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January 20, 1945

CURRENT ATTITUDES IN TULE LAKE: Department of Justice
Renunciation of Citizenship
Lifting of the Exclusion Order

The Department of Justice

Many of the residents of Tule Lake have long looked with favor on the possibility that this center may come under the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice. The great majority of the population, however, took no part in any activity to bring this about. Some individuals disapproved of the idea, stating that under Justice there would be no wages for work and life would be pretty tough.

Until early October of 1944, agitation directed toward bringing the camp under Justice was almost entirely limited to the pressure group comprising the two organizations, the Sokuji Kikaku Hoshi-dan and the Sokoku Kenkyu Seinin-dan. In October the rumor that the Justice Department was to take over the Tule Lake Center after the November election appeared among the appointed personnel. Certain high ranking members of the administration stated and hinted ~~that~~ to both Caucasians and Japanese that this was almost a certainty. 1/ This news was accepted philosophically by the majority of the residents; only the pressure group took it very seriously and made dire threats of what would occur if it did not come to pass. (This exhibitionistic group has yet to carry out one of its numerous spectacular threats.)

The reasons that camp control by the Justice Department was acceptable to the segregees were: firstly, because it was imagined that a change of status from segregees to internees would raise the prestige of the residents with the Japanese government; secondly, because the WRA administration had become a symbol of ineptitude, broken faith, stupidity and corruption in the minds of the Japanese. For some reason the Department of Justice was thought to be comparatively free from these vices.

1/ This can be documented.

Motives for Renunciation of Citizenship

The most important motivating forces for the renunciation of citizenship were:

1) Pressure exerted by the leaders of the pro-Japanese groups.

(Some of the Japanese language schools were involved in this along with the Hoshi-dan and the Seinin-dan.) These leaders based their activities on their personal, fantastic and completely synthetic concept of Yamato damashi (Japanese Spirit), a concept which, in reality, consisted of a pot-pourri of what these semi-educated, paranoid leaders remembered of their own education in Japan and the imposition of a gangster-like rule of terror, designed to force support from the camp's population. To this was added a liberal sprinkling of activities designed to feed the groups' pathological need for exhibitionism: military exercises, ceremonies, costumes and self-mutilation. 1/ This group made a public display of applying for renunciation in abody and probably was responsible for many renunciations outside of the group proper. Members of the group stated frequently and publicly that they were "denouncing their citizenship" and that by so doing they were behaving like "true Japanese" and would, consequently, get to Japan sooner than the "non-denouncers." That ignorant and ill-informed persons were influenced by this fanaticism was indisputable.

2) The fear of being drafted. In spite of the favorable court decision rendered in the case of the Tuleans who refused to appear for their physical examinations (summer of 1944), this fear, in the opinion of the writer, was the chief underlying motive for renunciation of citizenship until the lifting of the Exclusion Order. (It is the unadmitted motive of most of the members of the Hokeku.) This attitude is almost never expressed overtly to Caucasians. "You never know when the government will change its mind and take us. By renouncing our citizenship we play safe."

1/ The anthropologist prevailed here. It should be changed to head-shaving.

The writer is aware of the fact that this attitude is incomprehensible to the non-Japanese. The dogmatism of the hypothesis is based on a permutation with camp attitudes possessed by no other Caucasian. Two recent expressions of this attitude will be given here. Others appear in the remainder of the discussion.

On December 11 the writer was asked by a nisei girl who had no connection with the pressure group whether she would have to renounce her citizenship if she wished to go back to Japan. She added that she had been talking it over with her father and they had come to the decision that she could afford to wait. "It would be different if I were a boy. Then they would question the reason for my decision - the draft."

On January 3 another nisei woman, concerned over her husband's future, said:

"Can ~~the~~ people be thrown out of camp if they renounce their citizenship? Could they be put in the Army if they were thrown out of camp?"

3) Renunciation of Citizenship if the only honorable and logical step for an individual who has asked for expatriation and intends to return to Japan. This is the rationalization most frequently offered by persons renouncing their citizenship. In a few individuals as in the case of the following man who is past draft age and could easily make his living outside of camp, the attitude is sincere:

"I could go anywhere. But my intention is to stay in camp until I'm forced out. If possible, I wish they'd send me to Santa Fe. No matter where it is, they won't get me out because I've sworn before hundreds and hundreds of people to remain in camp and remain a true Japanese. Does anybody think I'll go back on my word? Not if I'm a man!"

This informant is a man of great integrity and courage, one of the few individuals who openly opposed the pressure groups.

4) Renunciation of Citizenship is one possible guarantee against eviction from camp. This attitude has appeared since the lifting of the exclusion order, although, without doubt, it was operating subconsciously beforehand. The camp residents have become so cynical regarding the word of the United States government that even this step is not generally regarded as an absolute safeguard against eviction. On December 29, a

nisei girl said:

"Many people hope that by renouncing their citizenship they will be allowed to stay here. But they're not sure."

The writer has never received the slightest implication that renunciation of citizenship was connected with the removal of the leaders of the pressure group on December 27. The majority of the renounees do not relish the thought of life in Santa Fe. If the current propoganda of the pressure group - that the interned men will be united with their families within sixty days - gains credence, some people will seize upon this certain refuge. If the people did not fear eviction, this motive for renunciation could be dismissed.

Development of Attitudes after lifting of the Exclusion Order

The first reaction to the lifting of the order and the announcement that Tule Lake was to be put on the same status as the other centers was surprise and shock. For several weeks the great majority of the center residents took it for granted that they would be among that group who would not be allowed to leave the center. As more and more of these persons received orders which excluded them only from the defense commands, resistance against compulsory ejection from camp stiffened. An attitude observed on every hand was excellently stated by an elder nisei man on January 5:

"I have noticed that the people are stiffening in their attitude. Last week some were saying, 'If they make us get out, we'll go.' Now they are determined not to leave.

"If they (WRA) use force, undoubtedly they will succeed in getting them out, but undoubtedly there will be trouble too. It might be possible to get out at least fifty percent of the people if they would pay them a part of the damages they have suffered. But the majority of the people I have talked to recently say they're not going out."

When asked how the people were reacting to Mr. Myer's message, this informant, who is extraordinarily frank, said:

"Most of them read the bulletins right through and if they don't understand - all right. Most think they understand, but they don't."

On January 18 the following statement was made to the writer by a kibeï friend of long standing. It also bears out two of the points

discussed in the previous section.

"If this becomes a relocation center, they'll draft us. In that case they (the people) say, we must get busy and send in our renunciations of citizenship."

This is a significant statement for the informant is an ultra-conservative block manager who has always disapproved of any fuss or agitation. He resigned from the Sokoku as soon as the political aims of that organization became obvious.

In general, the prevailing attitude in camp at present is a determination not to go out unless irresistible force is applied. "We will hold on with our hands," some people say, by which they mean they will have to be dragged forcibly from the camp. There is also a widespread conviction that, if worst comes to worst, Tule Lake will be the last center to close and the wisest course is to sit quietly in camp, watch the Japanese in the other centers bear the brunt of the pioneering, and then, if there is no alternative, take advantage of the experiences of those who have been "forced out."

Within the past ten days there has been an increase in vague threats that the people will be willing to cause trouble to guarantee their shelter in camps. Only one of these threats will be quoted here:

"Violence is very possible. Even in this camp ^{1/} the people are saying, 'I'll commit sabotage or blow up a bridge if they make me go out, just so I'll be sent back to camp.' That should be avoided. Anything that will be forced on the Japanese people -- they won't take it."

Absolute resistance to the idea of leaving camp is not unanimous. An appreciable number of people, even in Tule Lake, would leave if they were given satisfactory and tangible assurance of economic security. A rather long statement by a man of this turn of mind will be quoted:

"My impression is that the people are very much at a loss due to the fact that they can't make a decision. The representatives of the government . . . they admit they're in the dark themselves. They don't know what to do or what it's all about. . .

"When they came out to ask us to make this decision, I told the Army

^{1/} The implication is that people in other centers are expressing this attitude with more force and frequency. This is very probably true.

Colonel (at my hearing): 'If you set a deadline I will renounce my citizenship due to the fact that I have no place to go. . .'

"I don't care who it is; nobody who can't see their way to their own living - nobody is going to start walking out in the dark. If they compel me, I'll stay here. At least by staying here I'll have a roof over my children and enough to eat - though I don't like the food.

"We want some assurance if we're going out."

"I told the Army: 'I don't see why you're asking us. Everything is in your power.

"In my own case, I've got six children and my wife and also my father and mother. To go outside you have to have a certain kind of home. If they want me to go out the least they can do is give me some kind of a set up and say, 'Joe, will you take this?' But they say, 'America's going to help you. So you might as well lean back and take it easy.'

"That's very unsteady. I can't rely on it. If they'd say, 'The government is at war and we can't stand a big expense, so will you take this for the time being? Leave if you can go out and leave like a good individual,' it would be different. . .

"If they were a little more sincere and honest about it the people would go out faster. I've lost everything. It's somewhere in the United States. That's where I lost it. The people of the United States are holding what I did lose.

"The people (in camp) are liable to create a disturbance just to be able to stay here.

"If there was some way that they were really trying to help me, I'll go. But if they just show me, 'There's the gate - Go!' - NO SIR!

"They (WRA) have a 50 ton job with a ten truck. They've got to buy a little better equipment. The people don't believe the personnel. . . .

"By telling us that there is a stop list - a lot of people will try to get on it." 1/

CASSANDRA DEPARTMENT

Whether Tule Lake is declared a refuge center or not, the majority of people in all of the ten centers will seize at any pretext to delay their relocation. The chief emphasis will probably be put on negative actions: pressure to get the people "loyal to America" out of Tule Lake so that those "loyal to Japan" may be sheltered there; renunciation of citizenship to achieve the same end; possibly, in some centers, demonstrations designed to prove to the WRA and the American Public that the Japanese are, in truth, dangerous to the security of the United States and cannot safely

1/ This statement was made January 8, 1945.

be permitted to go out. 1/ Some of the issei are already comforting themselves with the assurance that under the Geneva Conference, they, as enemy aliens, cannot be forced out of the camps. On ~~xxxxxx~~ a well educated young nisei stated:

"Under the Geneva conference, they can't kick the aliens out."

The writer asked him, "Is that one of the reasons people are renouncing their citizenship?"

"Sure, why not?" replied the informant.

On January 5 an elderly issei stated:

"I hear that in Manzanar, specially the issei are asking the United States government through the Spanish Consul to stay in camp until the close of the war."

The positive reaction to relocation will be expressed by reasonable or unreasonable demands for financial assistance or recompense for losses suffered by evacuation.

If Tule Lake is declared a refuge center it will undoubtedly give added impetus to the powerful determination to resist expulsion which has already crystallized in many of the relocation centers. Whether Tule Lake is declared a refuge or not, the existence of this resistance must be accepted. Though the writer has little data to support the following statement, she is inclined to the opinion that even if Tule Lake is placed on the same status as the other nine centers, unless WRA can muster a force similar to that of the United States Army which placed the people in camps, the majority of the people are going to remain. ~~This will~~ The efforts of the WRA are going to be met with a tremendous passive resistance, the long tried and very potent camp defense against the unpopular policies of the authorities. If insufficient or half-hearted force is applied in an attempt to break this resistance there will be mass phenomenon of a disordered and violent character most embarrassing

1/ lest this statement be misunderstood the writer wishes to add that in her opinion, those Japanese capable of any act of sabotage against the U. S. government are almost non-existent. In spite of these desperate threats, it is extremely unlikely; that anyone will take this means of remaining in the centers.

to the WRA. If the force employed is so powerful that resistance is obviously futile, the danger of uprising will be less. The people will leave the camps as they entered them, quietly, sullenly and bitterly. The one difference will be that the resentment will be far greater than it was in 1942.

January 31, 1945

In making a judgement of public opinion, sufficient time must be allowed to permit attitudes to solidify. Opinions concerning the pickup of January 26 and the statement released by the DJ have now crystallized sufficiently to permit a preliminary analysis, although it is still too early to regard the conclusions reached in this report as final.

Attitudes regarding both of the above mentioned subjects have shown a remarkable amount of diversity, a diversity which depends chiefly on the viewpoint and experiences of the individual informant. The Hoshi-dan and Hokoku-dan people are rabid; the ordinary camp resident approves of the purge of the radicals although at the same time he may bewail the fact that many innocent people were made to suffer for the sins of a few leaders; the active opponents of the Hokoku are rejoicing. Approval or disapproval on the part of the "common people" appears to depend largely on two factors: if the informant had friends in the group whom he considered "mild" or innocent, or if he resided in a block where the Hokoku had little power and had not imposed its tyrannical rule strongly, he is likely to say that an injustice has been done; if, on the other hand, he has been subject to threats, he is extremely relieved, although he may have to keep his relief to himself. It should be kept in mind that both moderate individuals and what could be termed "radicals" are found in the last group: Weak souls who have been terrorized by the shaved-heads and stalwart individuals with considerable influence, who have been threatened or beaten because they had the guts to criticize the policies of the "gangsters who are a disgrace to the true Japanese." Two statements from very honest informants are quoted below. On the whole, though, most people in camp express more sympathy for the "innocent."

"Most people are really glad about the pick-ups but they don't say so. (The informant means they don't dare to say so.) Most people are glad those radicals are picked up. The radicals are still stubborn, so we better keep quiet. . . . If they are willing to debate in public whether we should stay quiet or make trouble it would be all right. But if I should say that in

public, they'd say, 'Oh beat him up.' This is especially true now after this last bunch of radicals has been picked up." 1/

Another man said:

"The people certainly ar n't crying about it."

The writer said that many individuals had expressed regrets. The informant came back with:

"You don't live right amongst the people and feel the pressure. Very fortunately this block is not as crazy as the others."

On the subject of the innocent, he said:

"I knew of some men who were innocent and I felt like interceding. But I came to the conclusion that several months of close association with these bunch of hot heads will do them incalculable good. In the first place, they shouldn't have joined the organization."

On the possibility of still another pick-up, this man stated:

"If the Hokoku doesn't know when to stop, it will do them good. Some people I have talked to are rejoicing over the justice that was done to them."

STATEMENT FROM DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

The chief criticism raised against this statement by the non-Hokoku resident was that it implied that Tule Lake was a relocation and not a segregation center. The cry immediately arose: "Let the loyal (to America), the fence-sitters, get out of here and let this be a segregation center."

"Even the people who didn't belong to the Hokoku-dan thought it was awfully unfair of the government to make this a relocation center and say we couldn't do this and that. I think instead of sending the people out, the quickest thing would be to make this an internment camp and get rid of the loyal people. . . It seems that the government is taking it out on the Hokoku when the government itself is lacking."

On the whole, though, the statement was very well received. Anti-Hokoku people were delighted.

"Confidentially speaking - I wouldn't know - but some people think Mr. Burling has brains in his head. Many of the people think he did the right thing. He really meant business. That's the way we all felt. The people were kind of happy. They all wanted to get copies and pass it around.

"The camp is picking its head up now. It's worth living now. You have an easy feeling since the pickups. I don't care if it is uncomfortable

1/ The idea of a public debate between the "moderates" and the "radicals" is most intriguing.

here, just so the feeling is good. As Mr. Burling says, most of the people in camp are quiet Japanese and only a minority is making a fuss." 1/

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"The people did not resent the sternness of the statement. Only I ask the Department of Justice that they don't make the mistake in deciding who is responsible for the trouble and who is innocent. I hear some very mild men were picked up. Of course, the DJ can't see as we do. . . At least we trust the Department of Justice. They are honest. Under WRA there is so much politics."

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"It (the statement) amused me a good deal. It sure disgraced many of them (Hokoku). If they had shame enough, they wouldn't have the face to come out now. We all agreed that that ought to put a stop to them, but it seems it didn't. . . The statement Mr. Burling made about the draft dodgers was very true."

The venom which the statement aroused in the Hokoku people astonished even the writer:

"They (Hokoku) are very happy because of how angry the DJ felt."

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"Do you think Burling wrote that? I think he got a lot of his ideas from somebody else. Burling doesn't know anything about the Japanese. I hear he's always worked with Italians before. (The informant implies that the statement contained such deep knowledge of Japanese psychology that the ignorant Mr. Burling must have had expert assistance.)

"I've got a hunch that it was Higashi who stooped for the DJ."

"Anyway, it's a frameup - why didn't Burling get the actual instigators of the movement instead of picking up those poor dumb guys."

"Boy, would the HOKOKU like to get their hands on the guy who stooped to Burling. And they'd like to get their hands on the Japanese who translated the speech too. I think some kibe did it." 2/

"The way those hearings were conducted it seems as if Burling had the final say of whether to accept a renunciation or not. The law states that it is the Attorney General who has the final say - - I'd hate to live in this country if Burling was Attorney General. Maybe that's what he's trying to be."

The informant ended by denouncing Mr. Burling as a Jew, a member of the mythical group who rules America and is bringing her to ruin. 3/

- 1/ The informant lives in a very quiet block and exaggerates the feeling of relief.
- 2/ Even the stalward writer trembled a bit at this point in the conversation.
- 3/ This particular statement is to be forgotten. Should the slightest inkling of its content ever get to the colony, the harm done the writer's work will be incalculable.

About one aspect of the DJ statement there is no disagreement: the Japanese translation was ludicrously poor. Many people laughed at it. One issei stated that it was as bad as his English. Some say an ignorant nisei must have done it; others accuse Hyakutoru Mori, a resident who has done some translating for the Administration. These criticisms come from people who approve the statement. The translation is also purported to contain some statements which are not in the English version.

The concern which the writer expressed on a previous occasion that many people were afraid to stand and read the announcement was quite erroneous and based on ~~an~~ insufficient data. A far more common occurrence through the camp was described as follows:

"When that statement was put out in messhall 8, for two days the people were crowded around it and reading the news. Many were so interested they were reading it for a couple of days at least."

Hesitancy to read the statement in public was limited to those blocks where many Hokeku boys had been picked up.

Reaction to News of Possible Exchange

This news was received with a mixture of elation and cynicism. Some people put no trust in it because it came through the State Department.

Reaction to Dillon Myer's Statement Bul. # 3.

The effect of this announcement was nil. "It didn't say anything new." The Japanese version was criticized as inaccurate. The statement did, however produce the furious article (enclosed) written by one of the writer's best informants.

Renunciation of Citizenship

Three interesting attitudes on renunciation of citizenship were obtained. They bear out a contention made in a previous report:

"They feel that if they don't renounce their citizenship they can't go back to Japan. You might have to get out of camp. Frankly, that's how everybody feels."

"Some are renouncing because they definitely refused to go into the Army. . . But as for the girls, I don't know yet. If we have to renounce

our citizenship to go back to Japan, I'll do it. . . That's how everybody feels. We're just thinking it over."

"The Hokoku group were all glad to be sent to Santa Fe. They have this one feeling that now their status is sure about the draft. If they're here, there's still a slim chance."

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Concluding Remark

In the opinion of the writer the power of the Hokoku as a pressure group is not yet broken. So long as people dare not voice their opinions freely in camp lest they be beaten, something is rotten in Denmark.

February 8, 1945

CASUAL REPORT ON CURRENT ATTITUDES - JANUARY 30 TO FEBRUARY 8

No event of moment has occurred this week. However, the attitudes which the common folk have expressed toward the Hokoku may have some interest in the light of the great coming pickup on Saturday. Naturally, I shall cover the reactions to this pickup diligently and forward them by the end of this coming week.

Rather than subject this data to an analysis I believe it will be more amusing and informative if it is presented much as it was picked up. This will therefore be a very informal account of parts of conversations held with various individuals all of whom are very good friends of mine. They represent a pretty fair cross-section of the camps' population: some are hardshell "loyals" and some are quavering fence-sitters.

Z, a young kibe i and renouncee has been disgusted with the Hokoku for several months. He lives in a strong Hokoku block where he has suffered much persecution from the shaved-heads.

"The Hokoku is not patriotic. They're doing crazy things. Real Japanese are supposed to be more broad-minded. They should know where we stand. (Z. means that the people in camp should realize what they are up against and not defy the authorities needlessly.)"

"The Hokoku say that only their members are going back on the Exchange Ship. The way the Hokoku are acting now seems to me just like the Communists in Japan." 1/

The DI of J. statement had a poor reception in Z's block:

"Nobody reads it. Some people tore it down and threw it away. I think it's not wise to stand there and read it. I went to the colonial police to get a copy. If we stood there and read it, they'd say, "That's an inu!" ('They are the Hokoku.)"

(Z. is a courageous young fellow with guts. Pressure had to be pretty strong to make him quake this way.)

His young wife, also a renouncee interrupted here:

"Gee, I hope the day will come when we can go to the laundry and wash our clothes and not have the Hokoku people glaring at us. There are two groups in this block: one for the Hokoku and one against it."

Her husband added:

"If they want to go to Santa Fe, let them go! I don't even care about leaving the loyal (to America) people here. My main point is to get to Japan. That's the reason we came here."

F. is a conservative "original inhabitant" of Tule. He is willing to cooperate with the administration to the extent where he has long had the reputation of an inu. He really wished to relocate but will not do so unless given more money. He hasn't the guts to oppose the Hokoku in any way as Z has been doing for some time.

1/ 'Communist' is truly the worst thing a Japanese can be called. In a subtle way it's worse than inu, because the Japanese government has persecuted the Communists with more vigor than the U. S.

On the Hekoku F. said:

"Their purpose in making all these funny demonstrations is probably that they are doing it to stay here and avoid the draft. Just because a certain person is just sitting here and taking it easy (like F.) unconcerned-like, probably their mind is much more set to stay than the ones making all the fuss."

A friend came in and added his bit:

"I feel sorry for these fellows. As I heard it, the Administration told them to go ahead. They should have stated how far they could go with the thing. If they had told them to quit blowing the bugle, it would be OK."

F. did not agree:

"Really though, they ought to size things up from the way the Administration does things. The Caucasians don't know what's what. You have to be careful. The Caucasians don't hold any responsibility."

Fried: "But they should hold responsibility"

F: "But they never did!"

(F. means here that the Hekoku leaders should have known that the Ad. would let them fall into a trap and have had sense enough to have avoided it.)

I then turned the conversation to the statement:

F: "I didn't have a chance to read it carefully, but there was quite a bit of truth about it."

Friend: "One thing I didn't like about it: they talked about the Japanese Americans in the Army and said it (Hekoku's activities) is a disgrace to the Japanese fighting in Italy. That's not logical at all. The people over here have nothing to do with that thing."

F: "I didn't get that far. But I think they had a letter like that coming to them. They are really going too far because after all this is American soil."

We then discussed renunciation of citizenship. Neither F. nor his friend intend to renounce unless they are absolutely forced to it. Said the friend:

"As I see it my American citizenship isn't any more good to me than a roll of toilet paper right now. In fact, it's less good. But I was born with it and I'm not going to give it up. It might come in handy some time." 1/

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M. is a young and extremely intelligent nisei. He is one of the few Japanese in Tule who would truthfully be called public spirited, having had the guts to take on and made a success of a high Co-op position after Hitomi's murder.

1/ What the friend really intended to say and stopped out of courtesy to my sex, I leave for your fertile mind to deduce.

He is fairly neutral in his feeling toward the Hokoku. On D. of J. statement, he said:

"From my own opinion I think what he said was right. Any country would say the same thing. A lot of things were frank and strong. I think I'd have said the same thing in his shoes. He probably didn't think he should beat around the bush.

"He's right that this isn't a segregation center. He's giving as much as possible of human treatment. In any country people have no right to make an outward show of patriotism. Of course, I give those young people credit for coming out and making this outward show."

Since the time is now right to collect attitudes as to whether this pick-up was received differently by people than the first, I now turned the conversation in this direction.

"The reaction was quite a bit different. They were given time to see their friends. I think that should be. I think it's a very good gesture on the part of WRA and Justice."

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K. is the stern and idealistic elderman who is under giri to me for his life. For many months he has been the leader of an underground group of which the administration has no knowledge. Evidently these elder men have been attempting to make the Hokoku boys see the light.

"We've talked to them but they don't want to believe. They get so arrogant and stubborn. They think it's a great, chivalrous thing to do. They don't want to believe what we tell them. They must find it out for themselves.

"These boys have plenty to learn. Six months or a year in a concentration camp will do them lots of good. That is - if they learn how to behave. Of course, some will go bad and be worthless. With some, it will make a man out of them." 1/

K. knows whereof he speaks when he talks of concentration camps, having spent about a year in Teupp. He was at one time one of the most feared agitators in the camps. He's got the power over the people that Lenin must have had, but has been biding his time ~~xxxx~~ in Tup Lake. Anytime he wants to lead something, he's got a good lieutenant righthere.

K. stated that the reaction to this second pick-up had been very different:

"The reaction this time is different. The people don't seem to give any thought to it. They (not Hokoku) are sort of nonchalant. They don't seem

1/ Haw - now you're a character builder.

worried or don't seem to care. Many of them are rejoicing. Many of them are saying, 'It's good for them; they asked for it.' In fact, though I shouldn't say this, some say, 'Bakateri.'

Being a female of insatiable curiosity, I pressed K. for the meaning of Bakateri. He blushed and didn't want to tell me. Finally he said, "It means 'God damned fool.'" Actually, in a unliteral translation the closest American epithet would be 'Horse's Ass.'

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The following is the kind of interview most helpful to me but perhaps puzzling to you. I've known the "I" family intimately for 18 months. All I have to do is visit them and let them talk. What comes out is easy for me to interpret. I'm in so thick here that the frankness is sometimes shocking. I'll put it in dialogue form. Mr. M. is an issei and ex-sente Fe internee who was picked up for agitating in Gila. His wife Mrs. M. is somewhat neurotic, but a Japanese female of extraordinary energy and determination. Her sister, Nakao, has more common sense than the two of them put together. All three intend to relocate as soon as they can find something really secure.

Nakao: Is it true that 600 Hekoku are going to be picked up soon?

(Since I had not yet heard this news from Noyes it is an excellent example of the power of the espionage and the spread of rumor.)

Mrs. M: The more they take out the better!

Nakao: I heard that when one of the men got on the train his friend gave him an envelope which according to Japanese custom would have money in it for a farewell gift. When he opened it all he saw was a slip of paper with the word Bakateri.

(I ventured to wonder how the D. of J. statement had been received.)

Nakao: The people not in the group thought, "They're telling them!"

Mrs. M: It don't make any difference to me what they said. I don't give a damn about the sons-of-bitches. (Hekoku, not D. of J.)

Here two male visitors came in to see Mr. M. We three females retired to the back of the apartment behind a screen - oh Dai Nippon. Now the gossip got really hot.

Mrs. M: There's a boy I know who regrets having to go. He told me he'd like to resign, but he feels he wouldn't seem like a man.

Nakao: They just can't stop now. That's the trouble.

At this point Mr. M who was dying of curiosity lowered himself so far as to desert his guests to the care of his father-in-law and come into the oku, the back of the house reserved for humble females. He stated with masculine force -

Mr. M: It has to be stopped!

Nakao: I said, "If you're a man, you should have the courage to change your mind."

Mr. M: (who has evidently been in correspondence with old friends in Santa Fe.) The Hokoku feels that they are going to train all the old people in Santa Fe to think along Hokoku ideas. But I hear they're finding out different.

I think the issei should be taken out of Santa Fe and just leave the nisei there. The first generation (issei) should be separated. It's the old men who teach the young men the bad ideas. (M. ought to know being issei himself.)

In Santa Fe Mr. Tachibana was appointed to be one of those to work to get the families reunited here in Tule Lake. He and Fujii and about four others. But those six men got out first and left us there. I was one of the last to get out. He said he would honestly represent us, but he didn't.

Mrs. M: If America lets the Hokoku go back to Japan first there's going to be trouble in camp. Then all the center will turn Hokoku. If people in camp would know that Japan wouldn't really take the Hokoku, it would really scare them (Hokoku). (This is a very acute observation.)

The Hokoku women here are so proud to see their husbands go to Santa Fe they walk into the mess with their snoots up.

(Exit Mr. M.)

A week ago my husband met a friend who had a bozo hair cut. "What! Are you bozo too?" he said. "Sh-h-h," said the man, "This is camouflage - otherwise nobody in my block will talk to me." When he came home my husband laughed his head off.

I hear they are pretty strong in block 74 too. In that block I hear there are two families whose daughters refused to become members of the girls' organization. All the other girls won't speak to them now.

Nakao: If these organizations showed that it would make a change we could speak to them. (They could be influenced by reason.) But they're so blind that we just have to wait. We can't talk to them now.

Mrs. M: There is a man in this block with six children. He's had one each year - they're one to six years old. He says he's going to get picked up too. So I told him, "What's going to happen to your

children?

I feel so sorry for his poor wife. Everytime she hears a car rattle she gets all jittered up. She thinks they're coming for him. She's such a nice lady, I feel sorry for her.

(I remarked that with six children in six years it might give the lady a much needed rest if her husband was picked up. This kind of talk is quite proper when only females are present. It was much appreciated.)

Our block manager is just dazed by the Hokeku pick-ups. He doesn't know what to do. He just goes to the wife of a man who has been picked up and says, 'I'll be glad to help you.' But she acts superior. Then he talks to me and says, 'Goddammit! What am I going to do with those guys? It's their will to be taken in. They tell me, "My son is going to be a real Japanese now."' You have no pity for them.

Nakao: There are ten girls in our Japanese class and five or six of them are Hokeku girls. At recess they all get together and talk. We who don't belong have to sit quiet.

Mrs. M: Mr. Best - he's just ignorant. If he'd think a little more he'd have stopped this racket when it started.

Nakao: If they could assure us that we were not going to be forced out of camp I think a lot of people will drop out of the Hokeku. The Hokeku are the only people who feel safe now. They feel they can't be yanked out of camp (made to relocate) and they can't be yanked into the Army. In a way, that's their main reason they founded that club.

In a way, they can't trust the ~~Japanese~~ American government. That's the only way they could assure themselves in forming that crazy old so-and-so.

(re-enter Mr. M.)

Mr. M: You know how to stop this crazy Hokeku? You have to pick up the first generation runners (the leaders). Then things will start quieting down. They're the ones who set fire to it. The first generation starts it.

Nakao: They ought to pick up the women first. The families will be worried to death to have their daughters go where they can't keep their eyes on them. The people figure they won't ask the girls, no matter what happens.

Hankey: Don't you think taking the girls would be sort of cruel?

Mrs. M: Well - they asked for it.

VOX POPULI -----

(I could make comments - but do not think it necessary. Tachibana's elevation to garbage man produces howls of delighted laughter, which is more significant than what people say.)

For the past 20 days the writer has been engaged upon an intensive study of the rise of the Hokoku-dan and the Hoshi-dan, the psychological motivations of the members and the attitudes which the camp residents as a whole have held toward these organizations during the past year. While the Hokoku made its formal debut on August 8th, 1944, the undercover preparations for this appearance were initiated as early as March 1944 and the nucleus of leaders formed as early as January 1944. Detailed notes on this long development are in the possession of the writer. During the past two weeks careful observations have been made of current camp attitudes and much thought given to possible solutions of the present difficult situation.

The following report is based on the additional insight into the situation gained by this concentrated study of its history. If the statements made in this paper contradict in part those of previous reports apologies are offered. The state of affairs is one of extreme complexity, the writer's experience in analyzing phenomena with a view to presenting evidence which may be helpful in determining future policy is very limited, and, since no better procedure is available, it is better to proceed by rule of thumb and frankly admit errors made in the past.

This report will comprise three sections: 1) a very brief history of reactions of the Resegregation Group (Hoshi-dan and Hokoku-dan) and of the camp residents to the events of the past three months; 2) a discussion of possible solutions of the present problem (replete with ominous warnings); 3) a brief report on the development of camp attitudes during the past two weeks.

Camp Reactions to Events of December 1944 to March 1945

By mid-December 1944 the short sighted policy of the Resegregation Group which had attempted to force its will upon a fundamentally resisting population for almost a year, had resulted in the group being regarded with dislike, disgust and active hostility by many of the camp residents. Certain criminal acts, perpetrated by one of the chief undercover leaders had roused active resistance on the part of self-respecting Japanese who had far more potential influence in camp than the self-seeking leaders of the Resegregation Group could ever hope to obtain. The cowardly beating of courageous opposers of this terroristic pressure had caused just wrath among informed persons and it is likely that given a few more months in which to make errors, the Resegregation Group would have collapsed from inner decay, its own silliness and the power of adverse public opinion. A rival pressure group, whose aims were probably only a little less selfish than those of the Resegregation Group had already come into open conflict with the "super-patriots". When Mr. Imachi, a member of this rival group, entered block 54 and beat up Morimoto, the Hoshi-dan secretary, ordinary citizens did not attempt to conceal their delight. This scandal caused the resignation of several hundred members. Then, when it appeared that the Department of Justice was making an investigation of the leaders of the Resegregation Group and might take action against them, glee was evident on every hand. "Now at last," said the non-resegregationists, "those boys are going to get what they deserve."

When the first 70 men were interned this reaction of "justice has

continue to make a fuss and their goal will eventually be reached. The authorities should not forget that the leaders of this group, in camp and in the internment centers, are fully aware of the slavish fear of the administration toward newspaper publicity. If their desire is not met they will see that the matter gets publicity. Many times in the past year the writer has listened to their plotting and knows that when other avenues fail they will turn to this attempt to discredit the authorities. In November of 1944 a plot was hatched to beat 12 men in one night and simultaneously present Dillon Myer with a petition for Mr. Best's removal. It was hoped that the resulting publicity would "Blow the camp sky high and force action." The writer got wind of this plot and it was stopped by a public-spirited Japanese.

It is doubtful if this particular method of gaining attention will be attempted again. Blowing bugles, marching, and the stubborn continuation of pro-Japanese activities is more effective and less dangerous.

Possible Solutions of the Problem

On the field of camp attitudes the writer is on sure ground. She is, however, lamentably ignorant of administrative difficulties. In the discussion to follow, she can only tell the truth and hope for the best.

Solution I - Resegregation of Hoshi-dan and Relocation of Remainder of Residents.

If Dillon Myer believes that the internments on the part of Justice can be utilized as a resegregation program and that the internee's relatives should be allowed to join them in a "Super Segregation Center," he must take the risk of a tremendous blow-up at Tule Lake, unless the residents who remain are assured of unequivocally of shelter for the war's duration. The writer knows that he is or was considering this from a statement made to Grodzin/s on Feb. 7, 1945. Any move in the near or distant future to take out the families of the internees, providing this assurance is not given, will result in half to two-thirds of the now peaceful population taking ~~xxi~~ up activities which will insure their internment also. These activities may be violent and emotional in the extreme, and will certainly bring most objectionable publicity down upon the head of whoever is administering the center. Even if a year elapses and the population is still insecure, the reaction will be dangerous. The only factor which would diminish the reaction is the surrender of Japan.

Solution II - Tule Lake Declared a Refugg Center

If Tule Lake is declared a refuge center the most powerful of the motivations for pro-Japanese behavior will disappear. The Hokoku and Hoshi-dan will lose face beyond recall, and very probably will collapse utterly. In this event, it would not matter much what is done with the internees. 90% of them could safely be sent back to Tule Lake. The instigators should be ferreted out and kept locked up for the duration. If the authorities see fit to put the internees and their families in a separate center, no one in Tule will object very much. They have made themselves so obnoxious that most people would be glad to see them go.

Solution III - Do Nothing to Clarify Status of Tule Lake

This is the policy the writer fears will be followed; an announcement

of the peoples' status will be delayed indefinitely while the forced closure policy is pushed in the other centers. Attempts will be made to stop the Resegregation Group's pro-Japanese activities by punishing members for breaking certain WRA regulations which are in process of preparation. The officers of the organizations will ~~continue to be interned~~ continue to be interned.

This promises to be a prettysloppy business. Putting women or children in the stockade or fining and imprisoning parents is not going to stop the tremendous push of the re-segregationists. They see victory around the corner and are not going to be discouraged easily. They are so arrogant and starry-eyed that only re-segregation or an unmistakable realization of the futility of their objective can stop them. Moreover, there is another important handicap in the path of legal procedure of this nature: the very strong reluctance of the WRA to undertake it. As is well known, the colonial police are a bunch of rabbits. On the matter of taking action against the Hokoku the Caucasian police are little better. Mr. Noyes had had to battle furiously even to get them to make the raids and to arrest the two presidents. "We can't bite off more than we can chew," is the refrain from Best down. While the Internal Security's fear of the re-segregationists is unwarranted and stupid, there is an important factor which cannot be ignored: the super-patriots are capable of mass resistance of a type which can be very embarrassing to the WRA. By picking off leaders and jailing them, the WRA gains very little. The arrest of the two presidents made very little impact on the colony. The Hokoku continued merrily and the people were not much impressed. Putting a group of women in jail might be discouraging but the writer doubts very much if it will stop the martyr spirit.

If, of course, no move is made to reunite the families and this kind of petty persecution is continued for a year, it will have some effect. But the urge for ~~status~~ and for reunion will remain unabated. Moreover, if the general population is allowed to remain in this present state of indecision, they will incline more and more to the Hokoku view. New organizations may spring up.

The writer has heard of the proposed FBI investigation. If the project must struggle along in limbo, the following actions are advisable.

1. The stern prosecution of the guilty men and good stiff sentences. Most of these boys are now in Santa Fg and went with the first pick-up.
2. WRA prosecution of minor offenses on the project level.
3. Slow parols of young men interned to Tule Lake or to the outside.

The writer has some conception of the objections to these suggestions. Yet, as the situation stands now, it is difficult to see what else could be done to stop the vigorous activity of the re-segregationists. And, it should be emphasized, even these steps will not stop them but will only discourage them.

The fact that men like Tachibana and Wakayama have escaped comparatively unscathed though they were the chief instigators of the whole business is a crying injustice. To allow them to continued to direct affairs from Santa F as they are doing - to allow them to maintain their status as "great men" which is what many of their misguided followers still believe them to be, is a sorry reflection on the title of the governmental agency responsible.

Security

To the suggestion that decent fellows should be returned to Tule Lake the probably reply will be, "It's awfully silly to take out a bunch of men and then start sending them back." To this the writer retorts, "It was far sillier to take them out in the first place." The psychological effect on the resegregationists, in the event that a small number of men are returned will be enormous. The action need not be undertaken immediately. The boys must be given time to stew in the company of their leaders and see how they have been misled. If a very few could return in the near future, it is probable that stories of the sad reception they received at Santa Fe would soon be leaking through the colony. The Hokoku would look very silly and the ~~xxx~~ undecided people would be able to make up their minds.

Developments of the past two weeks.

The most important comment which can be made concerning the development of attitudes in the past week is that the undecided, see-sawing section of the population has continued to sway away from involvement with the Hokoku. What effect the new pick-up of tomorrow will have, remains to be seen. The camp is full of stories of parents who force, beg or bribe their sons to join the organization, yet, letters of resignation continue to come in. Issei pressure on the children is still strong. But the writer believes that the ranks of the Hokoku will not increase to any considerable extent, providing, of course, that no new factor enters the picture. The two raids and the arrests of the leaders appears to have had no inhibiting effect whatever on the Hokoku proper. Nor has it affected the enthusiasm of the Joshi-dan nor the implicit faith of the issei Hoshi-dan who continue to spread rumors that they are going to be reunited with their sons and husbands in a month, sixty days, etc.

Many of the camp residents, however, are strongly in favor of slapping the Hokoku down if they don't shut up and behave themselves. Many others are very pessimistic and do not believe that raids or arrests will stop them. All non-Hokoku people and neutrals express great concern over the possibility of the families being reunited. "Boy, will they have the laugh on us if that happens. If they'd only tell them they won't be reunited." Undoubtedly, the triumphant air with which the super-patriots now conduct themselves is arousing great resentment. "They are just keeping it up for spite," say several informants.

A wave of violence has broken out in the camp in the past week. There have been three serious fights, the Manzanar school windows were stoned for the first time in camp history and a group of Hokoku bums threw stones through the windows of a man whom the accused of urging people to resign from their organization.

The arrests of Kawabata and Hinoki, the presidents, were followed by the circulation of a petition for their release. Since these men go on tomorrow's pick-up, the petition will probably never reach the WRA.

I should like to raise a private howl - a certain Fujizawa, father of a boy recently interned is one of the camp's worst issei agitators. I gave his name to Noyes who passed it on to the D. of J, but Fujizawa is not going. Leaving these radical issei in camp is foolish indeed. If 75 or 100 issei agitators had been taken on this next pick-up instead of 40 issei and 85 nisei, the effect would have

been much better. I tell this to Noyes but he says, "How are we going to find out?" Jesus Christ - are you "by essential bent a prosecutor" or aren't you. I can find out who they are but it would be presumptuous and un-crickety to do it. But maybe nobody cares.

I am chortling over the fact that I have heard through confidential Caucasian channels that the Japanese government has informed the Department of State that they have been misquoted on the matter of the exchange. There seems to be a debate as to whether this information should be released to the camp. HAW. Three informants ~~xxxxxxx~~ have given me the same information in the last few days. It came via shortwave.

The following attitudes are common in camp. The first has many to corroborate it:

"If they start pushing the people out, everybody will get together. If the other camps will do it, we have enough better reason than they have. The people are not going to get out of the other camps unless they offer them a good job and a place to stay. Some people (in Tule) are very calm because they have determined they're going to sit here and nothing's going to stop them. They feel they have the right."

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"Yesterday I heard that the men sent to Santa Fe from the Hokoku are writing to their families here, asking them to apply for transfer to Crystal City. The people should be informed of the delay in rejoining their families and it will make them stop and think. It's fair to give them good warning first then to have them get in a mess and treat them cruelly thereafter."

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G: "WRA can disband the Hokoku only by segregating them. If WRA thinks they're going to stop them by making a few arrests, they're wrong."

S: "But if WRA let's them re-segregate, they'll say, "Look what we did!" That's what they want."

G: "The women are getting stronger and stronger. I'm very sure that no matter what they do, they'll want to be pulled in. I don't think arresting them will do any good."

"A frank statement on what they could do and couldn't do will help. But if Mr. Best did say something frankly now, nobody would believe it."

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"Why doesn't the administration make some definite statement. Who is in charge here anyway, WRA, the Dept. of Justice or the Army or what? Somebody ought to take more interest."

"I know some poor kids, their parents made them shave their heads. But they still roll up their jeans to show their agah socks (evidently a part of the accoutrement of flaming youth). A lot of kids say that when they're 18 they'll have to join, due to their parents' pressure and the draft."

"The women in the Jeshi-dan are sure carrying on."

"Just what were the orders given by the WRA. We don't know?"

"You just can't open your mouth to anyone nowadays because you don't know which side they're on (Hokoku or anti.)"

"We're always saying, 'Trouble has to stop. But that's what we're saying all the time.'"