Mr. McCaskill then outlined the Organization Plan which was tentatively set up at a meeting on Sunday, May 24. The plan for this project calls for three cities: the one here which will have approximately 10,000 people and the others four and three miles respectively down the road, each of which will accommodate 5,000 people each. The War Relocation Authority wants us to consider placing another 10,000 people in this project . . .

*Adm.*  
Mr. Head was called upon for remarks. He stated that staff members should keep in mind that the Caucasians here at Poston should consider themselves a facilitating group. A great deal of the success of this project depends upon the people dominating the picture --- city managers, and the branch heads, the city-planning committee, (the city councils which will serve as that function.) He announced that Mr. Ralph Gelvin is in direct charge of city managers' group. This group is to be a political group. It was requested of Mr. Evans to explain to the group assembled the functions and duties of the Block Managers. If there are any contacts to be made with the Block Managers, they must be made through either Mr. Evans or Mr. Gelvin. Do the planning through Mr. Evans and let him take it to the block managers. A great deal of our success depends upon the block managers. The block managers have the responsibility of pulling his block together as a community, to see that members of his block feel that they are part of the community. The block manager sees to it that a person is selected from each building on his block to make up the block council. There will be fifteen people on each block council and this council is to assist the manager and to begin to think of effective planning, to make plans to organize groups. At the present, four blocks or a quad, are meeting together to try and formulate ideas and present them so that we can assemble one plan which will be a perfect single plan. Mr. Evans announced that he now had two assistants who are Japanese. These two act more or less as liaison officers. In time, these two may handle the entire job. A question was raised as to who was the proper person to assign Recreation Halls. Mr. Powell is handling this now, but in due time, the recreation halls will be turned back to the particular block managers for their own use.

Mr. McCaskill then expressed his personal feelings about this camp. He said that the staff was doing "a whale of a good job" and that all were to be congratulated. "The Commissioner will appreciate this."

One of the biggest problems we face now is the problem of how are we going to take care of these people when they are turned out after the war, so that when they leave here, they can go back and take their places. That is a grater problem than taking care of them here. What kind of people are we going to have when we leave? Mr. McCaskill stated that that should be the focus of all our problems now. There must be created on the outside as respective an atmosphere as possible for these people when they leave for the outside. We are helping the people to reabsorb themselves into the stream of American life. We are not segregating a minority group. Most of these people are just as good Americans as all of us here. We are going to have the worst and the best.



July 20

Supervisor Nishimoto decided to name Sumida, Murakami of 30, and Hiroto of 53 as members of the committee to choose Unit Administrator. (Cf: July 19, page 4) *they* held a "caucus meeting" in the Supervisor's office this morning to find some candidate ac-

JULY 20 -- (3)

ceptable to the Block Managers. Murakami reported that Okamoto (a resident of Murakami's block) had approached him and asked him how the selection of Sumida for the post be considered by the Managers. The inner members of the Managers' group commented that Sumida's nomination should be encouraged to the limit. Sumida, however, said he was not willing to take over the position. In the end, they agreed to recommend Dr. Suzuki for the first choice, and in case Suzuki would not accept the proposition (Probably he would refuse) Sumida's name would be presented to the committee. Sumida would be easily accepted by the members from the Local Council.

(It was clearly evident that the Community Council clique is trying to find some one who will be friendly with me. They realize, one of the Managers said, that Unit Administrator could not last in his position <sup>for</sup> more than two days when the Supervisor took a belligerent attitude toward him.)



July 19

#####

A Nisei soldier on furlough from Camp Blanding, Fla., left Poston yesterday morning with his parent, who was to receive dental care in Phoenix. The soldier was, however, held up at the gate and returned to the project, because he had not paid the sixty-cent subsistence fee per day as required by the WRA. Both he and his parent missed the train and the dental appointment.

JULY 19 -- (2)

Mills, Burge, and Crawford, the chief of the Leave Office, were in conference this morning over this matter. They did not like the idea of forcing ~~the~~ soldiers to pay the subsistence, although the WRA instruction stated that ~~they~~ they should be compelled to pay. The misunderstanding happened as the result of the soldier's ignorance <sup>of</sup> ~~about~~ the rule; no one at the departure station had told him of the rule.

#####

July 3

Dr. Suzuki informed me on the attempt of the Community Council to oust Dr. Pressman, the chief medical officer. (Cf: June 26, page 2, the second paragraph)

*Community*

About the middle of May, there was a considerable agitation within the hospital among the workers to circulate a petition not to have Dr. Pressman come back to Poston. The agitation was sponsored by Dr. Murakami, who hated Pressman for a long time. The matter was brought out in the hospital staff meeting by Dr. Murakami, but Suzuki doubted if such a petition would be effective to block Pressman's return. Suzuki objected in the meeting to the Murakami idea on the ground that the hospital workers would become unbearable to work under Pressman should the petition fail to accomplish the ousting. Pressman was a vindictive person and would try to take it out on the hospital workers, Suzuki argued then, and the workers realized that the ousting move should be handled by some other evacuee organization such as the Council. Murakami subsequently contacted Kawasaki, Okamoto, and Yahiro begging them to take some immediate action upon the matter.

Okamoto and Yahiro, about several days afterwards, sent a telegram in the name of the Community Council to the Washington



JULY 3 -- (4)

WRA office (It is unknown whether the Community Council as a body consented to the idea of sending the telegram) to block the return of Pressman here.

Meanwhile, the "City Hall" gang appealed to John Powell, under whose department the hospital belongs. Powell said it was too late to do anything at the time. In fact, Powell said, he prevailed on Pressman during the Denver conference ( at the beginning of May) to return to Poston. Pressman agreed to return here, although he had received an attractive offer from the Indian Service.

While the gang was still working on the plan to block Pressman's return, the doctor returned to the hospital. He was not in a pleasant mood when he appeared in the hospital for the first time. He called Suzuki in his office and wanted to find out who had been behind the scheme. He is taking an attitude, according to Suzuki, "Well, I am back here now. What are they going to do about it?"

#####

JUNE 21 -- (1)

The WRA Information Digest of June 15, 1944 had the following interesting items printed:

*Admission*  
The Japanese American Joint Board, organized in January, 1943, has completed its work and has been officially disestablished, according to a letter written by Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy to Secretary of the Interior Ickes.

During the life of the Joint Board, a total of 39,299 cases (mainly involving American citizen evacuees) were submitted to it for review. Of this number, 25,654 were recommended for indefinite leave, 501 were given clearance for war plant employment, and 12,254 were denied clearance. About 890 cases remain on which action has not been taken.



APRIL 26 -- (1)

The following paper, written by John W. Powell, is reproduced here without his authorization:

April 23, 1944

A relocation center is a temporary expedient, but while it lasts it must develop the functional forms of a permanent community.

The Authority administering the relocation centers builds its policies, perforce, on the thesis that the centers are temporary shelters for people migrating from west to east. It therefore resists at every point the tendency of the simulacrum-community to put down roots and to develop genuine institutions.

At the end of its second year, the Authority is confronted with the fact that the migratory movement is dwindling, the more mobile elements in the centers nearly exhausted by resettlement and the remainder showing a pronounced inertial <sup>5</sup>resistance to resettling. It is confronted with the anomaly of artificial communities, governed under the thesis of impermanence, threatening to become permanent dependencies on a relief basis: unproductive, uneconomic, insolevent, and indissoluble.

To the migratory shelter-camps, certain professional services had to be given by the Authority. These ~~ser~~ services make up one of the major branches of administration, known as Community Management need not be concerned with the duration of the settlements; however long they last, it will be needed, and when they dissolve it will liquidate them. The Operations division is concerned only so far as decisions must be made about permanent structures, improvements, and farm plans. It is concerned over the issue between permanence and dissolution, but not in the deciding of that issue. To take one notable example, it is obvious that the physical establishments at the centers, their housing in particu-



APRIL 26 -- (2)

lar, will not stand up very much longer; perhaps not for the duration of the war. But it is not Operation's responsibility to decide, even on this basis, whether the centers shall remain inhabited.

Administratively, it is not for Community Management, either, to Relocation or even the Project Director's, will have so profound an influence on the community's own decision to stay or go. That issue lies with the camp community's own motivations and goals, which express themselves in its institutions. It is Community Management that has the closest and ~~most~~ decisive impact on those institutions, those goals and motivations. As nearly as any one factor can be, it is our attitude and policy that will be decisive.

My thesis is that administrative policies insisting on the temporary nature of the settlement will increase its inertial resistance to movement, and that only a full and genuine sharing in the development of self-confident and self-sustaining institutions will provide the motivation necessary to relocate and reassimilate our camp populations. Confidence is the only key to the gate by which the residents are locking themselves into the false security of the centers. Genuine security must be given before that confidence will grow: not the security of cash grants, but the individual security which is confidence that one can master the business of living an adult productive life, and the social security which is the confidence that one is accepted with full status and respect, not only as an individual conforming to the master-institutions of the society but as a member of one's own group with its own characteristic values and institutional practices.



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My charge is that the Authority, though from the best motives, is destroying economic self-confidence and social self-confidence. It destroys economic self-confidence by denying the right of the producer to the title to his product, and even to access to markets for it; by putting the employee on a dependency basis and denying him the right to receive and dispose of his wages as other workers do; and by enforcing a policy of shared poverty governed by an artificial equalitarianism. In its eagerness to prevent the rise of self-perpetuating productive enterprises in the centers, the Authority is ensuring the permanent dependency of the mass of the residents.

It destroys social self-confidence by denying the institutional autonomy of the center communities, as it steadily increases the range of precesses pre-determined by the demands of the remote-control, administration-bureau "culture" at the expense of the continuity and integrity of the security-giving procedures of the Japanese community itself. In its eagerness to placate the wartime anti-Japanese feeling which threaten the aims of the Authority from the political side, the Authority is heightening the feelings of guilt, shame and insecurity already attached to "being Japanese"; and is thereby creating permanently segregated clusters of alienated dependents.

I believe that these policies can and should be changed, in specific ways aimed at specific goals; that the changes should be made on the responsibility of the Community Management Division; and that an attempt should be made to measure the changes in response, over a definite period of not less than one year.



## II

My thesis is that by treating the center community as temporary, we are forcing it into permanence. The temporary nature of the centers is given in their creation; we have to recognize it. The kinds of permanence we are fostering are not given, however; they are undesirable, and avoidable. Our mistake has been that of confusing the people with the center. We have treated the people themselves as though their economic and social needs were temporary; as though not only our responsibility, but their very existence, were of brief duration.

A. Our root problem is that of motivation. Most migrations spring from within the people moving. Evacuation was motivated not by the evacuees, but by their enemies. They are not here for purposes of their own, but because other people did not want them somewhere else. They had no motive in coming; most of them have none to leave again; and the lack of self-motivation is apparent throughout most of center life. Of negative motives we have an abundance, and we ourselves contribute more; but negative motivations will not serve our purpose. People shall not reassure them by making them feel they are not wanted here.

Some of our administrative policies are aimed, properly, at maintaining continuities between the present and the future, continuities which can serve as bridges for relocation. The school curriculum, and the school experience, we have tried to make one such continuity. Employment and work policies for the adults are also stated in terms of continuity of experience, standards, and expectations. In both cases, we have had some success. But it has been a success of conformity with regulations rather than a real reaching of the well springs of motivation. What student motivations, what work motivations, individuals



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have here, they brought with them. The dominant testimony of teachers and employers agrees that we have not created any genuine students, have not developed job-responsibility where it did not exist before. And both agree that there is, in the mass, a deterioration of habit.

This argues powerfully that we should not "encourage" people to stay in the centers. But I think we are misleading the message. We cannot expect the momentum of the past to carry us forever, without loss through friction. Human motivation is eternally renewed from the roots; and those roots are the economic and social hope and self-confidence of the community which nourished the school and makes demands upon the workers.

We have encouraged the center community to develop reasonable facsimiles of the institutions of government, of economic exchanges, and of social intercourse. I suspect we are more in danger of being fooled by these simulacra than the residents are. We have never yet fooled our residents by illusions; but we ourselves tend to accept them as reality, because we have to believe in them to believe that we are doing our jobs.

B. What is the reality of government in a center like Poston, which I think has gone farther toward resident control than most of the others? There is a legislative Council, an Executive Committee, a Judicial Commission. The Council has adopted a code of law and order; the Commission hears misdemeanor cases, levies fines, direct the activities of the police and of the Youth Counseling Board. The Commission has the power of subpoena. But suppose the defendant appeals to the Project Director, and he agrees with the defendant: the whole elaborate balloon collapses, and leaves the naked point that all power in the center is the



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Director's disciplinary power, extended through deputies and agents but derived only from the Director. It is on an exact par with self-government in a penitentiary, a boarding school, or a company<sup>p</sup> union.<sub>^</sub>

Government is the act of a people in making its own decisions; by derivation, the machinery through which they reach a decision. Administration is the act by which decisions are made by certain people for others; by derivation, the procedures and offices responsible for reaching decisions for other people. The relocation center remains an administered community. Not only is the deciding power in the Project Director. He is in turn bound by the decisions of others, at a distance from him; and, over a period of time, the trend of their decisions gets formulated and crystallized into a Manual of procedure and of policy which pre-decides the majority of issue which may arise.

In the course of time, as the active persons among both the staff and the residents leave and are replaced by others, the Manual becomes at once more binding, and more irrelevant. More binding, because the new appointed personnel have no local experience or understanding on which to base their judgement, and so must rely wholly on the rules. More irrelevant, because the younger staff aides, who could be assimilated more readily to the administrative culture, are gone, and the core-community is emerging ever more clearly in its homogeneous but alien character: a character derived from the rural-California-Japanese communities that branched off from the parent-trunk forty years ago, and grew into forms that are characteristic neither of Japan nor of Anglo-Saxon American institutions.

Time and again, the impact of Washington-reasoned quotas on



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on Project-proven institutions has revealed the chasm. Each time, the Project administration is put in the middle, the worst of all administrative positions: where if it sides with the Authority against the residents, or with the residents against its <sup>own</sup> source of authority, it is equally defeated and lost. In turn, the evacuee aides closest to and most necessary to the project administration are caught in the same trap. The remedy does not lie in letting the residents decide policy. It lies enlisting them in the shared making of shared policies. This cannot be done at a distance. And, while Washington must be guided by necessities the projects do not see as clearly, there is a difference between having Washington's necessities understood and shared by the projects, on one hand, and on the other having the basic local decisions ~~which embarrassed them, and with~~ of the projects themselves made by remote control. Correspondence, long-distance, conferences, and traveling delegations have not prevented project administrations from being caught again and again by decisions which embarrassed them, and with which they did not agree. Only if more discretion is left to the centers can the residents be given a share in policy decisions; and only by giving them a genuine share can we preserve any sense of adult autonomy in their community. The alternative is sheer compliance, which may drive some residents, as it has driven some staff members, to relocate; but which ends in apathy for most of both.

### III

The professed obstacles to relocation are more superficial than final. Families facing one or all the usual obstacles have gone out; and more families with <sup>no</sup> obstacles at all are still in centers. Still, it is difficult to explain why the Authority ~~thin~~



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that inherited the disinherited, and inherited a liability of tens of millions in lost resources and expectations, while it cannot itself restore those losses by outright grant, will not permit the more skilled or productive workers to earn their own means of release from the centers.

A. The ultimate fact about center economy is that everything is given, and nothing is earned. Food, clothing, shelter, are (with one small punitive qualification on clothing allowance) given to all, as a matter of right. Cash allowances are given to all who will accept employment, though employment is limited to objects approved in Washington rather than measured in proportion to the kinds of workers and work available and desired in the center. In addition, two other kinds of employment are permitted. A portion of the money spent for personal necessities in the cooperative centers may be diverted to cash allowances for co-op workers (in Poston, co-op wages pre-rated as a tax on every family would cost each family more than a dollar a month, with about 18 families contributing to the support of each co-op employee); and money further out of the pockets of residents may be taxed by a Community Activities Trust to employ workers in activities the Government will not subsidize. In the end, it is still true that the only income in Poston is money sent in by the Government. In the ~~end, the first~~ first year and a half, as much money went out of Poston in money-orders each month as was distributed to all workers. (This is in addition to C. O. D.'s) Lately, the monthly sum sent out has fallen by more than forty per cent; and this probably represents the proportion of family resources used up to supplement the project income.

The policy is strict equality: no one may be in a position



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to receive more than his neighbor, save for the \$16. - \$19. differential allowed as recognition for either extra responsibility or unusual willingness to work. Of course, people with outside incomes still coming in are not stopped from receiving them. But people with accumulated capital in the form of skill or experience are forbidden to convert these resources into income.

I proposed some time ago that people producing marketable commodities be allowed to sell these, on or off the centers, for money which would be deposited to their credit in a trust or credit union (after repaying to the producer the cost of materials). The money on deposit to the producers' credit would be available only for resettling. A limit might be placed on the amount that could be used in the center, and even on the amount that could be accumulated toward relocation expenses. The plan was vetoed, presumably on the defensible ground that it is better for us to export the producer than the product.

Yet, again, it is only confidence that can breach the project fence. Most of our people have lived by producing, and most of the producers were farmers. They need to be sure that their skill, their product, is still marketable. Instead, we rely on a theory that Adam Smith would have disavowed: namely, that only poverty and insecurity beget ambition. If nine-tenths of our farm families are in centers two years from today, it will be our failure more than theirs.

We are penalizing those with the least resources, and those who lost most in evacuating; and we are stultifying the motive of workmanship in an industrious group of people. What are we afraid of? First, that competing from within the centers will hurt them (and us) with other workers. Second, that if we let



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the farmers produce for sale ~~they~~ will stay together, stay Japanese, stay segregated -- and grow secure. As to the first point, we are sending these people out into competition; are we only afraid for ourselves, while we are still their sponsors? If it is not that, but that people on the centers are subsidized and hence their competition ~~/are we only afraid for~~ is unfair, there is still an answer, though a radical one. It is the subsidization, the conscientious beggary, of the center population that has cut the roots of economic motivation. Can we face the question whether it may have been, or is now, a real mistake? Can we reopen the possibility of regular wages and regular rents, <sup>6</sup>~~sub~~sistence, and service charges?

As to the point of segregation, our fears are somewhat besides the point. Precisely because we are making our workers unproductive and inert, we are preparing to have segregated centers with thousands of workers in them when the war ends. If a post-war readjustment throws millions again on to the land, as the depression did ten years ago, our people will then have no chance to scatter. If wise management of the economy achieve the miracle of full employment after the war, we need not fear the continuation of Japanese communities, few and small and scattered as they are. The thing we have to fear is the sapping of the production potential of ten thousand agricultural producers; and that is the direction in which we are now moving.

B. The first economic revision needed, therefore, is the recognition of the rights of producers to the materials, the markets, and the fruits of their labor, even though it is justified under a specific reference to resettlement. The second essential reform is the employment of evacuee staff members by the



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Authority, on civil service grades, for service at the centers.

Evacuees workers have been employed on civil service by the Authority for work in Washington and the field. One physician was offered employment on civil service by the Authority for service to all the centers on a visiting basis. There, for the present, the line is drawn.

As ~~the~~ resident community becomes less-bilingual, communication is decreasing. In Poston, where the first Community Council was more than half college-graduate Nisei, the last ones have had to have the Oath of Office translated for them. Where the Co-operative Study Group began as an English-speaking seminar in Adult Education, the last meetings of the Co-operative Congress have been conducted without a word of English spoken. Despite the increasing proportion of Community Activities position held for nisei, more and more of the section's business is conducted in Japanese. Despite the efforts of the volunteer school teachers in English teaching, most English classes talk about the English language -- in Japanese. The English vocabulary of school pupils, as measured in tests, has slipped back by as much as four grades. In the last few months, when the stop-list seemed to be almost all that was keeping the project running, most of the key administrative posts have been in the hands of kibe. Leave clearances now coming in will strip us of most of the experienced bi-linguists. Meantime, as was said before, the appointive staff is receiving the great majority of its recruits from distant sources, while the veterans leave.

I know of no bar to the employment of evacuees, who have resettled and proven themselves to themselves and to us in outside competition, as project administrative workers. I have asked



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before now for the detail of successfully resettled workers as relocation counselors -- and been refused. But one of them came back, on outside pay status, as a Student Relocation worker, with considerable success; we shall try to get another next summer as a religious worker; and the two-months visit of a Red Cross Home Nursing instructor, a nisei from Colorado, created not jealousy but hope and new faith.

We exclude no other class or color from Center employment, we who champion the employment of nisei as a right not restricted by color or class. We cannot argue that the employment of a few, even a few score, out of the twenty to thirty thousand resettlers will perpetuate the segregated character of their opportunities. ~~And~~ we have to accept the fact that, granted the youth of most of them, there have been in all our centers evacuee aides whose ability far surpassed that of some of the civil service staff. Not to employ them ourselves is an arbitrary denial of both right and reason. To begin employing them would both ease the strains and restore the good faith of center administration.

Once again, our stress on the temporary and unedonomic nature of the centers has resulted in policies which will perpetuate the involvent and unproductive status of their residents. If they cannot regain their productive confidence under our employment or their own, most of them will not venture the hazard of employment at all.

#### IV

If what I have said may be subsumed under Community Government and Business Enterprise, even though it cuts across other realms of administration, what I have to say now defies classification. Perhaps it is most relevant to our policies in re-



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gard to Japanese activities, but it applied equally right across the field of the Authority's action.

We have consistently tried to deny that our residents are Japanese, or to cover that fact with an effusive enamel of baseball, movies, jazz music, and patriotic cliches. By our actions toward the issei, from the first denial of their political participation to the last cut in the employment of their actors and artists, we have proclaimed to the nisei that we were ashamed of their Japanese heritage, and to the issei that we respected their heritage only so long as they maintained it out of their own pockets and out of sight of the world. In the segregation to Tule Lake, we assured ourselves and the world that we were removing the "Japanese orientation" from the other centers, and that those who remained were "American"--whatever, in this context, that may mean. It certainly does not mean that they speak English, or that they believe the Allied communiques announcing defeats of the Japanese. It does not mean that hundreds of them are not faithfully studying Utaï, Ikebana, Japanese poetry, and Japanese calligraphy -- or that scores of nisei are not still studying the Japanese language. Why should it mean these things? Is our cultural activities program to be the guardian of loyalty, or may we trust the intelligence agencies to do that? We have not yet, in this war, banned the music of Beethoven, from our stage and his language from air schools.

I think we may have missed the meaning of "bushido", the knightly spirit that bids the Japanese-American be the best American, because he is Japanese. We have fostered the Irish pride of the Irish-American, the Nordic pride of the Scandinavian-American. In this war, we are not worrying about the "hyphenated"



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German-American as we did in 1918. With the Japanese-American, however, we are denying the hyphen, and asking him to make an unreal choice between his heritage and his citizenship. The two are not exclusive of each other. He comes to his citizenship with his heritage, though we say to him "If you live in America you must not be Japanese." His identity, to himself, is as a Japanese, and not any the less an American. He has no identity as an American apart from that which his parents and his fellows gave him. To make him a non-Japanese American is to leave him no identify at all.

We have, unwittingly but consistently, drilled our nisei in the necessity for covering up or apologizing for being Japanese in birth. We have in fact abetted forces of the discrimination by evading the plain issue. We should not be surprised that some of our proudest and most sensitive nisei are among the expatriates. Had I to adopt Germanic traits and belittle my Scots, Irish, and Welsh forebears in order to claim acceptance here, the value of citizenship would seem to me more dubious. Is it Okamoto, Sakai, Yamaguchi, Kunitani, whom we accept as colleagues and fellow-citizens, or is it only their reassuring taste for Bob Hope and an Allied victory? Nisei Americans are Japanese Americans. That is their identify, and their pride, and their contribution. How much are we doing to give them confidence by denying the Japanese in favor of the highly abstract American? Incidentally, what kind of non-Japanese Americans are they to be: Celtic, Nordic, Mediterranean, Jewish, Negro, Indian -- or At Large?

B. A parallel question concerns our attitude toward the California-Japanese cultural institutions, as they survive in



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the centers in competition with our professional services. For every staff member in the Welfare section, there are probably ten informal welfare counselors in the community who hold people's confidence not by their professional skill but by their sharing in the familiar value-patterns and social procedures from which the security of the *issei* is still derived.

We cannot outlaw these welfare services. Some of them we can enlist as partners. Some, we can curb where they conflict with necessary administrative procedures. But what shall it profit us if we gain the monopoly of welfare, and lose our people? On the other hand, we cannot employ all these others: the quota, the budget, the language, our own professional pride, and the pride of those who still refuse to accept "family welfare" services -- all these stand in the way.

To ignore them completely means to open another chasm between the staff and the community. I believe we need to meet them half-way, believing in all humility that the School of Social Work is not yet the sole arbiter of human relations. We shall, indeed, have to make most of what effort is made to approach each other. The profession carries an obligation, which the priest or the block manager may not feel on his side. But I find nothing as yet in the Manual which indicates that the community's preferences as to family counselors is to be respected, save in respecting the voluntary nature of the relationship between the resident and the Welfare Section. I believe there is still room for a little voluntary relationship from the Welfare side. We shall not strengthen confidence within the people by denying it to their familiar institutions.

C. On the side of Health, the professional lines are more



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strictly drawn. We cannot accept responsibility for faith healing, herb remedies, skin-pricking, or unsupervised midwifery. The fault here has rather been that of belittling and resenting the interest -- if you like, the neurotic anxiety -- of the center community in health matters. It has been **assumed** that where the residents disagreed with the Health administration, the residents must be wrong. Further, to avoid pampering the center at the risk of outside hostility, we pare down our services; to defend ourselves to the residents, we then tell them that there is even less health service outside; and finally we are impatient when they give this back to us as a reason for not relocating.

If the health service is a significant line of American professional practice that must be held, it is no ~~less~~ <sup>less</sup> significant that it has been the health service around which hostile staff-resident relations have centered so often. The physician, in his professional contempt for lay judgments, should be reminded occasionally that he is himself a layman in social anthropology.

D. The internal security of a center, which is one of its most delicate areas of adjustment, has tempted us into some perilous a priori judgments based on theoretical police procedure rather than on the ways in which the rural-California-Japanese community regulated the behavior of its members. Was there less crime in those communities, or did they only succeed in keeping the culprit and the punishment in their own hands? We cannot say, because we do not even agree on the definition of crime. In a community where the gang beating of an informer is approved by the people as a fact, though deplored as a theory; and where a humble apology is more punishment than a proud sojourn in detention: here the issue between mutual confidence



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and mutual conflict is delicate. Here, in my judgment, we also have a strict measure: the number of appointed police is the measure of the gap between the staff and the people.

What about the theft of Government property? Why is it that the Nakagawas and the Kobayashis will respect each other's belongings, in their respective unlocked barracks, but both of them will stroll home with a nocturnal increment of household lumber from the Project pile? Leave out the question of why the appointed personnel also appropriate such items as they deem justified by expediency. The problem is the evacuees' "responsibility toward property." And the answer, which must be complicated, is I think rooted in the fact that everything here is given, nothing earned. The residents did not enter the projects with the powerful sense of expectancy of Government favors which they now have. That followed the fact that what they got was given.

One of Poston's Christian ministers returned from Chicago recently, and told in a sermon of seeing the bears at the zoo. Here in a cage was an enormous fellow, who should by nature have been wielding his strength fending ~~xxx~~ for himself on the howling slopes of the Rockies. Here before the cage stood a child, throwing a handful of popcorn. Up rose the mighty creature, -- and danced a few steps. "We," said the minister, "are that bear."

Internal Security, in its full and literal meaning, is precisely the issue. That we have applied that title only to the policing of property and personal behavior is more revealing than we have any right to admit.

E. Education, the stronghold of professional Americanism,



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is also one of the revealing areas for the diagnosis of motivation. I went to Poston originally to develop a college-level adult education program. There were students, there was money from outside sources, there was interest in the activity. But there was no education. After almost a year of trial, I withdrew the program and the request for funds. Partly, the reason was that the nisei have had in the past, only training, never education. More important was the fact that training was all they wanted. Their motive was flight: flight from Little Tokyo, flight into status and function and acceptance on the basis of technical performance. Here, where at first we envisaged a duration community in which the young men would rise to leadership; where half of the first seminar were members of the council; where the Republic and The Social Contract seemed, and for a time proved, the proper diet for budding community leaders: here, as soon as the gates began to open, the motive of flight reasserted itself, and only the classes in mathematics and chemistry maintained themselves.

The motive of education is the sense in a young person that there is something he wants to be, something he wants to do, some place he must go. Education is what he does to make himself from what he is into what he must be, But in the centers that motive does not exist. The nisei have to escape even in order to stay what they are, and not become issei. Whatever they make of themselves thereafter must be made outside the center. I do not argue the exceptions, which I know. I state the rule.

The vocational training program inside the center is also, I am sure, more wasteful than the same training would be for the



APRIL 26 -- (19)

same boy outside. Even while he goes through his project apprenticeship, he is unsure whether the outside world will admit him to its apprenticeship. And the motive of training to take over a project job is weak, because no one here knows how long either he or the project will be here. ~~Nix~~ He is not a young man readying himself to be an adult in a producing community of adults. He is a young man hoping to earn more money in one trade than another, but also hoping or fearing that if the Army doesn't get him he may grow up to be just another member of the resident relief community.

The point is that that same problem which faces everyone in the center is overtly revealed in education and training programs. Because the community is economically unreal and socially unrecognized, work and the training for work within its lack heart. The very slackness of the work and the training then operate to increase the hesitation about going out. I think more relocation opportunities could be built around school transfers, in addition to those built around jobs and housing. But the basic question is that of our own policies toward the center. If we cannot give it reality, we shall not give its people the confidence and the motivation necessary to relocation. Merely tightening the hours, reducing the quota, and enacting penalties for light-minded attitudes will do no more than increase the insecurity of the residents. They already assume that the employment cuts are aimed solely at enforcing relocation-- despite the fact that most of those cut off were issei workers serving the more permanent sections of the population.

Only a radical move toward self-support, toward productive self-respect, toward centering the community's economy around



APRIL 26 -- (20)

money earned instead of money given, will serve to quicken our working pace and give reality to training. Only if we treat the people as permanent can we hope to see their present establishments vacant. Until then, teachers and pupils will mark time.

V

Community Management, which I abbreviate locally as Commun. Man., may become a set of agencies for effectuating the Manual; or it may become a set of services which share with the community the task of making institutions that will work. The test of such institutions is whether they generate enough confidence, and receive enough respect, to overcome the residents' doubts about status, the guilt over being Japanese, the embarrassment of language, the resentment over loss, and the expectation that their present state of insecurity and disadvantage is permanent and intentional on the part of the American people.

It may be that the system of administered eleemosynary equalitarianism is merely ahead of its time. Even if that were the case, it would still breed insecurity and apathy among those who were its premature victims. Our ostensible situation is that of persons crowded in a station waiting room. Seats on the train are few, and takers fewer; and more and more of the waiters are thinking they might as well stay there, where there is first aid and free lunches. In that situation, Community Management represents the first aid. But that is not our actual situation. Actually there are thousands of people, families, with work to do and children to raise, living in shelter camps where a certain measure of security is provided. Ultimately, the destiny of every family is outside the camp. But because we are afraid to have the camp take on any of the aspects of a genuine community,



APRIL 26 -- (21)

we are killing the courage and the incentive to move and withholding the means of movement. In that truer picture, it must be the responsibility of Community Management to find out not only the telling symptoms of the disease, but the institutional remedies. I may be accused of homeopathic theories in urging that the community itself be treated as a living body and allowed more freedom to generate its own sources of health. But I am more afraid of the osteopathic manipulation of the bones of administrative procedure, when the disease is cancer of the will.

The migratory labor camps for emigres of the dust bowl did not breed permanent camp residents. The resettlement and socialization policies of TVA did not breed apathy and insecurity. Nor were the traits which disturb us now present among the rural California Japanese. Somehow, in the last two years, timidity and confusion and dependence have been created and institutionalized among more than eighty thousand people. I do not take this lightly. We are in danger of having created, in the shortest possible time, the most tragic fiasco in America's history of dealing with minority groups.

In the face of that terrible danger, shall we lack the courage to try the remedies that seem indicated by the disease? Shall we refuse to permit the re-establishment of habits of productive enterprise, whether in the centers or not, if that method seems to promise any benefit at all? Shall we Manualize the native wit and sensitiveness out of our project staffs and their evacuee colleagues, because we believe that if we all act alike we cannot act wrongly? Shall we deny to evacuees a share in the responsibilities of center administration, if that too promises well and if the refusal to do so heightens the distrust



APRIL 26 -- (22)

of our own good faith? Shall we continue to belittle and gild over the fact that our residents are Japanese as well as American, and to discriminate within our own centers against all things representative of the Japanese side of their culture and heritage?

Community Management has not lacked courage. It has proposed some of these things, and been refused on grounds of higher policy. It must keep the courage to do them yet. We, who are in the closest daily touch with the community in its daily affairs, need not become ourselves issei. But we can be the champions of our own obligation to sustain the courage and vision of the people we work with, and to deal with them as adults lest they begin to believe that they are indeed children.

It is not true that "we believe in them, but America doubts." America deals with these residents in us; and it is our own doubts that they read in our policies and actions. How shall they believe that the rest of the country will give them more rights than we have, who are responsible for them and, in part, to them?

It is my present judgment that Community Management now stands between a fighting chance and a ghastly failure. For the sake of all we hope we are fighting for on this earth, we must not fail.

John Powell  
Poston, Arizona  
April 23, 1944

#####



April 19

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Duncan Mills left the project yesterday for a few days.

*Admin*  
Nomura thought this was a preparation for the Administration to take an action on the controversy over the term of Block Managers. It was a practice of the Administration, Nomura believed, to avoid to take a joint responsibility over major issues. It always sent one of the key members out of here when it was ready to make a major decision.

#####

April 19

*Admin*  
Nomura informed me that Len Nelson ~~left~~ left for Chicago yesterday. He had been called by the Office of the Indian Affairs to account for many discrepancies in the report of transfer of the properties from the Indian Service to the WRA. Nelson at the early stage pulled out equipment and tools out of the various Indian Reservations for Poston use. Now the final inventory did not check with those which had been sent in.



APRIL 19 -- (4)

Wade Head was here for the purpose of accounting the discrepancies in the transfer.

One evacuee who work<sup>d</sup> in the warehouse reported to me that one Caucasian appointed personnel could not leave Poston, although he had resigned from here, because of his failure to balance the properties which had been entrusted in his custody. He told me the discrepancy credited to this appointed personnel alone amounted to \$80,000.

Nomura said the figure would not be <sup>an</sup> exaggeration, because <sup>as for instance</sup> he knew <sup>^</sup> that the project received three hundred tool boxes with complete sets of tools and could account for only twelve complete sets at the time of the transfer. He believed that thses tools had been stolen and taken out of here by the workers on contract jobs and appointed personnel. When the project had awakened to the fact and instituted searching regulations at the M. P. station for all cars passing through, it was too late and damage had been done.



APRIL 14 -- (1)

It is rumored in the administrative circle that Leupp is to be reappointed soon to take care of those in the stockade at Tule Lake.

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April 2

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*Admin*  
French, the Community Analyst, was asked by someone high up in the Administration to make a study of the appointed personnel. He said he thought that those persons in the Fiscal Division (Charles Taylor, Shepard, etc.) are racists. Popkin, the Chief of the Construction and Maintenance Division, hated Japanese but he was hiding it very shrewdly, French believed.

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March 26

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~~the~~  
In recent issues of vernacular papers articles are appearing  
reporting the probable retirement of Myer and his <sup>a</sup>plce being  
perhaps taken by Commissioner Collier. The Utah Nippo of the  
March 22nd issue and the Rocky Shimpo of the March 20th issue  
printed articles in Japanese along this thought.

Admission



See also Employment, April ,

Admin



See also Block Manager System

March 27



MARCH 26 -- (4)

Both of these articles pictured Myer as "the real friend of the Japanese." They expressed concern that the Japanese would be confined in the "Japanese reservations" like the Idnians should Collier succeed Myer. They advocated to support the views and the policies of Myer whenever possible. (The originals are in ~~the~~ my file.)

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Mar 17

(The <sup>ow</sup>golling items must be kept strictly confidential because of my pledge to the FBI agent.)

The ~~per~~rand boy for Harper came after me right after lunch and said Edward Smart wanted to see me. I thought I was going to be investigated and felt uncomfortable while going down to Harper's office.

Smart and I borrowed Burge's office and went inside. This is what Smart told me:

He came down to Poston yesterday morning because he expected trouble from some of the Nisei to be examined on March 19. He was an officer to enforce law and only concerned in doing his duty. But as a man knowing so many people in the Administration here he did not desire to pick up any one from Poston. For the sake of his friends holding the key positions here it would be bad if some of the Nisei refused to obey the instructions to report to the examinations. Not only that such arrests of the Nisei would create another wave of adverse publicity for the Japanese. In Smart's opinion, the Japanese people have had worst breaks in the past. He wanted to protect those law abiding Japanese as much as possible, but due to some irresponsible and unthinking Japanese, who were arrested by the FBI, the rest of Japanese have been suffering.

Smart told me that he heard Unit III might have troubles over the Nisei draft. He asked me if I knew anything about it. I told him I did not know about it beyond the rumor along the same line as Smart heard. Unit III is an unit by itself and <sup>in</sup> we Unit I have very little inter-communication. It was impos-



MARCH 17 -- (10)

sible for him to find out anything about Unit III by staying here, I ~~said~~<sup>added</sup>. He should go down to Unit III to find out things, because the people in Unit I knew very little about that camp. He asked me whom he should see out there. I told him that the Unit III Administrator was the proper person to get in touch; it was one of his many duties to see law and order was maintained in the camp.

He asked me how was the condition in Unit I. I reported that I expected no one here who would refuse to answer the call for the pre-induction physicals. There were about three who we thought might refuse to report, but the members of the Advisory Committee for Selective Service got busy and argued with these boys to make them realize of consequences of such acts. Now these members reported they believed these boys would report to the Hospital. I added that I would not expect any serious trouble of any nature in this Unit. Thanks to the effort of Len Nelson the evacuees and appointed personnel were working together harmoniously. As to the problem of law enforcement here we had made a long stride in one year after the November disturbance. Smart said he was happy to hear that.

I said even the case of George Fujii I hoped he would be exonerated soon. I worked with him on the Police Commission and liked him. He worked hard for the community. Smart said he knew Fujii was a hard working man for the community, but he had enough evidence to convict him.

Smart thought Fujii was not alone responsible for what he was charged with. He was certain that there were others who had instigated Fujii. He asked me if I knew James Takashima. I said I knew of him, but I did not know about him, because he is a



MARCH 17 --(11)

Unit III man. Smart said he heard much about him and wanted to check his activities. I told him that he usually stayed in Unit III, therefore he must go there for that.

Smart told me to keep the conditions over the Nisei draft under control here. I promised I would do my best.

Smart informed me that meat had been stolen from the refrigerated store room frequently. The Japanese reefers were being suspected by many here, but he did not believe the story. He believed the thefts were ~~performed~~<sup>committed</sup> by T, the Caucasian who was in charge of the storage room. He had the only key to the room. He was suspected of selling the stolen goods in the Black Market in Parker. Smart thought he would be making about fifty dollars a week. He requested me to put my most trusted policeman on his trail, because he wanted to catch him and his whole ring. I said I would do my best to cooperate with him, because I did not want the Japanese here to be suspected of anything which they did not commit. I told him that someone drained gasoline out of the hearth belonging to the Funeral Director. I was certain that it had been done by some Caucasian. I was very anxious to catch these Caucasians/trying to put Japanese on the spot.



~~#####~~

March 16

On my way home I dropped in to see Nelson, who was working in his office. We spent about two hours in bull session. Some of interesting items revealed by Nelson are recorded here;

1. When Unit III opened, he was there first before Burge was appointed as the Administrator.

2. Burge kids him how well Unit I is being run. He brags that Unit III is a model Unit. He does not know what is happening in Unit III right now. James Takashima, the Mayor of Poston, and his gang have had several meetings in the various blocks



MARCH 16 -- (8)

agitating to create an active resistance to the Nisei draft. He was expecting to have some trouble with the boys who had been notified of their pre-induction examinations on March 19. According to Nelson's informants some boys had expressed that they would refuse to heed the notice.

3. Takashima, in Nelson's opinion, is a "double talker". He is out to get Takashima. Nelson was indignant about Takashima for his act of inciting others to refuse their induction, while he himself sitting in the back assuming no responsibility. "There are bunch of innocent suckers who falls for Takashima's tactic," Nelson said.

4. Nelson admits he is a vindictive man. He had been double crossed by Gerry Wumino twice. He cannot forget them and will even the old score some day.

5. When Nelson assumed ~~to~~ the post of Unit I Administrator, an agreement was made between Head, Gelvin, and Nelson that Gelvin and Nelson would assume the full responsibility for Unit I and Head was to act on the project level only. That is to say, what had been agreed between Gelvin and Nelson for Unit I would be final and Head could not go against them.

When Nelson succeeded in rounding up the four delinquent boys (two Nakamura, Nakasone, and Nakashima ---see Tsuchiyama's Journal for June and July, 1943.) with the aid of the Block Managers, Gelvin agreed with Nelson <sup>on</sup> ~~with~~ the decision to send them to Leupp. Gelvin saw Head and received his approval for the action. When the case became air tight after a few days and the boys were to be sent out (Nelson sent two trucks from the Motor Pool to the Police Station to round up the boys and about senteen others. The original plan was to send about ~~twenety~~ boys out to Leupp.)



MARCH 26 -- (9)

Head changed his mind at the last minute and refused to send the boys out, without consulting either Gelvin or Nelson. Gelvin lost his temper. He was really mad, because Head had overstepped him and disregarded the previous agreement between them. He went home and started to pack his things to go away from the project. Finally Haas and Nelson got between Head and Gelvin and patched the thing up. Nelson knew that Nakamura, the chairman of the Community Council and the father of two of the boys, Okamoto and Yahiro, his friends, and Mrs. Mukaeda, a friend of Mrs. Nakamura, worked on Head persistently.

The trouble between Gelvin and Head was settled with a compromise to send out just those four boys to Leupp.

A few weeks later,<sup>45</sup><sub>1</sub> the four boys were rounded up and were ready to be taken by E. Miller, the Director of Police then. Head came out of his office and told Miller, who was just about to start his car, "Take the boys to Gila." Miller was dumbfounded.

According to the instruction by the Project Director, Miller took the boys to Gila. There there had been no arrangements made as to accepting these boys. Miller argued with Bennet for four hours, telephone conversations carried between the arguments between Bennet and Miller on the one side and Head on the other side. Bennet<sup>7</sup><sub>1</sub> finally agreed to take the boys.

(Haas told me this sometime ago. When he was at the WRA conference in Denver last September -- or August -- Wolter of Gila came up to him and said, "What's the idea of sending the bad eggs to us without notifying us?" Haas did not answer him. Then Wolter went on, "Those boys told me that they had not done anything bad in Poston. They are not bad at all. Why send good boys?" Haas replied, "You got nice boys, and you are saying so.



MARCH 16 -- (10)

then why kick about it?")

Nelson said Gelvin got another dirty deal from Head on another occasion. He was really disappointed <sup>in</sup> ~~with~~ Head. Nelson, too, knew that Head was not the same man as he <sup>had</sup> ~~known~~ him before. It might be because he was away from his wife and his son so long, being alone here.

Nelson wanted Gelvin to become the Project Director after Head. But Gelvin had few friends here.

In January this year Head was going out of his way to recall Gelvin from the Indian Service to succeed himself. Gelvin went out of Poston as a disgusted man, and Head felt guilty in falling down in his friendship. Head wanted to compensate for what he had done.

6. Okamoto came to see Nelson last summer and warned him to stop segregation. He said if the WRA went on with its plan of segregation Poston would have another disturbance. He said it in such a way that Nelson thought Okamoto was threatening him. Nelson without replying to what Okamoto had said told him, "You go home now and pack up your things. You are going to Santa Fe or Leupp or whichever you choose." Okamoto turned pale and apologized. Okamoto is afraid of Nelson since then. (I told him I had known that Okamoto was avoiding Nelson.)

Okamoto, the City Manager, came in to see him only once over some matter during the two weeks Nelson had been acting as the Project Director.

7. Recently Okamoto came in to see Nelson. He asked if another segregation was going to place <sup>those</sup> palce. He said he had heard that the WRA would segregate <sup>those</sup> who are willing to relocate from those who will not relocate. Okamoto wanted to get an answer most con-



MARCH 16 -- (11)~~11~~

fidentially. Nelson told him he knew nothing about it.

8. French and Spicer came in to see Nelson the other day (presumably March 14) and had a long conference. During the course of conversation French said Nelson was all wrong in treatment of the Unit III boys. (He probably meant ~~Nelson's~~ idea of turning the draft agitators to the FBI.) Nelson should study the backgrounds of these boys and treat ~~him~~ <sup>them</sup> accordingly. Nelson replied that he did not care about their backgrounds, and because he has been here for almost two years now, he knew how to treat the trouble-makers. Spicer sat without saying a word.



MARCH 8 -- (1)

*Administrative*  
Nishimoto suggested to Sakai and Ekimoto, the Supervisor and the Assistant Supervisor respectively, to see the Acting Project <sup>Director</sup> on the opposition of the Managers against the reduction of their staffs. (CfL March 7, page 3) He thought it wise to present the view of the Managers so that the Administration would have an opportunity to present it to the Project Director and the Deputy Project Director while they were in Washington.

The three called on Len Nelson and presented their arguments. They stressed the fact that a Block Manager was indispensable to a block, and a secretary was indispensable to the Manager. Nelson informed them as follows: An instruction came down from Washington to transfer two block gardeners to the Agricultural Department and the two janitors to the Operation Division. In reality, however, only difference was to be found in its cost accounting, and the Managers would have the supervisory authority over them as before. The instruction in addition specified to reduce the part-satff to one block manager and one <sup>part-</sup>time secretary. The Administration here, however, realized the importance of the block manager system in the community life and made a strong recommendation to Duncan Mills to request the WRA at Washington to allow Poston to have one manager and one secretary to each block. Mills saw the argument and agreed to present the Poston recommendation to Washington when he reached there. As Nelson put it, "The Block Managers are king pins in their blocks and the block activities revolve around them. I don't care what Gila or Granada are doing with the Manager system. . . . Here the Managers are not supposed to stay in their offices all the time. There must be someone else in there all the time, so that the Managers will be free to go about. His importance is found in outside of the



MARCH 8 -- (2)

offices, although they must know what's going on in the offices."

From what Nelson explained it was evident that there was no controversy between the Managers and the Administration over the size of their staffs. The Administration, in fact, was endeavoring to allow each Manager his staff of six, while the Managers' meeting demanded for five persons as a minimum.

Nelson blamed a high ranking official (unnamed) for leaking the news prematurely without letting evacuees know of the full detail of how the Administration stood on the question.

On a suggestion of Nelson, the delegates/agreed to call a meeting of the Executive Committee and the Negotiation Committee tomorrow morning. Nelson promised he would be present at the meeting to inform them of this fact.



Feb 21

The following article appeared in the Los Angeles Examiner  
on February 20:

*Administrative* Immediate removal of Dillon Myer as executive head of War Relocation Authority was demanded in a resolution sent yesterday to Congressman John M. Costello by members of the American Foundation for Expulsion of Japanese.

Criticising WRA for its lax policy in handling Japanese the Foundation demanded replacement of Myer and "all other persons unfit to administrate their positions in behalf of of the safety of the American people" and to replace them with "people of executive ability, who have definite knowledge of the problem, with which we of the Pacific Coast are faced."

Signed by Marshall S. Johnson, president of the organization; John C. Porter, vice president, and Wiledd Andrews, attorney, the resolution read:

"Whereas, we urge Congress and the President of the United States to give thought and consideration to a realistic program dealing with the serious Japanese problem with which the 11 Western States are faced and to give definite consideration to the welfare and protection and security of the American people;

"Whereas, under the present program now existing under the War Relocation Authority little and no restrictions are placed on Japanese<sup>a</sup> internees;

"Whereas, such procedure is believed and expressed by the American Foundation for Expulsion of Japanese to be unwise and dangerous and a great opportunity for organized espionage and sabotage and a constant threat against the welfare and security of our country and the American people; therefore be it

"Resolved, that we, as members of the American Foundation for Expulsion of Japanese and citizens of the United States, go on record as urging Congress and the President



FEBRUARY 21 -- (4)

of the United States to give consideration in bringing forth action for the dismissal of Mr. Dillon Myer, who is maintained as the executive head under Mr. Harold Ickes, Secretary of the Interior, and be it

"Resolved further, that such other procedure be taken as may be necessary to handle the removal of any and all other persons, who are unfit to administrate intelligently and adequately their positions on behalf of the American people, and to install in their places, people of executive ability, who have definite knowledge and understanding of the problem with which ~~wc~~ of the Pacific Coast are faced."

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Outside of the evacuee leaders residents at large do not know how to comment ~~on~~ the transfer of the WRA under the Department of the Interior. There is very little discussion on this matter.

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\*\*\*\*\*

The younger residents, who work in the Administration, passed the news this morning that the Department of the Interior had taken the WRA over.

Feb 17

*Admin*  
Haas commented this morning thus:

1. The WRA would not be attacked so much as before. An independent agency is more likely to be accused and criticised by the papers and the public.
2. The WRA has a better access to the President, because it has a Cabinet member for its superior. Ickes is an influential member, and the WRA will be benefitted by *him*.
3. The WRA was a temporary set-up. Now the Government *has* recognized permanency in the nature of works performed by the WRA. The WRA will be here to stay, which fact was reconciled in the minds of the Government leaders.
4. Ickes is a stronger man than Myers, and will be able to withstand criticisms and attacks much better. "He has been at it for the past nine years." Furthermore, what Ickes will



FEBRUARY 17 -- (3)

say will have more weight.

The transfer drew many comments from ~~some~~ members of the Community Council. Okamoto, for instance, believed that the policy of the WRA would revert to the colonization idea. He thought Collier would be coming around to Poston again.

Onishi thought it was an admission of failure of the relocation program.

Nomura believed it was a beginning of "the Bureau of the Japanese Affairs" to make the Japanese "reservations".

Another man said that the WRA should stick to one policy from the beginning to the end, if they wanted the Japanese to relocate, they ought to stick to relocating the Japanese. Okamoto said that the whole idea was new, emerging out of the war, and the WRA could not have any history or previous records to rely on in forming <sup>its</sup> ~~their~~ policy for the ~~the~~ future. The WRA must necessarily depend on a trial and error method.



#####

Feb 13

Duncan Mills ordered a sweeping changes in location of administrative offices. For one thing, he ordered to move the Poston Chronicle staff to the Project Administration Building, giving the Press Adobe Building to the U. S. O. The arrangement called for the English staff and the Japanese staff to



FEBRUARY 13 -- (3)

be situated in rooms adjoining the room of Pauline Bates Brown, the Reports Officers, on the opposite sides. The motives for this move, as suspected by the press workers, was to supervise them to work full eight hours every day and to order them more closely as to what articles should be printed.

The Poston Chronicle workers, however, are resentful of being moved near to Brown, and are actively opposing the plan. It is contemplated by them now to resign en masse. They do not desire to be ordered by Brown to insert certain articles against their wishes. They have no right to object to such orders by Brown. Now that the WRA will intensify relocation, they are afraid to print too many articles which will publicize the program in the fear that they might be misconstrued by the public as Inu, who are in collusion with the WRA to coerce the residents out of the center.

K heard Brown say sometime ago that she did not care whether we had a Japanese language newspaper in the center. (It is my estimate that more than half of the population here is entirely depending on the Japanese section of the Chronicle for news.)

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Feb 10

During the conference with Nelson, he informed me that he had been offered an lucrative job from the Indian Service recently, but he had refused to accept it. He said he wanted to finish what he had started here.

The WRA has cut greatly his request <sup>of</sup> a Budget for the new fiscal year, as Nelson reported. The WRA wanted Poston to operate on \$1.20 per capita just as any other center. It cut the Poston request for the cost of replacement for machinery



FEBRUARY 10 -- (4)

parts (including automotive vehicles), gasoline, oil, etc. by \$45,000, that of school maintenance by \$7,500, and that of keeping the Poston evacuees in the Indian Service Hospital in Phoenix by \$65,000. Nelson has been fighting with the WRA at Washington by letters, wires, and telephone calls to have his budget approved. Poston had planned to develop the Indian Reservation here when the project was opened, including the scheme to create 5,000 acres of agricultural farm. He wanted to continue this plan, for which the allotment of \$1.20 per capita was not sufficient. Nelson had requested the WRA to decide one way or the other very soon, to carry on the original plan of developing Poston or to operate without an extensive production program, which would mean a curtailment of the present agricultural farm.

At another state of the conference, Nelson stated that Mills was very different from Wade Head, and that the new Project Director "means business".

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David French, the Community Analyst, told me that Duncan Mills had told the appointed personnel that he would run the project "business like". He has already refused many requests of the appointed personnel right and left, which would have been granted by Wade Head easily. He was a great "stickler" for the WRA regulations. "The appointed personnel can't get office desks and chairs which they used to get under Head any more."

French reported there were much complaining among the appointed personnel against the new Project Director. He thought Mills was alienating the Caucasians in the low ranks.

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JANUARY 27 -- (1)

Dillon Myer arrived here from Phoenix last night.

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*Admin*  
A joint meeting of the Councilmen, the Block Managers, and the Division Heads was held to hear Myer this afternoon in the school Auditorium. There were about two hundred present, among them the key members of the appointed personnel were found.

Thomas Masuda, the member of the Legal Department, who acted as the chairman, first introduced Wade Head. Head announced that he has resigned as of this afternoon to take over his old post at Papago to rejoin his family. He stressed the fact that Poston had made a wonderful stride in the progress of self-government with the evacuees and the administrative staff working as a homogeneous unit in the last several months. He hoped that the same trend would continue with the new Project Director. He asked the leaders present to cooperate with the new director to make a further progress on the road. He then introduced Duncan Mills, the new Project Director, who spoke briefly asking for the assistance and cooperation of the staff and the evacuees in running the project.

J. Tkashima, the chairman of the Community Council, read a resolution thanking Wade Head for his service to the Japanese in the past. The motion was made to make it a resolution and was seconded. It was passed by <sup>a</sup> voice vote unanimously by the meeting and was presented to the former Project Director.

Then, Myer was called on to address the audience. The highlights of his speech were as follows:

1. He regretted Head's departure from Poston. <sup>Head</sup> He had expressed his desire to resign from the Poston job as early as last July in Denver. Myer since then had been persuading him to remain



JANUARY 27 -- (2)

here, but Head's intention was too strong at the end of the last year and Myer could not change it.

2. Duncan Mills is a capable man, who is best suited to follow the policy set down successfully by Wade Head. He does not speak very much, but "when he starts talking he is a very interesting speaker."

3. Poston has made a tremendous stride in improving the project. Since his last visit, the adobe school had been constructed, and the farm had been developed.

4. Poston is further advanced in self-government than any other center. It is successfully operated by ~~the~~ joint participation of the appointed staff and the evacuees.

5. The WRA will emphasize family relocation this year.

6. He hopes he can make an announcement that one relocation <sup>center</sup><sub>1</sub> be closed. Such an announcement will be made in the next thirty days. One or more centers will be closed as time goes on. Poston is not one of those to be closed.

7. As relocation progresses and the population in ~~the~~ centers decreases, economy dictates that the residents be concentrated into fewer centers. The WRA budget must be justified to be approved by the Congress.

8. The WRA will not push any one out of centers. But it does not promise that they will ~~not~~ remain in the same center. As time goes on it may become necessary to consolidate two centers into one, or to transfer the residents of one center into other centers.

9. When he visited the centers for the first time in 1942 he noted that every one was in a "pugilistic posture." They argued with chips on their shoulders. Things have changed com-



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pletely. People are settled, and their frustrations had been relieved.

10. Recently we suffered from the anti-Japanese agitation by politicians and the "earst papers. It comes in waves or in a cycle. By such agitations we found more friends for us, who had never spoken their words on the issue. "It is a storm before <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ ray of sunshine." It is not <sup>so</sup> dark as we read in the papers. The Japanese have made many friends. The public is learning the Japanese problem.

11. The program of the WRA is to let the public realize to treat the Japanese as any other American of any ancestry. The WRA has succeeded in that much better than they had hoped for.

12. "A lot of people, including Mr. Costello, wishes to get rid of me. But I will not resign. Unless my boss says otherwise, I will remain with the WRA."

13. The race baiters took advantage of the Tule Lake incident. It was <sup>a</sup> result of many factors. One was that those people had been moved to Tule Lake when they did not want to move. Another is that people from nine different centers gathered in a new center and they struggled for power. The incident was caused by a "fear", but "I don't know what that fear was yet."

14. Tule Lake is settling down, according to reports received by Myer. But minor difficulties are expected there because of the composition of the population.

The next period was devoted to the questions from the floor. First, Takashima presented three questions of the Community Council.

1. More money for assisting relocation -- Myer's anser:



JANUARY 27 -- (4)

"I cannot see any hope of getting an increase in assistance for relocation."

2. An increase of cash advances -- Myer's answer: "At this stage of game, I don't think I can convince the Congress that the evacuees should be paid higher wages." "Nothing has changed since the time the cash advance system was set up. (the first part of September, 1942)" "If your money is getting low, and you think you are not getting enough here, we will assist you in getting jobs on the outside. There are good chances of making money right now."

3. The project quota of manpower at 5,600 should be raised to meet the proposed extended program of agriculture here--- Myer's answer: When the projects opened no one knew what department needed how many men. They hired as many as they thought they needed. Soon afterwards it was known that the workers were not put <sup>ting</sup> in hours they should or some unnecessary works were operated. There was an indication that it would become a public scandal. That <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ the reason the arbitrary quota was set up to rectify the situation as quickly as possible. If any project undertakes a worthy work and needs more men, the WRA is receptive to such a request.



Jan 27  
(After  
D. Myers  
Speech)

Tom Sakai asked from the floor, "If Nisei are drafted, will they be sent to an unit set up separately for the Japanese? Or will they be sent to any unit of their choice as the Americans are?" Myer's answer: He left Washington two weeks ago and he did not know the latest developments. When he left he had only known that the announcement was to be made by the War Department. As Myer understood it, the Nisei would be sent to the 442nd or 100 th after their basic training.



JANUARY 27 -- (5)

George Fujii asked if any right and privilege lost by the Nisei can be regained by this draft. Myer said he could not answer this question because he did not know. However, the draft was one of those things for which Myer had been fighting for, and this draft is one step toward regaining what had been lost by the Nisei.

S. Sasuga of Block 2 asked whether the WRA would indemnify the property losses incurred by the fire on December 25. Myer told him this was the first time such a question was asked and he did not know the detail. He told the <sup>5</sup>questioner to refer the matter to the Project Attorney.

A man from Unit III asked a question what the WRA would do in assisting the Nisei, who wrote that he did not know when he would lose his job in a defense plant, <sup>1</sup>although he had been cleared by the WRA. There were cases of discharge, the letter said, in which the Nisei had been cleared by the WRA but subsequently the Provost Marshal ordered the plants to fire them. Myer expressed his regret that such things were happening. The policy of administration is different according to the local office of the Provost Marshal. The WRA is trying to eliminate the practice of different policies in different localities, but it finds very difficult to have the <sup>R</sup>Army establish one uniform rule. The WRA always investigates each case as soon as it hears about it. There was one case, Myer reported, in which the Provost Marshal fired a Nisei from a toy factory. The WRA took the case with the Provost Marshal and succeeded in reinstating the Nisei in the factory. It would be much better from now on, as many plants were taken off the "Security Group"

Another man from Unit III produced a letter from the De-



JANUARY 27 -- (6)

partment of Justice, which stated that the internees would be paroled to the WRA very soon. He wanted to know from Myer how soon that could be done. Myer replied that all the internees would not be paroled. The Department of Justice conducts hearing for them. If ~~they~~<sup>he</sup> can be acceptable for parole, the man is referred to the WRA. The ~~WAR~~<sup>WRA</sup> at Washigton<sup>n</sup> referred the matter to the project, to which he desires to go. If he is accepted by the project, it is so notified to the Department of Justice. After the hearing it should not take more than three weeks until the man knows that he can go to the project he desires.

M. Okamoto accused Myer of being unsympathetic and discourteous ~~for~~<sup>in</sup> his statement that those who wish for more money ought to relocate to the outside, because there are many jobs which pay good wages and the WRA would assist them in relocating. He argued that the Japanese did not come here by their own choice. They were thrown in here after losing everyting ~~they~~ had. There are many people who cannot relocate even if they wanted to because of a lack of fund.

Myer answered Okamoto to recall the first part of his statement that it was unwise to ask the Congress for an increase of wages at this stage of the game. "It is the major problem with you. I sympathize with you. Nevertheless I don't see how I can argue to the Congress that it is the problem of the Japanese which must be solved by us."

Takashima argued on the relocation assistance further. He asked Myer if there was any chance of getting \$500 or \$1,000 per person. He argued that the Congressmen are "business men" and ought to understand that it would be cheaper to pay off \$500 or \$1,000 now than keeping them in relocation centers for



JANUARY 27 -- (7)

two years or three years from now.

Myer corrected Takashima that the Congressmen were not business men, but they were mostly lawyers. If the entire population of the all the relocation centers signed a contract with the WRA that they would relocate if they were given \$500 per person, he would be able to convince the Congress that it would be cheaper to pay the sums and to close the centers.

"I don't think it is the difficulty of relocation. It is not a lack of fund that people are not relocating. The difficulty lies elsewhere. I know many well-to-do families settled back in centers and not thinking of relocation at all."

The questioning was called to <sup>an</sup> ~~the~~ end as the deadline of 3 p.m. arrived. Wade Head again stood and spoke that the Japanese ought to be thankful in having Myer for their champion. Myer's job is a thankless one, which no one would want to take. The Poston Japanese are fortunate in getting a man of high caliber for their new Project Director. "I am now signing off" was the last words from Wade Head at Poston. He had tears in his eyes as he sat down.



#####

Jan 26

Wade Head called an emergency meeting of the Community  
yesterday afternoon  
Council and informed the members that Duncan Mills would suc-  
ceed him as the Acting Project Director. He advised them not  
to reveal this news as "something must be saved for Dillon Myer  
to speak about this Thursday."

Head suggested to persuade Ralph Gelvin to come here to  
take the office of Project Director. He advised them to select  
a committee to see Gelvin, who would be here this Sunday to  
get his family.

#####



#####

Wade Head is back on the project today. Rumors are rife  
that he will resign in a few days.

A man called Mills is here. They are saying that he is  
the Acting Project Director.



JANUARY 18, -- (1)

*Administration*  
A regular weekly meeting of the Block Managers was held in the conference room of the Unit Administration Building. It was a short meeting, which lasted only for forty minutes.

The matter first taken up was in regard to distribution of fuel oil for stoves. There have been numerous complaints from the blocks that the drivers of the oil trucks were playing favoritism to some blocks and were discriminating <sup>some</sup> other blocks. The story is like this: during the recent shortage of fuel oil (Cf: December 17, page 1, the last line; December 18, page 1, the first paragraph. The restriction of one gallon per apartment heater per day was lifted on December 29.) some blocks bribed these drivers --- one Block Manager, as for example, gave them two cartons of cigarettes, some other blocks invited them into their kitchens and fed them lavishly with special cuts of meat, some others gave them some other special favors. The purpose of this bribing was to have these boys fill up their oil tanks to the top, <sup>for</sup> ~~as~~ they had been instructed by Haviland to distribute oil equally --- the amount of oil in this equal distribution being insufficient to fill the tanks to the top. Naturally, there were some blocks which were not wise to the game and failed to treat these drivers with special favors. ~~As~~ In the drivers a feeling of liking some blocks and disliking other blocks resulted. They felt obligated to the blocks which <sup>had</sup> treated them kindly and returned such favors with extra supplies of oil. Giving <sup>an</sup> extra amount of oil to one block meant giving less than allotted to another block. There were complaints coming from the Block Managers to the Supervisor, but nothing serious developed as the restriction was lifted on December 29



JANUARY 18 -- (2)

and the shortage was relieved.

During this crisis the Supervisor adopted a practice to go around from block to block checking the amount of fuel oil in each oil tank. He went around everyday during the period. After every round he reported the gauge readings to Haviland and requested him to supply oil to the blocks ~~with~~ being low in ~~the~~ <sup>their</sup> supply. Since the beginning of this year he continued the practice two or three times a week. (The tank supplies oil to the kitchen stoves, the boilers in the latrines and laundry, and the heaters in ~~apartments~~.) The Supervisor has been submitting a list of the blocks which need oil after ~~his~~ <sup>her</sup> round, but the drivers have not followed the instruction. He has been protesting about this for several days. About two weeks ago Block 21 ~~had~~ ran out of oil completely, although an instruction to supply the block with oil had been submitted to the drivers. The situation was aggravating, for the neighboring blocks had been supplied with oil the night before. It was remedied immediately, although residents of Block 21 ~~were~~ <sup>had been</sup> excited to beat the boys.

Yesterday, this was repeated. The drivers of the oil trucks neglected to serve Block 21 again, and the oil tank had been drained empty. All the boilers and stoves went out in the evening while people were busy taking showers. The Block Manager was angry, he being a scrappy ~~Manager~~. He rushed down to the Supervisor's apartment, and together with him went to the foreman of the oil truck crew. They were told that he was at the movie show at the Block 4 stage. They, then, went to the show and made a call for the foreman through the public address system. Block 21 got over the crisis, but their humiliation



JANUARY 18 -- (3)

for having been neglected was not healed, for again the tanks in neighboring blocks were quite full.

This morning in the office of the Supervisor of Block Managers there were several Block Managers including the Manager of Block 21 discussing the oil problem. They were all indignant that oil has not been distributed equally and fairly. They were stressing a proposal to replace the present truck drivers with others more reliable. The Supervisor took these managers ~~and~~ to Acting Project Director Burge to solve the problem. They howled their heads off to Burge, who explained that a transfer of the officers had taken place at the first of the month and the new chief of the Transportation Division had not been acquainted with his duties. Burge arranged a meeting of the officers of the Transportation Division with the Supervisor just before noon.

At the meeting of the Block Managers Supervisor Sakai reported that the oil supply situation would be improved within a few days. At present, he said, there is a slight shortage of oil; Poston is using about 14,000 gallons of oil daily, while a daily supply is 12,000 gallons. Nine railroad tanks are expected to arrive at Parker any day now. The Block Managers agreed among themselves to limit the use of fuel oil by the residents for their heaters to one gallon per day.



French informed me that Len Nelson would be leaving in a few months as soon as some ~~of~~ lucrative position opens up in the Indian Service.

He thought Walter Balderston is not appreciated among the appointed personnel for what he deserves.

He thought the administrative policy in Minidoka was paternalizing. The evacuees did not have much hand in running the center. The policy is set down by the Administration as if to say, "We are thinking of the best for you in our hearts. This is a good thing to do. So you do as I tell you. The evacuee leaders accept the policy set down and force it down to the residents, like saying, "This is good. The Administration thinks so, and we think so too. You do as we tell you. It would be good for you to follow us."

French thinks that the evacuee leaders exercise "informal" pressure on the residents to carry out such a policy. The Japanese who dared to oppose the administrative policy would be deprived of few spoils whatever there are, such as jobs, food distribution to the blocks, fuel distribution.

The Minidoka residents, French claims, had gotten away from the JACL influence at Puyallup. They went through the same process at Puyallup as we did with our strike here. I suspect French's analysis of Minidoka is that of Ned Spicer.

#####

Haas informed me that many of the appointed personnel



JANUARY 15 -- (3)

are here without the civil service status, although they had to satisfy the civil service qualifications to get the jobs. Most of them in this category may be fired by the WRA at *Anytime*, while some others have contracts for the duration and six months.



JANUARY 13 -- (1)

2. Administration  
Ted Haas, the Project Attorney, was over at my place last night. The informations given by him are recorded here at random.

1. On January 1, 1944, Mrs. Wade Head resigned from the directorship of the Papago Indian Reservation. Wade Head, who had been on leave from the Indian Reservation since the opening of Poston, succeeded her. He <sup>is</sup> ~~has been~~ on the payroll of the Indian Service as the Director of the Papago Indian Reservation since January 1. He is still working for the Colorado River Relocation Center without pay, but he is ready to leave any time now for his old post. This fact, however, is withheld from the evacuees here, although they suspect that Head would resign sooner or later.

2. The contract of transfer of Poston from the Indian Service to the WRA stipulates that an Indian Service officer who is leaving Poston must stay two to four weeks with his successor from the WRA when he turns his business over. It is a duty of the retiring officer to acquaint the new one as to how the project has been running and how to deal with the evacuees. In case of Ted Haas, Commissioner Collier made a special dispensation on the request of Glick and Head allowing Haas to remain in Poston two to four months, keeping meanwhile Haas' new position with the Indian Service open. The WRA was originally to send a Project Attorney to succeed Haas in last December and Haas ~~was~~ to leave Poston on January 1. Haas does not know the definite date of his departure yet; the date will be decided between him and Glick at the San Francisco conference of the Evacuee Property Officers. He thought he would be leaving here about the first part of March. The postponement of his departure was necessitated



JANUARY 13 -- (2)

by Burge's insistence that he would accept to become the Deputy Project Director acting also as the Project Director provided Haas would remain with him for at least six months. A compromise had been worked out between the WRA and the Indian Service allowing <sup>Haas</sup> him to remain here for two to four months.

3. Both Director Myer and Commissioner Collier induced Head to remain here as the Project Director *unsuccessfully*.

4. Head believes in the policy of more evacuee participation in running the project. He is more concerned to maintain this policy unchanged in the future, whoever may come as the Project Director. He did not want evacuees interfered by the appointed personnel. He thought Burge was the most logical person to carry <sup>on</sup> out his policy because of his personality. Burge had been scheduled to be inducted into the Army, but the WRA asked the Draft Board for his deferment in order to keep him here. (Dillon Myer has held a point of view, however, that any WRA official, except Project Attorneys, should serve in the Army when called and no deferment should be asked. Burge's case is therefore unusual.)

5. A new Project Director will be brought in from the outside, but no change in the administrative policy is <sup>not</sup> completed. Burge is entrusted with the duty to orient the new Project Director, who will be told to let the evacuees run the camp. He will <sup>be</sup> told that any attempt to change the policy or to interfere with it will be opposed with strong evacuee antagonisms and resentment against the Administration.

6. As reported previously Len Nelson was made the Assistant Project Director in charge of Community Administration. Besides Nelson, John Powell and Rupkey were made Assistant Directors.



JANUARY 13 -- (3)

John Powell is the Assistant Director in charge of Community Management. Burge, Nelson, Powell, and Rupkey are all in the \$5,600 per annum classification.

7. Harper, the Director of Internal Security, had ideas of his own as to how to use the police authority here. (He once told me --- about in November --- that he had been trained by the FBI and has been in the police work all his life. He knew everything as to how to maintain law and order.) <sup>His</sup> The first case was the arrest of a sex pervert in Unit III. An Issei, about fifty-five years of age, gave some candies to a girl about eleven years old and played with her genitals. He is a bachelor and looked harmless beyond this crime. This sort of crimes were not uncommon in isolated Japanese farming communities in the rural districts of California. Bachelors quite often had different standards of sex morality and propriety. In this case, however, her parents filed a complaint and Harper arrested the Issei/pervert. Immediately after the arrest, Harper decided <sup>to</sup> take him out to Yuma for confinement in the jail and for trial. Elmer Yamamoto, an evacuee attorney, who is assigned to the Unit III work protested and Haas intervened. Harper insisted it was a felony and the suspect should be tried in Yuma. Haas told him that it was not the way these cases <sup>are</sup> were handled here; those cases are handled much more efficiently by the evacuees. If Harper took this man out to Yuma, it might be all right as far as this case was concerned. But, Haas argued, it was doubtful whether the evacuees would cooperate with the police in the future. They might not report any more cases to the police in the future. Harper finally acquiesced and the man was tried here. He was ordered to work



JANUARY 13 -- (4)

in the Poston General Hospital as a janitor and was transferred to Unit I on probation. I have seen this man several times since the crime and he is working conscientiously.

Yamamoto was not satisfied with Harper. He wrote to Wade Head and protested to what Harper had attempted to do. (I suspect that Haas had had <sup>a</sup> hand in this.) He argued that the evacuees had set up the police organizations and the judiciary system. If the future cases were to be handled in the way Harper had tried, there was no need for those evacuee organizations. Head called Harper in his office and warned him for his future action. (This story fits with another story I heard about that time from a policeman in Unit I. One morning he came into the Police Station and complained to the evacuee policemen that he could not tell what he should do to cases. If he acted according to the instructions from the WRA he would get protests from the Administration here. The Indian Service wants one way about the law enforcement and the WRA another. He thought things will be all right after the Indian Service pulled out of here on January 1. He was waiting hopefully for that day.)

About a week ago I had an occasion to talk with him on the licensing system of dogs and cats. I noticed a remarkable change in Harper at that time. He was willing to listen to my points and expressed his view that he wanted to enforce the laws without unduly antagonizing the residents. Haas informed me in confidence that he had been "educating" Harper to come around to the let-evacuees-run-the-camp policy.

Haas thought that Harper can be kept in line by Powell and the Police Commission. He told me to work ~~in~~ hand in hand with



JANUARY 13 -- (54)

Powell to keep Harper checked. (At present, Harper is directly responsible to Head. But under the WRA set up, he will be placed under John Powell in his Community Management Department.)

8. When the Review Board for Leave Clearance had undertaken hearings in last October, there were a considerable amount of criticism and resentment from the community. Rumors were rampant at that time that the interviewers were bullying and cross-examining evacuees. As soon as Haas heard these complaints, he called the Board members in a meeting and admonished them. He then explained <sup>to them</sup> in detail as to how to create an intimate atmosphere so that the subject might be at ease. <sup>The situation improved immediately.</sup> (Lately there are no such criticisms that the Board members are officious and bullying.)

9. Ralph Drennen left Poston disgruntled. He did not know how he was received by the Japanese. Haas was fully aware of what the evacuees were saying about Drennen.

When the Employment Division was split into two sections, Drennen was confident that he would be made the director of the project employment. Actually he was made an assistant to the director.

10. President Roosevelt is kept in touch with the problems of the Japanese in relocation centers, much more than we suspect. Mrs. Roosevelt is interested in the minority issue. Admiral McIntyre, Commissioner Collier, Secretary Ickes, and Director Myer are constantly informing the President. The President is supporting Myer in the present Congressional attempt to oust him. However, if he thought it would jeopardize his chance for the fourth term, he would ask Myer to step aside.

11. Myer thinks Poston handled its strike very well. He also



JANUARY 13 -- (6)

thinks that Poston is the futherest advanced center in many respects.

12. Haas and Empie did not get along so well. Haas was outspoken in the staff conferences. Many times he criticised Empie on his policies, but the latter took them as personal affronts. One of the first occasions to call <sup>it</sup> for showdown was the issue of whether to allow evacuees to eat in the personnel messhall. Empie was in charge of the messhall and was opposed to let the Japanese eat with the appointed personnel; Findley and Haas among others were opposed to the ruling. Haas forced the issue and won out. (This will be reported in Tsuchiyama's report. She <sup>who was</sup> was the first one ~~to be~~ kicked out of the messhall.) Empie was for having more appointed personnel in Poston to run the camp. Haas was directly opposed to theis point of view; he wanted to let even the Legal Department run by the evacuees. Haas believed that Poston had too many Caucasians. At the time of the strike, Empie and his gang pointed out, "See what happened because you didn't listen to <sup>us</sup> me." Haas and his gang retorted to them, "See what happened. That's because we had too many Caucasians here." Since then the issue was brought to the open in the staff conferences many times. Haas accused Empie of having many unnecessary workers under him; he accused Empie of nepotism. He had Rhinehardt, his father-in-law, in one of the key positions. He also had his relatives on the Casual Labor status. Haas pointed out these malpractices to the staff. Empie was so incensed at one time that Head and Gelvin asked Haas to lay off the subject. Haas, however, refused to do so, and he was instrumental in abolishing the Casual Labor. (That was in September, 1943)



JANUARY 13 -- (7)

(Cf: My October Journal. Caucasian laborers were withdrawn from the Bailer room of the hospital. The Indians were fired from the Parker railhead warehouse. At the time about three hundred men were fired.) When Haas argued with Empie on the Casual Labor issue, the latter said, as Haas quoted him, "What's wrong with spending the money that had been appropriated? I will spend every penny that's there." Haas reported with an argument for government economy.

Haas thinks that Empie had been convinced that he was wrong when he left for the Reclamation Office job in the Department of Agriculture at Denver. He thinks it is a sort of demotion for Empie.

13. It was at the time when Moris Burge fired ~~Arx/Arx/~~ Albert Kaniye from the office of ~~Block/Block~~ Block Managers Supervisor for Unit III. Some of the Temporary Council members of Unit III wanted to know from Burge what had happened. Kaniye had been airing his grievances against Burge to his friends. Burge, however, refused to reveal the reasons of firing Kaniye to the councilmen saying that it was none of their business. Haas at that time was acting as the advisor to the council. When he heard this, he immediately went to see Burge. Burge was in ~~the~~ a meeting of the Block Managers. Burge replied through a messenger that he could not be interrupted just at that moment. Haas sent the messenger back with an instruction that he wanted to see Burge just at that moment. Haas started on his arguments of self government, when Burge <sup>had</sup> come out of the meeting on Haas' demand. Haas told Burge that the councilmen certainly had a right to demand an explanation from Burge for his action in re-



JANUARY 13 -- (8)

gard to Kaniye. Burge <sup>was convinced by</sup> <sup>that he had made a mistake</sup> ~~saw~~ the arguments by Haas<sup>1</sup> and explained the matter in full detail to the councilmen. Haas believes that Burge has learned a good deal since then; he is willing to listen to the evacuees. (Cf: October 27, page 17)

14. Head relied heavily on John Evans at the beginning for advices on how to run the center. Evans, in turn, was advised by Tomo Ito, Roy Furuya, Tack Nishimoto, and others like them. Whenever Haas gave some advices to Head which were not in line with those from Evans, Head used to say, "You are not in touch with the community. Evans knows the community." Haas said, "Evans is out of touch. I know the community." Evans gave Head too many "bum steers". After the November strike, Head realized that Haas knew more about the community than anybody else, and he began to rely on Haas more and more. Nowadays Head relies on Haas heavily.

15. Giles Zimmerman is a conscientious objector. He is serving in a medical corp. There is <sup>one</sup> conscientious objector working on the project. He is a Montgomery, a school teacher for the Poston High School, working at 5 dollars a month.

\*\*\*\*\*

I did not get these informations from Haas for nothing. I had to pay a price for them. The items given to him in exchange were

1. Hayano-Takahashi issue
2. Inside politics on the Roy Furuya case
3. The attempt to put the Recreation Halls under one central organization.
4. What the Police Commission would attempt in the future, provided I am not dethroned.



JANUARY 13 -- (9)

I don't think I paid too highly for them. Haas was more than usual willing to reveal confidential news. He is leaving Poston with regret.



2  
Admin  
January 12 -- (1)

Wade Head wired the project that he was arriving here tomorrow with Dillon Myer, who is en route to the conference of Evacuee Property officers and Project Attorneys at San Francisco. Head instructed the appointed personnel to withhold the news of Myer's coming from the evacuees, "because he wanted to show Poston in the normal time as it is." I attribute the secrecy to the fear of the Administration that the residents might tie up Myer's arrival with Head's rumored resignation, and that they might begin some agitation to keep Head here.



#####

January 3, 1944

2 Admin  
TO: All Evacuee and Appointed Personnel

SUBJECT: Responsibility for Government Property

Jan 8  
Policies of the WRA with particular reference to property control and accountability provide that every employee, evacuee and appointed personnel, is directly or indirectly responsible for all supplies, materials and equipment used on the Center.

Indirectly you are responsible for the care and proper use of Government property, regardless of who may be the actual custodian. This is your duty as an employee of the WRA.

Directly, you are monetarily responsible for property in your custody or under your supervision. Conservation and proper utilization of Government property should, therefore, be one of your primary objectives. Remember that your personal investment in this property as well as Uncle Sam's interests must be protected.

Disregard for this purpose any previous distinction between expendable and non-expendable property, for it is all accountable in one way or another. Government property in your custody must be accounted for irrespective of its kind, quantity, quality, value or dimensions. You should always be prepared to (1) produce the item, (2) a receipt therefor or (3) some other document to prove its legal disposition.

In the absence of the above, the Board of Survey may determine financial responsibility, particularly where negligence or abuse is evident. Salary deductions can be made in such cases.



JANUARY 8 -- (6)

Any accident or improper conduct where personnel or Government equipment is involved must be reported immediately through proper channels to the Washington office. All cases of negligence or unauthorized use of Government property become a part of the employee's personnel records.

Your fullest cooperation in carrying out the WRA's program of conservation of Government property and the personal safety of its personnel is anticipated.

W. Wade Head

Project Director



#####

Jan 7  
2. Admin.  
(Cross reference  
in 3 a)  
Walter Balderston, the Chief of the Community Activities Division,  
visited me and revealed the following facts:

Wade Head put an extra effort in preparation for his speech on  
January 2. He spent a whole day on it. The A.P's had been impressed  
that the speech was going to be "extra special" for him. The subjects  
for the speech had been prepared by the Community Council. He did not  
know that the speech was to be presented to the evacuees as a surprise.



JANUARY 7 -- (4)

"When Wade told me that he was going to make statements in Japanese, I nearly flopped." There was discrepancy between Head's speech and its translation.

Assistant Director Hoffman of Gila sat in the Leave Clearance hearings conducted by Haas, Powell, and Balderston (not as a team). He was greatly impressed by the way the hearings are conducted here. He thought the informal atmosphere created in the Poston hearings was better to bring more and truer facts out.

"Everything I hear about Gila is disgusting."

Wade Head does many things which are disrupting and disturbing to other A.P.'s. He says "yes" to the last man who comes to him. He acts on matters without consulting the departments directly concerned with them.

The Indian Service had had their own way about running Poston, not minding W.R.A. orders. Now that the W.R.A. has taken Poston over, they are trying to even the score. They are meddling into everything. It will be all right shortly.

The boiler attendants went on a strike at Minidoka. I asked Balderston, "As far as the W.R.A. is concerned, isn't Minidoka supposed to be the most loyal and trouble-free center?"

Balderston asked me what I thought of Dr. David French, the new Community Analyst. I told him he was getting off pretty good because he is getting his Poston slants from Ted Haas, not from Leighton's research results. Balderston came out with a statement that he had been disappointed by Leighton's works. He has read all published and unpublished articles, which he thought were regrettable and unauthentic. He criticized especially severely the article for a psychiatric magazine,



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as "lousy."

French interviewed a number of evacuees on the speech by Wade Head. He found that the residents remembered only a few highlights of the long speech, each remembering different subjects than others. The two subjects.- (1) The war will last six years yet. (2) He will quit if the residents did not cooperate with him - were remembered by most of them. Balderston asked me if that is correct. I replied that the length of war was remembered by many as French had observed, but as to the other subject there were many people who had no interest whether Head would remain here or not. These people reported other subjects as the highlights of the speech. (The latter topic was given only in the Japanese translation and not in the original. Interpreter Nagai added it extemporaneously. He had been given the privilege to add anything he wanted. It may account partly for the fewer number of persons remembering Head's intention for the future.)



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There was a rivalry among several political leaders to get the assignment of delivering the Japanese translation of Wade Head's speech on January 2 from the Block 4 stage. The competition was especially keen between Nagai and Okamoto, Nagai finally winning out.

Head's draft of the speech was turned over to the Executive Board at the end of last year. It was then turned over by Nagai to his subordinates, Matsubara and Okabe, for its translation into Japanese. The draft contained an instruction that the interpreter may add anything he desired in the Japanese translation. Both Matsubara and Okabe kept this instruction secret, because Nagai would certainly expound lengthly on his own theory of how to run this camp based on his "half-baked" academic principles. They withheld the manuscript in Japanese until the last minute.

K. of the Poston Chronicle told me that Nagai likes to get hold of anyone coming into the office of the Executive Board and to start his speech beginning with "From the standpoint of the great principle of the Co-Prosperity program for the Greater East Asia . . ." or "Speaking from the theoretical conception of jurisprudence . . ." or any other academic sounding phrase. The other members of the Board hate to listen to Nagai's speech, and they usually walk out of the office as soon as Nagai starts on them.

K. was told by many persons in the know that the A.P.'s were greatly disappointed when Nagai had been selected recently as the chairman of the Executive Board.



See also Attitudes, January 3.