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To G. H.

~~the~~ Province

From E. H. Spicer

Subject: "Summary of Closing Procedures"
John, ^(at Jerome) by Rachel Reese Sady, July 15, 1944

The report on Jerome
procedure ought to go back
to Pitts for comment. (I
notice that John Clear read
it before; probably Pitts didn't
read it).

The report on the effects
of the Jerome closing on
vacancy study about the
future seems to me quite
important. I am having
Rachel reduce it to its
basic points. It will come
to you as a 2 or 3 page
memo shortly & should probably
be seen by the Director & Ed. Arnold. Well

8/5/44

Red Spicer

Mal Pitts has seen, agrees,
and is including material
in his final report now
being prepared with recom-
mendations for procedural
changes. He will send report
to me for inspection

JHP

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Community Analysis Section

July 15, 1944

SUMMARY OF CLOSING PROCEDURES

By Rachel Reese Sady

Transfer Preferences: Very soon after the closing of Jerome was announced the main interest of the evacuees settled on the centers of destination. Block managers made an informal survey of the preferences of people in their blocks, and then a mimeographed preference questionnaire was distributed. Choices and reasons were to be stated, but no indication made of what sort of reasons would be considered valid. Choices were between Rohwer, Gila River, Granada, and Heart Mountain, and at the beginning it looked as if Heart Mountain and Gila first choices would be satisfied, but that many Rohwer and Granada first choices would be disappointed. During the long delay between the issuance of the preference sheets and the actual decision-making rumors about how the preferences were being done ran rampant. People were avid for information about the various centers - climate, living conditions, etc. Some, however, did not care where they went and others claimed at first that they were resigned to being sent to a rejected center (i. e. Gila); however, as time went on interest and tension about the subject increased. Tabulation of first choices of transfer were 1,280 for Granada, 2,983 for Rohwer, 1,067 for Gila, and 357

for Heart Mountain. Since there was capacity for only 2,500 at Rohwer and 500 at Granada, the discrepancy between desires and possibility was obvious.

Up until definite administrative action on the transfer preference problem was taken there was a good deal of anxiety to know centers of destination and some pressure was given the administration to take action. A processing committee was finally appointed to classify according to a scheme of priorities reasons for first preferences, after another mimeographed form had been sent out asking for additional information regarding reasons.¹

By far the majority of the evacuees did not follow the processes involved in arriving at centers of destination - their main interest was in the final result.

The block managers were issued the destination lists compiled by the processing committee and instructed to arrange interviews for block members who felt they had a case for appeal, with a newly set-up Transfer Committee.

Since the majority of the evacuees received their first preference, discontent with the system used was limited. However, outstanding complaints included accusations of splitting families, ignoring the second choices, insufficient weight given the needs of various projects for ministers, Seabrook favoritism, inadequate explanation of the medical classification, obvious clerical errors, atmosphere of confusion and mystery in which the work was carried out, and dissatisfaction with the priority system set-up (specifically, the feeling that soldiers' families should get preference regardless of choice or whereabouts of soldier was considered

¹ For exact sequence of events weekly reports can be referred to; the Welfare Section at Jerome however has written up a chronology with evaluation of adequacy of the entire process, for their final closing report.

by many to be uncalled-for "flag-waving.") Also, the interviews given by the Transfer Committee were severely criticized - many got the feeling that they were only a formality, that individual cases actually had no chance at all and that mistakes would not be corrected. Actually, many mistakes were corrected, but in spite of the fact that the individuals may have ultimately gotten the center of their first choice they felt the anxiety and tension they endured until the decision was made unnecessary.

All through the center one of the most common reactions to the lists was "If so-and-so can go to Granada (or Rohwer), why can't I?" This sort of thing points up the fact that there was no general evacuee understanding of the priorities in use.

Many uncertainties were created about the future by the whole idea of closing Jerome, and the long period of uncertainty about center of destination only added to this. There was a very evident desire to know definitely as long in advance as possible what would happen to them. If the transfer preference decisions had been worked on and made at an earlier date a great deal of tension and confusion could have been avoided - anxiety about destination increased with delay in the decision-making.

Recommendations:

1. In advance of any preference decision program of the future, the capacity of the receiving centers in terms of families as well as individuals should be known. Relocation should not be relied upon to reduce the number of transferees and prevent

overcrowding.

2. The process of determining centers of destination should be made as long in advance of the actual movement as possible. There are several reasons for this. First, it reduces that much cause of anxiety on the part of the evacuees; knowing where they are going is important to them. Early decisions would prevent the building up of strong attitudes about where they were going, would give plenty of time for adjustment to the idea of the new center. Second, enough time would be allowed for a more efficient job of decision-making. Third, there are such practical considerations as preventing last minute rush jobs on train lists, avoiding such housing bottlenecks as occurred at Rohwer, etc. - time would be allowed for all the procedures of moving depending on lists of who is going where to be effectively worked out.

3. One individual should be responsible from the very beginning to the very end for the entire transfer preference procedure; if no one is available at the center, someone should be detailed there for the job. The evacuees should know from the beginning who this person is and what his responsibilities are, and on what basis he is working. Also, the same clerical crew should work throughout the process. The shifting of the job from person to person and from committee to committee as was done at Jerome should be avoided; one person with an understanding of the job can do better than a series of individuals with little or no understanding of the problem.

4. Evacuees should understand what kind of reasons will be

considered valid for a preference before they are asked to state reasons. A determination of these reason should be made prior to any other action. The community analyst could be called upon for a statement of the kind of reasons that are important from the evacuees point of view; the problem could also be discussed with the Community Council or any other such organized group on the center. But the sort of suggestions desired should be made perfectly clear to these groups to avoid the fear that they would be held responsible among their fellows for the decision-making; this fear contributed to the hands-off policy of the Community Council at Jerome. These groups - in fact, everyone - should be informed of developments, or what reasons are adopted, and thanked for their assistance.

5. Every family head at the center should be interviewed as to his preference and reasons for preference - for second and third as well as first choice. An interviewing squad could circulate through the center, holding interviews in the block managers' offices. The priority system adopted should be explained to each individual; everyone should know exactly what is happening and why. Special cases, not falling within the priority system, should be given full attention nonetheless.

6. Lines of communication between the administration and the evacuees on the matter should be carefully watched. The system used should be such as that everyone could be told exactly what is being done, and on what basis. The person in charge would be responsible for this, and everyone else should keep hands off. Everything should be kept open and public - no "air of mystery"

should be created so that favoritism is suspected. The block managers should not be depended on over their ability. No ambiguous letters or instructions should be sent out. Every possible line of communication should be used - newspaper (at Jerome the Tribune at one point quoted Mr. Whitaker as saying the overflow for preferred centers would be settled by lottery!), block managers, councilmen, administrative announcements, information given during interviews - to keep the residents well informed.

7. No decisions at all should be made until every family head has been interviewed. No previous commitments by anybody should be made (least of all letters written and signed promising certain centers by the project director).

8. The family unit should be decided during the interview and family members be put on the same card (if a card index is used). Single old uncles, for example, should not be filed separately, even with a cross reference to the family unit, because it is too easy to separate these people by clerical error. Extended family groups wanting to keep together should be carefully cross referenced; the interviewer should be sure to find out in each case if there should be such a cross-reference.

9. No tentative lists (especially tentative lists known to be erroneous - cf. the first Rohwer tentative list at Jerome and Heart Mountain) should be issued. At Jerome so-called "tentative" lists turned out to be pretty hard to change, especially after the people working on train lists got hold of them.

10. After preliminary tabulation of preferences and comparison of preferences with vacancies by center, the centers should be decided on in order of their popularity, one at a time, so that second choices could be filed in a least favored center. At Jerome it was either first choice or Gila - and after requesting indications of second and third choices, this created a bad impression. Such a procedure also sent poor priority first choices to a center instead of very good priority second choices (cf. a Jeromian may have wanted to go to Granada because of a family member relocated nearby (a good priority), but didn't get included on the Granada list. Second choice was Heart Mountain, also comparatively close to the relocated family member, but Heart Mountain was already filled up by the first choice people, many with extremely low priority reasons - indefinite relocation plans, or was disappointed out of Tule Lake, etc., so the high priority Jeromian had to go to Gila).

11. Should be cautious about asking for volunteers for a poorly favored center. (cf. volunteers were asked for Heart Mountain when disappointed first choice Granada, second choice Heart Mountain could easily have filled that center. As it was Heart Mountain also became overly popular and many volunteers were disappointed - which did not look particularly good after being asked to volunteer.

12. Any suggestion of using the preference question to force evacuees to stay on a post contingent should be avoided.

13. The medical priorities in use should be clear cut and there should be complete coordination between the individual in charge

of the preference decisions and the Chief Medical Officer making out medical priorities. At Jerome evacuees classed as Medical C, meaning rejection of their application for medical preference, felt they had been tricked by this classification into thinking it meant consideration. In other words, if their application is rejected they should be told so definitely; at least it will end the suspense.

Housing: Housing was one of the main concerns of the evacuees when the closing was first announced. Stories of people coming out of Tule Lake to other centers having to stay in rec halls and in generally crowded quarters were repeated. Assurance was given early, however, that housing would not constitute a problem, and the subject was dropped.

The community analyst at Gila, accompanied by two evacuee leaders, arrived at Jerome long in advance of the Gila train movements out; some time later the Welfare head from Gila arrived. Plans and pictures of Gila were displayed and Gila transferees were interviewed by block as to selection of units for occupancy.¹ Adjustments were made, and individual desires taken into consideration wherever possible, questions about Gila answered. Although it became evident that Gila was being crowded and Jerome families would have to become accustomed to less space, evacuees in general thought that their needs and desires were at least being taken into account.

¹The main difficulty was that the Gila housing crew had to work without benefit of a definite Gila train list, since the final transfer decisions were made at a late date.

Assignments to both Granada and Heart Mountain were made on a similar, if less thorough, basis (only approximately 500 apiece went to these two centers); no evacuee representatives came from those centers and assignments were made more arbitrarily. Here again crowding was evident.

Rohwer housing was another story. Throughout the Rohwer movement there was evacuee dissatisfaction with the housing program. No preference was given in making assignments at all, no interviews held. Stories came back of confusion in the assignments, units being already occupied when the Jerome families turned up. But when small families were assigned to share units, without partitions giving even a minimum of privacy, it was the last straw. A group of Rohwer transferees met and agreed not to move to Rohwer until partitions at least were put up. They presented their case to the administrations of both centers, and steps were taken to remedy the situation. Crowded conditions and confusion in assignments continued, however, to be the main barrier to a satisfactory introduction to the new center.

Recommendations:

1. Be sure of the space at the receiving center. Capacity should be figured not in terms of individuals relocated and individuals left, but families. A family still occupies a unit, whether the son has relocated or not.
2. The difficulty of getting families in the receiving center to move out of their own units into smaller ones to make room for large incoming families should not be underestimated. Part of the Rohwer bottleneck was due to this.
3. Lists of incoming evacuees to receiving centers should be

by family units and should be available in time for them to work out a satisfactory housing program.

4. The Gila plan for accomplishing housing should be adopted.

Use of the Council: The block managers were of much more importance in Jerome than the Councilmen; there was a general feeling that the Council was a futile gesture - some of the more sophisticated interpreting it as a measure to make WRA feel better, not help the evacuees. The Council had adopted the pattern of evading the issue in crisis situations, consistently tabling topics which other evacuees felt were the really important ones. Because of this unimportant role of the Council, not too much could have been expected from it in facilitating closing procedures. However, administrative attitude toward the Council could have been improved greatly.

Recommendations:

1. Use of the Council in strengthening lines of communication concerning closing procedures. This would help to some small extent the prestige of the Council, as well as the administration. At Jerome almost entire dependence on the block managers was evident - so much so that several councilmen were in favor of disbanding since "the administration doesn't pay any attention to us anyway." The Council should be kept closely and correctly informed.
2. More attendance at Council meetings by responsible members of the appointed personnel, both to answer questions and present problems, ask for suggestions. At Jerome when the Council received a letter from the administration asking for priority suggestions there was evident a great deal of misunderstanding

concerning for what the administration wished, and no one was present to clarify the point.

3. Closer relationship with the Council as a body, not with the chairman as an individual. The administration seemed inclined to think that divulging state secrets to the chairman, asking for his opinion - as an individual - equivalent to giving proper attention to the Council. The Council was interested in form - a casual word to a councilman was not considered a substitute for a letter addressed to the whole Council containing the same information.

Use of the Block Managers: The administration kept in close contact with the block managers, telling them the procedures being adopted in determining centers of destination, etc. In spite of this, information to the evacuees was poor. Two factors in connection with the block managers contributed to this. First, many of them had a very poor understanding of English, and instructions and information were given them in English with no formal attempt at interpretation. Second, not understanding the instructions, the block managers were inclined to report back to their blocks their interpretation of how things should be - which varied in many instances. Some neighboring block managers were in constant disagreement with one another, which added to whatever confusion was already extant. At Jerome the block managers were used very effectively in helping supervise crating, freighting, etc.

Recommendations:

1. The administration should be sure that information and instructions are understood; it might be well to employ an of-

ficial interpreter for exactly such use.

2. Suggestions of a light treatment of what is a serious matter from the evacuees point of view should be avoided in dealing with the block managers, or any other group of evacuees, during meetings concerning closing processes. Even if some laugh at jokes at their expense, there is considerable resentment. The block managers at Jerome felt that the project directors joking about the transfer out of place; it fortified them in their opinion that he did not give their problems serious enough consideration.

3. In handling block complaints about closing processes, the administration should not try to get the block managers to "side with" them against the block people. "Waste time."

4. There isn't any great point in pretending to offer the block managers full authority and responsibility for a process (cf. at Jerome, the transfer preferences) or to keep their hands off. This sort of "take it or leave it" proposition puts them on the spot, emphasizes their helplessness since obviously the only practical choice is to "leave it."

Train Movements: The actual physical entrainment at Jerome went smoothly all the way through. Trains were loaded quickly, and what delays occurred in pulling out were due to railroad action, not WRA. After the first movement no attempt was made to keep evacuees seeing the others off behind the fence - rather they were told they could come as far as a ditch - any further would have been dangerous. Enforcing the ditch line was possible, whereas enforcing the fence line would not have been (wasn't the first day), so the decision was a

practical one.

The necessity of having transferees stand in trucks under a very hot sun for fairly long periods before entrainment was unfortunate.

After the Rohwer movement started, buses were substituted for trucks for the women and children. This was necessary to relieve the overloaded project trucking, but was also fortunate in that it was more comfortable physically and lent more dignity to the trip.

Recommendations:

Whenever possible any situation should be avoided in which the evacuees might feel any similarity to herding cattle on trucks and shipping them, since they are very sensitive on the subject of being "pushed around", of being treated en masse instead of individually. For example, the substitution of buses for trucks for Rohwer movements was an excellent idea psychologically as well as practically.

Closing the Co-op: The Jerome Co-op, soon after the announcement of the closing decided with the advice of their accountants to close March 31 in order to have time enough to liquidate assets and pay dividends before Co-op members scattered. Some evacuees felt the Co-op should have remained open longer; the majority, however, accepted the suspension of services as an inconvenience necessary to the closing of the center. The Rohwer Co-op took over, with general evacuee satisfaction with the results. Since the problems of closing a Co-op in other centers to be closed will differ from the Jerome case (in that no other center is located so close to another one, like Rohwer) an entirely different procedure would have to be worked out.

Read by Charlie Lynn

THE CLOSING OF JEROME RELOCATION CENTER

For Semi Annual Report (WRA-Wash) Jan-June 1944

In view of the success of the relocation program and the steadily mounting number of evacuees leaving the relocation centers, the Director of the War Relocation Authority decided in the last months of 1943, to eliminate one of the relocation centers and to transfer the residents to available quarters in other centers. On February 22, 1944, it was announced that the Jerome Relocation Center was the one selected to be closed and that center was officially closed as a place of residence for evacuees of Japanese ancestry on June 30, 1944. There were three major considerations which finally determined which of the nine possible centers should be chosen: First, Jerome had always been a small center; its population had never exceeded 8500 and at the time the decision was made the residents numbered 6479. Secondly, Jerome was only 35 miles from the Rohwer Relocation Center and, since almost half of the Jerome residents could be transferred to available quarters there by truck and bus, much expense could be saved. Thirdly, the project administrative staff had been considerably depleted by transfers and resignations, and if the center remained in operation personnel replacements would be necessary in the face of a critical shortage of qualified candidates for employment.

The reaction of the Jerome residents to the announcement was one of natural disappointment that Jerome had been selected for closing, and of some bitterness that their cooperation in making it a clean and livable center had gone for naught. Nevertheless, they accepted the decision with resignation. The closing brought into focus the problem of the future and intensified their feelings of insecurity. Relocation proceeded at the usual rate for a while after the announcement, but, as the actual time for departure approached, Nisei who were planning to go out slowed down the movement by staying to assist their families. The center residents to a large extent were given the privilege of choosing to which of four other centers they wished to move. Rohwer and Granada were more popular than

others as destinations, and as their quotas became more than filled a priority system had to be set up. Appreciated by the Jerome evacuees were the efforts made by the receiving centers to make arrangements for the reception of the newcomers before their arrival by sending representatives to Jerome to discuss housing needs and to supply information the transferees desired to know concerning their future home. In the eyes of Jeromites, Gila River handled this most satisfactorily. Community action of this sort bolstered the morale of the transferees who were again anticipating partings from friends and familiar scenes, and on the whole the people were most cooperative and the movements was accomplished with a minimum of hardship and no disturbance.

Administratively, all went efficiently and according to plan. Careful planning and the previous experience in the movement of large numbers of people, gained through segregation, resulted in a very smooth operation. During the month of June, 5601 evacuees were physically transferred to other centers, 13 had been transferred in May, and 93 on temporary leave were given assignments as to their center of responsibility. Aside from these, 650 had been transferred to Tule Lake early in May. This number included those designated for segregation after the earlier mass movement, together with their dependents.

As in previous mass movements of the evacuees, the Army, represented by the Eighth and Ninth Service Commands, cooperated with the Authority by taking charge of the train trips to the more distant centers (Granada, Gila River, and Heart Mountain). The Army's responsibility included arranging for the transportation, feeding and medical care en route, and escort assistance. The cooperative efforts of the two Service Commands resulted in an overall efficient and yet sympathetic operation. Generally speaking the railroads contributed to the effort by providing equipment that was cleaner than that supplied on previous transfer trips and by keeping to schedules over tracks heavily loaded with war traffic. Those evacuees who went to Rohwer were transported by truck and bus under the Authority. All persons on all six special train trips and twenty-four bus and

truck trips reached their destinations without incident and the trips were accomplished more comfortably and closer to schedule than on any such mass transfer previously.

Four centers received the bulk of the Jerome residents; a few went to two others:

Rohwer	2514
Gila River	2063
Granada	549
Heart Mountain	509
Central Utah	17
Minidoka	11
Temporary leaves to be assigned	<u>44</u>
	5707

The baggage and household goods, handled almost entirely by the evacuees themselves, had been shipped either previous to the evacuees' departure or wait in the same trains with them. Forty-three freight carloads were shipped to the three distant centers; 557 truckloads, including most of the Jerome homemade furniture, went to Rohwer.

For about one hundred of the appointed personnel of the Jerome center arrangements were effected for transfers to other centers and offices of the Authority through the coordination of the Personnel Management Division of the Washington office. A few persons did not request such transfers. As before mentioned, many of the key administrative staff members had made arrangements for transfers or had resigned previous to the closing. Nearly all appointive personnel transfers were effected between the 1st and 15th of July.

The pickup, accountability, transfer, and disposal of the large volume of government property at the Jerome Center represented a considerable problem, but one which was handled accurately and speedily. Approximately 45 per cent of the property at the center was transferred to other centers and offices of the Authority for further use by the Authority. The balance of the property, including the plant and other physical assets (except the land, which was leased), was disposed of through established channels to the Treasury Department. It is expected that

the functions of the War Relocation Authority with regard to the Jerome center will be completed and all property will be turned over to the Treasury Department by August 15, 1944.

REPORT ON THE CLOSING OF THE JEROME RELOCATION CENTER

Summary

The Jerome Relocation Center of the War Relocation Authority, at Denson, Arkansas, was officially closed as a place of residence for evacuees of Japanese ancestry on June 30, 1944. During the month of June, a total of 5601 evacuees were physically transferred to other relocation centers of the Authority; 13 evacuees were transferred in the month of May; and at the closing of the center, reassignments of center of responsibility were made for 93 evacuees who were on temporary leave at the time of the Jerome Center closing. Provision either by transfer or reassignment was made then for a total of 5707 evacuees.

Operations necessary for the closing and transfer proceeded according to plan and schedule. The Army, represented by the Eighth and Ninth Service Commands, cooperated with the Authority in the arrangements for six special train trips to the Granada, Heart Mountain, and Gila River Relocation Centers, to which a total of 3078 evacuees were transferred on these trips. The functions which the Army performed for these trips were the same as those performed in previous transfers made by the Army and the Authority cooperatively to the Tule Lake Center, and included the arrangements for transportation, feeding en route, escort assistance, and medical care en route.

The operations necessary at the Jerome Center for the transfer of the property of the evacuees to other centers were carried out with efficient and expeditious handling. All evacuee property had either left the center before the evacuees left, or left the center on the same transfer trip with them.

The pickup, accountability, transfer, and disposal of government property at the Jerome Center represented a very large problem, but one which is being handled carefully and accurately, and with considerable speed, considering the volume of property to be handled. Approximately 45% of the property at the Jerome Center was transferred to other centers and offices of the Authority for further use by the Authority. The balance of the property will be disposed of through the established channels to the Treasury Department.

Arrangements for transfers to other centers and offices of the Authority were made for nearly all of the appointive personnel at the Jerome Center. Most of the appointive personnel left the Jerome Center for their transfer destinations immediately after July 1, 1944.

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It is estimated that the transfer operations, in regard to property, will be complete in the early part of August, 1944, and that the entire plant and equipment remaining may be turned over to the Treasury Department as excess to the needs of the Authority by August 15, 1944. All operations of the War Relocation Authority at the Jerome Relocation Center will cease at that time.

The official announcement that the Jerome Relocation Center was to be closed was made by the Director in March, 1944. Plans and schedules were prepared and agreed upon, establishing June 30 as the final date for evacuee residence at the Jerome Center. The first contacts made with the evacuees at the Jerome Center to start individual plans for the transfers necessary incident to the closing of Jerome were made in the early part of April at a meeting of the Block Managers, Community Councilmen, and other influential evacuees at the Jerome Center.

Because of space limitations at the designated centers of destination for the transfers, an outside quota of the number of persons that could transfer to those designated centers was established. Then a means of designating a preference for a center of destination by the evacuees was established. The mechanics for this expression of preference were set in motion early in April.

The results of the tabulations of the first preferences given for centers of destinations showed that more persons desired to go to Granada and Rohwer than could be accommodated, and fewer persons desired to go to Heart Mountain and Gila River than the quota provided for. As a result, a series of hearing boards was established at the Jerome Center to attempt to adjust the preferences expressed with the space and quota limitations. These interviews took considerable time, it is true, but it is believed that they were well worth the time spent. In the final transfers, it is believed that well over 90% of the evacuees were quite satisfied with their individual center of destination, and the adjustments to the quotas for each of the receiving centers was accomplished.

Preparations for the closing operations had to be virtually suspended during two and a half weeks in the month of May in order to complete the transfer of about 650 persons in two train trips to the Tule Lake Center, under the segregation program. After these segregation movements were complete, however, operations toward the closing of Jerome were again established and moved forward expeditiously.

The Eighth Service Command was designated as the Army's representative to assist the War Relocation Authority with the transfers of those evacuees who were transferred by special train. The Eighth Service Command secured the assistance of some army personnel from the Ninth Service Command that had served on previous transfer trips with the Authority, as it was the first time that the Eighth Service Command had had the full responsibility for such a movement. The cooperative efforts of the two Service Commands, however, resulted in an overall efficient and yet sympathetic transfer operation.

Tables I, II and III set forth the details of the transfer operations, giving the numbers of persons transferred in each train or motor transfer trip, the destination of each transfer trip, dates and hours of arrival and departure and the trip and railroad "main" numbers. A few persons transferred by regular train service to centers of destination to which established special transfer trips were not made. One family of five went to Heart Mountain after the regular transfer trip, because they could not travel with the regular trip since a small boy in the family had measles at the time of the trip departure.

There were two categories of persons who were on temporary leave from the Jerome Center at the time of the transfers and closing who were not physically transferred to other centers, but for whom a reassignment of center of responsibility had to be made: 1, those persons on temporary leave who had family members at the Jerome Center, and whose family members were transferred to other centers in the transfer trips; and 2, those persons on temporary leave from the Jerome Center who had no family members at the center at the time of the transfers, and for whom the Washington office would work out reassignments for a center to which to return. Tables IV and V set forth the numbers of persons in these two categories. At the time of the preparation of this report the reassignments to be made by the Washington office were not complete, so no distribution is shown for this group.

On one of the transfer trips in May to the Tule Lake Center, the train was routed by way of the Granada Relocation Center, and thirteen sick cases were transferred at that time from the Jerome Center to the Granada Center. This group of thirteen has been included in the recapitulations listed below.

There are listed below two recapitulations of the transfers from the Jerome Center to effect its closing: 1, a recapitulation by mode of travel or reassignment; and 2, a recapitulation by center of destination.

RECAPITULATION by mode of travel or reassignment.

By Train		3078
Granada	530	
Heart Mountain	499	
Gila River	<u>2049</u>	
By Truck and Bus to Rohwer		2490
By regular Train service		33
Minidoka	11	
Central Utah	17	
Heart Mountain	<u>5</u>	
Total physical transfers in June		<u>5601</u>
Transferred to Granada in May (on special train en route to Tule Lake)		<u>13</u> 5614
Persons on temporary leave whose families were transferred and persons on leave who were reassigned		49
Granada	6	
Heart Mountain	5	
Gila River	14	
Rohwer	<u>24</u>	
Persons on temporary leave with no family in center who will be reassigned by Washington		44
Total number of persons for whom the Jerome Center transferred responsibility, either by physical transfer, or by reassignment, to another relocation center		<u>5707</u>

RECAPITULATION BY CENTER OF DESTINATION

Granada			
	Special train - June	530	
	Special train - May	13	
	Temporary leave assignment	<u>6</u>	549
Heart Mountain			
	Special train	499	
	Regular train service	5	
	Temporary leave assignment	<u>5</u>	509
Gila River			
	Special train	2049	
	Temporary leave assignment	<u>14</u>	2063
Rohwer			
	Truck and bus	2440	
	Temporary leave assignment	<u>24</u>	2514
Minidoka			
	Regular train service	<u>11</u>	11
Central Utah			
	Regular train service	<u>17</u>	17
Temporary leaves to be reassigned by Washington		<u>44</u>	<u>44</u>
			5707

The technique of pre-assignment of living quarters at the center of destination before leaving Jerome was again used in the transfers to the four centers of destination. Representatives from those centers came in advance, to the Jerome Center, and made the housing assignments directly with the evacuees. The new addresses were tied in, wherever possible, with the shipment of the checkable baggage and household goods and freight, so as to facilitate delivery upon arrival. Housing assignments for the Rohwer Center did not get under way as quickly as might have been desirable, but nothing serious resulted from that delay. An interesting sidelight on the transfers to the Rohwer Center was that, whereas the transfers in June raised their population to about 7900 persons, or nearly 600 under the highest population that that center had had at one time, the total number of individual families in the 7900 persons, was 18% more than it had been when the population was approximately 8500 persons. Such a situation, of course, necessitated considerable rearrangement of living quarters, and space used per family.

The transfer trips to the Granada, Heart Mountain and Gila River Centers were accomplished by special trains, arranged for by the Army. As on previous transfer trips arranged for the War Relocation Authority by the Army, the War Relocation Authority delivered the passengers at the railhead, and provided detailed routing sheets by cars for all the evacuees to be transferred. After a mutual count of the passengers, the Army assumed control, and were in charge of the trip while en route. All arrangements for transportation equipment, tickets, escort, medical service en route, feeding en route, and the obtaining of necessary supplies en route were made by the Army. At the railhead of destination, the Army delivered the evacuees to the War Relocation Authority, and the War Relocation Authority assumed responsibility for them at that point.

The transfer trips to the Rohwer Center were made by means of motor conveyance. All of these transfer trips were the responsibility of the War Relocation Authority en route. The Army furnished an advance and rear patrol only.

There were no occurrences on any of the transfer trips, either by train or by motor. There were no births or serious illnesses on board or en route. No persons were set off the transfer trips en route, and all persons who departed from Jerome reached their destination.

Members of the military escort performed their functions in a most commendable fashion. If they had any personal feelings regarding the operations or the evacuees, these feelings were kept entirely to themselves. Their manner of handling the evacuees was at all times courteous, sympathetic and understanding, yet firmly efficient, as the occasion required.

The evacuees did a very satisfactory job of policing on the trains, both in the coaches and in assisting the army cooks in the kitchen and baggage diner cars. On Trip No. 1, some of the army mess detail were unable to make the trip and evacuees were either selected or volunteered to fill in as cooks and cooks' helpers. They did this in a very commendable fashion.

The technique which the Army used on the six train trips, of serving fruit between meals in the coaches, was a good one. It reduced the attempts of the evacuees to take food aboard in their luggage, which might become spoiled and result in sickness, and also provided a diversion for the evacuees in their somewhat restricted quarters between meal times. Coaches and cars were kept orderly and neat by the evacuees en route.

Approximately the same menus were used by the Army for these transfer trips as had been used on previous transfer trips. As in the past, the food was good, adequate in quantity, tasty as to preparation, and seemed to be enjoyed by everyone.

The WRA train representatives assumed their responsibilities with understanding, and discharged them with full credit. It was necessary to reverse the riders on Trips 5 and 6, as the rider for Trip 5 did not arrive in sufficient time to take that trip out. No serious inconvenience resulted, however.

The project directors and their staffs at the center of departure and the centers of destination are deserving of considerable praise and commendation in the manner in which they met deadlines, and had all people, equipment and supplies and luggage ready at the appointed place at the appointed time on each transfer trip. All trains left on schedule with the exception of one, which did not leave on schedule because the railroad could not get the transportation equipment on the siding at the appointed time for departure. In the instance of Trip 4, the train arrived at its destination, Casa Grande, Arizona, five hours ahead of time. As a result, the evacuees were required to remain on the train for four and one-half hours before unloading operations could take place. This caused no real serious inconvenience to any of the evacuees, however.

Generally speaking, the railroads provided commendable service on all of the transfer trips by rail. The routes in several instances were over tracks carrying a heavy load of war traffic, yet the trips stayed nearly on schedule or a little ahead of schedule in all instances. The equipment furnished for the transfer trips of the Jerome closing was, in nearly every instance, cleaner than any furnished for any previous transfer trips. In only one instance was it necessary to change any of the equipment en route, when one coach had to be changed because it only had one toilet. There were the usual problems of having to close off toilets because of lack of water, and permitting the evacuees to pass between cars until servicing could be accomplished at the next division point. The problem of running out of drinking water was overcome on these trips by having on board in the kitchen cars in reserve, the amount of 24 5-gallon cans of water, provided by the Army at the departure of each trip.

The handling of the baggage and household goods of the evacuees was done almost entirely by the evacuees themselves. Unlike previous transfer trips, the shipment of household effects of the evacuees was accomplished before the evacuees themselves had left. The evacuees performed, under direction, all of the crating and loading of household goods that were

shipped by freight, and of the checkable baggage which went with each train trip. As high as eight freight cars of household goods of the evacuees were loaded and shipped in one day. A total of 43 freight cars of household goods were shipped to the Granada, Heart Mountain and Gila River Relocation Centers for the 3078 persons who were transferred to those centers, or about one freight car for 75 persons.

The relocation center mess divisions again cooperated with the Army in the feeding operations, by providing the perishable items of subsistence needed for each transfer trip and the return trips (deadheads) of the escort group to Jerome to effect another transfer trip. All items requested by the Army were ready and on hand when wanted. Particular praise should go to the steward at Jerome who handled by far the largest part of the transfer trip requirements without a slip-up, at a time when the closing down of mess halls in the center and keeping operations going with a bare minimum of supplies on hand was a full job in itself.

The transfers to the Rohwer Center from the Jerome Center were less spectacular, but much more extensive, than the train transfer trips. Since the Rohwer Center was only about 35 miles from the Jerome Center, the mode of travel was by motor conveyance. At first, only WRA trucks, autos and station wagons were used. However, after the first few trips, arrangements were made with the Missouri Pacific Trailways for the use of busses to take most of the people who could go in that mode of conveyance, and the trucks were used to haul the household goods and baggage. The final routine arrived at was for 25 to 35 trucks to make one trip a day, hauling the household goods and baggage, and two busses make three trips a day, between the two centers. On several days there were both a train trip to another center and a motor convoy to the Rohwer Center.

A total of 133 people had been transferred from Jerome to Rohwer before the scheduled trips between the two centers began on June 6, 1944. The 133 people, moved before the scheduled movements, represented hospital cases and their families, and families of persons who were planning to relocate immediately, or during the time of the scheduled transfers. The transfers were made by station wagon, truck and ambulance. All sick cases were out of the hospital by the first of June and the hospital shut down operations for anything but emergencies on June 14.

A total of 276 persons were designated as a post contingent group to assist the appointive staff at Jerome with the work of the transfers. Generally speaking, the post contingent group worked hard and well, and contributed greatly to the smoothness with which the operations took place. The post contingent group were transferred to the Rohwer Center on June 30, leaving Jerome at 4:15 P.M.

A total of 557 truckloads of household goods and baggage were hauled from the Jerome Center to the Rohwer Center for the 2490 persons who were transferred to the Rohwer Center. This represented approximately two-thirds of a truckload of household goods and baggage for each family that transferred to the Rohwer Center. This amount of goods was large because of the

proximity of the Rohwer Center. The evacuees that transferred to other centers by train left behind them, in most instances, those pieces of home-made furniture that they had fabricated out of scraps of lumber while in residence at the Jerome Center. The people going to Rohwer took with them from Jerome, not only the items of home-made furniture that they had made at Jerome, but also a large part of the items which the persons who had gone to other centers left behind. The items transferred to Rohwer were all needed and are in use at the Rohwer Center.

The first block cleared of evacuee residents at the Jerome Center was Block 14, next to the area in which the appointive personnel were quartered. Then the family groups that made up the post contingent evacuees group were moved into Block 14. Thereafter, depending to a certain extent upon the destination of the family or individual, the pattern of closing the center was generally to vacate the blocks in order, beginning with Block 1 on the northern most corner of the center, and complete the transfers from the outside tier of blocks, and then turn back and take the next tier of blocks, etc., until the entire center was vacated. The same pattern was used in the closing down of the mess halls. In a few instances where persons had not yet been transferred and were still in residence, the mess hall was shut down and arrangements made for these people to eat at another mess hall.

Blankets and miscellaneous items of government property were turned in by the evacuees at the office of the Block Manager on the day that they were leaving. Crews of evacuees and other temporarily employed help kept current with the vacating of the residences in the picking up of the cots, mattresses, and other items of property that needed to be picked up, accounted for, and stored at central locations. Another crew followed closely in cleaning out the supplies and equipment in the mess halls, and cleaning and packing the items for shipment or storage. Other crews were assigned to especially large concentrations of equipment and supplies, such as the schools, the farm, the construction division and its various warehouses and yards, the hospital, and the motor pool. Another crew was assigned to cleaning up the barracks and buildings, closing them against the weather, and cleaning the grounds nearby. All reasonable fire protection measures were taken, such as the gathering up and burning of litter, and the cutting of weeds.

The property accountability problem in the Jerome closing was a large one. Early in April, a complete inventory was taken of the property at Jerome. This inventory was circulated to all other War Relocation Authority centers and offices and the Department of Interior. Various centers and offices requested items of the property to be available at Jerome. Approximately 45% of the total property was thus requested. This will approximate 65 carloads of property, of which at the time of the preparation of this report, something over 50 have been shipped.

The balance of the government property, including the plant and other physical assets (except the land, which is leased) will be turned over to the Treasury Department, in accordance with established government regulations. Arrangements were made with the Procurement Division of the Treasury Department whereby they have assigned men to work at the Jerome Center and receive

the property as fast as the War Relocation Authority can clear it through its records and make the necessary declarations regarding its being excess to the needs of the Authority. The Treasury Department has been very cooperative in their work at the Jerome Center.

Through the coordination of the Personnel Management Division of the Washington office, transfers to positions at other War Relocation Authority centers and field offices were effected for all but four of the appointive personnel at the Jerome Center who desired such a transfer or reassignment. Approximately 100 persons were transferred under these arrangements. Arrangements were made in each case for the payment of transportation for the change of headquarters, and for the payment for the shipment of household goods, in accordance with established government regulations. Nearly all appointive personnel effected their transfers between the 1st and 15th of July to their new posts of duty.

A liaison representative of the War Relocation Authority, Mr. Malcolm E. Pitts, was assigned to work with the Army in the joint relationships concerning the transfer trips. The liaison representative worked with the Eighth Service Command throughout the entire transfer movement. Periods of three to six days, on three different occasions in April, May and June, were spent with the Eighth Service Command, at its headquarters in Dallas, Texas. Plans, instructions, and general information were provided the Army at those times. Desk space, office supplies, and items of personal assistance were accorded the liaison representative in a most courteous and cooperative manner. No stationary field station was established.

The assistance of Mr. A. H. Gass, Representative of the American Association of Railroads, in the Military Transportation Section of the War Department at Washington, and his district representative, Mr. Wasson, at Dallas, Texas, were important factors in making the relationships with the railroads and the service received from them of a uniformly good character.

Commendation should be made of the interest, industry, hard work and sympathetic understanding of the Army officers assigned to work with the War Relocation Authority on this work. Lt. Col. James G. Gee, Major Sam Bouchard, Major Caryl Whitmarsh, and Major Frank Prince were outstanding.

Individual praise should go to each and every appointive staff member at the Jerome Center, to other WRA personnel detailed to the Jerome Center to assist in the closing, and to nearly all of the evacuees. Both appointive staff and evacuees worked long hours and with interest to get the job done. Particular praise should go to Project Director, E. B. Whitaker, at the Jerome Center, and to Assistant Project Director, W. O. Melton, for their overall coordination, organization and getting the job done on time. Mr. Melton's organization and follow through on the completion of the work was superior.

Although the final transfers of physical plant and some moveable property have not yet been completed at Jerome at the time of the preparation of this report, the work is so nearly complete with the routine and the procedure for its completion established, it is considered that the closing operations of the Jerome Center are complete. It is expected that the functions of the War Relocation Authority at the Jerome Relocation Center will be complete and all property turned over to the Treasury Department by August 15, 1944.

Letters of commendation were prepared and sent to key Army personnel, WRA train riders, project directors and other persons specially detailed to the Jerome Center to assist in its closing operations.

All files and correspondence relating to liaison work with the Army and the transfer operations portion of the Jerome Relocation Center closing, have been made a part of the files of the Denver, Colorado office of the War Relocation Authority.

In the future in the closing of other relocation centers, there would appear to be two things learned in the Jerome closing experience, that it is believed could and should be improved. Nearly all of the other operations and procedures appeared to be adequate and to function satisfactorily. However, the two things to be mentioned are deemed as essential and key decisions and activities to all the other activities and operations related to the closing. Where a center is to be closed and the persons remaining at that center are to be transferred to more than one other relocation center, it is deemed that the two important things are as follows:

1. That the determination of the center of destination for each and every evacuee be made as far in advance as possible, before the transfer movements begin. Every evacuee should know to which center he is going to transfer not less than thirty days before the transfer movements begin. All hearings of appeal or desire for change of center of destination should be over by that time, and the final decisions made.

2. That the names of the persons and the size of each family group going to a given center of destination be made available to that center of destination so that the receiving center can have all housing adjustments and construction alterations done before the transferees arrive. The names and numbers of the family groups should be made available to the center of destination not less than thirty days before the transfer movement begins. Each evacuee and family group should have his definite housing assignment at the center of destination not less than three weeks before the transfer movement begins. This requires, of course, prompt cooperation and action on the part of the center of destination as well as of the closing center. The Jerome Center closing accomplished the two points mentioned above by the time the transfer trips got under way, but it is believed that considerable time would have been saved, many questions, arguments, and problems obviated, and some avoidance of last minute rush, if the facts mentioned had been settled and known thirty days in advance of the start of the transfer trips.



Malcolm E. Pitts
Field Assistant Director

TABLE I

SCHEDULE OF DEPARTURES AND ARRIVALS OF TRAIN TRANSFER TRIPS

Jerome Relocation Center Closing
June 12 through 27, 1944

Trip No.	Railroad "Main" No.	Escort Military Detachment No.	From	To	Date and Hour of Departure	Date and Hour of Arrival	*** No. of Evacuees Transferred	WRA Director's Train Representative
J-1	22,355 G	1	Jerome	Heart Mtn.	9 a.m. CWT 6/12/44	4 p.m. MWT 6/15/44	499	R. Howard Embree
J-2	22,356 G	2	Jerome	Gila River	9 a.m. CWT 6/13/44	6:30 p.m. MWT 6/15/44	515	Gordon Brown
J-4	22,357 G	2	Jerome	Gila River	7:30 p.m. CWT 6/18/44	*3 a.m. MWT 6/21/44	513	Marcos de Leon
J-3	22,358 G	1	Jerome	Granada	4 p.m. CWT 6/19/44	7:30 a.m. MWT 6/21/44	530	Louis Fanslan
J-5	22,359 G	1	Jerome	Gila River	**7 p.m. CWT 6/23/44	1:15 p.m. MWT 6/26/44	510	Joe Janeway
J-6	22,360 G	2	Jerome	Gila River	4 p.m. CWT 6/24/44	7:45 a.m. MWT 6/27/44	511	Mason Davis
6 Trips			Heart Mountain	499	TOTAL		***3078	
			Granada	530				
			Gila River	<u>2049</u>				
				3078				

* Unloading started at Casa Grande, Arizona at 7:30 a.m. MWT, 6/21/44.

** Delay in departure occasioned by inability of railroad to spot rail equipment at Jerome siding at time scheduled for departure.

*** All persons who departed from Jerome on all train trips arrived at proper destination. No persons were set off en route.

TABLE II SCHEDULE OF DEPARTURES AND ARRIVALS OF MOTOR TRANSFER TRIPS

Jerome Relocation Center Closing

June 1 through 30, 1944

Trip No.	Mode of Transportation	From	To	Date and Hour of Departure	Date and Hour of Arrival	Total Number of Evacuees departed from Jerome and arrived at Rohwer	
						Cumulative	Total
Before regular movement	Truck	Jerome	Rohwer	May 25 to June 5 1944	May 25 to June 5 1944	133	133
10	Truck	Jerome	Rohwer	10:45 a.m. CWT 6/6/44	11:45 a.m. CWT 6/6/44	121	254
11	Truck	Jerome	Rohwer	10:45 a.m. CWT 6/7/44	11:45 a.m. CWT 6/7/44	118	372
12	Truck	Jerome	Rohwer	10:45 a.m. CWT 6/8/44	11:45 a.m. CWT 6/8/44	91	463
13	Truck	Jerome	Rohwer	10:20 a.m. CWT 6/9/44	11:20 a.m. CWT 6/9/44	223	686
14	Truck	Jerome	Rohwer	10:30 a.m. CWT 6/10/44	11:30 a.m. CWT 6/10/44	240	926
15	Truck & Bus	Jerome	Rohwer	10:00 a.m. CWT 1:30 p.m. CWT 6/12/44	11:00 a.m. CWT 2:30 p.m. CWT 6/12/44	151	1077
16	Truck & Bus	Jerome	Rohwer	10:00 a.m. CWT 1:30 p.m. CWT 6/13/44	11:00 a.m. CWT 2:30 p.m. CWT 6/13/44	147	1224
17	Truck & Bus	Jerome	Rohwer	10:00 a.m. CWT 1:30 p.m. CWT 4:00 p.m. CWT 6/14/44	11:00 a.m. CWT 2:30 p.m. CWT 5:00 p.m. CWT 6/14/44	212	1436
18	Truck & Bus	Jerome	Rohwer	10:00 a.m. CWT 1:30 p.m. CWT 4:00 p.m. CWT 6/15/44	11:00 a.m. CWT 2:30 p.m. CWT 5:00 p.m. CWT 6/15/44	203	1639
19	Truck & Bus	Jerome	Rohwer	10:00 a.m. CWT 1:30 p.m. CWT 4:30 p.m. CWT 6/16/44	11:00 a.m. CWT 2:30 p.m. CWT 5:30 p.m. CWT 6/16/44	190	1829

TABLE II (CONTINUED)

SCHEDULE OF DEPARTURES AND ARRIVALS OF MOTOR TRANSFER TRIPS

Jerome Relocation Center Closing

June 1 through 30, 1944

Trip No.	Mode of Transportation	From	To	Date and Hour of Departure	Date and Hour of Arrival	Total Number of Evacuees departed from Jerome and arrived at Rohwer	
						Cumulative	Total
20	Truck & Bus	Jerome	Rohwer	10:00 a.m. CWT	11:00 a.m. CWT	118	1947
				1:30 p.m. CWT	2:30 p.m. CWT		
				4:30 p.m. CWT	5:30 p.m. CWT		
				6/20/44	6/20/44		
21	Truck & Bus	Jerome	Rohwer	10:00 a.m. CWT	11:00 a.m. CWT	120	2067
				1:30 p.m. CWT	2:30 p.m. CWT		
				4:30 p.m. CWT	5:30 p.m. CWT		
				6/21/44	6/21/44		
22	Truck & Bus	Jerome	Rohwer	10:00 a.m. CWT	11:00 a.m. CWT	138	2205
				1:30 p.m. CWT	2:30 p.m. CWT		
				4:30 p.m. CWT	5:30 p.m. CWT		
				6/22/44	6/22/44		
23	Truck & Station Wagon	Jerome	Rohwer	9:15 a.m. CWT	10:15 a.m. CWT	9	2214
				6/25/44	6/25/44		
24	Truck & Bus	Jerome	Rohwer	4:15 p.m. CWT	5:15 p.m. CWT	276	<u>2490</u>
				6/30/44	6/30/44		

Note: James Rains, Assistant Project Director of Rohwer acted as WRA Director's Representative on all motor transfer trips from Jerome to Rohwer.

TABLE III

SCHEDULE OF PERSONS TRANSFERRED BY REGULAR TRAIN SERVICE TO OTHER
RELOCATION CENTERS.

Jerome Relocation Center Closing

June 6 through 30, 1944

From	To	Date of Departure	Date of Arrival	Total Number of Evacuees So Transferred
Jerome	Minidoka	6/6/44	6/9/44	6
Jerome	Minidoka	6/9/44	6/12/44	5
TOTAL				11
Jerome	Central Utah	6/13/44	6/16/44	14
Jerome	Central Utah	6/15/44	6/18/44	3
TOTAL				17
Jerome	Heart Mountain	6/30/44	7/4/44	5
TOTAL				5
GRAND TOTAL				33

TABLE IV

JEROME RELOCATION CENTER CLOSING

June 30, 1944

Persons on Temporary Leave Whose Center of Responsibility Was Reassigned from Jerome to the Same Center of Destination to which Other Members of their Immediate Families were Transferred by Regular Transfer Trips.

From	To	Number on Short Term Leave	Number on Seasonal Leave	Number on Indefinite (trial period) Leave	Total Number of Evacuees Reassigned
Jerome	Granada	1	1	4	6
Jerome	Heart Mountain	2	0	3	5
Jerome	Gila River	2	4	8	14
Jerome	Rohwer	3	6	15	24
TOTAL					49

TABLE V

Persons on Temporary Leave from the Jerome Center who had No Family Members at the Jerome Center to be Transferred to Other Centers by Regular Transfer Trips, for whom the Washington WRA office will assign a New Center of Responsibility to which the Persons on Temporary Leave may return.

From	To	Number on Short Term Leave	Number on Seasonal Leave	Number on Indefinite (trial period) Leave	Total Number of Evacuees Reassigned
Jerome	To be assigned by Washington WRA office	5	9	30	44