

7
1943

THE SEPARATION OF NISEI AND KIBEI

Statement prepared by
Dr. Robert Redfield

The arguments for separation of Nisei and Kibei I understand to be these:

- 1) It would enable us to say: "The loyal majority of Japanese have now been set apart from those who may not be loyal, and therefore the restrictions placed upon the former may be relaxed during the war and their return to normal life at the end of the war may be made easier." Hearing this, the public might be more disposed to accept the relaxation of restrictions.
- 2) Encouraged by this forward-looking and humane policy, the Japanese themselves might better accept the circumstances of confinement.
- 3) It would enable us to show advocates of a severe policy that more stringent restriction of the more dangerous had been undertaken.

The arguments against separation I understand to be these:

- Not guilty
on a
presumption*
- 1) The public might not respond as suggested above; it might then prove impossible to relax the restrictions; disappointed, the Japanese might lose confidence in the United States, and the prospects for readjustment of the Japanese to American life might be made worse rather than better.
 - 2) It would separate families (brothers from brothers, chiefly).
 - 3) Administrative difficulty.

I cannot judge the administrative difficulties, and I consider the issue without weighing this factor.

The argument that families would be separated does not seem to me to be strong. Separation would occur at the choice of one of the pair separated, and such separations have already occurred.

The remaining argument against separation depends upon future events which are unpredictable, as does equally the corresponding argument in favor of separation.

✓

In the face of this fact, I incline to separation because the step is consistent with what I take to be the fundamental conception of the enterprise: these are Americans who, because of a dangerousness which exists in a minority of them who cannot be at once identified, must be protected, and must be placed so that the rest of us are protected from that danger. The task is to identify the truly dangerous and confine or deport them, and to re-introduce the rest into American life. Separation is a step in that direction. It reduces the degree to which all may be supposed to be dangerous (while increasing the degree of suspicion attaching to a segregated minority); and it provides a mechanism whereby individuals may be moved from the prima facie dangerous group to the group which is not dangerous.

I incline to separation provided the Nisei are in favor of it, and provided the objectives of the action are made known to the Japanese leaders, together with the risks that attend it. I would say, "The attitude taken toward Japanese Americans depends on events beyond the control of any of us. The good will that we may hope to gain by this measure may not be realized. But if and when and to the degree that the people of the country are ready to accept Japanese Americans into their communities, the separation arrangement should make easier the return of the loyal to normal life. There is a risk of disappointment. Take this risk with us. It is American to take risks for good causes."

Jan 2, 1943
The others
WRA
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NOTES ON GENERAL DEWITT'S SEGREGATION PLAN

BY John Embree

1. This Plan involved the moving of several thousand individuals now in relocation centers to units 2 and 3 of Parker (Colorado River Relocation Center) and removing the present inhabitants of these Parker units to various other relocation centers.
2. The types of people to be moved, designated as "segregatees", are as follows: Repatriates, parolees from detention centers, evacuees with police records in assembly and relocation centers, evacuees listed as potentially dangerous by the intelligence services, members of families such as may elect to accompany segregatees, and their children under sixteen.
3. The aims of the Plan are to produce two results: To avoid "increasing necessity for use of troops in maintaining order", and to avoid "Loss of a useful manpower reservoir".

4/ The above three items will be commented upon in order:

1. The present inhabitants of relocation centers are just beginning to recover from the extremely unsettling effects of evacuation from their homes, a period of life in an assembly center under military guard, and a relocation to various centers in country and under conditions new and strange to them.

Under these unsettling conditions the building up of a new community life and law and order is difficult, made the more so by unnatural conditions of life in the relocation centers. Any new large-scale relocation of people by groups without a hearing and under conditions of martial law as proposed in the Segregation Plan will renew and aggravate all the old frustrations and anxieties produced by the evacuation. What little sense of security may have been built up will be completely destroyed again.

Social disorganization will be produced not only by suddenly removing hundreds of people from each center without a hearing, but also by introducing into each center hundreds of new people from Parker. The suspension of education and other relocation center activities, which is implicit in the Plan, would add to this social disorganization.

2. The categories of people which it is proposed to move are very heterogeneous. Many perfectly law-abiding people who wish to return to Japan will be put together with a group of people who have police records and another group with **subversive** records. A segregatee camp made of such groups will have no means of building up a responsible public opinion within itself for law and order, and so will need full military control. Furthermore, the placing of repatriates and anti-social lawbreakers together is not very just. The legal bases for again removing thousands of people without a hearing is also doubtful, especially in areas outside the western area.

3. The effects of the Segregation Plan are not likely to be those which are desired. First of all, more military guards will be needed at Parker than at present. Secondly, the other centers, due to increased disorganization as a result of temporary martial law and the carrying out of the segregation Plan, will also need more guarding. Thirdly,

Embree's report on Segregation Plan

the useful manpower reservoir in the centers will be virtually dried up due to the removal of many thousands to Parker and the effects of the carrying out of the Segregation Plan on the population of the remaining centers.

* * *

The above program is virtually evacuation all over again, with all of its attendant difficulties and unpleasant after-effects. It would remove the last vestige of citizenship rights of Japanese-Americans and fly in the face of the Four Freedoms we are fighting for. Furthermore, it would solve none of the present problems of WRA.

During the process, WRA would abdicate authority to a segregation director and would have to assume responsibility for the after-effects of the plan in the relocation centers, a situation not unlike that following the assembly center period.

A POSITIVE VS. A NEGATIVE PROGRAM

It might be pointed out in this connection that the proposed Plan is completely negative. Simply removing thousands of individuals from present centers to a segregation center does not remove the causes of social disorganization in relocation centers. This disorganization has been brought about by the original evacuation experience, which seriously undermined the family and community organization of the evacuees. Together with this social disorganization there has been produced, inevitably, as breakdown in the social controls exercised by family and community organization. Added to this have been the serious psychological wounds suffered by the American citizen group, (two-thirds of the total.) These factors together with the conditions of center life (families in single rooms, common mess halls, barbed wire fences, etc.) produce social conditions requiring a constructive administration of the evacuee population is not to be completely lost.

The WRA has already commenced a positive program within the centers for reconstructing community life and providing for the constructive psychological readjustment of the individuals. Despite the handicaps indicated above, some progress along these lines is being made. Plans are at present under way ~~for the~~ segregating repatriates, since they have expressed a desire to return to Japan and do not have much in common with the rest of the evacuees, who look toward America for their future.

The anti-social elements in the centers are being dealt with in two-ways - by regular processes of local, state and federal courts, and by individual segregation to Camp Moab. All such action is based on anti-social action within centers.

Persons regarded as potentially dangerous to the internal security of the nation need no further detention unless they become anti-social within the centers, either through violence or through attempts to convert their fellow evacuees.

Embree's report on Segregation Plan

The ultimate aim of the present program is also to reduce the number of guards necessary and to return as many evacuees as possible to productive participation in the war effort and in American life. It is believed that the positive and constructive program now under way is more likely to produce the desired results rather than any purely negative measures such as large-scale segregation.

ES

Confidential

March 20, 1943

MEMORANDUM

From: The District Intelligence Officer.
To: The Director of Naval Intelligence.
Subject: Japanese Relocation Centers; Conditions and Activities in.

1. The following information concerning the Japanese Relocation Centers at Poston, and at Gila River, Arizona, was supplied by a Caucasian informant, whose reliability is considered excellent:

REGISTRATION FOR MILITARY SERVICE

B-2 For some weeks past, the main topic of interest in the relocation centers has been the all-important matter of registration for military service of all male Japanese of suitable age. It is apparent that agitators among the Issei and Kibei groups have sought to influence the registration of Nisei youths who, but for interference on the part of their elders, would unhesitatingly have declared their real sentiments with regard to loyalty. The great bone of contention was the manner in which Questions #27 and #28 of the Army Questionnaire, (DSS Form 304 A) were answered. These questions had to do with the individual's willingness to serve in the armed forces of the United States and a pledge of loyalty to our Government, while forswearing any allegiance to the Japanese Emperor.

It now appears that the true purpose of those questions, which purpose presumably was to obtain a reflection of each man's own state of mind, has been defeated by outside influence and later by granting permission, to all those who wished to do so, to change their declarations from "No" to "Yes," more as a matter of expediency than for reasons of loyalty. ✓

B-2 The attitude of the Issei towards the induction of young Japanese into the armed forces is, for the most part, highly unfavorable. The Issei point out that the Nisei are American citizens who have been incarcerated without due cause; that their American citizenship means nothing and that if they are taken into the Army the Nisei will not receive a "fair break." ✓

The attitude of the Nisei in this regard is not unlike that of their elders. The younger Japanese say that, even if they volunteer or are inducted into the service, their parents will still be "locked up." Nisei soldiers already in service, allege, when they visit the relocation camp, that they are unfairly treated in the

Army. The Nisei further complain that even if they volunteer they will not be permitted to stand guard duty; will have no opportunity for advancement, and that the fact of their military service will in no way better their present condition.

B-2 Many evacuees feel that they should have been given a chance to volunteer before evacuation, and that the present offer of an opportunity to volunteer for service is just another way the United States Army has of "putting on the heat." "Why volunteer?" they ask, "If you volunteer they won't give you a break, and if you don't volunteer they'll draft you anyway." ✓

B-2 The Kibei stress all the arguments brought forth by both Issei and Nisei, adding such remarks as, "If MacArthur doesn't get you, the sharks will"; "Your American citizenship means nothing"; "The Army will merely send you out to be slaughtered"; and, "If you leave here your parents will suffer." ✓

At the Colorado River War Relocation Center, Poston, Arizona, the registration is not completed. However, registration within that center during the first few days indicated that approximately twenty per cent of all registrants had answered "No" to Questions #27 and #28.

At the Gila River War Relocation Project, Rivers, Arizona, re-registration was contemplated, inasmuch as agitators had so interfered with the first registration that an accurate estimate of the situation was impossible. It is reported that twenty-seven trouble makers were removed from the camp by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on February 16, 1943, and that following their removal a second opportunity for registration would be offered the evacuees.

B-2 The attitude of Issei towards young Japanese who have left the camps to join the Army appears to depend on whether they believe the boys joining the Army will be given due consideration and acceptable treatment. In general, the idea that the Japanese who volunteer are foolish, appears to be prevalent. |

It has been previously reported that families of Japanese volunteers had been practically ostracized by other residents of the centers. It now appears that most of the unpleasant treatment of such families is fostered by Kibei, who loudly proclaim the accusation that volunteers have been disloyal to their Mother Country, that is, the Mother Country of their parents. It is believed that, in general, the families of volunteers are not the victims of of any actual mistreatment.

as a protection against the extreme summer heat. The grounds around the barracks at Poston are, for the most part, as yet unimproved. The idea has been brought forward that an evacuee's attitude towards the war effort may be determined to some extent by his effort to improve the appearance of the barracks in which he lives. In some cases lawns have been planted, convenient little porches or roofs over doorways have been constructed, all of which contribute to a homelike appearance. It is recalled that Unit #1, which has been brewed in the camp, shows the least improvement of all. the seat of most of the trouble that has been brewed in the camp, shows the least improvement of all.

B-2 At Gila River the barracks are painted a cream-color and are of a construction superior to that of the Poston barracks. Linoleum has been laid over the wooden floors and nearly every barrack has a small grass plot or decorative garden nearby.

B-2 It is reported that a certain amount of dissatisfaction on the part of evacuees is caused by the Japanese help who work in the kitchens in which food is prepared for the Caucasian employees. The food served to the latter is said to be noticeably superior in quality to that served in the mess halls of the Japanese. Many of the Japanese have small charcoal burners or electric plates in their living quarters and are able to supplement their diet by preparing small quantities of food, from time to time, at home. It is reported that the tea supply at Poston, has been exhausted and that evacuees are preparing a substitute brew from rice.

ATTITUDE OF YOUNG CHILDREN

B-2 It is reliably reported that the attitude of the Japanese youth under eighteen is one of frustration and uncertainty. They appear to be dazed by what has happened. Prior to the evacuation they had considered themselves Americans and have since learned that they are considered Japs, the word "Jap," meaning something reprehensible. It is believed by the informant that the young Japanese children are rapidly losing their American ways along with much of their Japanese training. They have seen their elders deprived of the right to govern families and, in consequence of this, many children pay little or no attention to their parents. It is reported that many Issei do not try to take corrective measures with their children for fear their action may be observed by others, "dogs," do-called, who will report them to the authorities for beating their children because the children are pro-American.

NISEI AND KIBEI LEAVING FOR OUTSIDE EMPLOYMENT

B-2 The question of employment on the outside is one that is looked upon by all evacuees with mixed feelings. They

naturally wonder how they will be treated in a new location, and whether their departure may insure better treatment for those they have left behind. Those who accept outside employment feel that if they make good they should be allowed unrestricted freedom of travel throughout the United States and that their families should eventually be permitted to join them.

ATTITUDE OF NISEI TOWARDS SEGREGATION OF DISLOYAL JAPANESE

B-2 It appears that most of the Nisei are heartily in favor of the segregation of disloyal Japanese, if and when it is definitely proved that those persons selected for segregation are disloyal. The whole matter appears to hinge on a definition of disloyalty, and whose parents are to be affected by the decision. Some Nisei feel that their parents are now classified as disloyal because of contributions to various Japanese organizations, the real nature of which, they appear to believe, was unknown to the Issei, who contributed through sentiment or friendship for the solicitor, or because they were afraid of losing face in the communities in which they lived.

B-2 It is reported that several Nisei had expressed satisfaction in the removal from camp of men like Zenshiro Tachibana, who has been several times previously reported by the Eleventh Naval District. At the same time, the same Nisei were very bitter in their denunciation of such men as Saburo Kido, Fred Tayama, Ken Matsumoto and Mike Masaoka, of the Japanese American Citizens League, all of whom have favored segregation. They appear to be of the opinion that these men are a real threat to American security, in that they, in bettering themselves at the expense of Japanese internees, are creating a race hatred. Several Nisei reportedly have said, "When this thing is over, they die."

ORGANIZATIONS

DAI NIPPON SEINEN KAI

B-2 At Poston, the Dai Nippon Seinen Kai (Youth Association) has lost its leader, Zenshiro Tachibana, who was apprehended as an agitator and trouble maker on February 2, 1943.

It is reported that the organization admits approximately fifty members at Poston, but a reliable informant has expressed the belief that there are actually between five hundred and six hundred members. It is the belief of the informant that many of the so-called "steak bakes" and athletic meetings held by the evacuees are definitely connected with the Dai Nippon Seinen Kai.

B-2 At Gila River, the Dai Nippon Seinen is reported to have between seven hundred and eight hundred members. Its leadership is said to be strongly pro-Japanese although it is not known that the entire membership should be so considered. Following the removal of several prime movers in

this group, on February 16, 1943, by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a number of young men, most of whom are Kibei, were said to be actively seeking leadership of the organization.

SEICHO-NO-IYE

B-2 It is reported that the Seicho-no-Iye group at Gila River is made up of several families who are actively seeking new converts. Meetings, attended by fifty to sixty persons, are held in private apartments. It is understood that the administration heads look upon the group as a non-militaristic group, teaching the doctrine of brotherly love, the absence of evil, somewhat after the manner of Christian Science.

No evidence of the existence of Seicho-no-Iye groups at Poston, has been reported.

THE PRESS

B-2 The Poston Chronicle operates under the supervision of Mr. Norris James, who is listed as Press and Intelligence Officer at the center. It has not been determined whether qualified censors are employed to review the Japanese language section of the paper.

B-2 At Gila River, an informant reports that the Japanese section of the Gila River News-Courier is reviewed by censors, but the censors are all Japanese. There is said to be no Caucasian at the Gila River center with sufficient knowledge of the Japanese language to serve as censor. It is understood that Mr. LeBaron, Publicity Director, has stated that he is aware of the fact that items may often reach the Japanese section which are not set forth in the English section of the paper, but that copies of all issues are sent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington, D. C.

CAMOUFLAGE NET FACTORIES

B-2 It is reported that, at Poston, the Issei do as little as possible towards any camp activity and, if employed, they make certain not to over-exert themselves for their pay of \$16.00 per month. The net factory at Poston has only recently begun operation and it is too soon to gather an accurate picture of the situation.

At Gila River, the net factory appears to have the approval of the majority of both Issei and Nisei. Both groups have a certain amount of pride in their achievements and are fully aware that their work is contributing to the war effort.

AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE

B-2 The Friends are very active at both Poston and Gila River. Many teachers on the administrative staff are affiliates of the Friends group, who constantly talk pacifism. Inasmuch as most of the evacuees are Buddhist, it is unlikely that they are deeply impressed by the religious expressions of the Friends, but the attitude of self-pity fostered by the pacifist groups cannot but be harmful.

Dr. and Mrs. Walter Balderston are resident representatives of the American Friends Service Committee at Poston. Although Dr. Bladerston is understood to have no official connection with the Administrative Staff, it is reported that he takes part in all staff meetings. In consequence of this, he is cognizant of all administrative affairs and it is alleged that he "passes on" information to the Japanese and to the organization he represents and by which his salary is paid.

B-2 One Naomi Wood, employed as a school teacher at Poston, is known to be strongly opposed to all war activity and is alleged to have talked to the younger Japanese against volunteering, against Selective-Service, against work in the net factories or any activity that helps the war effort. Naomi Wood is reported to be a divorcee, now engaged to a conscientious objector, name not reported, who visits her frequently at the center. In view of the known attitude of the personnel in Civilian Work Camps towards the evacuation of Japanese, and the constant hammering of these groups on the topic of "mistreatment of minority groups," it appears that the liaison between Naomi Wood and her fiance might be a means of passing information in and out of the camps.

ATTITUDE OF JAPANESE TOWARDS AMINISTRATION OFFICIALS

B-2 It appears that those evacuees who have been given employment close to the administrative officials and serve as informers for them, have the highest regard for those in authority. In general, however, the evacuees feel, especially at Poston, that the camp officials, representing the War Relocation Authority and the Indian Commission do not have the interests of the evacuees at heart. It is reported that many Japanese have expressed the view that the administration is weak and that few staff members have had any previous association with Japanese people and are therefore not qualified to administer the affairs of a Relocation Center. Evacuees feel that members of the Indian Commission in the camps look down upon them as being less than human, and appear to wish to exploit the Japanese for the benefit of the Indian Commission. The evacuees feel that these individuals make no effort to understand Japanese psychology or to gain the confidence of the Japanese. Consequently, the Japanese do not support them.

B-2 At Gila River, the attitude of the evacuees towards the administration officials is said to be much better than at Poston. At Gila, the feeling is expressed that the officials are doing everything they can to help the evacuees and are, for the most part, sincere in their work. It is possible that the attitude of cooperation reported at Gila River may be attributable in part to the presence of a Mr. Williamson, Internal Security Head, who formerly lived in Hawaii, and has an excellent understanding of Japanese psychology and customs.

Norris James, Press and Intelligence Officer at Poston, is apparently not highly regarded by the evacuees. He is reportedly considered known to the Japanese as a white "dog", a stool-pigeon and an informer. It is further reported that James proclaims to all who will listen that he is an intelligence officer. Presumably he wishes to give the impression that he is connected with some branch of government service. He is alleged to have told that he had orders to report to the Twelfth Naval District on January 15, 1943, but that his orders had been temporarily cancelled. It is further stated that James makes frequent visits to El Corral, the only night spot in Parker, Arizona, where he drinks heavily and talks too much.

ATTITUDE OF OFFICIALS TOWARDS UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

B-2 It is believed that most of the officials in the camps are anxious to put a stop to un-American activities on the part of evacuees. The officials are largely dependent on dogs, informers, for such reports as they are able to obtain regarding subversive acts, and it is believed that they frequently received biased and altogether inaccurate information. Having had little or no former experience with Japanese, they are often unable to judge between accurate reports and information that is given by unscrupulous informers in the hope of bettering their own condition while involving others in trouble, often because of personal enmities.

RED CROSS ACTIVITIES

B-2 It has been previously reported that Red Cross activities within the camps have been sponsored and operated largely by Issei. Because of the fact that individuals connected with Red Cross activities have been known agitators, their activities along the line of collecting funds for humanitarian service have been viewed with some suspicion. Although certain of the Issei are reported to have said that through Red Cross assistance they hope to demonstrate their loyalty to the United States, it is also understood that the heads of internal security at Poston, have stated that, to their knowledge, the Red Cross activities at the camp have no definite connection with the National Red Cross structure. It is understood that the National Red Cross is sending an investigator to both Gila

River and Poston to audit Red Cross collections and to insure the proper supervision and dissemination of Red Cross funds.

SPANISH CONSUL'S VISIT

B-2 It is reported that whenever the Spanish Consular Representatives visit the Poston camp they are escorted around the camp by a member of the Administrative Staff or by some member of the Internal Security Board. An informant within the Poston camp reports that the Consul has visited twice during the past five months. He carries on his conversations with the Japanese with the assistance of an interpreter, who is not his escort. The Consul is reported always to have contacted Rev. Masutane Mitani, Zenshiro Tachibana and Gongoro Nakamura, all well-known suspects, previously reported. The general opinion, as expressed by Japanese informants within the camp, is that the relationship between the Spanish Consul and the Japanese evacuees is not good, in that scrambled information is too often given which is, in turn, forwarded to Japan.

SABOTAGE

B-2 Because of the location of both the Poston and Gila River camps, there would be slight advantage to the Japanese in local sabotage. However, there appears to be no organized unit headed by camp officials looking towards the prevention of sabotage such as fire, disruption of the water supply, etc. Naturally, the evacuees themselves would be the victims of such sabotage and it appears unlikely that any will be attempted unless the possibility of a Japanese air raid or other attack on the West Coast makes it appear to the evacuees that their own freedom would be served by destruction of the camps.

However, the possibility of sabotage at other locations in the war area, directed from within the camps, cannot be overlooked.

SECURITY

B-2 The relocation camps are guarded by units of Military Police, whose members are, for the most part, men who are fit only for limited duty. At Poston the guards make a careful check of individuals entering or leaving the camp but reportedly make no attempt to determine what an individual may be carrying in the vehicle in which he arrives, whether it be a pleasure car or truck. The opinion has been expressed that, once past the gate, an outsider could remain within the camp several days without being apprehended.

B-2 It appears that the administrative heads and internal security officials have no definite set-up for obtaining information before-the-fact. In consequence of this, they appear to be vulnerable to any kind of subversive activity that ~~the~~ may be attempted.

B-3 A recent report from another governmental agency mentions the fact that mail communication is constantly carried on among pro-Japanese leaders in the various centers, possibly through the offices of Christian ministers. It is also suggested that the cooperative organizations in the various camps may serve as a means of transmitting information. Certain visits have been made by cooperative leaders to other camps, ostensibly for the purpose of coordinating the activities of the cooperatives.

It is believed that the only censorship in the camps, of mail addressed to persons within the United States, is that of letters passing between relocation centers and internment camps. The mail to and from internees is observed because they are suspects.

RADIO

B-2 Previous reports have indicated a strong possibility of the existence at Poston of short wave sending and receiving apparatus. It is reported that many private apartments in Poston have radio receiving units. Inasmuch as there are radio repair shops within the center, it appears not impossible that short wave units could be assembled without the knowledge of camp authorities.

B-3 It has recently been reported by another governmental agency that as many as fourteen Poston War Relocation Authority trucks with Japanese drivers and passengers have gone by way of back roads to Lake La Paz, some twenty miles south of Poston, presumably to fish. As many as 150 Japanese at a time have been permitted to make these trips, which presumably have accomplished without the knowledge of the War Relocation Authority or the Military Police. It is suggested that an activity of this nature could indicate the establishment of a cache of food and weapons, and that this area might be designated as a headquarters if the Japanese were able to escape from the camp in the event of a strike or other incident within the camp. Because previous reports have indicated the receipt at Poston of short wave radio parts in sufficient quantity to facilitate the construction of a short wave transmitter and receiver, the reporting agency suggests the area near Lake La Paz as a possible location for activities of that nature.

B-2 It is reported by informants within Poston and Gila River, that the evacuees would welcome the appointment, by one of the governmental intelligence agencies, of an officer representative who has had years of experience among the Japanese, especially the Japanese of Southern California, to serve as a contact man who would not only keep in close touch with the activities and sentiments of the evacuees, but work also with the camp authorities to the end that differences may be ironed out and better relations established among the War Relocation Authority and the several intelligence agencies.

Several evacuees have gone so far as to state that they would greatly prefer that such representative be a Naval Officer as they have a high regard for the United States Navy and believe that the Navy understands the present situation better than the Army or the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It appears that the desire for a liaison officer or officers may be concurred in by the administrative heads, inasmuch as information rated B-2 reports that on or about February 27, 1943, a letter was drafted by camp administrative officials addressed to Office of Naval Intelligence, Military Intelligence Service, War Relocation Authority and others requesting that some such action be considered.

Fear has been expressed within the centers that even though action is taken in this regard, persons not sufficiently familiar with the Japanese people, their language and psychology over a period of years, may be appointed and that the situation will actually not be improved.

In a separate letter, the District Intelligence Officer is requesting authority to send into the War Relocation Centers in this district a particularly well qualified officer to contact the War Relocation Authority officials and Japanese residents of the Centers.

C. A. PERKINS,
Acting.

CONFIDENTIAL

April 26, 1943

FOR PERSONAL ATTENTION D.S. MYER

INVESTIGATION OF JAPANESE ACTIVITIES
BY CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION OF WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND
AND FOURTH ARMY

General Statement

On April 9 Mr. Victor Nielson of the Civil Affairs Division, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, brought to the Field Assistant Director's Office of the W.R.A. in San Francisco a film designated "Film A-L". The film is entitled, "Dockets of the Individuals Listed as Subversive (Pro-Japanese), or as a Participant in a Crime at an Assembly Center, on the 'Designee List' under Date of December 17, 1942." This "Designee List" was forwarded to the War Department in Washington by General DeWitt and contains 332 records. No parolees or persons requesting repatriation are included in this list.

Mr. Nielson explained that General DeWitt had been instructed by Colonel Scobey of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. McCloy, to deliver this film to us. We acknowledged receipt of the film and now have it in our possession. We have a Recordak Viewer in the San Francisco Office and can thus make use of these films should the need arise.

I took advantage of Mr. Nielson's visit to inquire as to the nature of the work which he is doing in the Civil Affairs Division in investigating the record of past activities of Japanese evacuees. Mr. Nielson gave the following information.

An extensive program of investigating Japanese activities prior to evacuation and setting up an elaborate system of records has been in progress in C.A.D. for a number of months. This activity is continuing at the present time on a large scale. Mr. Nielson is in charge and has a staff of about 20 persons working on this program full time. His staff includes clerks, statisticians, and interpreters. At one time there were four interpreters but at the present time there are only two. Mr. Nielson estimates that he now has in his office more than 12,000 separate cards giving information concerning individual Japanese evacuees (one card per person) and it is his personal opinion that at least 8,000 of these individuals have a record that shows they are definitely pro-Japanese.

Mr. Nielson stated that there is an "enormous amount of work" yet to do in completing this investigation and that, with his present staff, it will take several months at best to complete it. As far as he knows it is planned that this investigational program will continue and he estimates that, if and when it is completed, he will have a total of about 25,000 records of individuals who show definite pro-Japanese leanings.

It occurred to me that this whole program was of sufficient interest to W.R.A. for me to ask Mr. Nielson if he thought the records that he was compiling could be made available to W.R.A. He said that he would find out. After three or four days I was informed that this question had been taken up, through Colonel Bendetsen, with General DeWitt and that General DeWitt had stated that it would be all right for me to visit Mr. Nielson's office and see first hand the work he is doing. Also, if there is any particular information which we wanted duplicated he would be glad to consider each separate request on its merits.

On April 13, after receiving this word, I made a special trip to the Presidio. Mr. Nielson personally showed me in some detail the program he is directing, including several different types of files he is building up, the checking of Japanese newspapers, bank records, and the translation of a 1,000 page Japanese book on the history of the Japanese in America. The program is so extensive and involved that I made a second trip to his office on April 22 and obtained considerable additional information.

The information obtained to date is summarized below.

Description of Files

File 1. Card File. History of Individual Japanese.

There are over 12,000 cards in this file giving information on individual Japanese. The information contained on these cards has been obtained from several sources the most important of which are: Japanese newspapers published on the West Coast, dating back to 1937 when the Japanese-Chinese Incident took place, an investigation of Japanese organizations, and information obtained from bank records showing contributions of Japanese to Japan in connection with war activities.

Presumably, any Japanese who has his name in this file has done something that would make it advisable to check his record more carefully, with the thought that he shows definite pro-Japanese leanings. Mr. Nielson states that he considers approximately 8,000 of this group to be definitely pro-Japanese.

Mr. Nielson places quite a bit of importance, when deciding whether to include a Japanese in this file, on contributions that have been made by him to any one of several phases of the war effort in Japan. He uses several criteria as to whether a contribution is important. The file includes the name of every Japanese

that has committed any kind of an act that might be interpreted as pro-Japanese. However, Mr. Nielson does not consider a contribution significant unless it is repeated or particularly large. He also tries to consider the financial circumstances of the donor. For example, a relatively poor man making a \$25 contribution would be more significant than a rich man giving \$25.

Mr. Nielson has not had time to carefully analyze his records but he estimates that about 90 percent of the 12,000 Japanese on file are males and 98 percent of all the cards are for people over 21 years of age. He states that it should be kept in mind that, while the Nisei represent approximately two-thirds of all the Japanese in America, only about one-third of the Nisei are over 21 years of age. Also, many of this one-third are under 30 years of age. In general, he finds that seldom does anyone, Nisei or Essei, under 28 or 29 years old, have any kind of a pro-Japanese record. He thinks this is because young people have developed no particular interest in Japanese-American relations.

The cards in question are 5x8 inches and are similar to those microfilmed on Film A-L (see above). Blank copies of the "old" and "new" cards are attached hereto.

File 2, File of Newspaper Articles.

This file consists of several thousand 5x8 cards upon which are recorded digests of articles appearing in the two San Francisco Japanese newspapers and one published in Seattle, Washington. One of the San Francisco papers was a daily which had a circulation of about 20,000 in the Bay Region and adjoining territory. This paper was printed partly in English and partly in Japanese and Mr. Nielson believes it was very influential. He thinks that its policies and management were closely related to the Japanese Consul in San Francisco and to the Japanese Government.

The reading of these newspapers by interpreters, issue by issue and page by page, to glean out any and all articles and references that in any way appear pro-Japanese, is nearly completed. In addition to the above there is an important Japanese newspaper which was published in Los Angeles. The same kind of checking of the issues of this paper has just started. The checking goes back to the Chinese incident in 1937.

These cards are arranged in the file chronologically and "tie in" with the pro-Japanese name file in the following manner:

The information on the cards in the pro-Japanese file (File 1) indicates the date of the article and the name of the Newspaper, and gives a very brief synopsis of the article in which the name of the person in question appears. If one wants to check back to get a clearer and more detailed description of this article, refer to this newspaper file and look up the card which contains this lengthy description by merely referring to the date. In this manner reference can be made back and forth between these two files.

File 3. File of Japanese Organizations.

This file consists of over 100 5x8 cards upon which is recorded information concerning various types of Japanese organizations. Although there are more than 1100 cards, and every card represents a separate group, Mr. Nielson said that there were in reality only about 150 basic Japanese organizations and the others represented branches or affiliations. Japanese organizations and the others represented branches or affiliations. He stated, however, that he preferred to analyze each separate organization for the reason that he found a considerable difference in the activities of the various groups even though they belong to the same "basic" organization. This was so because, in many instances, both the members and the leaders were more pro-Japanese in one group than they were in others.

These cards are useful in determining the nature of the organizations referred to on the cards containing the history of individual Japanese (File No. 1). For example, if the back of one of these individual Japanese cards shows that the individual had membership in three or four Japanese organizations, and there is doubt as to the purposes and activities of these organizations, the details can be obtained by referring to this Organizations File. The information on organizations in this file is given in considerable detail.

File 4. Translators' File.

- This file consists of a set of several thousand 3x5 cards which were made out by the translators at the time newspaper articles were summarized. Each card contains the name of the individual, both in English and in Japanese characters, and also any aliases or other translations of a name that could be derived from the characters appearing in the paper. In other words, these cards are the original ones from which the cards in Card File No. 1 were made up. In all cases these cards were also signed by the translator who translated the article from the newspaper or periodical.

File 5.

This file consists of a set of regular letter-size forms upon which is recorded all incidents in which Japanese got into trouble at the various Assembly Centers before they were transferred to Relocation Centers. This information, however, has been transferred to, and appears on, the cards in File No. 1. Apparently this information is rather incomplete and not very important.

File 6.

This file contains all sorts of information concerning all

phases of Japanese life and activities in the evacuated area and contains such items as lists of Japanese who are heads of pro-Japanese organizations, surname lists, code lists, and confidential letters sent by Japanese individuals and agencies to Japanese agencies in Japan. The most interesting information in this file is a report on a one thousand page book giving a complete history of Japanese activities in America, and a letter sent by an official of a prominent Japanese bank to the home office of the bank in Japan giving a complete plan of action when war broke out between this country and Japan.

Mr. Nielson places a great deal of importance on the book and letter. Only about one third of the book has been translated so far but this includes the Table of Contents which I read. The book is very exhaustive, covering all important phases of Japanese life in America. The author appears to have been a very prominent Japanese and his acknowledgments show that he received assistance from many other influential Japanese. I asked Mr. Nielson if he thought the book contained pro-Japanese information that was not intended for other than Japanese. He said, "Yes", and pointed out that the edition was very limited, was printed in Japan, and that only two copies of the book have been found by the authorities in this country since Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Nielson stated that the bank letter (written before Pearl Harbor) indicates that the writer was sure that war between Japan and the United States was inevitable.

MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITIES OF
MR. NIELSON'S STAFF

Various members of Mr. Nielson's staff are engaged in making a work sheet record of the various Japanese organizations which made significant donations to the Japanese Government during the years 1937-41 inclusive. A tentative work sheet indicates that some \$22,000,000 left this country in one year. Many Japanese pledged themselves to pay one dollar a month to support various war agencies in Japan. Some individuals have donated large amounts.

Mr. Nielson originally had four interpreters working on his staff but now has only two. These are engaged in reviewing the Japanese newspapers and are just now starting reviewing newspapers which were published in Los Angeles. One girl is working full time checking various bank drafts which left this country for Japan, in order to obtain clues to records indicating substantial donations made to the Japanese Government. The Yokohama Specie Bank and the Sumitomo Bank are the most important banks in this connection.

/s/ Philip Webster

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Project Directors' Roll Call on Segregation

May 1943

Bennett -- Favors segregation; individual investigation -- examine internal security dockets -- Project Board to consider; segregate those who said no to 28, with immediate families; examine leaders of drama groups and Japanese societies -- largely issei; approximately 1000 males -- 3,000 people; mere trouble-making not enough -- purely on loyalty basis. (Sees correctly distinction from Leupp.) Segregate all repatriates. Can pick out first 50% in 45 days. Last group another 60 days to pick out. Don't use Canal unit for this purpose -- remove disloyal to separate center.

Taylor -- Evacuees favor segregation; has group (about 1200) of well-trained people who are disloyal; 1372 applications for repatriation -- this includes women and children; plus 57 on original list; and plus 79 Hawaiians equals 1508 repatriates in last few weeks; between 1900 and 2000 that should be segregated. Favors their segregation; expects no trouble from their segregation, and expects trouble if they're not segregated; cleavage among the 2000; approximately 1200 versus 80. (D.S.M.: If remove 10 leaders, would the rest of the group remain cohesive? P.A.T.: Removal would bring trouble. Majority have definitely made up their minds - only few would pull out of group as result of removing leaders.) Use hearing procedures, etc. on some in this group before segregation. Investigate certain other associates.

Head -- Agree with Bennett; start with repatriates; segregate a group that says they're protected by Geneva Convention and hence refuse to work, etc.; Judo and Sumo and Shibai groups -- segregate; can process group in 2 months.

Ernst -- Relocation is No. 1 job of segregation -- plus stronger Community Council, with issei representation, plus stronger internal security, plus Leupp as a cooler, and let them return to center when term is ended. But also have a segregation center. Discount answers in registration; chance to review those who want to change no answers; segregate those who ask for it. Repatriates, but talk with families. Don't segregate by classes. No evidence that over 50 people need to be segregated. About 650 have asked for repatriation. Would segregate those who stuck to repatriation request.

Johnston -- Will have to have segregation. Need for: (1) internally, and (2) public relations. None of us smart enough to pick loyal from disloyal. Segregate repatriates, and a few definite "noes". From there on, very hard to select: will make registration a "tea party" by comparison. Segregate: repatriates, noes, groups suggested by FBI, etc.

Robertson -- 1089 have asked for repatriation and noes above 17 years. Only 348 aliens in this group - rest are citizens. Have had opportunity to change noes -- only about half dozen have changed -- sees no advantage in further investigation of noes. Start segregation with citizens. Should segregate immediately -- move 439 citizens who said no and ask repatriation, plus 192 who said no but did not ask repatriation, first. ✓

Merritt -- Circumstances surrounding noes deprive those answers of loyalty significance; On the reregistration -- over 97% answered yes -- even repatriates answered yes. Recommendations: 365 people be denied leave and make legally possible surrender of their citizenship. (Prevent "kibei" problem - lose citizenship if born here - leave for 5 years. before maturity - unless appear before Board and show knowledge of English and loyalty.) Segregate the 365 - all are kibei. (Another 65 wanted to change to yes and gave good reasons.) About 900 nisei said no: does not mean disloyalty. Can satisfy selves on project about loyalty of these through interviews, but can't prepare adequate dockets to satisfy Washington on these conclusions. Segregate repatriates and disloyals after are sure "no" means disloyal.

Coverley -- Favors segregation. Disagree with Robertson that should segregate citizens first, since aliens are dominant group among evacuees. At Tule, large group to segregate. Segregate between 5,000 and 5,500. Tule would be a good segregation center. 5000 made up: 2800 who refused to register, fairly deliberately disloyal; 1200 citizens who said no. This 4000 includes the repatriates. Adding dependents under 17 brings the total to 5,000 to 5,500. Mechanics: Don't gaze into hearts and minds to determine loyalty - use objective tests.

Stafford -- Unclear about meaning of loyalty. Have 397 repatriates; 125 noes - 82 males, 43 females; some of the noes have already changed; concerned about those who sign anything but practice "passive resistance" - about 200 - cause no trouble but make no contribution. Move out repatriates and those who answered no with clear understanding. Consider also those who practice "passive resistance". Total to be segregated - rough guess - 1000 including families.

Lindley -- Segregate repatriates (about 100) and no answers (about 100 to 150). Small groups. Total about 200 plus families. Between 200 or 300 all told.

Best -- Segregate on basis of loyalty will brand the evacuees. We'll make some disloyal by pinning such a label on them, and by kicking them around. Boys at Leupp are not troublesome; are loyal to WRA. Some say they want to live as Japanese - should be segregated so they can.

Cozzens -- Should segregate repatriates. If possible, keep them separate from other segregates. Also segregate noes, and those whom deny indefinite leave. Give a chance to change negative answer, but in 90% of cases, got fairest answer first. Disagree with Robertson about moving citizens first. Disagree with Merritt about not taking no answers seriously. If set up board to examine evacuees, important to ask whether they have dual citizenship and which they want to keep. Passive resistance has large bearing on loyalty.

Cozzens (continued) -- Segregate as rapidly as possible but don't move wholesale over night - make too many mistakes. Should make definite statement that our relocation program is only into non-military areas. If did so, evacuees would give up hope of return to West Coast and relocate faster. Also get support from West Coast.

Whitaker -- Segregation should be on individual basis as loyalty is. Can't move everybody at once. Move some groups now -- have to consider individuals further. Evacuees will be surprised if we announce segregation - WRA has said can't segregate because of expenses, etc.

Pitts - If reinstitute Selective Service, will help. Some noes due to resentment over no Selective Service. Some registration officers insisted 27 and 28 be answered same way. Use draft and then use disloyals as labor battalions.

Rowalt -- Surprised at amount of consensus. Pretty well agreed with Washington Committee. Segregation is more or less necessary, but not too desirable.

Procedures on plan C need to be revised to fit segregation without return to West Coast.

Myer -- 1. Opposed to categoriaal segregation - except repatriates and expatriates who stick to that after check. 2. If segregate quickly -

great upset, morale disturbance, etc.; disrupt relocation program, farm program, schools, etc. 3. Ready to move on segregation - no disagreement about repatriates. (Can handle trouble-makers through Leupp and internment camps.) Public demands segregation. Project Directors agree. 4. Will set aside segregation centers; set time tables and start. Will find out what trouble this will cause.

May, 1943

May 10, 1943

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UNITED STATES NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
Eleventh Naval DistrictCOUNTER INTELLIGENCE TOPICAL STUDY MEMORANDUM
B-7-0REGISTRATION OF JAPANESE AT RELOCATION CENTERS
WITHIN THE ELEVENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Registration of all Japanese above the age of seventeen years was carried out during the months of February and March within the relocation centers at Rivers and Poston, Arizona. Its purpose was to enroll volunteers for the all-Nisei combat unit; to ascertain the loyalty of registrants insofar as such could be determined by their own declaration; and to obtain knowledge of the number of Japanese males who may be available for selective service. It is understood that American-born girls as well as alien men and women over seventeen years of age were registered at this time for leave clearance. Individuals not available for military service are to be considered for employment in agriculture or in other useful pursuits outside the relocation centers.

GILA RIVER WAR RELOCATION CENTER, RIVERS, ARIZONA

At the Gila River Center, the first phase of registration had as its purpose the enrollment of volunteers for the United States Army. On February 6, 1943, a "team" composed of an Army Captain, and three non-commissioned officers, one a NISEI, arrived at Gila River to acquaint the Camp Administration with their plan of procedure.

Two days later, February 8th, a meeting of all camp leaders was called. In the presence of block managers, community councilors and other Japanese leaders, the registration program was outlined by the Army "team" and various officials of the camp administration. On February 9th, an open meeting was held at each of the two camps, Canal and Butte. At this time the plan was again set forth in detail by the officer in charge of the Army registration group and following his address a question and answer period was thrown open to the audience. The meetings were quiet and orderly.

On February 10th, camp officials called a meeting of the ISSEI, in order that parents might be made fully cognizant of the plan for registration of their sons for voluntary induction into the Army. Inasmuch as there are many Issei whose knowledge of English is extremely limited, it appeared advisable to conduct the meeting largely in Japanese. The principal speaker was an Army Sergeant of Japanese descent, who addressed the group in Japanese

but because of his lack of facility in that language he soon became the target of hecklers who tried to ridicule him by means of their superior knowledge. The meeting became more and more disorderly, as the hecklers were encouraged by frequent shouts of "Banzai," by one Mizuno, Akira, an alien, formerly of Stockton, California. Dyo, Tsutomu, requested permission to ask a question, but having gained the floor, began a speech which resulted in the forced adjournment of the meeting. Speaking in Japanese, Dyo said that the evacuees ought not to fight for a country that did not trust them and had deprived them of their rights as citizens. At this point the Army Sergeant attempted to explain that he had no authority to comment on political matters, whereupon he was jeered and ridiculed to such a degree that the meeting was adjourned.

On February 11, 1943, special meetings were scheduled at Butte and Canal camps for the purpose of assisting Kibei in the registration. In the Butte meeting, which was held first, so much difficulty was experienced in attempting to maintain order that, again, a forced adjournment became necessary. The Kibei meeting which had been scheduled for the Canal unit was thereupon canceled.

War Relocation Authority officials called a meeting of camp leaders for February 12th. At this meeting the gravity of the situation was pointed out and leaders were informed that no further disorders would be tolerated. The Army Captain in charge of the registration informed the War Department of conditions encountered at Gila River and on February 13th, Colonel Scobie arrived to take charge of the registration. On that day an unauthorized meeting of Kibei was held in the hills back of Butte Camp. Fukumoto, Kameich a Kibei and leader of the Gila River Seinen Kai addressed the assemblage, stating, in effect, that the draft in World War #1 had been a failure and that young Japanese should not fill out the Army questionnaires. Confidential informants (B-2) stated that Fukumoto had been active in attempting to persuade young men to answer "No" to questions #27 and #28. ✓

Question #27 asked if the registrant would be willing to fight anywhere against any enemy of the United States. Question #28 was worded as follows: "Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese Emperor, or any other foreign government, power, or organization?" On the questionnaires to be signed for leave clearance only, question #28 was modified to read: "Will you swear to abide by the laws of the United States and to take no action which would in any way interfere with the war effort of the United States?"

Fukumoto, who is reported as having been highly emotional and violently pro-Japanese in his remarks, was forcibly removed and taken before Colonel Scobie who, it is understood, did not mince words in his denunciation of Fukumoto's behavior.

Registration appeared to have arrived at a standstill. According to information from another governmental agency, about seventy per cent of the male residents had answered "No" to questions #27 and #28, as of February 16, 1943.

On February 16th, fifteen Japanese aliens and thirteen Kibei, outstanding agitators who had been most active in attempting to influence registration, were removed from the camp. The aliens were interned at Lordsburg, New Mexico, and the Kibei were sent to Moab Relocation Center, Moab, Utah. It was reliably reported that, after the removal of this pro-Japanese group, evacuees were permitted to re-register. At that time the number answering "No" to questions #27 and #28 dropped to thirty per cent and no further trouble was experienced during the remainder of registration proceedings. It is understood that the War Relocation Authority kept a record of all persons who changed from their original declaration.

At the completion of registration, on March 10, 1943, one hundred one (101) Japanese-American male citizens and five (5) aliens had volunteered for service in the combat unit. The five aliens who volunteered are listed herewith:

1. Asaka, Harry Suekichi
Formerly of Pasadena, California.
2. Hadu, Sadayuki
Formerly of Santa Barbara, California.
3. Oishi, Alfred Junichiro
Formerly of El Monte, California.
4. Oishi, Gerald Jiro
Formerly of El Monte, California.
5. Ozawa, Harris Hayato
Formerly of Pasadena, California.

The files of the Eleventh Naval District reflect no derogatory information on any of these individuals.

Many individuals who are said to have been instrumental in influencing disloyal registrations are still residing at the center as only a handful of the worst agitators were removed. The following individuals are believed to be troublemakers who escaped removal because of a lack of evidence against them.

1. Nomura, Katsuyoshi, 24-14-C; born in Japan in 1898; entered the United States in 1918. Nomura, who builds models of Japanese warships with "Rising Sun" flags, is reported as having said, during the registration, that Issei and Nisei, alike, are all children of the Emperor. He desires immediate repatriation to Japan following the war and wishes never to return to the United States.
2. Sugai, Tomojiro, 24-3-D; born in Japan in 1884, and prior to the evacuation resided at Santa Maria, California. An informant of unknown reliability states that Sugai, a parolee, visited the parents of young Nisei in his block, on the night of February 16, 1943, and told them to advise their sons to register "No" on questions #27 and #28; not

to worry about answering "no" as there was nothing the government could do about it. Sugai's own sons, Francis and Kinji, both answered "No" to questions #27 and #28.

3. Ishinari, Genjo, 73-3-D; born in Japan in 1897 and prior to evacuation resided at Stockton, California. Informants of unknown reliability stated that Ishinari had advised many persons not to work in the camouflage net factory and to answer "No" to questions #27 and #28. He is alleged to have said that Japan has embarked on a sacred mission in the Orient and that he, himself, would gladly die for Japan. Ishinari is reliably reported as a troublemaker, gambler and strongly pro-Japanese.

Authorities stated that all residents of the Gila River Center over seventeen years of age had registered, with the exception of about one hundred thirty (130) individuals who were, for the most part aged aliens, ill, or ignorant of the time limit placed on registration. It was not believed that any who failed to register did so from any subversive motive.

Statistical record of registration at Gila River, Arizona:

Total Population	13,274
Total Aliens Registered	4,627
Total Male Citizens Registered	2,588
Total Female Citizens Registered	2,394
Total Registered	9,609
Total Male Citizens Answering "No" to #27	1,098
Total Male Citizens Answering "No" to #28	894
Total Female Citizens Answering "No" to #27	1,511
Total Female Citizens Answering "No" to #28	244
Total Aliens Answering "No" to #28	2
Per Cent Male Citizens Answering "Yes" on #27	57.6
Per Cent Male Citizens Answering "Yes" on #28	65.4
Per Cent Female Citizens Answering "Yes" on #27	36.9
Per Cent Female Citizens Answering "Yes" on #28	89.8
Per Cent Aliens Answering "Yes" on #28	99.9

COLORADO RIVER WAR RELOCATION CENTER, POSTON, ARIZONA

At the Colorado River War Relocation Center, registration of all residents above the age of seventeen years was begun on February 10, 1943, with the registration of male citizens. By February 24th, 3,321 individuals had been registered and of this number 236 volunteered for service in the all-Nisei combat unit before the so-called "volunteer registration" was closed.

Beginning March 1, 1943, female citizens and aliens were registered in an effort to determine their loyalties and their potential danger to the security of the United States if they were eventually released for outside employment. Before March

Registration, Eleventh Naval District

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3rd, the date set for closing the registration period 3,168 female citizens and 5,855 Japanese aliens had signed the registration forms.

According to officials of the War Relocation Authority at Poston, the total registration, 12,344, represented 100 per cent of all persons over seventeen years of age within the center. The total population of the center, as of April 14, 1943, is reported as 17,132.

Registration of men who wished to volunteer for military service was accomplished by a "team" composed of one United States Army officer and three enlisted men, one of whom was a Nisei. Unit #3, Poston, was selected as the site of the first registration because of its relatively small population (approximately 5,000) and the fact that little or no anti-American agitation has taken place there. A prepared speech was ready by the Army officer in charge of registration procedure, after which daily meetings were held for question and answer periods. It is reported that the meetings were fairly well attended and were carried out in an orderly manner, interrupted only by an occasional sarcastic remark. Administration officials reported that no unauthorized mass meetings were held, although small groups gathered from time to time near the block mess halls and latrines to discuss questions #27 and #28.

Block residents were required to report for registration by blocks, at a central booth in the Unit Administration Building. Registration of volunteers was accomplished by the Army "team." Officials reported that there was no evidence of agitation or of tampering with volunteers in the vicinity of the central booth. This was attributed to the isolation of registration booths, which were accessible only to registrants of a designated block which was undergoing registration at a specified time. A few guarded remarks, which probably were designed to shake the morale of prospective volunteers, were heard from time to time, but no actual difficulty was experienced.

fact

Various informants stated that there was no evidence of interference on the part of Conscientious Objectors, of whom there are several among the Caucasians in the center, although it is believed that some of them may have been consulted privately.

Of the 236 volunteers at Poston, it is now reported that seven have requested withdrawal from Service. These persons are:

1. Hirata, Frank
2. Honda, Masami Joe
3. Manaka, Rinji
4. Nakamura, Yoshiyuki
5. Obata, Jack Shiro
6. Shinagawa, Shoroku Howard
7. Yoshida, Fred T.

A review of Eleventh Naval District files reflects no previous information on Hirata, Shinagawa, Obata or Honda.

1. Manaka, Rinji, is possibly identical with subject of 12ND

card #1262, dated July 28, 1937, in which one Manaka, Rinzi, age 24 years, was reported as having arrived from Japan as a steerage passenger on board the Asama Maru, June 3, 1937. Manaka gave his address as 471 Cortez Street, Monterey, California, and stated that he was a sardine fisherman and diver. Manaka, subject of the 12 ND card noted above, was met at the dock, on his arrival from Japan, by five well dressed Japanese who, he said, were his relatives.

2. Yoshida, Fred T., was listed in February 1942, as a Civil Service employee in Los Angeles, California.

3. Nakamura, Yoshiyuki, appears to be identical with an individual of that name who is subject of 12ND card #18152, dated March 14, 1942. He is described as a resident of Reedley, California, and a fencer of the first rank in the Reedley Branch Hokubei Butoku Kai. Nakamura was born in California and at the age of six years was taken to Japan for his elementary education, returning to the United States in 1930. He was listed as student at the University of California, Agricultural Department in 1939.

According to officials of the War Relocation Authority, logical reasons were offered by these men for their desire to withdraw from voluntary service. The reasons were, in all cases, severe family illness or extreme family pressure. Hirata's parents opposed his desire to volunteer on the grounds that they desired repatriation to Japan and wanted their son to go with them.

It is of interest to note that persons concerned with internal security at Poston are of the opinion that the removal of Zenshiro Tachibana and certain of his followers from the camp prior to the period of registration, served as a warning and possibly exerted a sedative influence on others in the camp. Tachibana, organizer and leader of the Seinen Kai and active troublemaker, was arrested at Poston on February 1, 1943, in connection with the strike and riot at that center during November, 1942. Tachibana has been the subject of previous dissemination in the Eleventh Naval District. There could be no doubt that various other agitators and followers of Tachibana were present at Poston during the registration, but they had not yet re-formed into organized groups, for no leader had been selected to replace Tachibana. There had, in fact, been so much bickering among the trouble-making element in the struggle for leadership that the period of registration caught them unprepared. It is believed that these groups will soon have reorganized under new leadership and will operate again as anti-American agitators.

Statistical record of registration at Poston, Arizona:

Total Population	17,132
Total Aliens Registered	5,855
Total Male Citizens Registered	3,321
Total Female Citizens Registered	3,168
Total Registered	12,344

Registration, Eleventh Naval District

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Total Male Citizens Answering "No" to #27	1,203
Total Male Citizens Answering "No" to #28	513
Total Female Citizens Answering "No" to #27	1,626
Total Female Citizens Answering "No" to #28	130
Total Aliens Answering "No" to #28	28
Per Cent Male Citizens Answering "Yes" on #27	63.8
Per Cent Male Citizens Answering "Yes" on #28	84.6
Per Cent Female Citizens Answering "Yes" on #27	48.7
Per Cent Female Citizens Answering "Yes" on #28	95.9
Per Cent Aliens Answering "Yes" on #28	99.5

It appears that the lines of argument or propaganda most often used by troublemakers in their efforts to influence registration were:

1. That the all-Nisei combat unit was in reality a suicide battalion which would be used to effect a landing in Japan for propaganda value only. ✓
2. That the only reason evacuees were being recruited was the shortage of manpower in the United States. ✓
3. That the all-Nisei unit was to be used to fight the Japanese, while the Caucasian soldiers remained on the sidelines as observers. ✓

In an effort to ascertain the reasons for negative answers to the loyalty questions (#27 and #28), several hundred evacuees were interviewed by a member of the Caucasian staff at Gila River, who listed the following points as governing factors in the decisions of a large number of Japanese residents of the center:

1. Mass evacuation of Japanese-American citizens.
2. Classification of American-born Japanese in Class #4, under selective service law.
3. The fact that citizens of Japanese ancestry have, in recurrent newspaper items, been called saboteurs, fifth columnists, etc., although no proof has been brought forward to substantiate the allegations.
4. Non-effectiveness of citizenship rights of Nisei in the United States.
5. Many Nisei believe that they will always be under social handicap, racially and under restricted civil rights.
6. Willingness on the part of Nisei to renounce United States citizenship and accompany their parents to Japan, where they feel that they will have better opportunities than they enjoy in the United States.
7. Adherence to the principles of ancestor worship, through the teachings of their parents. The portion of question #28 which requires registrants to renounce all fealty to the Emperor of Japan appears to have been very annoying to many evacuees.
8. Dislike of white Americans, recently acquired, because

of newspaper and radio comments of an unfavorable character on the Japanese race.

9. Misunderstanding on the part of some registrants that answering "Yes" to question #27 means willingness to serve in the armed forces of the United States whether through selective service or volunteer service.

10. Many Nisei are mentally immature and unable to make their own decisions. Their parents' wishes were, therefore, consulted and in many cases influenced registration.

It is reported that most of the Japanese-Americans who volunteered for military service are still in the camps, awaiting call. Many farewell parties have been given in their honor, and their former enthusiasm for joining the Army appears to have given way in some instances to a certain amount of chagrin at finding themselves still on the waiting list after having been banqueted and toasted as befits volunteers. It is further reported that there is also some embarrassment on the part of camp residents who promoted hasty farewell festivities in the somewhat mistaken belief that the volunteers would be transferred at once to induction centers.

Distribution:

ONI	(2)	ZIO-Tucson (4)	FBI-LA
DIO	8ND	ZIO-LA (2)	FBI-SD
DIO	9ND	ZIO-SP	MIS-LA
DIO	12ND	ZIO- Pt. Hueneme	MIS-SD
DIO	13ND		
DIO	14ND		

Weyer —

MEMORANDUM for the Files

SUBJECT: Notes concerning relations with the War Department regarding segregation and possible revision of exclusion orders, the question of acceptance of Japanese Americans in the Armed Forces and in war plants, and other items.

This memorandum is written in an attempt to permanently record certain facts that may not have been documented and to outline a sequence of documentation that may be helpful to historians and others who are interested in studying the development of the program of the War Relocation Authority ~~xxxxxxxxxx17xx1942x~~ in its various stages.

I became Director of the War Relocation Authority on June 17, 1942.

Colonel Bendetson, who was Civil Affairs officer for General DeWitt, and who was administering the WCCA program, was at that time in Washington. On or about June 20, a meeting was held in Assistant Secretary McCloy's office, attended by Mr. McCloy, Col. Bendetson, Milton Eisenhower, E. M. Rowalt, and Col. Tate.

Col. Bendetson proposed that the War Relocation Authority immediately take over responsibility for the future administration of all assembly centers, also for the movement of people to the relocation centers. This proposal was rejected, because of the very large job ahead of WRA to complete recruitment and training of a staff and to prepare for the reception of the evacuees at the relocation centers, which were then in the process of construction, and for other reasons. One main reason was that we felt reasonably sure the WCCA was anticipating difficulties in administering the assembly centers, and possibly some disorders, and we did not feel that the War Relocation Authority was in position to take over at that time and properly cope with problems growing out of the hurried evacuation to assembly centers.

Almost immediately after this meeting a schedule was outlined by Col. Bendetson and his staff for movement from assembly centers to relocation centers, and the whole movement was expedited. It seemed rather evident that very often movements were made on the schedules outlined even though the relocation centers were not ready for occupancy.

About August 20, Col. Bendetson discussed with me at length the necessity for our immediately carrying out a segregation program and recommended that all Kibei be segregated. This conversation immediately preceded a letter from Gen. DeWitt to Secretary Stimson documenting such a policy, and prior to the time less than 50 per cent of the people in the assembly centers had been moved to relocation centers by the War Department. This letter of Gen. DeWitt's of August 24, was the first of a series of letters documenting recommendations to the War Department which culminated in a very detailed plan for segregation being submitted by the Western Defense Command on December 30, 1942. The general pattern of these segregation proposals was outlined in my letter to Secretary Stimson of June 8, giving reference to letters from Gen. DeWitt, copies of which are available in the files.

My letter of June 8 was prepared in reply to a letter from Secretary Stimson of May 10, 1942, and the tone of these two letters will indicate some of the tensions that had developed over a period of 8 or 9 months regarding the issue of segregation and for other reasons.

During this whole period, the feeling ~~xx~~ in the WRA generally was that we were receiving good cooperation from Gen. DeWitt and Col. Bendetson on all matters pertaining to construction and development

of relocation centers. On the other hand, we felt that on matters concerning relocation policy and programs of segregation and center management, we received very little cooperation and on the contrary, that they often times went out of their way to criticise our methods and procedures which did not meet with their full approval. This was particularly true in regard to police methods at the centers, and the whole general philosophy that we held regarding our dealings with the evacuees.

Beginning in July, 1942 the WRA urged immediate reinstitution of Selective Service procedures for American citizens of Japanese ancestry, which had been set aside shortly after Pearl Harbor, even though there were more than 5,000 boys of Japanese ancestry in the armed forces prior to that time. We recognized that this would be an essential step in getting the WRA job completed. Furthermore, it was discrimination which we felt very strongly should be rectified. Assistant Secretary McCloy agreed with us on this point and immediately went to work in an effort to get a reversal of the decision~~xxx~~ on the part of the War Department.

On about November 1, 1942, after many weeks work, it seemed evident that action would be taken to re-establish the Selective Service procedures on a normal basis for citizens of Japanese ancestry. Because of the objections of certain Generals, however, including Gen. DeWitt of the Western Defense Command and Gen. Drum of the Eastern Defense Command, the announcement of the organization of the Combat Team on January 28, 1943, was compromise measure. It proved to be first step toward re-institution of Selective Service for the majority of citizens of Japanese ancestry.

The battle for the re-institution of Selective Service and the right to fight in the Army, which was requested by many of the Japanese American boys, is a long battle which is not very well documented. The minutes of the meeting of the Japanese American Citizens League held in Salt Lake City in November, 1942, will indicate the position of WRA on this matter at that time, and the JACL went on record during that meeting in support of the re-establishment of full Selective Service procedures.

Following the announcement of the plans for the organization of the Combat Team in January 1943, a registration of all people 17 years of age and over was jointly conducted by the War Department and WRA. This~~xx~~ proved to be a very emotional period at all of the centers and in the midst of this activity the first recommendations were made by WRA to Secretary Stimson regarding possible revision in the exclusion order. This done by letter to Secretary Stimson on March 11, which outlined in detail the problems then existing in the relocation centers. Alternate proposals were outlined and a definite recommendation was made that certain groups be given consideration for return to their homes at that time. These groups ~~xxx~~ included soldier's families, soldiers who had served in the last war, and those whose records indicated their eligibility for work in war plants.

Immediately following the announcement of the organization of the Combat Team in January 1944, the War Department proposed to set up a joint board for the purpose of reviewing the records of the boys registered in the relocation centers who were of military age and who might not have an opportunity to serve in the armed forces at that time because of the limited number ~~xxxxx~~ that could be used

in the Combat Team, with the expectation that ~~xxxx~~ a large number of these youngsters would be cleared for work in war plants. The Joint Board was to have in its membership an officer from Naval Intelligence, the Provost Marshal General's office, a representative from FBI, and the WRA. This board was established and all of the representatives functioned except the FBI representative who simply sat in as an observer and assumed no responsibility for the action taken.

It was expected that the Joint Board would review thousands of cases and it was the hope of WRA at that time that at least 50 per cent of the American citizens might become eligible for war plant work in a period of three to four months. The Joint Board was in existence for a period of about 14 or 15 months and only 486 people were cleared for war plant work by the Board during that period. The whole process bogged down because of the insistence of the representatives of the Western Defense Command that each individual case be investigated and this process bottle-necked the whole program so completely that it did more damage than good to the relocation program because of the disappointments on the part of many youngsters in the centers. The Joint Board took on many new functions never included in the original plan, that developed into cases of whether people might be relocated in the Eastern Defense Command. They started in to process all cases of American citizens who had registered during the period of February and March 1942, and made recommendations as to whether they should receive leave clearance. As a result of this action WRA placed on stop lists everyone whom the Joint Board did not recommend for leave

clearance, until further investigation and hearings could be made. WRA further secured information from the FBI, ONI, and G-2 on many individuals, 17 years of age and over, and asked for further investigation on all cases where there was any derogatory record of importance and also required hearings and investigations on all Kibei who had returned to this country after 1935 and who had all their education in Japan.

Over 11,000 hearings were conducted in relocation centers, involving these varying types of cases. These hearings were spread over a period of 16 or 17 months.

In spite of the insistence on the part of the Army in 1942 and 1943 that they had no responsibility for segregation and determination of disloyalty other than to provide information to us and in spite of the careful work that was done by WRA in checking the records of intelligence agencies, its cooperation with the Joint Board and the thousands of hearings held in the centers which were checked and reviewed by responsible people on the WRA staff in Washington, the WDC determined in the spring and summer of 1944 that they could not accept the recommendations of the WRA regarding these individuals. They decided that a completely new examination would have to be made to determine who should be excluded from the West Coast if and when the mass exclusion order on the West Coast was lifted.

Beginning with the confidential letter of March 11, 1943, to the Secretary of War, there is a whole series of documents and correspondence which will help to fill in the picture and will provide a summary of the discussions that were held from time to time.

I will attempt, as logically as possible, to list what these documents are in a reasonable sequence. A confidential memorandum of March 6, 1944 to Secretary Ickes outlining certain considerations relating to the re-opening of the West Coast to loyal citizens and law-abiding aliens. Attached to this document was the following series of documents - letter of March 11, 1943, to Secretary Stimson from the Director WRA, previously referred to. A letter of March 12, to the Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, to which was attached the letter to Secretary Stimson. This letter presented our objections to the proposed segregation policy and indicated that the ~~xxx~~ major object should be to remove the restrictions against loyal citizens and law abiding aliens and at the same time to provide for the disposition of those definitely disloyal. A letter of May 10, 1943 from Secretary Stimson to the Director of WRA in reply to my letter of March 11. A letter of June 8, 1943 to Secretary Stimson in reply to his letter of May 16. A letter of October 16, 1943 to Assistant Secretary McCloy outlining the need for joint planning and confirming a conversation we had earlier in October. A letter of November 19, 1943 from Capt. John Hall in Mr. McCloy's office, addressed to me, at which time he sent excerpts from Gen. Emmons report dated November 10, which referred to my letter of October 16 to Mr. McCloy. A letter of January 17, 1944, to Assistant Secretary McCloy regarding Gen. Emmons' statements attached to Capt. Hall's letter of some of the developments during the period from March 11, 1943 to March 6, 1944.

Other memoranda that may prove to be of use are a memorandum of March 1, 1944 from the Director of WRA to Secretary Ickes, outlining major problems of WRA, past, present, and future.

a memorandum from the Director of WRA to Secretary Ickes of March 9, 1944 summarizing 10 important reasons why revision in the exclusion order should be made. A draft of a memorandum dated April 5, 1944 and addressed to Secretary Ickes from the Director of WRA outlining plans for bringing the relocation program to a conclusion. A memorandum from the Director of WRA to Secretary Ickes of April 29, 1944 summarizing the high lights in the final report of Gen. DeWitt covering evacuation of persons of Japanese descent from the West Coast. A memorandum to the Secretary of the Interior from the Director of WRA dated May 10, 1944 with reference to the recocation of military orders excluding Japanese Americans from the Pacific Coast area and outlining steps WRA felt should be taken at that time. Memorandum of June 2, 1944 addressed to the Under Secretary of the Interior by the Director of WRA protesting movement of the Japanese section of PMGO to the West Coast and protesting the general re-screening by the War Department of all evacuated people. A letter of June 2, 1944 to the President from Secretary Ickes urging immediate action regarding the revocation of mass exclusions orders and setting forth reasons why the order should be revoked at that time. Memorandum of June 8, 1944 to the Under Secretary of the Interior from the Director of WRA regarding the proposal of the Western Defense Command to permit the return of selected evacuees to the exclusion area. A confidential letter from the President addressed jointly to Acting Secretary Stettinus State Department, and Secretary Ickes, of June 12, 1944 in reply to Secretary Ickes' letter to the President of June 2, 1944. A copy of a secret memorandum to Mr. McCloy, Assistant Secretary

of War, for signature of the Under Secretary of the Interior, dictated on June 9, 1944, which was never sent, relating to General Emmons' ~~ex~~ memorandum concerning proposed changes in the exclusion program. Memorandum of December 8, 1944 for the Files, to which was attached an unsigned letter to the ~~Attorney~~ Attorney General and Assistant Secretary of the Interior and copies of the minutes of the Committ meetings held on November 15, 20, and December 1, were attached. This series give a rather complete story of the developments and plans for lifting the exclusion orders during the period from November 13 to December 16, inclusive.

The final drafts of the proclamation, copy of letter to the President by the Secretary of War on December 13, and Secretary Stimson's ~~ex~~ press release in relation to the lifting of the exclusion orders, pretty well summarize the outcome of the discussions from December 6 to December 16, inclusive.

It was ~~xxx~~ the understanding of WRA and the Department of the Interior on November 13 that the WDC had made a commitment that there would not be more than 4,000 to 5,000 names on the exclusion list when finally supplied included between 9,000 and 10,000 names - nearly twice the original number. This wide discrepancy between the original commitment and the final figure made a vast difference in the problem of WRA both at the relocation centers and at Tule Lake and in its possible effect on persons already relocated who were on the War Department's excludee list. The War Department ~~xxx~~ did agree, however, on December 13 or 14, to give priority to further investigation and review at the centers of those cases on the War Department's excludee list who had previously been given

leave clearance by the WRA after investigation and hearings. All of these people were to be notified that such priorities had been established. An unsigned memorandum was prepared on December 13 for the signature of the Under Secretary of the Interior to the Assistant Secretary of War, outlining the problems existing at that time and the reasons why it was felt it was essential to give priority hearings on these cases.

D. S. Myer
12-23-44

DEVELOPMENT OF SEGREGATION POLICY

1943 FS

It is probable that no other policy has received as thorough a study as that which has to do with the separation of the loyal from the so-called disloyal elements among the population in relocation centers. As early as May 1942, Lt. Commander K. D. Ringle, a Naval Intelligence Officer detailed to the War Relocation Authority to assist in the development of its program, presented the first of what proved to be a long series of proposals. Commander Ringle suggested segregating the Kibei who had resided for a certain number of years in Japan, along with their parents and children. After full consideration it was decided not to act upon Commander Ringle's plan since it advocated arbitrary segregation of a category of persons on the basis of an assumption that practically all the disloyal elements were to be found in a particular group. It was recognized further that such an arbitrary movement, in effect similar to the evacuation itself, would be an injustice to many loyal American citizens among the Kibei who sharply oppose the militaristic course of the Empire of Japan.

On August 23, 1942 the War Department, in a memorandum from General John L. DeWitt, made a similar recommendation. On September 9, 1942 General DeWitt proposed that not only the Kibei but also the Issei be segregated from the others. After further consideration of these suggestions of the War Department the Acting Director of the War Relocation Authority stated in a letter to the Assistant Secretary of War, under date of November 20, 1942, the thinking of that period:

"In one sense, segregation is already getting under way under our new indefinite leave program which became effective on October 1. As it looks now, a steadily increasing number of evacuees with clean records will be leaving the relocation centers in the months ahead to take their places in the economic life of the country in interior

areas where they will again be exposed to the Americanizing influences largely lacking in relocation centers. In a second sense, a certain though inadequate degree of segregation was accomplished through the internment of suspected aliens immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

"Unquestionably, however, there is remaining in the centers a group of indeterminate size whose sympathies are clearly with Japan. There are the applicants for repatriation, for example, who, though they do not now appear to be a particular source of trouble, have made their choice and should be segregated from the others. This we hope to accomplish, provided facilities can be obtained and a practical program can be worked out.

"We are of the opinion that, except for the applicants for repatriation, segregation should be undertaken on the basis of the individual records of the evacuees--records in the possession of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the other intelligence services, and our own internal security officers. Some months ago we considered seriously a proposal to segregate arbitrarily those whose schooling in their impressionable years was taken in Japan. We have abandoned this idea in favor of approaching the problem on a basis of individual records even though a large program of segregation should appear to be desirable as we gain more experience."

The War Relocation Authority was unable to find or otherwise provide the facilities required to house the repatriate group in a separate center, although government facilities were thoroughly canvassed. Other suggestions were informally submitted by the War Department on October 5, October 9, and October 30. On December 30, in response to the request of the Director of the War Relocation Authority, the War Department outlined a comprehensive plan for segregation.

This plan adopted the idea of "screening out" individuals on the basis of individual records, and discarded the categorical approach.

In February and March, 1943, a registration program was held at all ten centers for the purpose of registering residents for military service and for leave clearance for relocation outside of the project areas. This registration was compulsory for all persons 17 years of age and over. Each citizen was required to answer the following question:

"Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, or any other foreign government, power, or organization?"

Each alien was required to answer the following question:

"Will you swear to abide by the laws of the United States and to take no action which would in any way interfere with the war effort of the United States?"

In a letter to the Assistant Secretary of War under date of March 12, 1943, following analysis of the results of this registration, the Director of the War Relocation Authority wrote:

"It is my judgment that the objective of a program of segregation should be to remove the restrictions from those who are cleared by the segregation process and thereby restore fully to the loyal group those rights which are enjoyed by the rest of the public. Restrictions were placed upon the group as a whole because it contained disloyal elements. Remove the disloyal elements and the need for restrictions disappears.

"Most of the plans advocated thus far have been based in too large part on certain assumptions. For example, it has been assumed that certain categories of people--Kibei, aliens, old bachelors, parolees, repatriates, to name a few--contain the dangerous elements, although few people seem to agree on the same set of categories. We now know from preliminary analysis of the results of registration, that segre-



gation on a categorical basis would not have accomplished the purposes hoped for. We would have picked up most of the undesirables, no doubt, but along with them we would have picked up many loyal people while leaving behind some disloyal among the Nisei. However, the results of the registration at last give us a basis for forming judgments as to an individual person's loyalty that may be reasonably sound.

"As you know from our many conversations, it is my considered opinion that segregation of the disloyal without offering compensatory benefits to the loyal would result in something very close to disaster. All evacuees, loyal as well as disloyal, would look upon such action as a tightening of governmental restrictions upon a whole racial group; and so would the public. It could serve only to intensify those anxieties and fears which have led steadily to deterioration of the faith of the evacuees in America. How far this deterioration has gone is perhaps indicated in a comparison of registration figures in Hawaii and in relocation centers. It is time to take positive steps to reverse an obvious trend."

During and immediately following the registration period, a subcommittee of the Senate, under the Chairmanship of Senator A. B. Chandler, conducted an investigation of war relocation centers and WRA policy and administration. Prior to making his report to the Military Affairs Committee, Senator Chandler sent a copy of the agenda to the Director of the War Relocation Authority. In the absence of the Director from the city the Acting Director commented upon the agenda, one item of which read "Those interrogated held the opinion that those who answered "no" to the loyalty question and those otherwise determined to be disloyal should be placed in internment camps." In reply to this point, on April 13 the Acting Director wrote:

1943

"Since results of the registration were first reported us by the projects, we have been giving this problem a great deal of thought. It is our opinion that a separation must be made, and we are planning to make one. We believe, however, that when the disloyal are removed, it will then be possible to relax or eliminate entirely the restrictions now placed against the loyal, permitting them freedom to reinstate themselves in normal life.

"We are also studying the group who answered 'no' and would like to present to your Committee the results of our analysis when it is completed. When this information is collected and studied we shall have valuable guides as to how to handle the segregated group. We shall know which of them are dangerous to the internal security of the country and therefore should be allowed no freedom."

A meeting of all Project Directors was held in Washington the week of May 24. Segregation was thoroughly discussed and a program was adopted which would provide for segregation from relocation centers of those persons of Japanese ancestry who have applied for repatriation or expatriation to Japan, and for the segregation of other persons after interviews and hearings. Persons to be considered for segregation other than repatriates and expatriates are to be drawn from the following categories:

1. Persons who in the registration of February and March answered the loyalty questions in the negative, or qualified their answers.
2. Persons for whom there is an adverse report by Federal intelligence agencies.
3. Persons for whom the Japanese-American Joint Board established in the Provost Marshal General's office does not affirmatively recommend leave clearance.
4. Persons whose applications for leave clearance or other material disclose information which in the Director's judgment requires further explanation.

An operations plan for the segregation of such persons is now being developed and movements will begin as soon as procedures are devised and transportation facilities may be provided. Agencies in charge of transportation advise that it is not possible to schedule major moves until after September 1.

Interview with Malcolm Pitts *by Ruth McKee*

7/15/43

Subject: Background of Segregation

Documents of significance cited:

Memo from Stauber to Director, June 1943 (tables attached)

Memo by Rowalt commissioning WRA attorneys to begin planning for Segregation, writing segregation instruction

Plan C, basis of segregation plans

It was hoped that the leave clearance program would automatically separate the "loyal" from the "disloyal" evacuees, the "loyal" going out under relocation procedure. However, the leave clearance program proved too slow.

Leave clearance committee

Rowalt	Ferguson
Pitts	Barrows
Provinse	Embree
Glick	

Mr. Pitts was assigned to draw up the Segregation Manual. Several drafts were submitted. The final draft, subject to corrections and suggestions by Project staff members at Denver meeting, July 26-27, omitted several sections appearing in former drafts. At this date, the sections on interviewing were still being revamped by Miss Gifford and Mr. Leflar. Train operations were deleted from final Segregation Manual since Army is to take over responsibility.

First public announcement of Segregation at Dies Committee, July 6-7; also discussed at Chandler Committee Hearings, July 3, 1943. ✓

July 8 - telegram to Relocation Centers announcing segregation.

July 14 - Segregation instruction no. 100, sent to Relocation Centers with an accompanying letter written by Mr. Embree.

Contact with other agencies and organizations:

ODT - Mr. Stevenson
Assn. of American Railroads - Mr. Gass
War Dept. - Asst. Secretary J. J. McCloy
Provost Marshall's Office - Bryan
Quartermaster General -

Such a procedure would eliminate the entrance into the procedure of a "Director of Segregation" and "Control Officers", whose purpose I presume is to relieve from the Director of WRA a chore which would soil his hands. It is the responsibility of the Director to administer the segregation program, and he cannot dodge it. He will need, of course,

FILE COPY

1) About 17,000 people

6,000 repatriates

9,000 - 10,000 people involved in "No" answers

1,000 - 2,000 people with "evaluated" intelligence records

2) Place - Tule Lake - Why

1) Large enough

2) Agricultural work

3) Military quarters adequate

4) Least well situated for relocation

5) Large number of segregees now there

6) Isolated

3) Hearings

For all except repatriates and expatriates whose formal application can leave no doubt.

Number who refused to register or gave "no" or qualified

answers to question 28, plus members of families - 13,315

Non-affirmative male citizen answers - - - 4,850

Non-affirmative aliens and female citizens - - 3,204

4) Time - September 1 to October 20

5) Transportation -

About 8 trains with kitchen cars for full period of 7 weeks

20 - 25 trainloads in and about 20 trainloads out of Tule

6) Cost

Approximately one million dollars, mostly transportation.

Cost of transportation about \$35 per person

7) Escort guards

15 - 20 Military Police to each trainload.

Taken to meeting of Senate Military Affairs Committee 7/3/43.

Mr. Fryer: If the Immigration Service keeps _____, why can't we keep repatriates at Stockton?

Mr. Myer: I have raised that question, Cy, when you were at Gila. I don't believe it.

Mr. Smart: Are you actually going to have more than a handful of repatriates?

Mr. Myer: It is question of moving those and their families, who say they want repatriation and who stick to it.

add to Segregation

40

Mr. Stabuer: There are 2,800 in the whole outfit that have said they want to be repatriated.

Mr. Smart: We originally had 50, and 40 backed out, and there are only 10 now. The thing looks kind of academic to me.

Mr. Myer: It may be academic, but we had 2,800 on that basis, with the possibility of another 2,000 that may develop. The question is, shall we try to make some other provision for it, even if we only had ten? If we had 200 families or thereabouts, that would be a thousand.

Mr. Fryer: They certainly ought to be taken out of the projects.

Mr. Stauber: Which ones do you think ought to be taken out?

Mr. Fryer: Those that have requested repatriation.

Mr. Whitaker: I think so too. I think those that have said they want to go back to Japan, they ought to get them out.

Mr. Myer: I say that with some reservation, for this reason, that we have run into a few cases where in a bitter moment an American citizen asked for repatriation. I think some of those cases we ought to reconsider. I don't know. There's a boy I met up at Minidoka just eating his heart out because of the fact that he did just that thing.

Mr. Fryer: I think probably there are exceptions, but generally, speaking, every person who has applied for repatriation.

Mr. Whitaker: Everybody who has applied, after careful consideration.

Mr. Myer: I think I'd give a chance for a recheck before we moved them.

Mr. Tozier: Isn't it possible some people will back out because of the way the war goes?

Mr. Myer: Yes, some of them have backed out. I think we should make a recheck. But in any case,--I have two questions on this segregation thing. Let's assume that we all agree that they should be moved if we can find a place. Are you agreed that we should not start shifting a

lot of families out of centers to make one of our present centers available for them, and we should find some other way to take care of them?

Mr. Glick: I suggest we transfer to the army the responsibility for administering the center where they are put, not only those we are satisfied are Japanese rather than Americans, but also those to whom we deny indefinite leave on application.

Mr. Myer: I talked with McCloy about that, and he says Justice. After all, the internment is taken care of by the army because they had the guarding facilities. He thinks it is the Justice Department's job.

Mr. Glick: I think if we could get rid of the problem of administering the center where the usual liberal policies of WRA are inappropriate,--

Mr. Myer: Might we legally turn over the money for some place, say like this place in Louisiana?

Mr. Glick: I think we can work that out, yes.

Col. Wilson: I think that would be the solution.

Mr. Glick: If we can assume, within the next three or four months, through a special transfer of money to FBI or otherwise, we can have FBI rapidly check through on the basis of applications for advance clearance, which are provided for in the new administrative instruction on leave, all of the evacuees in the centers. Let's assume there are 150, 300, or 500 people, in whose cases we feel if they applied for indefinite leave we'd want to turn them down. Suppose we were to move all those people out of the centers. Then we might actually be free to do this: terminate military areas over the centers, tell the army we no longer need police protection, simplify the leave regulations by announcing, "If you want to leave, you may leave, goodbye", and let it go at that.

Mr. Myer: You are quite an optimist, Phil. You sound like I did six weeks or two months ago. I'm not so sure we want to argue with Justice

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to accept that job, and we will help to finance it, if necessary, to provide space for repatriates where they can be detained in the meantime. If we want to go further and pull out additional people that may be ~~at~~ bad actors, and so on, we can see whether they would be willing to accept them.

Mr. Barrows: I think there is a serious objection of putting bad actors with people to whom we do not want to grant leave. * * If we put them into what amounts to prison or special confinement, we are really violating our commitment that they would not be subject to discrimination if they applied for repatriation. I don't think bad actors need to be put anywhere. That is our problem, we've got it, and should live with it.

Mr. Stauber: You should have a jail to put them in.

Mr. Kimmel: They become martyrs if you put them in a jail.

Mr. Myer: I don't think so, if it is properly handled. You don't have to jail them often, because they lose face if put in jail. The reason they became martyrs is because you had a situation there where it is easy to become martyrs at that time, but I don't think in our situation that would be true.

Mr. Stauber: When we say we want to move in the direction of getting separate conveniences for those who asked to be repatriated, that is one group; but we have another bunch, probably equally large, of persons whom the Japanese government has asked for, many of whom have said they do not want to be repatriated. We don't know what is back of the Japanese government's request, whether they are people--nor the reason back of their declination. Maybe they want to stay here to get further information and take it back.

Mr. Myer: Until we have analyzed that, we have no basis for moving them.

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Seg

WRA
Provine, J. to Redfield (U. of Chicago)

Aug 19 - 42 -

Provine write to
Redfield indicated that
segregation discussions being
carried on

x

segregation

Cen

SEGREGATION OF THE LOYAL AND THE DISLOYAL RESIDENTS

The announcement made by the WRA officials of the segregation of the loyal from the disloyal Japanese in the camps has enshrouded the camp residents with a melancholy atmosphere and has caused tragic disruptions of many a family; between the parents and the children, and even among the children themselves.

It might be, I believe, advisable to keep those who lack self-control and the extremely pro or anti-Japan elements separated from the rest for the maintenance of peace in the camps. But of the wisdom segregating all of them according to their answers to the question No. 28, I cannot but doubt, because their deep and complex sentiments can never be fully expressed in a simple word of YES and NO. There is much room for reconsideration on the problem by the Authority.

Let us take a glance at the common sentiments and the attitudes of the Isseis and the Niseis prior to the Pearl Harbor.

Isseis' Sentiment and Attitude

The Isseis' singular prayer was a peace forever and they wishfully believed there could never be such a thing as war between this country and their old country.

When the commercial treaty between the United States and Japan was unilaterally abrogated by the United States, the Isseis were very much worried, but they thought that was only a diplomatic bargaining on the part of the United States. When the embargo was put on all the exports to Japan by the Government, they were terrified, yet they still refused even to suspect the probability of a war. When they were informed of the news of the "Pearl Harbor" on December 7, 1941, however, they were utterly dumb-founded that they could not believe their ears for a while.

"Be ever grateful to the land to which you owe your living" is a traditional precept for the Japanese. Although the Isseis as a whole had to endure many a persecution and had to overcome so much hardship, they have been grateful to this country for the fact that they have been accorded fairly good living for the past forty years.

To the Isseis, Japan is the mother who gave them birth and this country is the father who provided them living. So, when the war broke out, they were in the same dilemma in which a child finds himself when its parents quarrel. Those who can imagine the feeling of the Isseis on the fateful day of December 7th will understand the dilemma.

They were accused by the public that they were all spies and saboteurs, but their innocence was proved by the fact that the F B I could not, it was said, obtain a single valuable information from any internees, and the subsequent official reports from Honolulu and the other strategic points show that there was not a trace of it.

They are, however, resigned to their fate. If American public insists upon their repatriation, they will leave meekly but ruefully for their mother country though they are deeply attached to the land where they have lived so long and selected as their eternal resting place. This is the common mood of the Isseis today.

Niseis' Sentiment and Attitude

In case of the Niseis, it was a quite different. I had been engaged in a wholesale produce business for thirty years in Los Angeles, and had many acquaintances among the grown-up Niseis in the city and the farm districts. It was quite interesting to me to see their true and unaffected sentiments and opinions on those critical days. Almost every one, excepting very few which was negligible, said, "We are Americans. Our first obligation is to fight for America, though Japan is the country of our parents."

But their sentiments of loyalty and patriotism turned gradually to bitter and antagonistic feeling in proportion as the public opinion toward them became disparaging and abusive. Their conception of democracy in the United States and their understanding of the Constitution were completely upset overnight as was their means of living.

In despondence and confusion over the fate of their future in this country, it was quite natural for them to look to the land of their parents in replanning their life. The majority of them, however, have never been there, and cannot even speak the language of their parents. Japan for them is, in fact, as strange as Russia or Germany. They cannot see clearly through what their future going to be, either in America or Japan. They are just confused.

I appeal to the WRA officials not to blame them for answering "YES" or "NO" to the question No. 28. They are in utter confusion and bewilderment and do not know what they should or ought to say.

Family Disruptions

When we entered the camps there were but very few family discords. However, when the Army solicited them to volunteer last spring, almost every family in the camps was thrown into a turmoil for the first time. The opinion was divided between parents and children and even among children themselves. Worried fathers were saddened, frantic mothers were crying, and many dejected and bewildered children were quarreling and re-monstrating in despair.

The announcement of the plan of segregation by the WRA again has created a pitiful confusion. Let them be alone, I beseech you, excepting those who voluntarily relocate themselves.

Future Peace Depends on Youngsters

How long the war will last? God knows! It is certain, however, that it will end someday and all the nations on earth will again live in peace as God intended them to. No matter how the war may be concluded, the United States and Japan must not repeat the same tragedy under any circumstance.

The Isseis' average age is in the neighborhood of sixty and within ten years most of them will be gone. But the Niseis are still young and the majority of them are in teen ages. Whether they remain in this country or expatriate themselves after the war, they will be an important factor in creating a good-will between the two nations.

Yosuke Matsuoka, one of the greatest diplomats and statesman of the contemporary Japan, was a little poor unknown teenage school boy in Tacoma, Washington, thirty years ago. (On his way home from Geneva he purposely stopped at Tacoma and visited his former employer and sent a wreath to her tomb when he was inaugurated as a foreign minister).

Who knows that there are no second and third Matsuoka among the camp dwellers? Although we Isseis understand the sentiment of the American public toward Japan today, I again appeal to the WRA not to disrupt their family life and not to put the innocent by-standers in bewilderment by asking them the question on loyalty.

Of course it may be necessary to segregate those who are extremely pro or anti Japan and those who cannot control their emotion from the rest in order to maintain peace in the camps.

Tokunaga

For Segregation Chapter

Re Myer request of Nov. 10, 1942,
asking Project Directors to let make
number of evcc. who would volunteer
for armed services, if given
opportunity.

"Providing plan is assigned for services with combat troops,
Boston would be able to enlist

① between 900 and 1000."

(Horris James, Public Relat. Dir., Boston, to Powell, Dec. 18, 42.

no would be

② "fairly consistent with that of any other group
of like number."

(By Robertson, Dir., H. P. Dir., to
Myer, Dec. 17, 1942

③ "incompatible to estimate."

E. B. Cozzens, Actg Dir., S. I. A., to Myer, Dec 9, '42

④ "... we might expect response from 60 to 75
per. cent of the eligible Hisei" ~~(1292)~~ (1292)

(H. L. Stafford, P. Dir., ^{to Myer} ~~Min. Coll.~~, Dec 9, 42.

⑤ "practically all physically fit single men ... would
volunteer for service with the armed forces if offered the
opportunity." (D. E. Harbison, Actg P. Dir., ^{to Myer} ~~Granada~~, Nov. 18, 42

(6) " ... we might expect 165 males to enlist ... If properly handled, we might reasonably expect between 500 to 700 volunteers during the first few months."

(Solon T. Kimball, Actg. P. Dir., Manzanar to Myer, Nov. 17, 1942)

(7) " ... at least 50 percent of those at Tule Lake between the ages of 18 and 34 and single, (2170) would volunteer. "

(1074 at Tule Lake)

(Elmer T. Shinnell, Proj. Dir. ^{Tule Lake} to Myer, Nov. 17, '42)

(8) "Our best calculation is that some 25- to 35% [of transferable - 1550] ... will volunteer. (Charles E. Frost, Proj. Dir., Central Utah, to Myer, Nov. 18, '42)

(9) Ray D. Johnston, Proj. Dir., Bohmer, Nov 14, 42 to Myer, 200 out of 1500 would volunteer

(10) ~~Johnston~~ Paul A. Taylor - Jerome to Myer, Nov. 14, 42 - 550 out of 1572 would vol.