

THE NATIONAL STUDENT RELOCATION COUNCIL

In the Spring of 1942, a "Do Not Disturb" sign on the door of an American-Japanese student at the University of Washington had this added note--"Working on the Last Term Paper of My Career--Let's Make It a Masterpiece". College administrators, faculties, and students of Pacific Coast colleges very early began to wonder if these approximately 2500 students must abruptly end their college careers and their hopes of a lifework. Plans ~~to help~~ sprang up almost immediately at the Univ. of Calif. and the Univ. of Wash. where the largest numbers were concentrated. As early as December 10, 1941, the International House at the Univ. of Calif. ~~urged Japanese American students to make use of an advisory service~~ ^{set up} ~~set up~~ to assist them in their problems. Similar help was given at the Univ. of Wash.

In the midst of a world war, at a time when colleges were being drained of their students by the draft, why this concern over a small minority of students? The college Nisei ~~are the group who~~ will shape the attitudes of the Japanese minority for years to come. They are American citizens, ~~so~~ ^{citizens} considered themselves, and were so accepted by their fellow students. Evacuation was in many cases more of an emotional wrench for them than for their elders who frequently did not feel themselves a part of the United States. An opportunity to continue their educational ~~work~~ would do a great deal to restore their faith and the faith of their families left in camps. In the worlds of Pres. Wilbur of Stanford University:

"It has been impossible for me to answer the questions put to me by these students as to why. Everything that they have learned from babyhood up in this country is negated by their present experience.

"It seems to me important for us to visualize the situation that will develop at the end of the war if these young American citizens, with their great capacity for leadership, have been confined in camps, have had their education interfered with, and have had the disillusionment that must inevitably come to them. In my opinion, the least that could be done would be to insure them the completion of their education in junior colleges and colleges and to arrange for adequate education for the younger American-born generation." (R.L. Wilbur to Conard, 4/13/42)

College administrators had formed very high opinions of their J-A students. Typical of their opinions is this of President Aurelia Reinhardt of Mills College ~~writing~~ who spoke from twenty five years of experience.

"Thruout these years there has been no single case of personality problem or ethical question arising among the Japanese students. Perhaps three fourths of these Japanese women have been Christians, but in sense of responsibility and in the high standard of personal conduct, our Japanese young women have been one in their standard of quiet, industrious and courteous behavior. They have won the affection and respect of their fellow students of all racial groups." (A. H. Reinhardt to Robert W. Inglis, 4/13/42)

Scholastically, the J-As were above average. A few scattered examples from the immediate pre-evacuation period will illustrate. At the Theodore Roosevelt High School in Los Angeles, 26% of the students of Japanese ancestry were in the top 10% of the graduation class. (Touchstone of Democracy, Council for Social Action of the Congregational Church, p.35) The January 1942 valedictorian of Fresno High School was a J-A. () At the Fresno Assembly Center in June, 1942, a mass graduation exercise was held. The valedictorians from Fresno, Hanford, and Central Union High Schools were all to be found in the Assembly Center. (F^{resno} Bee, 6/19/42.) The Japanese Students Club was one of five selected at the University of Wash. to receive scholarship awards. (Touchstone of Dem., p.35)

At the Univ. of Calif. in May 1942, the University Medalist--a pre-medical student with a straight "A" record, was a J-A. Of 154 applications for college relocation received from the San Francisco area by early May 1942, 23 students had ~~xxx"B"xxxxx xxx"xx~~ an "A" or "A-" average, 45% had a "B" or better average. Only one student was below a "C"

average. (Conard to Dr. Geo. Probst, Univ. Radio Office, Chicago, 5/4/42)

The future welfare of these Nisei students was important in itself. For these reasons, and because continued college education seemed a possibility, interested individuals and groups worked actively for it. If a program of student relocation succeeded, it might signal the beginning of a breakdown of public opposition to J-As resuming their place in the larger question of relocation of the entire Japanese

group. For this little group of students faced all the troubles of the wider group. They met ~~many~~ ^{& understanding govt. coop.} bureaucratic redtape, they met hostility from some members of a community, and they met a helpful welcome from other members.

A student writing in the March 9, 1942, issue of the Daily Californian, student publication of the Univ. of Calif., urged that the University administration consider it a duty to work out a program with inland universities for the transfer of the J-A. students attending U.C. He suggested that the inland universities offer reasonable accommodations, no loss of credit, and free tuition for the remainder of the emergency in order to prove "that democracy can work". (Daily Cal., 3/9/42) Another student writing a few weeks later felt that the above proposal was too improbable and that the most important task of west coast college students was to convince the administrators of the evacuation program that within the evacuee group were real Americans who were as valuable to the country as the most patriotic among themselves. "We certainly owe it to ourselves and to them

and of TP
"any attempt to handle the program as a Fed. undertaking, possibly with Fed. subsidies involved, would be defeated in the face of misunderstanding & near hostility".

Director Eisenhower of the WRA wrote to Pres. Sproul on May 6. In this letter Dir. Eisenhower stated that altho any program of student relocation would have to have the sanction of the federal government, he was convinced that the major part of the effort would have to be non-governmental. ^{because} He informed Pres. Sproul that he had requested Clarence Pickett of the AFSC to call a meeting of prominent west coast educators to formulate a program and policies. The letter closed with gratitude to Sproul for his insistence on the matter. (Eisenhower to Sproul 5/6/45)²

college grade at colleges and universities outside the prohibited zones.

Because of employment difficulties for these students, he estimated that ^{they} ~~these students~~ would need a minimum of \$600 for a twelve month period.

A ^{distinction} ~~division~~ was made between those students whose course of study was technical and would therefore require residence at colleges and those whose course could be carried on by class work in the centers or by correspondence.

Restricted scholarships were to be provided for the second group. Pres.

Sproul felt that the administration of the program should be in the hands of a committee of college and university representatives. ~~making~~ All R ap-

plications from students and inquiries to other institutions would clear thru this committee. The cost was estimated at about one million dollars

a year, which, according to ^{Pres} Sproul, would be "...a million dollars spent as insurance on the future welfare of the American Nation, and there will

be substantial savings in the release of funds appropriated for the support of the evacuation centers.... Respect and love for democracy cannot

be inculcated by depriving citizens of their rights and privileges without compensation, regardless of abstract or concrete justification which may

exist in the public mind." (Sproul to Tolan, 4/7/42) Pres. Sproul also

wrote to President Roosevelt urging his sponsorship of such a plan. (Sproul

to Roosevelt, 4/24/42) and to Vice-President Wallace expressing substantially

the same ideas as in his letter to Rep. Tolan. (Sproul to Wallace, 5/1/42) ^{insert} ~~signed~~ ^{here}

At the same time that President Sproul was urging a student relocation plan on the federal government, Richard Mills, Regional Secretary of the Pacific Southwest Student YMCA, called together in Berkeley a group of people interested in the evacuated Japanese students. This unofficial group consisted of interested people from the colleges, from the student YM and YW, and from religious organizations. The group decided to form

a Student Relocation Committee and to employ Joseph Conard as secretary. The committee's headquarters were to be in the Bay Area so as to be within easy access of government officials. The World Student Service Fund was approached for financial support and the group was assured of \$500 for the first month with indications that more would follow. (Conard to Cary, 4/14/42) Joseph Conard started work on April 1 and immediately had an interview with Milton Eisenhower, then Director of the WRA. Mr. Eisenhower seemed willing to consider the possibility of releasing Japanese students to colleges outside the military zone if sufficient safeguards were provided. (Conard to Robert O'Brien 4/5/42)

In a letter to Dr. Monroe E. Deutsch on April 8, Mr. Conard explained the new organization a little more fully. The Student Relocation Committee was to work in cooperation with national groups supporting it, but was to be directly responsible to a west coast committee. Separate committees were to be set up in the Pacific North West, Southern California, and Northern California, for work in those localities. In addition to these committees directing west coast policy, each area was to have a committee including one faculty and one student representative from each major college to help carry out the work. This committee proved most helpful as a means of securing rapid action on a campus. (Conard to Cary, 4/14/42)

A meeting of all interested ^{eastern} groups was held in New York on April 7, to consider the desirability of a cooperative approach to the problems of Japanese students. Representatives from such groups as the University Commission of the Church Boards of Education, the National Intercollegiate Christian Council, the Friendly Relations Committee, the Committees of Home Missions, the Federal Council of Churches, the International Student Service, the American Friends Service Committee, the Fellowship of Recon-

(Colon after "be" then last)

ciliation, World Student Service Fund, and the Institute of International Education were present. They decided in favor of cooperative action and asked that the Student Relocation Committee already at work be named the administrative group. They thought that the functions of the west coast SRC should be to determine what students wished to continue their education and what their financial resources were; to collect records on the capacities of the students; to get the support of western colleges behind a plan of relocation and they ^{to} try to get this plan accepted by the government; to raise funds thru government subsidies, state grants for university extension, educational and research foundations, church groups, etc.; to created an understanding of the situation in localities to which the students would go; to created a clearing house for information such as government orders; to ~~be~~ persuade west coast colleges to allow students to finish their Spring 1942 work by correspondence. They also agreed to set up an east coast committee to assist in the raising of money and the creation of favorable public opinion. The World Student Service Fund was asked to take care of all funds received and to assist in the raising of funds. (Minutes of the East Coast Group, N.Y., 4/7/42)

On the east coast, President John Nason of Swarthmore, Felix Morley of Haverford, and Dr. Frank Aydelotte of the Institute of Advanced Studies at Princeton were interested in the problem and agreed to take responsibility for the placing of Japanese students. (Cary to Conard, 4/9/42)

United States Commissioner of Education Studebaker was also interested and felt that it might be possible for the United States Office of Education to provide for the operating expenses of a student relocation committee. (Cary to Conard, 4/15/42)

4. After trying to weave through the educational bureaucracy,

I have decided to push ahead arbitrarily on the problem of University education. I am going to have Dr. Clarence Pickett of the Friends Service Committee set up a group of distinguished educators to work on this problem. I am extremely anxious for John Provinse to return and take hold of this and related problems.

Eisenhower
to Col. Cross
May 4, 1942

Reed Cary, a member of the Board of Directors of the American Friends Service Committee wrote to Joseph Conard on April 23 that the federal authorities insisted that the student problem be administered by one responsible organization with an adequate administrative staff and had unofficially indicated that they would prefer the AFSC to take that responsibility. (Cary to Conard 4/23/42) *WRA Dir. Milton Eisenhower wrote to Col. Cress on 5/4/42* In a letter to Clarence Pickett of the AFSC on May 5, Director Eisenhower of the WRA said:

"It is not feasible for the WRA to undertake such a university program for American citizen Japanese, but this in no way detracts from the desirability of such an accomplishment."

He asked Pickett to establish a committee to aid in formulating a set of policies. The program would include the selection and certification of students, the transportation of students to universities, the provision of work opportunities or non-Federal funds for support, and the development of an understanding attitude in the receiving communities. (Eisenhower to Pickett, 5/5/42) ~~In accepting the responsibility, Pickett said that concern for the welfare of loyal American citizens whose parents came from enemy countries would pay our democracy rich dividends in the future.~~ (AFSC release, 5/6/42) The AFSC called a conference in Chicago on May 29 of all concerned with the student relocation program to discuss the new developments. (AFSC release, 5/6/42)

There were some objections from the previously cooperating groups to the AFSC taking responsibility for relocation. The National Advisory Committee on Student Relocation of the National Intercollegiate Christian Council met and was told by Reed Cary that the AFSC had been requested by Mr. Eisenhower to take responsibility for the student relocation program. "The committee expressed genuine surprise that one of the cooperating groups should have gone so far ahead as it has in considering the assuming

of such responsibility without consultation with the Student Relocation Committee of which it is a part! They felt that the cooperative basis should be continued and therefore decided to reopen the question with the WRA ^{in order to attempt} to reestablish a coordinated plan guaranteeing cooperation of all groups. An appointment with Eisenhower was to be requested probably on May 18. (Eleanor French of Nat'l. Intercol. Christian Council to Conard, undated but probably 5/9 or 5/10. Arrived Berkeley 5/14) This letter caused great consternation in the west coast office as the staff there felt that any reopening of the question might result in dropping of the whole plan. Joseph Conard telephoned Mr. Pickett as soon as the letter was received. ^{nu} Pickett declared that there was nothing to prevent him from organizing a committee on which all groups in the Student Relocation Committee could serve; there was no reason at all to assume that the program must be exclusively an AFSC one. Prominent west coast YM and YW leaders sent a joint telegram to Eleanor French opposing the opening of the question with Eisenhower. (Kingman, Anderson, Reith) Eleanor French agreed to postpone the appointment with Eisenhower until she could talk to a member of the west coast committee. (Conard to Marian Reith, 5/15/42) In a letter to Miss French, Marian Reith of the Pacific Southwest YWCA, said that she considered the entire program so precarious that any publicity might arouse public opinion and shut the whole program down. She was also afraid that Mr. Eisenhower might reverse his decision and treat students like the rest of the evacuee group. All groups, she felt, must be willing for the AFSC to do the job and assume that they would find place for "good intentions and efforts" of other groups. The present task was to work towards cooperation at the meeting in Chicago on May 29. (Reith to French, 5/15/42)

There were representatives at the Chicago meeting from the interested colleges, the Association of American Colleges, various religious denominations, the YM and the YW, the World Student Service Fund, the Japanese American Citizens League, the WRA, the U.S. Office of Education, and others. The AFSC agreed to accept responsibility for student relocation provided that appropriate government certification of each student to be relocated be given and that they have every cooperation from government agencies. The following steps in relocation were listed:

- 1) Selection ^{of students} ~~academically and according to personality~~
- 2) Certification by government
- 3) ^{Location of} ~~Locating~~ cooperating colleges
- 4) ^{the} Raising funds
- 5) ^{Education of public opinion} ~~Preparing the atmosphere to receive students~~
- 6) ^{the} Matching applicants with college openings.

The following sources of funds were listed:

- 1) Money of the students
- 2) Free tuition and scholarships from colleges
- 3) Application for funds from national community chests
- 4) Allocation of money from foreign and home mission boards
- 5) Money raised by college student bodies.

All money raised for scholarships could be used for scholarships as the AFSC would take care of ~~the~~ overhead expenses.

The name became the National Student Relocation Council and all groups already working on the problem were to continue. The agencies already active on the west coast were to form a west coast committee under Joseph Conard. The old division of duties with the eastern committee being pri-

marily responsible for the raising of funds and the opening of eastern colleges and the western committee being responsible for the selection of students and relations with western government agencies was continued. (Release by West Coast Office, NSRC, no date) The activities of the eastern and western committees would, of course, have to be carried on simultaneously.

The first step in the work of the west coast committee was the preparation of an adequate student questionnaire. This questionnaire asked for such information as college last attended, class completed, major and minor fields of study, extra-curricular activities, approximate grade average, religious preference, plans for life work, amount of funds available for education, special skills, work experience, and references. Once the questionnaires were formulated, it was necessary to make plans for their distribution in the Assembly Centers and Relocation Centers. This necessitated making arrangements with the Wartime Civil Control Administration for entrance into the Assembly Centers and with the WRA for entrance into the Relocation Centers. It was necessary to meet with an evacuee committee to plan the distribution, and to call a meeting of interested persons in the Centers to explain the program. There was a preliminary sifting of the questionnaires to weed out Issei, Kibei, those not immediately interested in continuing their education, and those without funds whose grade point average was below a "C". The questionnaires were then ~~taken~~ tabulated by grade point average, major study, and religious denomination. (Between July 1 and July 15, all assembly and relocation centers were visited, the questionnaires distributed and collected.) On July 4, the first student, Harvey Itano, the U.C. 1942 medalist, left a center to enter St. Louis University a month after the opening of the term.

By July 21, the first batch of questionnaires ^{was} ~~were~~ ready for analysis.

By July 25, approximately 1750 questionnaires had been received in the three west coast offices. A brief analysis of these questionnaires shows that:

- Sex*
- 1) 67% were ^{from} males; 33% ^{from} females
 - 2) almost 50% of those who had already attended college had a scholastic average of "A" or "B"
 - 3) 87% of ^{those who had just completed} the high school graduates had a high school average of "A" or "B"
 - 4) 25% wished to study medicine, nursing, and allied subjects;
19% wished to take general courses
17% wished to take business courses
17% wished to study engineering
the remaining 22% wished to study miscellaneous subjects
- Scholarship*
- Future Plans*

In regard to financial resources:

- Omit & include under 'funds'*
- 38% had between \$ 0-250
 - 21% had between \$ 250-500
 - 18% had between \$ 500-1000
 - 20% had from \$ 1000-up
 - 3% unstated

Of 994 questionnaires in the Berkeley office on July 24, there was the following distribution by religious preference:

- 69% were Protestants
- 17% were Buddhists
- 11% had no preference
- 3% were Catholics

(Prog. Rpt., West Coast Section, NSRC, 7/25/42)

Approximately 10% of the students who turned in questionnaires had ^{already} on their own initiative won acceptance at Middlewestern or Eastern colleges.

These the SRC helped assemble the documents necessary for release and travel permits. (Prog. Rpt., West Coast Section, NSRC, 7/25/42)

The SRC during the summer of 1942 secured the volunteer services of many eminent west coast educators. Trained interviewers went out from each area office to interview students in the assembly centers. The rating of students was done during the summer by a distinguished group of volunteers in each area. Typical is the group which worked in the No. Calif. office and included deans from the Univ. of Calif., San Francisco State College, San Jose State College, Geo. Washington High School in San Francisco, Berkeley High School; the registrar of Fresno State College; professors from the Univ. of Calif., Mills College, San Jose State, Sacramento Junior College; and others. The permanent staff amused itself by classifying these volunteers as "archangels" and "angels"--the archangels being the admissions people. (Rpt. of West Coast Section to Dir. Barstow, 7/7/42)

Each student was rated by two raters on the basis of scholarship and personal factors. The Univ. of Calif. (system of grade points of 3 points to an "A", 2 points to a "B", 1 point to a "C", and 0 points to a "D" was used. The grade point average was recorded on the record card and from it a scholarship rating was deduced. For example, a

grade point avg. of 2.5 equaled a scholarship rating of 9.0

2.0 equaled a scholarship rating of 8.5

1.8 equaled a scholarship rating of 8.3

and so forth. No allowance was made for upward or downward trend in grade point average nor was allowance made for differences in academic standards of the schools attended.

The committee defined personal factors as "the sum total of all the elements that enter into personality and adaptability and general promise where not related to scholastic ability". The following system was used:

A rating of 10 equaled outstanding

9 equaled superior

8 equaled average

6 equaled below average.

Note that if a student was considered below average, his rating dropped rapidly. The following system was used in order to get a composite rating of academic and personal factors: The scholastic rating was multiplied by 3; the personal rating was multiplied by 2; these two figures were then added and the sum was the composite rating. For example, a student with a grade point average of 2.0 and a superior personal rating would obtain the following composite rating:

g.p.a. of 2.0 equals scholastic rating of 8.5

8.5×3 equals 25.5

superior personal rating equals 9

9×2 equals 18

25.5 plus 18 equals 43.5 equals composite rating

The scholastic factor was weighted more heavily because the personal factor was so open to error. However, placement of those with an unfavorable personal factor was safeguarded against by dropping from 8 to 6 between average and below average. Another reason for a heavier weighting of the academic factor was that the receiving colleges were in the habit of giving major importance to scholastic achievement. Giving more weight to scholarship was likely to be most acceptable also to the students concerned and to the public. (Conard to the Los Angeles NSRC office, 7/28/42)

While this job of tabulating questionnaires and rating students was progressing, work was also being done in raising funds, contacting colleges, and attempting to have the favorable colleges cleared by the Army and Navy. Once the colleges were willing to accept students and funds were available,

then it was possible to proceed with the matching of students with the available openings. All during this period, there were seriously ~~time consuming~~ bottlenecks and aggravating restrictions in dealing with government agencies. There were unfortunate incidents in college and community acceptance. ^{But} ~~And~~ there was friendly helpfulness both in colleges and communities. These will be discussed later.

By August 25, 1942, Director Barstow was able to report to the Executive Committee that:

2034 questionnaires had been received

200 (approx.) student arrangements had been completed

300 (plus) favorable responses had been received ~~by~~ from colleges

53 colleges had been approved by the Army and Navy

52 more colleges were in the process of clearance

300 (approx.) colleges had not replied to a questionnaire

75 (approx.) had replied unfavorably

(NSRC Rpt. of Director to Exec. Committee, 8/25/42)

At the end of the summer of 1942, there was considerable reorganization of the staff due primarily to the fact that many of the old staff had to return to their usual duties. Dr. Robert O'Brien replaced Dr. Barstow as National Director. ~~On the west coast~~, Howard Beale replaced Joseph Conard as West Coast Director and Thomas Bodine was made ~~Assistant~~ Assistant West Coast Director. (Beale to Nason, 10/24/42) At this point, both in Philadelphia and the west coast office, there was considerable concern over the high (per student) cost of relocation. It was agreed that this cost could not be justified economically, but that it probably could be justified as a "token payment to democracy". The ^{undue expense} ~~high cost per student~~ was due to high overhead in the Philadelphia office, to bottlenecks in the west coast office, ^{but above all} ~~due to an inadequate staff~~, and primarily to redtape and difficulties which

the government^{restrictions} and public opinion imposed. For some time, there had been differences of opinion between the staffs in the Philadelphia and San Francisco offices in regard to general policies. The Philadelphia office felt that the west coast office was overstaffed with part time and volunteer workers and that the job could be done efficiently by a few people. But as representatives from the Philadelphia office came to San Francisco, they ^{they realized that evaluating students, dealing with officials, + above all matching students with} saw things from the west coast viewpoint. ^{limited college open may need a most} Howard Beale is an example of ^{long - consuming job,} this shift in attitude with a shift in locale. (Conversation with Conard, 11/19/43)

In order to reduce expenses, Mr. Beale suggested the disbanding of the Philadelphia office and the centering of the entire program on the west coast. He proposed further that Director O'Brien be freed from office routine to work with the colleges and with the students. Another person should be hired solely to raise money. (Beale to Nasxon, 10/25) The west coast workers felt that there was no satisfactory way of keeping the Philadelphia office supplied with information in regard to the changing status of colleges, students, and communities. They saw no necessity for two offices, one frequently duplicating the work of the other. (Bodine to Margaret E. Jones of NSRC, Phil., 12/9/42)

The Philadelphia group felt that instead of merging the work in the western office, it would be better to center it in Denver, Chicago, or Philadelphia. They felt that the work should be centered in the east for several reasons. One of the big jobs after the Fall of 1942, was the raising of money. The source of the funds was mainly in the east. Frequently the donors wished to have a part in the allocation of the funds. The WRA office in San Francisco had lost most of its autonomy, thus negating a chief reason for centering the work in San Francisco. It was also felt that personnel would be more available in Philadelphia as

Japanese-Americans could be used as well as members of the Friends Service Committee staff. (Conversation with Conard, 11/19/43)

The west coast executive committee met on January 19, 1943. ^{The members} ~~They~~ felt that if any such ~~change~~ move was to be made, it should be made immediately as war-schedule spring terms began in March. The committee, therefore, wired Dr. Nason favoring consolidation in the East. The ~~NN~~National Council met in New York on January 20 at which time the AFSC offered to assume administrative responsibility and to concentrate its work in Philadelphia using the staff which was available there.

^{W. L. Nason} ~~As~~ the west coast office closed at the ^{beginning of Feb., 1943,} ~~end of January, 1943,~~ it was able to make this progress report on its success:

487 students relocated in 122 colleges in 25 states

438 students accepted for winter terms and awaiting final release

166 students accepted for winter terms and documents being collected

944 students waiting for scholarship funds and openings in technical schools

257 students whose records were collected and waiting analysis

364 students whose records were being collected

2601 relocated or in process of being relocated

442 colleges had accepted students or were willing to

360 colleges had been cleared by the Army and Navy

77 colleges were waiting for Army and Navy clearance

5 colleges were waiting to be submitted for Army and Navy clearance

(Progress Reports of 1/27/43 & 2/6/43)

In a letter to John Nason on January 23, 1943, Thomas Bodine expressed the feeling of the west coast executive committee concerning the move to Philadelphia. ^{Dr.} ~~They~~ believed that from a public relations viewpoint, it would be better if a non-pacifist council, not just the AFSC, kept overall

leadership. He went on to say that the west coast committee was concerned over the possible attitude of the new group. They feared that they might treat the students as "cases" rather than ordinary colleges "kids". In expressing this concern, Mr. Bodine also expressed the prevailing spirit of the dealings of the west coast committee with the students:

Will the new letter-writers realize that student/ relocation isn't just a matter of placing 2500 students in available college openings; it is maintaining the loyalty of the whole evacuee group, preserving their faith in democratic institutions by letting them realize that the NSRC isn't just another government ~~agency~~ authority, cold and distant, formal and tortoise moving, and isn't just a social agency, but is the friend of these boys and girls? Will the new staff continue to treat them as individuals and as human beings with all the silly worries and foolish notions of freshman and sophomore-like human beings? (Bodine to Nason, 1/23/43)

This will end with decision to be made in a few weeks in Phil. re future continuance of work followed by stat. summary to date.

The work continued in Philadelphia during 1943. C. V. Hibbard became National Director after Robert O'Brien returned to the University of Washington. In January, 1944, it was decided to continue the Council for the calendar year of 1944. At that time, it was announced that since July, 1942,

2348 students had been relocated at college

343 had been relocated to work

16 had been relocated to army

206 applications were pending. (King to Gilloon, 1/31/44)

The application of the draft to the Nisei will greatly reduce the number of students able to attend college.

If student relocation ^{was} ~~were~~ to be successful, substantial sums would have to be raised to pay for tuition, living expenses, and travel expenses. It is necessary to remember that the families of these students, many of whom had been well able to provide their children with a college education previous to evacuation, were now deprived of their livelihood. ~~Nor could the students depend too much on earning their way in their new college situation due to discrimination of some employers.~~

A tabulation of 994 questionnaires in the Berkeley office on July 24, 1942 indicates the funds these students had available for continued education.

\$ 0- 250---38%

250- 500---21%

500-1000---18%

1000-up-----20%

Unstated----- 3%

The AFSC estimated that \$250,000 of private funds would be needed in 1942 to carry on the work. (AFSC release, 5/6/42) The eastern committee attempted to interest foundations, religious denominations, and colleges during the summer of 1942. They were greatly handicapped in their efforts by limitations on their publicity imposed by the WCCA.

The general philosophy on which scholarships/ awards were made was that it was more important to get large numbers of students out of the camps than it was to provide each student with enough money to complete his education. By the Fall of 1943, the average grant per student had been reduced to about \$200. In order to encourage self-reliance, it was the policy to make grants only to those students who agreed to earn all or part of their living expenses. (Rpt. of Dir., NSRC, 9/29/43)

In their progress report of 1/27/43, the SRC estimated that financial aid offered by the colleges amounted to a total of \$107,430.00. \$18,350.00 ^{represented} of this ~~was~~ remission of fees; \$57,730 ~~was~~ scholarship grants; \$31,350.00 ~~was~~ work opportunities.

a large %

The greatest part of scholarship aid came from churches. Each denomination handled the question differently. Some of the methods were setting aside of a definite sum and making allocations from it, promising to take care of needy students of their own denomination, and securing tuition reductions and work opportunities in denominational colleges. Other sources of funds were service organizations, ^{foundations,} and the colleges and universities themselves. A breakdown of the sources of scholarship funds as of the first of January~~x~~ 1943 is given in the report of the west coast committee:

World Student Service Fund.....	\$20,000
Presbyterian.....	10,000
Methodist Board of Education.....	10,000
Baptist.....	5,000
Congregational.....	5,000
Methodist Mission Board.....	5,000 (for travel)
Individuals.....	4,019
Evangelical Reformed.....	2,500
Lutheran.....	1,000
Brethren.....	1,000
Episcopal.....	1,000

Brethren Service Committee..... 300

(Rpt. West Coast Committee, NSRC, 1/1/43) ~~x~~

Other denominations not listed here, for example, the Catholics and the

Buddhists, helped students directly. The SRC would recommend a needy student to them and they would deal directly either with the student or the college he wished to attend. The SRC has no figures on the amount

of aid given in this manner. *Very substantial help was given by large foundations such as the Carnegie Foundation & the Columbia Foundation. E.g., the Cal. Foundation granted 15,000 in 1943 + 10,000 in 1944. (R to J 1131)*

Dir. Hibbard reported to the members of the SRC on 9/29/43 that approximately 261 students had received grants since the organization of the Council. During that period~~x~~ 65,013.76 had been allocated for this

*Incl include here
and given by
colleges*

purpose. (Dir. report to NSRC, 9/29/43) In May, 1943, a survey was made of the students already relocated in colleges. 448 replies were received. Of this number, 15 $\frac{1}{2}$ % were to receive aid from colleges in the form of scholarships or work ~~per~~ grants. Only 9% of those answering the questionnaire would need aid from the SRC to continue their education. ^{others needed no aid} (Ibid.)

Below is a summary of the finances of the SRC from the ^{beginning of} opening on April 1, 1942 to June 30, 1943.

	April 1, 1942 to December 31, 1942	January 1, 1943 to June 30, 1943	Total
<u>Income</u>			
Contributions-General	\$38,229.15	\$25,922.33	\$64,151.48
Contributions-Schol. Fund	3,956.78	9,539.18	13,495.96
Refund of Scholarships	25.00	570.00	595.00
Other	<u>364.25</u>	<u>64.50</u>	<u>428.75</u>
Total	42,575.18	36,096.01	78,671.19
 Total Expenditures	 29,565.92	 25,717.63	 55,283.55 *

"Since the preparation of that report, exact figures on the expenses during the months of July & Aug. have become available, indicating that the total expenses up to 9/1/43 was actually \$53,704.97 (Prog. Rpt. 9/29/43)

The Pacific Coast colleges were almost unanimous in their willingness to be helpful to their J-A students. As early as March 12, 1942, the Associated Colleges and Universities of the Pacific Southwest went on record as approving in principle the proposal that colleges might request exception to the evacuation order of J-A students who would normally graduate at the end of that semester. They also agreed to communicate with the National Conference of Church Affiliated Schools, the Association of American Universities to ask these organizations to determine if suitably situated colleges would accept evacuated students. (Minutes of meeting in Los Angeles on 3/12/42 of Colleges and Universities of Pacific Southwest.) Faculty members at the University of Washington worked toward getting scholarship money and openings in midwestern universities. (Letter Faculty Committee to Faculty Members 4/10/42) *Some report has already been made of* We have seen the activities of President Sproul in behalf of student relocation. All but one Pacific Coast college furnished the evacuated students with free transcripts. ~~which~~ This amounted to a real contribution in time and effort.

The attitude throughout the country was also very favorable towards the Nisei students. Of the first thirty-two colleges and universities contacted by President Sproul, only two felt that they could not accept students under his plan of government aid. (Oakland Tribune, 3/28/42) Some of the ~~favorable~~ colleges placed quotas on the number which they could accept, altho the quotas ~~was~~ *were* frequently large.

Many of the eastern colleges were most generous. Grinnell offered board, room, and tuition to two students. Other students were welcome, but they would need to furnish \$600 of the required \$800. If financial help ~~were~~ *was* needed, scholarships, academic refunds, and employment were available. (Shelton Beatty, Dean of Grinnell to Gertrude Takayama 1/6/43) Other colleges offered to provide jobs to help with expenses. (T.R. Marsh,

Dean of Southwestern College, Winfield, Kansas to Conard, 9/5/44)
Radcliffe granted tuition scholarships amounting to \$225 and felt that
and equal amount could be raised to supply room and board. (Mrs. B.B.
Cronkite, Radcliffe, to Ada Wyman, NSRC, 1/16/42) The list could be
extended indefinitely.

We have seen that the Student Relocation Committee on 1/27/43 es-
timated the financial aid which had been given by the colleges at
\$107,430. Nor was the aid by any means all financial. Many colleges,
e.g., the University of Utah, had student groups responsible for helping
the Nisei to feel at home in their new environment. (Pac. Cit., 10/22/42)
All appointed some faculty member as friend and counselor. A relocated
student wrote back to the NSRC that the president of Jolliffe College had
personally shown her around the campus and help her with her personal
affairs. "The friendliness of everyone here clearly manifests the goodwill
in the school community." (Akira Omachi to NSRC, 10/12/42) Despite the
presence of a naval unit on the campus, President Graham of North Carolina
wanted to admit a few Nisei students. As the community was extremely
overcrowded, he felt that he could accept only two, but he wanted to
bring those two to North Carolina as a symbol. He called the executive
committee together and the two naval officers presented their objections.
They feared that the Nisei students might get into the cafeteria and poison
the food of 2000 future aviators. This, they pointed out, would be much
simpler and less expensive than shooting down 2000 planes later. Pres.
Graham stated that he would be personally responsible that the Nisei
wouldn't poison food. President Graham went on to say that the question
involved fundamental principles of liberalism and democracy and as long
as he was president, citizens of Japanese descent could attend the Univ.

of North Carolina. (Conversation Beale and Graham--Beale memo. of 9/30/42)

~~Although the Navy had no objection, Iowa State Teachers College~~

Of course, not all colleges were willing to accept Nisei. Although the Navy had no objection, Iowa State Teachers College was unwilling to have J-As because there were 1000 WAVES on the campus. (Ella B. Bradford to Beale, 11/13/42). The attitude of the University of Minnesota was unique. Minnesota had received a large number of inquiries concerning the admission of J-A students. At one Pacific Coast university, Minn. was in the lead in answer to the question "where would you like to go if you have to move". President Coffey wrote to the presidents of other midwestern universities asking their policy. Some were not willing to accept Nisei students. This was disturbing to President Coffey as he realized that most of the students were devoted citizens--many with brothers in the armed forces. He felt that no one institution could handle the situation, but that it was a task for the federal government. Consequently on April 8, 1942, he wrote to the Secretary of War, the U.S. Office of Education, and the American Council on Education saying that the Univ. of Minn. would not accept these students until some plan for their distribution was formulated by the government. Pending a plan by responsible government agency, the Univ. of Minn. would hold up prospective transfers. The Regents concurred in this policy. (Statement Pres. W.C. Coffey of Univ. of Minn. in Minn. Alumni Weekly, 6/6/42)

what happened later

The U. of Minn. cooperated with the Council as it began to place studs.

Some institutions felt that they would be unable to accept Nisei in their schools of medicine, dentistry, social welfare, etc., as they did not care to undertake the job of introducing J-A students into situations involving patients and clients. (W.G. Leutner, Pres. of Western Reserve University to Conard, 10/23/42)

An interesting refusal to accept J-A students came from Louisiana Polytechnic Institute. The Student Senate voted against the admission of Nisei students. In explaining and upholding the vote of the Senate, the President explained that the student body was 99% Anglo-Saxon and that all were at least third generation Americans. Their background was rural and local and they had not travelled. They had strong prejudices and did not have the background to treat the Nisei properly. The townspeople had similar backgrounds and prejudices and the college was an integral part of the community. (C.Cottingham, Pres. to Trudy King, 1/18/43). Doubtless it was to the advantage of the Nisei that they did not attend Louisiana Polytechnic, but it is to be doubted whether the student body could not have benefited from them.

It has been stated that all but one Pacific Coast College furnished free transcripts to students seeking relocation. This was the USC College of Dentistry and the refusal went beyond denying free transcripts to denying credit for work completed by J-A students. The NSRC had requested transcripts from Dean Ford of the College of Dentistry and had received no reply. Clare Harris of the So. Calif. office phoned him and was informed that he had taken exception to the "mimeographed, unofficial, unauthorized" request of the SRC. He did not care to assist "prisoners of war" to leave the Centers. He also stated that he objected to sending transcripts to anyone except a student or another registrar. (Harris to Conard, 8/14/42) But a student who wrote for a transcript received this reply: "Dr. Ford has stated that he is not releasing any grades for you boys until such time the war is terminated". (Ryo Munekata to Conard, 8/24/42)

In an attempt to clear the situation, ~~Dean~~ Deutsch wrote to Pres. von Kleinsmid of U.S.C. He pointed out that the NSRC was proceeding with

the approval of the WRA, War, and Navy Departments. Transcripts are merely an official statement of the status of the work completed and there ^{is} ~~was~~ therefore no reason why a student should be denied such a statement under any circumstances. ~~Dean~~ Deutsch hoped that Pres. von Kleinsmid would take the matter up with the Dean of the College of Dentistry. (Deutsch to von K., 8/24/42) Pres. von K answered in this astounding manner:

Directly after the evacuation order a considerably large group ~~xx~~ of students of our dental school found themselves in camp... Almost immediately there were set up a series of dental units... fairly well equipped,... at which the then students of the College of Dentistry were employed as clerical workers.

In this community at the time feeling against even the American-born Japanese ran high, and the security of these students within the confines of the camp was considered not only desirable, but quite necessary. The students themselves have repeatedly expressed both satisfaction and pleasure in the arrangement....

As you know, the College of Dentistry operates under its own managing board, and, so far as I know, this board is in agreement with the policy and practice of the Dean's office, feeling that what is being done is in every respect for the best interest of the dental students who they regard as a ward of the army continuing in good standing in the dental school.

The situation is unusual, but after most careful checking I believe that the present arrangement is for the best interest of the student and in every way conducive to his professional training."

(von K to Deutsch 9/3/42)

The correspondence continued with ~~Dean~~ Deutsch answering Pres. von K on the following day. He pointed out that J-As were removed from certain military areas, but that there had never been any intention on the part of the government to confine them for the duration of the war. He continued:

"In your letter you say, (The students themselves have repeatedly expressed both satisfaction and pleasure in this arrangement.' However, the very fact that these particular students are asking for transcripts shows that they are eager to continue their education if they can... I do not think that the Army has asked ~~for~~ that these students be their wards for the duration of the war, and I do not think that the College of Dentistry or any university has the right to set itself up as a bar if the student's record in all

respects is satisfactory and if the institution to which he wishes to go will accept him. Frankly, I cannot understand the reasoning behind it. It seems to me that it would imply that the authorities of the College of Dentistry have set themselves up as authorities to determine that these students shall remain in camp for the duration of the war."

(Deutsch to von K., 9/4/42)

The battle continued. By the middle of October, no transcripts had been received and Dean Deutsch wrote to Dean Ford: "I am wondering whether there was some misunderstanding of my letter". (Deutsch to Ford, 10/17/42) The middle of November Deutsch repeated: "I wonder if there has been some misunderstanding". (Deutsch to Ford, 11/11/42) Two days later, Dean Ford wrote Dean Deutsch that he had mailed the records. (Ford to Deutsch, 11/13/42). There was ~~g~~ joy a few days later in the NSRC office when the transcripts arrived, but it was shortlived. They were made out in such a way that credit was denied not only for the Spring semester of 1942 but for the entire academic year of 1941-42. (Beale to Rhoads, 11/18/42) The students concerned declared that previous to evacuation, they had conferred with Dean Ford and had been assured that if they completed their laboratory work and took their final examinations, they would be given credit for ~~that~~ ^{the current} semester. (Beale to Deutsch quoting letters from students involved, 12/5/42) Again the exchange of letters between Deutsch and Ford was resumed, Deutsch writing Ford that he hoped that the added burden of a scholastic penalty not be placed on these young J-As. (Deutsch to Ford, 11/20/42) Dean Ford replied that he had been very busy. He requested the address of the students concerned so that he personally could send certificates to the institutions of their choice. (Ford to Deutsch, 12/14/42)

In a letter to Dean Deutsch on 1/27/43, a member of the SRC staff said: "It seems as though the modern way to overcome an apparently impregnable fortress is to go over or pass by it. It looks as though we must do this with Dean Ford." (Stevenson to Deutsch, 1/27/43) This they did by informing the prospective accepting college of the ~~universal~~ ^{universal}, ~~minus USC~~, practice. *of all other colleges except the USC Coll. of Dentistry. Practically all dental colleges*

The Bar~~x~~ Association of Nevada, for example, disapproved of the transfer of students to Nevada on the grounds that "If Japanese students are loyal to the United States, they should be in the Army or in defense work".

(Reno Evening Gazette, 4/3/42, p.20)

Community reaction to the acceptance of relocated students was on the whole favorable. The opposition which existed arose from general anti-Japanese feeling and the common fallacy of identifying American citizens of Japanese descent with the Japanese warlords. There was, however, a more definite objection to student relocation. At the time when the SRC was attempting to place J-As in eastern colleges, the boys of those colleges were being drafted. It is not unnatural that some parents and friends of the draftees took the attitude that it was unfair for the J-As to be given an opportunity to continue their education at a time when other boys were forced to leave college. ^{insert here} These objectors forgot, however, that at the outbreak of the war there were approximately 5000 J-As in the U.S. armed forces, the majority of them of college age. (Pac. Cit., 11/5) They also forgot that J-As were not drafted after Pearl Harbor ~~solely because of ancestry.~~ ^{In fact} J-A men who were registered for the draft received notices from their draft boards early in 1943 that they had been classified 4-C--the classification of enemy aliens. With ~~these~~ facts in mind, Dean Deutsch answered ~~thaxx~~ this objection in these words:

~~"But if a young man, for physical reasons, is not permitted to go into the army, would you deny him the right to continue his education because his fellows are fighting and dying elsewhere? Why should you refuse these Americans of Japanese ancestry the right to a further education merely because other Americans are called upon to take part in the armed forces and they are refused this opportunity?" (Deutsch to Paul F. Shafer, Prin., San Fernando High School, Los Angeles, 1/8/43)~~

The SRC was embarrassed in the early stages of its work by the lack of a government policy. Favorably inclined colleges felt that if there were a definite government policy, they would be in a much better position to withstand adverse community reaction. Even after the SRC was given the sanction of the War Dept. and the WRA, it was proposed that President Roosevelt make a formal statement that J-As were American citizens and should be treated as

such. It was thought that a letter from the President to university and college associations would be more effective than incidental mention in a radio address. (Wm. Berrien to Deutsch, 6/23/42)

(Before a student could be released to attend college,) a guarantee of community acceptance from the community where the college was located, had to be obtained. If the student was in an Assembly Center and therefore under the jurisdiction of the WCCA, the following form, signed by the chief of police, mayor, or some other public official was necessary:

"We are not aware of any local condition which would make it unadvisable for _____ who is an American citizen of Japanese ancestry and who is fully accepted for admission by _____ university, to live as a student in this community." (Conard to McKelvie, 7/30/42)

After the students were in the Relocation Centers and under the jurisdiction of the WRA, the community acceptance form needed to come only from the university. The form was as follows:

"We believe the attitude of this university community is such that American citizens of Japanese ancestry fully accepted for admission at this University, may reside here without being molested. The University, therefore, sees no objection to the residence here of _____ (no.) of American citizens of Japanese ancestry who prove to be fully qualified and accepted for admission."
(Ibid.)

In giving examples of community opposition, the purpose is to show the sources of opposition. It must be remembered that these cases are the exceptions to the rule of favorable community reaction. The files of the SRC contain many letters testifying to the fact that colleges and universities would take more students if community opposition could be overcome. Letters to that effect were received, for example, from Ohio University (Beale to O'Brien, 11/13/42), Bethel College (Eliz. Johnson to Pres. E.E. Kaufman, 11/18/42), Oberline College (Bodine to Barstow, 8/12/42), Western Reserve University (Beale to Dean Francis Bacon, 11/19/42), and many others.

The West Coast Congressional delegation opposed Student Relocation as early as May, 1942. A meeting of a subcommittee of the west coast group was held on May 8 with Milton Eisenhower present. Congressman Welch objected to permitting Japanese students to continue their training as it would break down the procedure of evacuating all Japanese in order to place them in evacuation camps. He said he believed that Japanese students were more dangerous than the old Japanese who left Japan to seek better living conditions in this country. (Grodzins notes from minutes of subcommittee)

In a letter to Dillon Myer on June 17, Rep. Leland Ford said that the student relocation movement amounted to putting out "potential spies". He wrote Myer again on July 16 asking that the student relocation movement be discontinued. Dir. Myer replied as follows: "There seem to be many reasons why we should proceed with it, continuing to administer the program in close collaboration with the War Department, the Navy Intelligence, the FBI and all other responsible agencies. Therefore, I cannot comply with your request that the program be held in abeyance." (Myer to Leland Ford, 7/28/42--Grodzins notes)

At a meeting of the West Coast Congressional delegation subcommittee, Rep. Ford made the statement that 25,000 Japanese would be allowed to go free with college releases. (Grodzins notes) He also issued a press statement in which he said: "Now that we have the Japanese in camps, and now that they are satisfied to stay there, we see no reason why this certain group (WEA) should initiate other ideas which would take these people out of the camps when we have just gotten them in." (Release to Lyle Parker, L.A. Times, 7/15/42)

In several communities, the American Legion opposed student relocation and were instrumental in withholding formal community acceptance. Early in September, 1942, Director Barstow wrote to Lynn U. Stambaugh, National Commander of the American Legion. He said that ~~he~~ he felt that the Legion could be helpful in creating favorable public opinion towards student relocation. He knew that in some communities the Legion had taken the leadership in interpreting Nisei rights ~~to the community.~~ Dir. Barstow asked for a word of endorsement of the SRC program from the American Legion. (Barstow to Stambaugh, 9/4/42) In October Joseph Conard expressed the fear that altho there were Legionnaires who believed in civil rights and racial justice, the national headquarters were being influenced on the Japanese question by the California delegation who were in turn influenced *by* the ~~reactionary~~ California groups who were threatened by Japanese competition. (Conard to Morgenroth, 10/8/42) ~~Despite continued~~ attempts to give the Legion the SRC side of the question, *failed.* the Legion adopted a resolution opposing the release of J-As from camps to attend colleges (at their national convention in Kansas City.) (Nat'l. Legionnaire, 10/42, p.21.) At about this same time, the Calif. 6th. District *of the Legion* passed a remarkable resolution which said in part: "...it is probable many of the same American-born Japanese knew of the sneak raid on our possessions... and that it is probable that further education for them will mean their entrance into positions of managers, supervisors, directing and controlling of banking, industry, public utilities and all business in general". (Pac. Cit., 11/5/42)

An instance of American Legion objection to relocation occurred in Elmhurst, Ill. The President of the college wanted to admit J-A students and had reported excellent community attitudes. Just as four students were about to get ^{on} the train, a wire was received urging that the students postpone their arrival because of the activity of the American

Legion. (Bodine to Nason, 9/23/42) ~~It seems that~~ In the Spring of 1942 President Lehmann had obtained the approval of various community organizations including the American Legion. He was under the impression that he had given the SRC formal assurance of the community attitude, but there was no record of such assurance. *Pres. Lehmann was thus forced to ask again for community acceptance after the national convention of the American Legion passed its resolution opposing student relocation. When of the Am. Leg. had been held. This time the local Am. Leg. post* Pres. Lehmann asked the second time for community approval, the American Legion passed a resolution opposing the coming of the students to Elmhurst. The question was taken up by the Chicago Sun which wrote a strong editorial upholding Pres. Lehmann. (Morgenroth to West Coast Staff, 10/9/42) The students at Elmhurst voted 213-87 in favor of admitting the J-A students. By early November the situation was still not cleared up and the students were ~~still not~~ ^{yet} admitted. (O'Brien to Beale, 11/2/42)

At Athens, Ohio, the chief of police and the mayor refused to admit J-A students until local public opinion could be ascertained. The local American Legion post refused to go on record one way or another until the National Headquarters expressed an opinion. (B.T. Grover to Barstow, 9/4/42) Word was sent to the SRC that due to community attitude it would be unwise for students to come to Athens. Two students were already on their way when this news arrived and they had to be gotten off the train and ~~switched~~ ^{sent} to the college of their second choice. (Bodine to Nason, 9/23/42)

The most spectacular incident occurred in April when two Nisei girls were accepted as transfers from a west coast university to the University of Idaho. When they arrived in Moscow, they were told that their applications had been cancelled and that the town was hostile. There was talk of lynching. For their protection, the girls were taken to the city jail where one of them wrote a letter, parts of which follow:

"Right now, I am neither frightened nor feeling but I wish you could do something about this condition. At least you would know what to do when you're in again. I feel very young and lost for once in my life... Some of the townspeople are up in arms for our coming and are threatening mob violence so that is the reason why we are in jail. The sanitary conditions are terrific.... The jailer gave us blankets but I'm scared to use them since I found a bug on my blue night coat already...

April 18--10:30 A.M. and Mr. Hatt and Mrs. Bender were in to see us. He informed us that we will have to spend the day and night in jail--This being Saturday and they are afraid of the mob. We had lunch in the face of the deputy sheriff who is called the Bull Moose. He sure hates us. The jailer was talking to someone over the telephone and said that he is afraid that a mob will come to lynch us tonight.

... Please write, I'm scared."

(Maxine Honda to Bob (O'Brien?)) 4/17/42

Edits from U. Idaho paper here

Park College in Parkville, Mo., wanted to accept several Nisei students. The president of the college, W. L. Young, wrote to Joseph Conard early in July saying that the mayor and council had not met and hoping that formal community acceptance might be waived as the college community was very self-sufficient. (Young to Conard, 7/2/42) Later, President Young wrote saying that the mayor had been in the community only a short time and was fearful of acting without the Council which found it impossible to meet. (Young to Conard, 7/13/42) A few days later, he said that the sheriff would approve the arrival of the students and suggested that Conard write to the Sheriff. (Young to Conard, 7/16/42) This was done, the sheriff answered favorably, and some students arrived. More were due to arrive. Early in August, the students already enrolled became the subjects of an ouster movement started by a group of residents led by the mayor and members of chapters of the American Legion and the American War Mothers. President Young stuck by his decision against those of his fellow townspeople who he said "apparently have lost sight of exactly those things for which this nation now is fighting". Pres. Young sent out 1000 letters to the citizens of Parkville pointing out that at that time seventy two colleges were accepting J-A students under a plan approved by the Army, Navy, U.S. ^{Office} Dept. of Educ., and the FBI. (Pac. Cit., 9/3/42) When the matter got into the press, Pres. Young within one week received 400 communications, only eight of which opposed the entrance of the students. (Young to Conard, 9/8/42) On Sept. 10, the Board of Trustees met and voted to stand by President Young in his decision to accept the students. (~~Ymx~~Ibid.) An editorial in the Pac. Cit. had this to say about the affair at Park College:

"The war for freedom was being fought this week in the jungles of New Guinea, in the valley of the Volga, and in the skies

Early in 1943, the legislatures of three states passed memorials opposing student relocation. Such a memorial was introduced into the

Arizona House of Representatives (Pac. Cit., 2/11/43) and into the Idaho

the gov. of Ariz. transmitted the memorial to Pres. R. The pres. sec. answered explaining the work of the I.R.C. & concluding:
House of Representatives (Pac. Cit., 2/25/43). A resolution was introduced

into the Iowa Assembly stating that Japanese-Americans in Iowa colleges *that these students of Lancaster are no more enemy aliens than are the citizens of U.S.* should be returned to the relocation centers. (Pac. Cit., 4/1/43)

Scarlet and Black, the student publication of Grinnell University, made *considerable sacrifice*

this comment on the resolution:

"Has there been trouble? Not since they came... The students

in question have proved themselves, they have improved us.

The Japanese students at Grinnell have become an integral,

valuable, enjoyable part of our student body. Semester

grades came out a month ago, Mr. Findlay. Every one of

our Japanese students was on the presidents' list of honor

students. They live in our dorms, and we like them. They

are part of our social life, and we don't want to lose them."

(Edit. from Grinnell, Scarlet and Black, quoted in Pac. Cit.

4/8/43, p.3.)

A bill was introduced into the Penn. Leg. which provided for the cutting off of st. support from any college which accepted "interned" Japanese. (Scranton Times, 3/24/43)

the demands put upon them by their removal from the W.C. of the U.S. (M. H. McIntyre, sec. to the Pres., to Hon Sidney P. Osborn, Gov. of Ariz.) 3/8/43

over Europe.

And in a little college town in western Missouri, in what is nearly the geographical center of the great American nation, democracy won a hard battle on the home front." (Pac. Cit., 9/10/42)

insert

For the student relocation program to be successful, complete cooperation of all government agencies concerned was essential. One of the conditions under which the AFSC accepted responsibility was that this cooperation would be forthcoming. On May 21, 1942, Asst. Sec. of War John J. McCloy wrote as follows to Clarence Pickett:

"...I take pleasure in advising you that I am in complete sympathy with the suggestions made by Mr. Eisenhower in his letter of May 5 to you. Anything that can legitimately be done to compensate loyal citizens of Japanese ancestry for the dislocation to which they have been subjected by reason of military necessity, has our full approval."
(McCloy to Pickett, 5/21/42)

The Civil Affairs Division of the Far East Army Command
The WCCA was a ~~semi-military, semi-civilian~~ agency created ~~by the~~ *matters* Army in March of 1942 to deal with civilian control. It carried out the evacuation of the Japanese and was the agency which had jurisdiction over them while they were in the Assembly Centers. Thus, in the early stages of the relocation program, the WCCA was the government agency with which most dealings were had. Early in June, Milton Eisenhower wrote to Gen. DeWitt, commanding general of the Western Defense Command, asking that representatives of the NSRC be allowed to interview students in the camps. (Eisenhower to DeWitt, 6/5/42) On June 19, the WCCA issued a lengthy pamphlet of instructions governing the interviewing of students in assembly centers. Among important provisions were the following:

- 1) "Individuals or committees of the NSRC will make no release to the press or public in any manner except thru the Public Relations Branch of the WCCA."
- 2) "A member of the Internal Security in each center will be present during all meetings and interviews held by the NSRC and will be detailed by the Chief of Internal Security in each center."
- 3) "A copy of all instructions and directives furnished the Japanese students and Japanese committee will be forwarded

- to the Temporary Settlement Operations Division of the WCCA."
- 4) "Group gatherings of prospective students for lectures, interviews, instructions, etc. by members of the NSRC will not be permitted."
(Instructions of WDC and 4th. Army WCCA concerning interviews, etc., 6/19/42)

These directives were accepted by the NSRC, although not willingly. ~~They~~ had understood that they would be allowed to hold meetings in the camps, the meetings to be arranged with the Center managers. (Conard to Col. Karl Bendetsen, 6/21/42) The persons who were to go to the centers to distribute questionnaires and interview students had great difficulty in getting their passes. They kept being "put off". (Bodine--report on activities, 6/26 & 6/27)

The restriction which proved most troublesome was that which stated that no individual or committee of the NSRC could make any release to the press or to the public except through the Public Relations Branch of the WCCA. At the time the directives were accepted, the NSRC told the WCCA that ^{publications} ~~two releases~~ were already at the printers. One of these was a four page pamphlet entitled "Japanese Student Relocation". After the release of this pamphlet, Col. Bendetsen wrote to Mr. Conard announcing that it was not satisfactory and would not be approved. Any distribution of it would be a violation of the June 19 agreement with the WCCA. Before this letter was received in the Berkeley office, Thomas Bodine and Homer Morris, another member of the staff, went to the WCCA office in regard to passes. They were told that Major Beasley of the Army's Public Relations Office wished to see them. During the interview which followed, Mr. Bodine took copious notes. They were told that they were forbidden to circulate the pamphlet. When they asked if the facts in the pamphlet were corrected, the answer was "Yes, but the inference is wrong. As a writer I am interested in interpretation..." Major Beasley said that the first sentence in the pamphlet inferred criticism of the Army, War Dept., ~~Navy~~, and President Roosevelt. This sentence stated: "The mass

evacuation of Japanese from the Pacific Coast has placed under an indiscriminate ban more than one hundred thousand persons." Was that incorrect, asked Mr. Morris. "No, it is correct, but I am trained in inference, and I know the tricks of the trade.... I don't object to what a person believes, but I object to his insinuating what he thinks into what he writes.... I'm trained in influencing people's minds by the written word. And this is wholly bad. It may not have been written for that purpose, but that doesn't make any difference; it is wholly bad in its effect." The pamphlet also said: "Under the pressure of war emergency measures their basic civil rights have been suspended, their property has been put in jeopardy and--most serious of all--their faith in American justice and the ideals of democracy has suffered a shock, in some cases beyond remedy." Said Major Beasley: "You say their faith has been shaken. That is not so. You get stories to that effect, but I know these people more than anyone in the SRC knows them and can say unequivocally that it is not so." Mr. Morris remarked that the Constitution says that no one may be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Beasley answered: "...What is liberty? No one anywhere may take away another person's liberty--he may deprive him of privileges--but not of liberty." (Bodine to Pickett and Barstow 7/4/42)

Altho the SRC disagreed with Major Beasley's interpretation of the pamphlet, rather than jeopardize their entire program, they withdrew ~~the~~ it from circulation. (Conard to Bendetsen, 7/10/42) This episode placed the SRC in the position of attempting to arouse interest in placing students and of attempting to raise money, and yet being unable to give out information which would help to arouse the necessary interest. A strict interpretation of the instruction would prevent SRC members from speaking even to small semi-public gatherings. The group felt very strongly that it was essential for them to make these semi-public addresses. They had been asked to do a job and if they were to raise the

reputation?

necessary money they must let the public know what they were trying to do and what progress had been made. This most unsatisfactory arrangement continued all through the summer of 1942--the crucial period of the program. In October, President Sproul wrote to Col. Bendetsen recalling the original censorship agreement and noting that most students were by that time out of the control of the WCCA and under that of the WRA. In view of this situation and in view of the necessity for publicity to raise money, he assumed that the censorship restrictions were no longer binding. If no word was heard to the contrary, the SRC would assume that this understanding of the situation was correct. (Beale to Nason and others, 10/24/42)

result?

ASCC SPRING

Pres. Sproul never received a reply to this letter. The SRC ^{has considered} what publicity it ~~felt~~ desirable since that date. (K to G, 1/44)

In addition to the WCCA form for community acceptance, the WCCA required these additional documents for student release from an Assembly Center:

- 1) Form including statistical data
- 2) Evidence that he had been accepted by a college
- 3) Evidence that he had sufficient resources to last one year.

This could be proven by:

- a) Letter from his bank stating amount in his account
- b) Letter from his bank stating amount in the account of a friend or relative and a statement from that friend or relative certifying that he ^{would} will provide the student with needed funds
- c) Statement from a tenant or person paying income describing the income and showing that it ^{would} will continue for at least one year.
- d) Statement from a Center authority indicating the amount of cash or traveler's checks on hand in the Center.
- e) If the total amount is less than \$1000, the student ^{might} may have to prove that that amount is sufficient.

(NSRC, West Coast Area, Form #14)

An odd situation developed in regard to the WCCA's willingness to release students to Colorado. Gov. Carr of Colorado had made a statement which was interpreted by the WCCA to mean that he was not willing to admit J-As into Colo. unless they had been forced to leave the WDC. Students seeking relocation were obviously not forced to leave, therefore, the WCCA would release no student to Colorado without individual permission from Gov. Carr. Mr. Conard wrote to Gov. Carr in the middle of July asking him to clarify his position so that the WCCA would release students. (Conard to Carr, 7/13/42) Gov. Carr answered that he was unaware that such an organization as the WCCA existed.

"In order that the matter may be cleared for all time, will you not get word to all of these councils and authorities as well as the Army that I make absolutely no objection to the reception of people whether they are forced to leave by order of the President or the Army or whether they come voluntarily under legal pact. I still cling to my old position and say that they have the right as American citizens to do as they please and legally go where they please." (Carr to Conard, 8/7/42)

Mr. Bodine took Gov. Carr's letter to the WCCA offices and was told that that was satisfactory. (Bodine to Carr, 8/17/42) However, on August 18, Gov. Carr received a letter from Willard Spence of the Denver Council of Churches which said that Gov. Carr's signature was still necessary

on each release from an Assembly Center. (Spence to Carr, 8/18/42) *This situation was never really clarified but with the WRA as-
sumption of responsibility, the matter disappeared.* (Oct. 18/44)

Despite certain fundamental differences in viewpoint, for example, the necessity for censorship, relations between the NSRC and the WCCA were cordial. Individual members of the WCCA often cooperated beyond normal expectations. By the Fall of 1942, the release system was working smoothly and rapidly. Travel permits were coming through on a twenty-four hour basis. The record for speedy release occurred when the WCCA received a phone call at 3:30 of a Saturday afternoon asking if a travel permit for a Catholic girl could be secured in time for her to go East with three nuns on an eight o'clock train the following morning. ~~WITHIN~~ ~~Forty-five minutes, the request~~ They agreed to issue the permit the next morning, but not until the office opened at 8:15. The girl was released very early in the morning from the Tanforan Assembly Center so that she could be ready to get on the train the moment the travel permit was received. The train left San Francisco at 8:00; the SRC member picked up the permit at the WCCA office in San Francisco at 8:15; did some fast driving; and the girl caught the train on the other side of the Bay in Berkeley. (Min. W.C. Exec. Com., 9/8/42)

The WRA procedure for obtaining educational leaves is similar to

that of the WCCA. We have seen already the different form required for community acceptance. During the Summer and early Fall of 1942, applications for leave went through the San Francisco office. Late in 1942, the granting of release was discontinued at the San Francisco office and was centered in Washington. This greatly delayed releases. Whereas the maximum had been approximately 10 days it was now 5-6 weeks. (Bodine to Nason, 1/27/43)

The procedure for release from a Relocation Center under the WRA ^{is brief} was as follows:

- 1) The student filled^s out a student relocation questionnaire and various WRA forms
- 2) The Project Director forward^sed the questionnaire to the SRC office and the other documents to the Washington WRA office with his recommendation.
- 3) After placement arrangements have been made, the NSRC prepares a docket for Washington containing evidence that the student has been accepted at a cleared school, and that community acceptance is assured, and a statement of the student's financial position.
- 4) The Washington office submits the student's name to the FBI for checking. If this check does not produce any derogatory information, and all other conditions have been met, the Project Director is notified that leave may be granted.
- 5) When the student arrives at the college, he notifies the Washington office on a form provided and must keep that office informed of any subsequent change of address.

(Memo to Project and Regional Directors, WRA, 12/9/42)

Before a student could be relocated, a check was made to insure that he had no adverse record. This check was made by Army¹ intelligence, Navy Intelligence, and the FBI. Explaining the FBI check, J. E. Hoover wrote

When the students were in the Assembly Centers, the WCCA check was a three way check including Army Intelligence, Navy Intelligence, and FBI. The FBI check was made in the local San Francisco office.

After the students were in the Relocation Centers, the WRA had the FBI check done in the Washington office. This causes considerable delay. Occasionally, a student who at one time was held up by the FBI might later be allowed to leave camp. This indicates that during the first check, questions might be raised which would make holding up a student advisable. Later these questions might be revolved in favor of the student. (Conard to Gilloon, 12/9/43)

to Edward J. Ennis, Director of Alien Enemy Control Unit: "... this Bureau... will upon receipt of the names of individuals from you cause a check to be made of its records and you will be informed of any pertinent information received from such a check". (Hoover to Ennis, 8/18/42)

At first, the FBI check was made in San Francisco, but later it had to be made in Washington. This caused a two weeks delay in clearances. (Conard to Students Concerned, 9/11/42) This delay was serious in September, as the students were trying to enter the Fall terms. Students could be released from the camps on a check by Army intelligence. Later, an FBI check was made, and if anything of importance was discovered against them, they could be recalled to camp. (Bodine to Nason, 9/23/42)

The problem of what to call this FBI check was a perplexing and persistent one. "Certification of loyalty" seemed too strong, as did "assurance of loyalty". WRA Director Myer stated that no one should attempt to assure a student's loyalty. It could be said that the FBI checked and found nothing adverse. (Myer to Marks, 11/42) However, letters and memos from the WRA itself, do use the words "cleared by the FBI". (Ex., memo to Project Directors, 12/9/42) The FBI did not actually approve or disapprove anyone. They merely reported whether or not their files had any information on a particular person, and if so, the nature of that information. The responsibility of whether to grant or deny leaves remained with the WRA. (Myer to E.R. Fryer, Reg. Dir. WRA, 11/13/42)

The SRC faced a difficult problem when the FBI reported adverse information not on the student concerned, but on his parents. The fact that a Japanese alien was interned after Pearl Harbor did not necessarily mean that he was dangerous. In many cases, it merely meant that he was a leader in the Japanese community. Frequently the children of these community leaders were the most promising of the college group.

The SRC people felt that even in the cases where there was real reason for suspicion of a parent, that it was against American legal principles to hold a child responsible for the acts of his parent. They also felt that if the child was considered dangerous, he himself would be under investigation or be interned. Consequently, if an FBI record was reported on a student previously cleared by Army Intelligence on ~~the~~ the Pacific Coast, this information was sent to the Project and to the SRC for further recommendation. After this additional report, a decision was made on whether or not the leave should be cancelled. (Beale to Provinse, 11/14/42)

Before ~~a student could leave for~~ ^{could accept students,} an eastern college, that college had to be approved by Army Intelligence, Navy Intelligence, the FBI, and the U.S. Office of Education. The only ones of these which caused difficulty were the Army and Navy. The Army in June, 1942, ruled that persons of Japanese extraction ~~may~~ might not attend institutions "at which classified research projects are being carried on or which are located within 25 miles of important power installations, defense factories, or railway terminals/facilities". ^(Col. John T. Russell, Asst. Dir. of M.I. S. to John H. 6/23/42) The Army also stated that "further ^{Provinse,} consideration will be given, upon request, to individual cases where positive ^{Chief Com. Malaga, Ariz. W.R.A.)} evidence of loyalty on the part of the student is submitted". (Provinse to Barstow, 6/24/42) By June 24, the Army had given clearance to only one quarter of the list of colleges sent to it for approval. ^{llud.} (Provinse to Barstow, 6/24/42) The SRC did not wish to accept these limitations without protest, as all of their other efforts were useless unless there were sufficient approved colleges to which students could go. The west coast committee suggested that Pres. Sproul, or Pres. Hutchins of Chicago, or President Dykstra of Wisconsin should call on Sec. Stimson or Sec. Knox to try to clarify the situation. (NSRC to Pickett and Barstow, 6/29/42)

The New York Executive Committee meeting on July 9^a decided that they ~~would have to accept the fact that~~ complete clearance would^{apparently} be given in relatively few colleges and that to others, each application would be considered on its merits. But ~~they hoped~~^{there was hope} for gradual relaxation of the restrictions. (Min. N.Y. Exec. Com. 7/9/42) In the middle of July, Dir. Barstow said that the clearance bottleneck would have to be broken or that the AFSC would have to withdraw from the program. The other ~~possibility~~^{alternative} would be to announce that there was no possibility of Fall placements. (Schauffler, AFSC to West Coast Staff, NSRC, 7/15) A member of the eastern staff expressed the opinion that the Army could be worked with, though tediously, if it were "gentled". She feared that if the SRC should try to bear down too hard, they might add to the already existing resistance and create an impasse. (Schauffler to West Coast Staff, NSRC, 7/17/42)²

By the end of June, of a list of 100 colleges examined, only 17 were approved--practically all of ~~these~~ small and rural. The west coast committee predicted that the list of colleges absolutely clear would remain small, but that there would be a much larger number which would be permitted to accept students after careful investigation and some sort of special certification. They doubted that they would be given a list of definitely not approved colleges, but would have to discover~~ed~~ them by the trial and error method. They urged that the Army release the names of approved colleges as they were cleared, rather than ~~waiting~~^{to wait} for an entire list to be checked. If the ~~clearance bottleneck~~^{impasse} continued, the west coast committee ~~felt~~ again suggested that Pres. Sproul or Pres. Dykstra should go to Washington to try to break it. (Minutes West Coast Committee, 7/24/42)

On July 27, Director Barstow wrote to President Sproul that despite ~~all~~^{approval} ~~of the SR program~~^{of SR program from top War Dept. officials} ~~their backing in high places~~^{Army}, they were unable to secure ~~from~~^{clearances}

the War Department. Nor were they able to get any adequate statement of the principles and policies under which the decisions were made. The SRC had hesitated to take drastic steps in hopes that the break was just ^{announce that no Fall placements could be made in the hope} that clearance procedures could be worked out around the corner. However, Dr. Nason, Dr. Barstow, Dr. Aydelotte, and Mr. Cary had an appointment with Asst. Sec. of War McCloy, ^{former} WRA Director Eisenhower, and ^{WRA} Director Myer on July 29. If the results of that conference were unsatisfactory, they expected to go to the White House. If that step were necessary, Dr. Barstow asked Pres. Sproul if he would be ready to go to Washington and lend his support to the plea to the President. (Barstow to Sproul, 7/27/42)

The meeting with Asst. Sec. McCloy was most amicable and the SR group left with assurances of greater speed in clearances. (Barstow to Conard, 7/29/42) A few days later ^{Dr.} Barstow wrote to Marks, ^{Mr.} that Asst. Sec. McCloy had "pressed a button" and that they might expect general clearance in a few days. (Barstow to Marks, 8/3/42) The following day, ^{Dr.} Barstow wired to ^{Mr.} Conard that the War Department would have about 200 colleges cleared by August 5. The Army issued the following general restrictions:

- 1) Only Nisei were eligible
 - 2) The WRA would assure the War Dept. that college authorities were agreeable to the acceptance of the student and that satisfactory arrangements had been made with state and local officials regarding the presence of these students in the community.
 - 3) All students would be checked by the FBI before release
 - 4) The WRA was responsible for the conduct of the student after release
 - 5) The WRA would furnish Army Intelligence and the appropriate defense command with a list of students and the names of the colleges in which they enrolled as soon as the student had been checked by the FBI.
- (McCloy to Myer, 8/5/42)

By the end of September, the Army was ready to approve any college which was not on the Navy proscribed list. (Beale memo. 9/30/42)

The Navy at first refused to approve any university at which naval scientific research was carried on or where there were Naval ROTC units. (Provinse to Barstow, 6/24/42) The Navy carried on investigation of schools and compiled a list of those which it would not approve. (Marks to Barstow, 8/12/42) Some incongruous things occurred. The University of Colorado at Boulder was on the Navy proscribed list. A Nisei, who left a relocation center on a work permit, went to Boulder and was invited to join the faculty. (Conversation Conard with Grodzins,)When the Army restrictions were eased in August, those of the Navy remained just as strict. Navy clearance was further complicated by the fact that Navy subdivisions were relatively autonomous so that each one had to be worked with separately. The Navy approvals were so meagre that it was suggested that a group of people such as Commissioner Studebaker and President Dykstra go to the top navy civilians and give them the viewpoint of educators. (Rpt., Beale on trip to Washington, 9/30/42) The west coast steering committee meeting on October 23 felt that President Sproul's trip East should be utilized to help "crack the Navy" in the same way that the Army had been "cracked". They suggested that Presidents Dykstra or Graham join President Sproul and Commissioner Studebaker to present the matter from the educator's angle explaining the impossibility of placing excellent students without openings in good universities and graduate schools. (Beale to Nason, 10/24/42)

When the SRC left the west coast early in February 1943, there were eighty colleges closed to J-As. On June 4, 1943, the Navy issued a new "Master List of Schools Having Classified Naval Activities Making It Un-

Single space

desirable that Japanese Attend" containing 91 colleges. A few colleges which had formerly been proscribed were removed, e.g., New York University; but other colleges formerly cleared were now proscribed. This list unfortunately included many of the large universities which offered badly needed technical and graduate courses, e.g., University of Nebraska, University of Cincinnati, Yale, Harvard, Marquette University, Smith College. This order has resulted in some glaring inconsistencies. "Nisei in the Army were assigned to proscribed colleges. There were several here at the University of Pennsylvania, some even at colleges in California. The nisei, kibe and issei could and are teaching at these proscribed colleges, (University of Colorado, University of Minnesota) but they cannot study. They can work as janitors, as dieticians, as bus boys but they cannot study.... Girls can go to Barnard but boys cannot go to Columbia and when girls graduate they cannot obtain graduate work at Columbia. Girls can go to Radcliffe, use the Harvard laboratories but boys cannot. Non-evacuees including those who left the west coast prior to the freezing order and those who have never been on the west coast have been able to attend any college of their choice. Also any alien, Japanese, German, Irish, can attend Columbia University providing he passes the entrance requirements." (King to Gilloon, 11/18/43)

This SRC was given to understand that this situation would be remedied. (NSRC, Prog. Rpt., 9/29/43) However, in the middle of November, 1943, word was received of a new War Department directive. All colleges wishing to have Nisei students attend must go through a special procedure. All persons still in relocation centers in February, 1943 were registered and in time all of them will have been reviewed by the Japanese American Joint Board of the Provost Marshal General's Department. This board gives three

types of clearances.

"'C'--Persons who are cleared to obtain jobs or go to colleges which are not in the Eastern Defense Command area and which do not include employment in plants and facilities vital to the war effort.

'B'--Persons who can obtain jobs or go to college in the Eastern Defense Command area.

'A'--Persons who in addition to this are eligible for employment in plants and facilities vital to the war effort....

According to the new procedure students wishing to attend proscribed colleges would have to obtain similar type of clearance.... For instance, super, super, super, super loyal students might be allowed to take any course they desire at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Super, super, super ones might be able to take a limited number of courses at Mass. Institute of Technology and specialized courses at Yale, and so forth down the line."

(King to Gilloon, 11/18/43)

The lack of cleared colleges had brought a crisis in the work of the SRC by the ~~Fall of 1943~~. ^{end of 1943. - Insert 46A here} In addition to the proscribed colleges, cleared colleges and universities have not all been willing to accept students due to the attitude of a local military commander or to public opinion. Faculty opposition is the bar in other cases. Some schools are effectively closed because no part time work is available in the locality.

In order to minimize this lack of available colleges, several steps were taken. Practically all beginning students were encouraged to attend small colleges and to take general courses in the hope that they might later be able to transfer to institutions offering specialized courses. Excellent students were placed in colleges in the neighborhood of hostile colleges so that they might break down prejudices. Community officials and academic groups ^{were} ~~have been~~ supplied with evidence with which they might educate their hesitant members, (NSRC, Prog. Rpt., 9/29/43) Altho these steps were successful in a small way, the truth ^{is} ~~is as of~~ November 1943 ^{is} that unless many schools now closed to J-A students are opened, the SRC cannot continue to place students.

By the end of 1943, there were more proscribed colleges on the list than at any previous time and the list was continuing to grow. The restrictions also now apply to any person with one parent of Japanese ancestry rather than as formerly when the restrictions applied only to those students from relocation centers. Each branch of the Service Commands and each branch of the Armed Forces seems to be free to add colleges to the proscribed list.

In theory, it is possible for a student to obtain clearances to attend a proscribed college, but the amount of time involved in obtaining the clearances is tremendous. In the first two months after the new system was inaugurated, only three students had successfully gone through the process.

Since the first student left ~~Fule~~ Lake Relocation Center on July 4, 1942 until November 15, 1943, the SRC had helped 2136 students to reenter ³³² colleges in 40 states. ^(King to Gilloon, 11/19/43) One hundred eighty three others had applications pending. This transfer of students was accomplished at a cost of \$32.02 per student, including the expense of moving from the west coast to Philadelphia. (Prog. Rpt., 9/29/43) As of November 17, 1943, 536 colleges had been cleared by the Army and Navy. (King to Gilloon, 11/18/43)

The relocated students have done exceptionally well both academically and socially. The grade point average of all relocated students for the first semester in their new colleges was 2.3, or B plus. The first student to be relocated, Harvey Itano, at the end of three months led his class despite the fact that he entered a month late. (Conversation with Conard, 11/19/43) One of the Nisei was soon elected vice president of his class; another was elected president of the Junior Coass at the University of Pennsylvania. (Beale to Leutner, 11/3/42) Still another was elected President of the Student Council at Oberlin College. (King to Gilloon, 11/18/43)

Their receptions into new communities was cordial. A few quotations will show this:

"Reports are beginning to come to us from the 93 colleges which have our students. The tone of these letters, the happy picture they give of the quick adjustment of the students to their new colleges, are a tribute to the skill and wisdom used in the West Coast office in 'matching' students as well as to the spirit of the college authorities and students in welcoming the students." (Eliz. Johnson, NSRC to Exec. Com., 12/1/42)

"I am glad to write you that from my observation and from hearing other members of our administrative and teaching staff speak of them, the four American citizens of Japanese origin who are on our campus have made a most satisfactory beginning.... We are glad they are here." (Quoted in 8/20/42 Prog. Rpt. NSRC)

"The group of thirteen Japanese-American students who are here on our campus are unusually fine people. We have liked them here on the campus and the community has liked them. I feel certain we can absorb a rather large sized group without any difficulty whatsoever." (W. R. Jones, Drake U., to Beale, 11/27/42)

In their letters back to the SRC, the relocated students are either solemnly grateful or effervescently happy:

"The facilities are modern in all respects, the faculty is fine and well organized, and the people of Madison are friendly, all of which combine to make it happy for me. So to those many volunteers who gave of their time, the Student Relocation Committee, and you, I wish to express my most sincere appreciation for your efforts in our behalf." (Albert K. Mineta, Drew University, to Conard, 11/7/42)

"People here are so understanding and human, compared to some people of California. You can never know how happy and relieved I am to be away from California. How once again I feel and can begin to think again as a free person." (Hazel Takeshita, Iowa State Teachers' College, to NSRC, no date.)

"All the students in the dormitory are very nice to me. They greet me with a 'Hi' every time they see me." (Unoji Goto, U. of Cincinnati, to Conard, 10/10/42)

"Last Saturday at noon I finally received my traveling permit and I was so overcome with joy I just shouted when notified. I just can't find sufficient words to describe my gratitude for all that your office has done for me and other Nisei. In our darkest hour you brought forth your loving hands and gave us new hopes and inspirations. Surely Democracy can not and will not die as long as such groups like yours and Colleges that uphold the true ideals of Democracy exist.... I'm taking a teacher's training course and hope to go back to camp and teach the small generation of Japanese that despite everything, Democracy still lives and help them to love this country and its people as I do." (Quoted in letter Bodine to "Friends of Student Relocation", 11/11/42)

"Yesterday to keep myself from getting nostalgic I went to the May Company (a Department Store). There talking to the manager made my stock soar to its zenith. He told me that he and all the rest of Denver were for us and that he hoped we would help in the final victory. Coming home a group of soldiers invited me to a 'coke' and told me to have faith in the real America. Friendliness is the key here. Everyone from the boot black to the cop on the street greet me with a smile and as a fellow American. To my friends in camp I have written

that American is deeper than a few California jingoists who would persecute us Americans of Japanese ancestry and that whatever happens to remember that there is the great and understanding America like Colorado to line our coulds." (Ibid.)

"Entire town filled with campus atmosphere and the people are so friendly.... I have already made wonderful friends, and I love this place very much. Am already being rushed, so to say, by the fellows, for we came in the midst of some kind of celebration and things seem to be brewing on the campus." (Kaya Kitagawa, U. of Colo. to NSRC. no date)

These relocated students were a vanguard. Their success ^{will} ~~would~~ be important both in changing popular opinion and in bolstering morale within the camps. Almost without exception, they have been happy in their new surroundings and public opinion has accepted them. In no case has a student already relocated had to be moved because of community attitude. (King to Gilloon, 11/18/43)

Perhaps the most valuable accomplishment of the SRC has been ^{its} ~~their~~ effectiveness in combatting "Project psychology". Evacuation followed by continued confinement in a relocation center has ^{tended to} ~~produced~~ inertia. Fear of the outside world is present. It is much simpler to stay in camp where life is secure than to face the unknown life outside. The SRC field representative has worked unceasingly to combat this attitude. The college students are the potential leaders, leaders of a group outstanding for its industry and independence; they must not be allowed to accept dependence as a natural way of life.

The future of the SRC depends largely on the possibility of opening more colleges to the Nisei. Even if restrictions are relaxed, the Council will not continue indefinitely. It was created to do an emergency job; ^{and} it has succeeded in opening doors to J-A students. Continued reliance on an agency such as the SRC will not build up independence but eliminate it.

The total accomplishments of the SRC may look small compared to the work to be done; the acceptance of the relocated students may seem negligible compared to the anti-Japanese legislation which is being passed throughout the country. But this little group, many of them volunteers, ^{has} ~~have~~ translated goodwill into practical acts, and they have done it with ~~a~~ warm friendliness and even gayety.

RELOCATED

January 22 / 1944

Students accepted at college and now
at College out Working in Army

	College	Working	Army	Total
Minidoka	258	48	8	314
Tule Lake	192	43	1	236
Colorado River	191	25		216
Central Utah	171	29	1	201
Gila River	166	29	1	196
Granada	151	28	1	180
Heart Mountain	147	33	3	183
Rohwer	98	17		115
Jerome	88	18		106
Manzanar	66	14		80
Assembly Center & Others	119	14		133
Non-Evacuees	677	28		705
	2324	326	15	2665

TOTAL NUMBER OF STUDENTS ACCEPTED

Pending Philadelphia	114
Pending Washington	19 (need educational leaves)
Pending Projects (have leaves)	73 (haven't left yet)
	206

Relocated College since July, 1942	2324
Relocated Work	326
Relocated Army	15

TOTAL ACCEPTED

2665

2871

*in answer to
specific questions*

January 28, 1944

In reply refer to File #116.

Miss Fumi Iwata
33 - 2 - C
Rohwer Project
McGehee, Arkansas

Dear Fumi:

If only we knew the answers to all of your questions; they are just the type of questions we ask ourselves, but here goes - I will try to answer them in the order you requested. We were as blue as you were at the news, we were as shocked. Now for the questions:

1. When the Council began this work on the West coast there were certain regulations that we had to abide by. One of these was, that students could not attend colleges which had not been cleared by the Army and Navy. During the next year and a half we managed to have over 530 universities and colleges cleared; but there was always a large group of colleges which were uncleared or proscribed, and students were not eligible to attend these. In the last months of 1943 the procedure was changed, there was a small group of leading universities and colleges which were closed or proscribed, and students could only attend these if they had obtained the War Plant or Provost Marshall General type of clearance, but other colleges were cleared.

2. Students may not enroll in one of these so-called closed colleges without a War Plant type of clearance or a highly specialized type of Provost Marshall General type of clearance, or the more general type of Provost Marshall General type of clearance.

3. We do not know why a college is once cleared and then taken off the list. These matters are decided by the military authorities, and what governs their decisions are probably military secrets. Washington itself was first proscribed, then cleared; then proscribed, then cleared; then proscribed again, and we hope that it will be cleared again. You and the other students will have to be patient.

4. We were as surprised as you at the speed with which Washington was taken off the list of cleared institutions. We had been informed however that there were likely to be changes.

5. We are unable to tell you how long it will take for a student to go through the necessary procedure. One lucky boy did it in three days, another took over two months. Personally I do not think you have a 50-50 chance of getting cleared for the next semester. But then you might be lucky; the fact that you obtained your Joint Board clearance might facilitate matters.

6. We were unable to send your P.S.Q. forms to Washington until you had been tentatively accepted at the college. When you were formally accepted the college was still cleared; there was a brief period of a few days when if you got into the college and registered you would have been lucky. However as soon as we heard that Washington was proscribed we sent your forms on to Washington, D.C.

7. It is the school and not you that is uncleared. But you - not the school - must obtain the special type or Provost Marshall General type of clearance. (Complicated, isn't it?) I certainly do think that you will get your clearance eventually. There is the possibility that you will get it in time for this semester.

8. Yes, students have gone through the PMG procedure.

9. If you had registered at Washington University you would be able to study while you waited for your necessary clearance.

10. Don't give up hope - we are pulling for you. You will have to make your own decision as to whether you want to go out now and work in the community, or whether you will stay with your family. College is the biggest question. It might just be possible that Washington University would be removed from the so-called proscribed list, and the authorities at Washington would know this before the officials in Washington D.C. or we would; so that would be one advantage in being in St. Louis.

As regards the scholarship, that is in no way affected by these government regulations. It will be held for you and you may use it as soon as you are enrolled.

My suggestion is that you pester us with letters. We will keep you informed of developments. Just be sure to let us know where you are so that if your clearance should come through we could telegraph you, and you could be ready at the drop of a hat. (Or do you wear "Fascinators" the way I do?)

Cordially yours,

Trudy King
Permit Department

in answer to letter

NATIONAL JAPANESE AMERICAN
STUDENT RELOCATION COUNCIL

1201 CHESTNUT STREET, PHILADELPHIA 7, PENNSYLVANIA

January 22, 1944

Walter Godfrey
Chicago Advisory Committee for Evacuees
189 West Madison Street
Chicago, Illinois

Dear Walt:

Thanks for your recent letter posing the \$128 question. (Twice as hard as the \$64 question.) I will do my best to answer it. Must first tell you that at least 30 colleges have been added to the so-called "proscribed" list; that several others are in the waiting chamber. My answers are not necessarily final or correct. Much of the information is a military secret. Shhh - hh - h.

The final authority in determining whether or not a college is to be on a proscribed list rests with each branch of the Armed Forces and each Service Command. They are all entitled to add what colleges they wish. The Navy, of course, has a different system than the Army. And individual people in each branch have different outlooks. Captain Clarence E. Harbert, Chief, Japanese American Branch, Provost Marshal General's Office, 1828 Munitions Building, War Department, Washington, D. C., does not have the final say. Captain Harbert is dealing with the matter in Washington. He is unable to remove colleges from the list of proscribed institutions. He can take up the matter with the branch or Service Command which proscribed the college. But if his recommendation are not accepted, there is nothing further that can be done. It often may be just one particular person's attitude which makes a college remain on the list. In some instances, it is at the request of the college that they are put on the list. The Service Commands and the colleges usually know several days and occasionally several weeks before the Washington Office of the Provost Marshal General knows that they are proscribed. Captain Harbert has tried to correlate the information from the various branches of the various Armed Forces and from the Service Commands into one unified whole.

But there are still many unanswered questions. For instance, the University of Minnesota sends out its PSQ Forms to the students. They return them and they are sent to the Office of the Provost Marshal General in that Service Command. We send students who are hoping to go to the University of Chicago the necessary forms and we send them on to the head Office of the Provost Marshal General in Washington. It occasionally happens that at least two sets of these PSQ Forms are filed for one student.

The colleges obtain their instructions from the Armed Forces, the Service Command and from Alton C. Miller, Colonel, C.M.P., Director, Personnel Security Division, Headquarters Army Service Forces.

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Office of The Provost Marshal General, Washington, D. C., by way of us. We have just sent out the special letter that Colonel Miller drafted to the colleges explaining the procedure.

The Third Service Command, for instance, had its own interpretation of the word, "attendance." Captain Harbert of the Washington Office of the Provost Marshal General is attempting to change their attitude. But as far as I know, if they stick to their interpretation, there is nothing much that he can do. We do not know if the Office of the Provost Marshal General in Minneapolis can say that a student can attend the University of Minnesota without having to go through the Washington procedure. My personal hunch is that the forms with the Office of the Provost Marshal General in Minneapolis are sent to Washington where they go through various checks. As a matter of fact, most of the forms are sent out to California. If you will notice on the left hand side, there are a number of things which each form must be checked against.

Colonel Miller informs us when a student has received the necessary clearance. We in turn inform the college and the student immediately by wire if necessary. Some five students have come through the procedure so far, two because they never had to go through it really, three because they completed all the necessary checks. These students were going to the University of Cincinnati, Chicago and Illinois and Western Michigan College of Education respectively.

When I referred to the Air Force list, I meant that they had sent in their list of proscribed colleges which were checked against those already proscribed and any additions were added.

The colleges which believe that they are proscribed and which undoubtedly will be on the next proscribed list are Wayne University, University of Detroit, Penn College, Marquette University and Michigan State College in East Lansing.

We are not authorized to send out quarterly lists of the so-called "proscribed" colleges. I believe that if you contacted Elmer L. Shirrell and asked him for a list explaining why you needed it and if you cannot get it from him, ask and write Mrs. Oleta Dunbar, Administrative Assistant, Community Management Division, War Relocation Authority, Barr Building, Washington, D. C., I think you will be able to *get that* on the file those receiving this type of confidential information.

Unfortunately, we are unable to send you a copy of the Provost Marshal General's letter as it is restricted and as we are allowed to send it out only to a president of a college or the person designated to handle this matter. "This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act U.S.C. 50; 31 and 32. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to any unauthorized person is

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prohibited by law." You might be able to get a copy through the War Relocation Authority.

Yes, the Navy, the Marines, the Medical Corps, the Air Corps, the Army, the WAVES and what have you all deal through the Office of the Provost Marshal General. They all send in their lists to him.

We enclose one of our instruction sheets showing the type of information we believe would help a student's early clearance. Our instruction sheets differ to a certain extent from the Government one which was made up primarily for persons wishing to obtain war plant type of clearance.

Cordially,

TRUDY KING
Permit Department

TK:lch

Enclosure

P. S. A person having a war plant type of clearance may attend any university in the United States outside of the evacuated areas of the West Coast. A person having a Provost Marshal General clearance may only attend the college for which he obtained this clearance. If a student obtained clearance say to attend the University of Chicago, later wishing to go to the University of Michigan, he would have to obtain a second clearance. This second clearance would be mostly a matter of routine.

P.P.S. It is possible that students will be turned down. We do not know if an appeal is possible. We will be able to report when the first situation arises. We hope we'll never have to make a report.

H.B. The list of 30 additional colleges proscribed:

CONFIDENTIAL

California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California
Carnegie Institute of Technology Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

Iowa State College of Agriculture
and Mechanic Arts Ames, Iowa

Johns Hopkins University Baltimore, Maryland

Kansas State College of Agriculture and Applied Science	Manhattan, Kansas
Lehigh University	Bethlehem, Pennsylvania
New York University	New York, New York
Oregon State Agriculture College	Corvallis, Oregon
Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn	Brooklyn, New York
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute	Troy, New York
Stanford University	Stanford University, California
University of Chicago	Chicago, Illinois
University of Cincinnati	Cincinnati, Ohio
University of Florida	Gainesville, Florida
University of Illinois	Urbana, Illinois
University of Iowa	Iowa City, Iowa
University of Maryland	College Park and Baltimore, Maryland
University of Missouri	Columbia, Missouri
University of Nebraska	Lincoln, Nebraska
University of New Mexico	Albuquerque, New Mexico
University of Pennsylvania	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
University of Pittsburgh	Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
University of Puerto Rico	Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico
University of Virginia	Charlottesville, Virginia
University of Wisconsin	Madison, Wisconsin
Vanderbilt University	Nashville, Tennessee
Wheaton College	Norton, Massachusetts
Washington Institute of Technology	College Park, Maryland
Washington State College	Spokane, Washington
Washington University	St. Louis, Missouri