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**CONFIDENTIAL**

EVACUEE ATTITUDES TOWARD THE W. R. A.

Oct. 30, 1943

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY  
COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTION

*g. J. ...*  
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I. The Existence of Unrest.

During the last six weeks, the section of Community Analysis has interviewed over 250 people on certain specific topics. This is a small sample, but it represents a variety of age, sex and occupational groupings. The topics were relocation, employment, mess halls and hospital. There were certain dissatisfactions evident, but even more, these interviews showed the existence of a general dissatisfaction. This dissatisfaction was expressed during and developed from interviews on these specific topics.

The attitude may be summed up as suspicion of W. R. A. policies as administered here, and resolves itself into resentment of race discrimination, fear of forced relocation, persistent rumors of the camp closing, fears of increased privation to force relocation and a very vague fear of what may happen next. This report proposes to tell briefly of some of these problems of unrest.

II. Causes of Unrest--General.

Many of those interviewed emphasized the fact that the whole situation was a major cause of unrest. In the last eighteen months, evacuees have been through a series of experiences which in themselves would serve to cause suspicion no matter what present policies were adopted. This general situation, while obvious, is yet of most significance.

Since evacuation, registration has probably been the most unsettling experience. Even for those whose opinions remain unshaken one way or the other, the dissensions and doubts of this period have left some mark. For some hundreds, it still remains an acute issue. Evacuation and registration are not the immediate causes of unrest. They simply form the background against which the more specific causes may be considered.

The immediate causes of unrest arise from the legal status, the economic status, and the social status of the evacuees. This can be seen if the incidence of authority is examined, not generally but specifically, as it affects the daily lives of the individuals. Thus, it is useful to distinguish between the incidence of authority as it exists governmentally and as it exists occupationally. The interviews indicate that the occupational incidence of authority gives rise to much more dissatisfaction than the governmental incidence of authority.

### III. Causes of Unrest--Occupational.

In general, it may be said that there exists a widespread dissatisfaction because, in many of the important divisions, the evacuees are treated as people who are there to take orders and whose cooperation is not invited. This is not true of all occupational groups. Community Enterprises is highly praised because of the responsibility and initiative which is permitted the evacuee employees. This is considered exceptional and the general attitude can be more clearly documented by more specific studies of other important occupational groups.

The hospital has always been a focus of interest and certain changes which have occurred there in the past three months have caused general concern.

Early in July of this year, a new Senior Medical Officer arrived to take charge of the hospital. As it appeared to him, there were several irregularities, even abuses, which he felt his duty to reform. The section of Community Analysis is not in a position to state whether these abuses were serious or not, nor whether the reforms were necessary. It is concerned only with the reaction of the hospital staff and the community to the manner in which these reforms were undertaken.

The hospital staff, in general, felt that the Senior Medical Officer did not trust them, considered them as people of an inferior status and to quote one of many utterances, treated them as "natives". He appears to have made no effective attempt to discuss the situation with them but merely to give them instructions which he expected them to carry out. His distrust was shown by the close check he kept upon the issuing of certain supplies and his unspoken belief that evacuee doctors' right to prescribe would be abused if not persistently watched. In his personal relationships, the same attitude was felt.

*Has been transferred to Ark.*

This attitude was felt to exist not only in the person of the Senior Medical Officer but in some of the senior Caucasian nurses. It was remarked that at least one of them had spent so many years in the East that she assumed the superior race attitude unconsciously and took it simply for granted. It was also resented that the Caucasian nurses were nearly always given supervisors' jobs regardless of their ability related to that of trained evacuee nurses.

Whatever the justification for reform, effective changes became difficult because of these resentments on the part of the hospital staff. Real cooperation became increasingly less and medical services suffered accordingly, though the reforms may have been of benefit in some directions.

The dissatisfaction on the part of the medical staff was intensified by the attitude of the Chief Medical Officer of the W. R. A. He added to their resentment and at the same time, increased the fear of insecurity on the part of evacuee physicians by indicating that they could be transferred from one center to another at will and that their assent to such transfers could be assumed. Accordingly, a number of them indicated their intention of relocating or joining the armed forces. They felt that if they were to be moved about, they may as well put themselves in a better legal and economic situation.

Had this dissatisfaction been confined to the medical staff alone, it would, while serious, have remained a limited issue, but it was not confined to the hospital. In discussing matters of public concern both with groups and individuals, the hospital situation was frequently introduced. We had talks with a group of Christian ministers, with various block representatives, with a large church group and with various clubs. In every case, the hospital situation was brought up without any prompting on our part.

There exists a general fear that adequate medical attention will be lacking. It was noted that there were increased delays in appointments for medical and dental consultations. There were also fears that these delays would increase as doctors were relocated.

Frequently, groups made a number of proposals. These are not given as recommendations but merely as an indication of a state of mind. The most specific proposal was that evacuee doctors be employed on the same basis as Caucasian doctors; in some cases these proposals were extended to evacuee nurses. When it was pointed out that this would be a precedent causing similar claims to be made by other skilled groups, the answer was always that health was more important than anything else and there would be no resentment to giving preferred positions to medical men.

Another important cause for general unrest was the situation which developed in the mess halls' staffs late in the month of August. The mess hall staffs accepted a reduction of staff in July. They were then given to understand that no further reduction was to be asked of them until segregation caused a decrease in the population. On some time between the eighth and the seventeenth of August, they were informed that there would be another reduction to be effective at the end of August. The supervisors asked for time to consider the matter with their mess hall staffs. A meeting was held the night of the eighteenth of August. There were present the mess hall supervisors, the chief

of Mess Operations, the Project Director, and other officials. At the meeting, they were informed that the reduction in employment must be effective the twenty-first instead of the thirty-first. On the following morning, the supervisors were called in individually along with their block managers and were told that they must agree to the reduction in employment or turn in their keys to the mess halls. The details of the negotiations which followed may not be entered into here. Interviews with representatives of mess hall staffs and of the community agree that their great resentment was caused by the arbitrary manner in which the reduction was announced and enforced. Again, there was no attempt to seek cooperation, to explain the situation well enough in advance nor to discuss methods of dealing with the situation. The block managers also felt that they were suddenly called in to a situation about which they had not been consulted. The reactions were varied but in general they showed increased distrust of the W. R. A. and in many cases an increased feeling of hopelessness. If this sort of thing could happen unannounced, there existed the fear that anything might happen in the future.

One of the largest number of employees of labor is in the Farm Section. A number of supervisors and laborers were interviewed. The same intensity of dissatisfaction was not found here. There were, however, persistent and recurring dissatisfactions expressed in almost every interview. The supervisors felt that not enough incentive was given them to produce results. They were given limited authority over their units but felt that they had no share in forming the general policies. These dissatisfactions showed themselves in certain proposals. The proposals were of such a nature that they could not be put into effect because of the limitations imposed by Congress, but they do suggest that, if sufficient incentive, economic or other, was present the farm might be much more efficiently conducted. A number of the supervisors were, before evacuation, successful large-scale farmers. Some of them now feel they are merely "playing with a child's toy".

#### IV. Causes of Unrest--Political.

The principal causes of unrest may be resolved into two. First, there is the dissatisfaction with Community Government. Second, there is the belief that any evacuee's protest against W. R. A. policies will be answered by investigations and arrests.

The evidence of dissatisfaction with Community Government in our files is not yet sufficient to justify more than a tentative opinion. Those interviewed have expressed a fear that the new community government will not work. Several have stated that everything happened too late. People have lost interest in it

and it is believed that it will be difficult to persuade abler men of the community to take an active part. There exists also a belief that the Community Council will lack any real authority. It will operate within such narrow restrictions, without adequate control of revenue and subject to so many possibilities of veto that it will not be worth the trouble. One informant made the remark, to which several others assented, that Community Government was working well at Poston. So well, he said, that it would probably be discontinued. It was certainly believed by several groups of informants that any attempt to exercise real authority would be met by the veto.

There is also the belief that any attempt to influence the administration of the W. R. A. policies in this center will be useless. It is further believed that any attempt to alter the administration of W. R. A. policies will be construed as disloyalty. A number of arrests and transfers to Leupp were interpreted as evidence of this. Late in August, there was a rumor that people in Canal were circulating a petition requesting the removal of the Project Director and the Chief of Mess Operations. It was further rumored that those who initiated the petition were immediately investigated by the F. B. I. The rumor further adds that many did not sign the petition for fear of consequences. So far we have not been able to discover whether this rumor was founded upon fact or not. The significant thing is that it was believed. The arrest of Bishop Ochi on ~~August 18~~<sup>September</sup> simply accentuated these fears among some of the Buddhist groups. It was the belief of many that he was arrested either upon false evidence of his enemies or because he was feared on account of his outstanding abilities. This is not an attempt or even a suggestion of criticism that his arrest was unjustified. The fact to be faced is that many believe it to be unjustified, and that it adds further to the suspicion and distrust of the W. R. A.

#### V. Evacuee Proposals.

The dissatisfactions of the evacuees can be further understood if their proposed means of removing them are considered. Their proposals are, therefore, given not as suggestions by the Community Analysis Section but merely as further evidences of evacuee attitudes.

There is frequently expressed the desire for more consultations on policies both in general and in specific employment situations. It was emphasized again and again that if cooperation was asked, it would be given but that cooperation must be real and not nominal. Many of the evacuees in the various employed groups are men who occupied responsible jobs before evacuation. It is felt that their abilities should be more widely utilized and that this will not be possible unless they are given a greater share in the formulation of policy.

Related to this is the desire for more real delegation of authority. This shows itself more in the occupational situation than in Community Government. While some sections, notably Community Enterprises, do really give authority to evacuee personnel, these are exceptional. This shows itself specifically in remarks on the hospital, the farm and on mess halls. Interestingly enough, it is shown less on the part of the block managers. They have sometimes complained that they were not consulted sufficiently in advance, but they do perform real functions and have an authority which obviously gives them satisfaction.

## VI. Conclusions.

There is a general belief that no satisfactory changes will take place unless the attitude of the members of the appointed staff are changed. It is believed, rightly or wrongly, that a majority of the Caucasian staff adopt, to some degree or other, the attitude of race superiority and consider that the evacuees must always be in an inferior position.

Thus there exists a distrust of present leadership. This is implicit in all that is said; it is also frequently stated explicitly. Further, numbers feel that there is rigid segregation within the project and that those among the appointed personnel who do not conform to the pattern are the exceptions and not the rule. This extreme sensitivity to segregation of the two groups within the project because of race discrimination may be as much a result as a cause of other dissatisfactions; it is possibly a generalized resentment to many frustrations.

It is possible to indicate only vaguely the extent to which these attitudes are held and the groups which hold them. It is difficult to know how a statistical verification of these statements could be made. They are certainly shared by numbers of the abler Nisei and by many of the Issei. There are, however, numbers of Nisei who seem to be more concerned with possibilities of relocation than with the internal problems of the project. It is probably safe to say that the attitudes are shared by a sufficient number of the evacuees to be a source of grave concern and that if any changes are possible, they should be made soon. Segregation will not solve this problem. Those who remain share these attitudes as much, or nearly as much, as those who are going. One competent observer who was at Poston during the strike, expressed the opinion that evacuee attitudes here were much as they were at Poston just before the strike period. It is impossible to verify this opinion; it is merely given to emphasize that there is dissent and widespread dissatisfaction.

This report has been made brief. It could be documented by many quotations from interviews.

#### APPENDIX

Most of the interviews on which this report is based were made by Seichi Oguchi and Tek Sakurai, research assistants. The Community Analyst was able to make only a small number of interviews because most of his time was devoted to segregation.

Appended are a selection of interviews pertaining to some of the principal topics discussed in this report.

*August 1943*

INTERVIEWS

August, 1943  
Seichi Oguchi

TOPIC: Segregation

Block 66, Age 45, Housewife, an Issei.

There are many different cases among segregees. In some cases mother, husband, son or daughter lives in Japan. Relation with near relatives has good weight as the way each decides. I have a friend whose husband is in an interment camp who is an ex-serviceman as he was a soldier at the time of the Russo-Japan War.

He was industrious and was successful in his farming. At the time when the war started, the eldest son was attending a college and the second son was a high school student. But this war brought all kinds of misfortune to the family. As a result of the war, the father was interned. To the sons, their father was a very respectable person. His wife wonders what wrong he ever had committed. When the loyalty question came up, the mother and the sons had many discussions. The mother believes that as the result of his interment, her husband desires to go back to Japan so she thought they should all be in the same position.

But the eldest son was born in the United States, educated here, and has friends here, so he wants to stay in this country. After long consideration and many sleepless nights, he answered "yes" on loyalty and "no" on volunteer questions, thinking he might consider his mother's wish to some extent.

However, when he tried to go out to finish his course in a university, he found out that he could not go out. His mother and younger brothers went to join his interned father. The eldest son is left here with much worry. She is sorry for anyone who is suffering under such circumstances.

It will break many hearts but as U. S. A. policy I think it cannot be helped.

September 8, 1943  
Seichi Oguchi

TOPIC: Hospital

Age 53, Produce Merchant, an Issei, Male.

I have heard about the discontentment among the evacuee doctors because of the manner in which they are given orders. They are instructed in a way which may suit natives in the Orient but does not suit evacuees which are accustomed to a democratic way of living.

It should be realized that many evacuee M. D.'s have just as much pride in their profession as a Caucasian M. D. and they are serving the community in an extraordinary situation. Residents feel that if these doctors are gone, it is impossible to regain them. To hire other doctors from outside means from ten to fifteen times the expense and the Caucasians will be no better than evacuee M. D.'s. It will be very unfortunate for the residents if we can't keep them. We hope that an attempt will be made to hold these doctors as medical attention is vital to our welfare.

August, 1943  
Tak Sakurai

TOPIC: Hospital

Female, 21 years, typist-clerk, Nisei.

The orders of the head of the hospital are that all requisitions ordered from the warehouse must be checked by him.

The pharmacists have the most trouble. Previous to his arrival, they would requisition for ethyl alcohol weekly. Since his arrival, it has been difficult for them to obtain it. His reason is that civilian hospitals on the outside do not have any. The pharmacists were unable to do their work. Now when they make a requisition, they request ethyl alcohol and the same thing under its scientific name. The head crosses off the alcohol and passes the other request. When the pharmacists requisitioned for sugar, they ordered a sufficient quantity to last for some time; the head now decreases the order.

August 28, 1943  
C. B.

TOPIC: Mess Hall Staffs and Hospital

Discussion with the Y's Men

I had advanced the hypothesis that life in a relocation center had increased the sensitivity of the evacuees to any show of authority. I used the mess hall staff troubles as an example. On the general point, they would not agree that their sensitivity was unusual. They said they had always experienced discrimination and it was merely continued in a more obvious form here. Consequently, their dislike of the chief of Mess Operations was quite marked as a result of the difficulties recently experienced. They came to the conclusion as had many others, that cooperation should have been secured instead of attempting to secure the results by peremptory orders.

On the hospital situation, discussion was even more animated. A member of the hospital staff argued vigorously that it was not just a personal attitude on the part of any one of the appointed personnel; it was a whole pattern of authority. He

stated specifically that some of the Caucasian nurses were incompetent, many had been out of practice for years. Some of the evacuee nurses were efficient. When it came to a question of becoming supervisors, no evacuee nurse getting one-tenth the salary of a Caucasian would ever become a supervisor. The only evacuee supervisor held that position because no Caucasian was available for that post. He added that many of the evacuee aides were superior to the Caucasian nurses.

He reiterated that some of the Caucasian nurses had attitudes of superiority from long experiences in the Orient.

August 30, 1943  
Seichi Oguchi

TOPIC: Mess

#### A Mess Supervisor.

A supervisor of a mess explained his situation: Since that drastic reduction of the mess workers came up, we had meetings among mess crews as the question must be settled in a peaceful and democratic way. For myself, I have decided to resign if I can't satisfy my crew. Among my crew there were different opinions. But the crew had such a feeling that the supervisor alone should not become the victim of circumstances. The problem was getting very complicated. However, they thought that food must be served every day without interference; they would not quit work to cause trouble for the residents.

Under such a dilemma, they had decided that in the event a satisfactory solution could not be found they would resign effective September 1, but to avoid confusion they would serve until a new crew came to take their places. He thought that this would be fair.

While the block managers, block chairmen and the mess supervisors were trying to find a solution, each supervisor was called before the Chief of Mess Operations and was asked whether he and his crew would keep up the job or not. He was told that if he would not keep up his job, he must lock the door and bring the key to him or deliver it to the block manager.

But he thought it was not practical as people must be fed every day. Workers and babies need special attention and as babies' foods were under his care, he believes that the form of ultimatum should be avoided by all means as they were working pretty hard to find a better solution.

August 25, 1943  
G. B.

TOPIC: Mess Hall Staffs

Male, 33 years, Nisei

The statement was actually made that there would be no more cuts in the mess hall staffs. Then on the 18th of August, a meeting was held explaining the need of further reductions immediately. On the 19th of August, a memorandum was sent to the mess supervisors telling them to report to the Mess Operations office. Here they were told that terminations must be effective immediately. A telegram had come in stating that they had only \$2300 instead of \$4000. Five mess supervisors turned in their keys; the majority continued to work on a voluntary basis. The block managers were involved. The keys were to be turned over to the block managers by the supervisors so that the block managers could appoint a volunteer mess crew. The block managers had not been previously asked to cooperate. They felt they had not been forewarned. Every block manager and supervisor was told the decision in a different way. On the 19th, many of the block managers called a meeting to ask where they stood.

Five mess halls did not serve breakfast on the morning of the 19th. On that same day there were three meetings--a block managers' meeting, a supervisors' meeting and a meeting of the block managers and supervisors. Now things have been smoothed out since Washington says the decision is final most mess halls are operating under the quota and the rest are continuing on a voluntary basis.

Other divisions had been better educated concerning this out. Most people thought the mess problem would settle itself with segregation but Gila is behind the other centers.

There were no notices of ten days of the termination which was always given heretofore. The Chief of Mess Operations says it is not on the books. "There is a tremendous feeling of instability in camp. I don't even know whether to start a garden." "It all shows you can't buck the government no matter how much justice you have on your side."

September, 1943  
Tek Sakurai

TOPIC: Agricultural Operations

Male, 28 years, U. of S. C. Graduate, Nisei

Some resentment is caused by the attitude of some of the appointed personnel in the Agricultural Division. When evacuee foremen go up to them to discuss a problem, they merely brush the

person off with some casual remark. This does not tend to win the respect of the foremen. Their remarks also are not tactful. When trying to speak to a group of foremen, nationalism is emphasized to such an extent that it embarrasses the Issai.

In contacts with officials from the outside, the Agricultural Division has done very well. Whenever an important official comes to this center, great pains are taken to make the best impressions. The various sections are checked to see that the records are in order and they are kept in very good condition.

September 8, 1943  
Seichi Oguchi

TOPIC: Agriculture

A Farm Foreman, Age 45, Farmer, an Issai.

There are so many ideas in my mind I don't know where I should start. This is wartime and so much should be done and could be done. But the management seems to have the set policy that it can't be done as we are evacuees. With the method they have now, efficiency can be improved.

Agriculture should not be governed under public work. It should be independent if it is to get the best results.

Mess and agriculture must have far closer coordination.

I was a field foreman in a ranch of 9000 acres; now I am a field foreman of 500 acres. It is like a baby's toy. Years ago, my mind was working like a razor but not now. When larger responsibility is given, our mind starts to work but if not it becomes foggy.

We have no machinery to do real good work here. I wonder why the administration is not in favor of a full swing. Regarding water, I believe that it depends on crops and methods of farming.

We should operate everything on the outside basis. The United States needs foodstuffs; there will be no competition as there is no surplus production. Give all benefit to production, let farmers pay their own expenses.

The reason why W. R. A. can't gather farm implements is because it does not run on a real farm business basis, giving benefit to all those who work.

There is no over-production, although there are experienced farmers in idleness who are dependent on the W. R. A. There is a problem to think deeply on. If the farm is run strictly on a business basis, it will change the whole outlook. Camouflage is a good example.

If the W. R. A. became the boss of the farms and turned the whole running to actual experienced people, there would be a difference. Use the best men on the right spot, but give power to one man who will run the whole thing, then there will be a different picture.

Giving petty power to each farmer and dividing the farms tends to bring about a lack of unity for there will be many farm implements. Thus, efficiency is lowered. It must be under one experienced man's management who knows the business thoroughly.

As the nation and the Army and the Navy consume any amount of products now, why worry about competition. If there is no competition, why be jealous of our production power? There is no sense to be so.

Farming should be done by farmers. If Gila is not suitable for larger production for any reason, W. R. A. should select suitable farms and leave the inside management and responsibilities to us. Support one year's living expense with the understanding that the products will be turned over to the W. R. A. at the market price, then there will be no necessity of supporting us in this way. We can be producers to the nation instead of consumers. It does not make any difference to be here or any other place. Fair Americans by this time know that we are not dangerous by any means. We want to return to normal life supporting our own families.

There will be no loss to the side of the government as crops are turned to it. We only want a proper amount by working for it. If the W. R. A. makes a plan which is really workable, all will be out and become self supporting. If not, many can't go out.

As we came here losing almost everything we had by no means of our fault, I think it is fair to ask a favor to start us again in a way which is workable. As time goes by, rehabilitation becomes harder as we form the habit of present life.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY  
GILA RIVER PROJECT  
RIVERS, ARIZONA

January 8, 1944

Mr. L. H. Bennett  
Project Director  
Gila River Project, W.R.A.  
Rivers, Arizona

Dear Mr. Bennett:

I forward a report on evacuee reactions to the shooting incident of December 1, 1943. I regret the delay in forwarding it. I have been engaged in other, and somewhat time-consuming activities. For what it is worth, this report is a partial indication of community opinion at the time of the event, and may already be modified.

Yours sincerely,

G. Gordon Brown  
Community Analyst

Approved \_\_\_\_\_  
H. W. Wolter

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY  
GILA RIVER PROJECT  
RIVERS, ARIZONA

EVACUEE REACTIONS TO THE SHOOTING INCIDENT  
AT GILA RIVER PROJECT

This report is made primarily to state and analyse the community reactions to the shooting and wounding of Elmer Satoshi Kira on December 1. In order to make it self-contained the facts are briefly reviewed, although they are well-known. The last part deals with the mental condition of the victim, although it has probably been reported by others.

I. THE INCIDENT

On December 1st at 5:20 P.M., a young evacuee, Elmer Satoshi Kira, 22, attempted to pass the north Chandler entrance to the Gila River Project. He did not stop at the command of the sentry. He said "I don't need to pay attention to any sentry, I'm the President." The sentry gave him two warnings, firing a shot at each warning. Kira did not halt. The sentry then aimed at him and shot him in the left side. He was immediately taken to the Butte Hospital, where Dr. Hata extracted the bullet, and declared the injury not dangerous. Physically he improved continuously and was transferred to the Arizona State Hospital on December 10.

II. EVACUEE REACTIONS

Early next morning the personnel of the section of Community Analysis began questioning people about the incident. The following is a summary of information so gleaned.

(1) Rumors. The significant fact is that the number of rumors was relatively small. Of the people interviewed the day following the incident, over 80% had the facts correctly and without distortion. Most had learned the facts correctly and objectively from the "Arizona Republic;" the Project Director had given a concise statement to the papers the evening of the incident. The false rumors were mostly dissipated by the evening of December 2, or by the morning of the following day.

Sample rumors during the first day were as follows:

"The boy is dying." This was said by very few, and disappeared by evening.

"It was an old man, slightly off." This is half true.

"I heard he was riding a truck which was leaving the center,"

"I heard that some guy from Canal was shot trying to leave the center yesterday morning." The victim was from Butte.

"I heard he was injured critically."

"I heard he was coming home from a trip into Phoenix and was drunk at the time of his arrival at the Military Police station."

It is noteworthy that these rumors are not, in general, violent distortions of the truth; the rumor that the shot was fatal was transmitted by few.

One rumor which persisted in varying forms was to the effect that on the following days, further shots were fired at evacuees attempting to cross the boundary, or on the Banks of Canal. These were believed by many. The last such rumor of which we have any record was on December 6; but it was originated by a somewhat intoxicated mess-hall employee at Butte, and he claimed he was the target.

Internal Security investigated all these reports and found that none were based on fact.

Summing up in time, the course of rumor might be given thus:

December 2: Most people had the facts correct, a few were believing and transmitting rumors; and appreciable minority had not yet heard the news.

December 3: Some rumors persisting but decreasing in volume. First rumors of subsequent shootings.

December 4. and 6. Gradual subsidence of all rumors, that of subsequent shootings dying last.

(2) Evacuee Attitudes

The majority, possibly 75 percent of the evacuees exhibited no great reaction, expressing neither resentment nor concern. This is a more significant fact than the resentments of the minority.

Of the minority who expressed, in some degree, resentment or concern, the following are typical.

"The sentry should have known he was crazy." This was expressed by only three people.

"The sentry should not have shot an unarmed man." This was expressed the more extreme Japanese section.

"It was unnecessary to shoot." This was expressed by only one man.

"The conditions should be more carefully explained to the people."

Extracts from remark made by an extremely anti-administration woman:

"There are some people around here who wanted to show them-----. But I told them 'Don't you do it. You wouldn't have a chance. They're just looking for a chance to mow you down.' Their chance will come."

"They think they can break us. But they're wrong. Our minds are getting harder and harder."

There were a few who expressed resentment, but did not specify any object of resentment.

The objects of resentment are thus vague and of a general nature. Except for the few quoted, there was no criticism of the sentry and the vast majority realized he was only following orders. The Military Police as such were not blamed; neither was the WRA; but presumably both were included in resentments against a system: One informant believed that, if resentments had been more extreme, the WRA would have been the objects; the WRA is the nearest target in any retaliation against the system.

One informant expressed the opinion that resentment was less than it might have been because the victim was Nisei.

(he is actually Sansei.) As Nisei, he knew English and was a citizen. This explanation applies only to the more Japanese group. The same informant expressed the obvious opinion that resentment would have been greater if the victim had died.

In general, resentment or concern was expressed chiefly by the more Anti-Administration segments of the population: and even their reactions were not very violent.

### III. THE VICTIM

The victim of the incident was Elmer Satoshi Kira. The following notes upon him were collected as follows: (1) a discussion of the event by Mr. John Fukushima of the Community Council; Mr. Fukushima and a social case worker had gone through Kira's letters and found much clinical material; (2) interviews with the family and friends of the victim by Tek Sakurai, of the Community Analysis staff; (3) a joint interview by Miss Hankey and the community analyst with Dr. Hata of the hospital; and (4) an interview by Mr. Wolter and the community analyst with Mr. Kira, father of the victim.

Kira was a premature child. He had an excellent record in grade school, and a good, though not outstanding record at high school. At the time of evacuation, he was 20 years old, and was majoring in commercial art at a Junior College.

At the Project, he lived in Butte and was employed on the Gila News-Courier until June 1943, as artist. He went to work again in August, 1943, but did not stay long.

On the army questionnaire he answered in an unusual manner: "Yes" to question 27 and "no" to question 28. He later applied to change his answer on question 28 to "yes!" He was up for leave clearance hearing on September 14, 1943.

During the period when he worked for the "News-Courier", he kept rather aloof from the other members of the staff. People in the same block also noted that he did not readily join in with others in social events. He had one close friend with whom he was on easy terms, but this friend relocated in June, 1943. Between that time and the day of his leave clearance hearing, he seems to have become aloof although the change in behavior was not great.

After the leave clearance hearing, he came home and complained he was very tired mentally and physically. He

lay down and rested. He said that the questioning had been severe. An examination of the hearing transcript shows that some searching questions were asked him and that on one or two occasions he and his questioners had sharp exchange of words. He also let out the revealing remark that he would take a job when he found one good enough for him.

No marked outward change was noted until about the beginning of November, though entries in his note-books show signs of increasing abnormality. His father was scheduled to relocate on November 4, but was delayed for one week. On November 4, originally set for the father's departure, young Kira came to the bus with suit-case packed, dressed for the trip. He was not permitted to proceed.

From that time on he withdrew more to himself. His records state that he was the Project Director and that he was immensely wealthy. During this latter period, also, he quarrelled violently with his mother and sisters. On one occasion he poured out all the sugar, stating that it was poison and that he was the intended victim. There is evidence that he once struck his sister. Sometimes the family slept in another house, so that male friends could look after him. On the day his father relocated he had told his sister<sup>that</sup> he was going to kill his father and mother. He thought<sup>that</sup> he was President of U.S., drawing a salary of \$200,000 per week, making him the richest man in the world. He believed he has an I.Q. of 700.

Finally, on December 1, he attempted to leave camp. He afterwards told Dr. Hata that some irresistible influence was drawing him out. When asked if he heard the sentry's challenge, he said he did, but the magnetic influence kept pulling him on. Then he was shot.

After extraction of the bullet he was normal for a period, and, when asked, specifically said he was no President of the U.S. But after 24 hours he again began to have delusions. Asked if his I.W. was 700, he said it was down to 500. He again believed himself President of the U.S., also project director. He bore no grudge for the injury. He remained in much the same condition until he was transferred to the Phoenix State Hospital on December 10.

It is believed by his family that the exciting cause of Kira's mental condition was the leave clearance interview and they, and Kira himself, blame the hearing board for what happened. Family and friends state as an opinion that the strain of waiting for leave clearance, plus the relocation of his father, worked on his mind until he became completely unbalanced.

Dr. Hata's diagnosis is schizophrenia and incipient dementia precox. His prognosis is: Physically, good; mentally the patient has a better than fifty-fifty chance of recovery, but that he should not return to the Project.

Dr. Hata further gave it as his opinion that feelings of injury, of injustice and of martyrdom will cause an increase of such cases. He sees incipient signs of it in the type of cases coming to the clinic. There will likely be more such cases among the Nisei than among the Issei, and more dementia precox than senile dementia.

#### IV. GENERAL REMARKS

The reactions of the people to the shooting incident indicate that the Community is probably much quieter and much more balanced than it had been two months previous to the event. While no comparable incident occurred then, other incidents had given rise to wild rumor, to uneasiness and to unrest. In this case, while there was a small minority which reacted extremely, there was no real threat of violence, rumors were relatively few and what rumors there were died quickly.

This relative quiet is probably the result of two factors. First, a large proportion of the disturbing elements have been segregated. Secondly, there is less distrust of the Administration than previously existed. This lack of distrust is not complete; the whole incident simply suggests improving relationships between administration and evacuees.

Concerning Dr. Hata's opinion the schizophrenic indications are increasing, there is some sociological evidence to support it. This will be included in a future report. In the meantime, it is sufficient to note that there are some hundreds to people here who have had leave clearance hearings two, three or four months ago, and who are still unaware of the final decision. Many of them are full of anxiety and are increasingly resentful of what appears to them to be an unpardonable delay in letting them know what is to become of them.

January 8, 1943

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY  
GILA RIVER PROJECT  
RIVERS, ARIZONA

April 25, 1944

Mr. L. H. Bennett  
Project Director  
Gila River Relocation Center  
Rivers, Arizona

Dear Mr. Bennett:

I forward a Community Analysis report entitled NOTES ON EVACUEE ATTITUDES.

For convenience I have made it concise. I could have illustrated and expanded each statement indefinitely. As noted in the text, I have not said anything which is not amply confirmed by interviews, comments and acts.

After completing the report, I read the article on relocation centers in Fortune. I note that some of the statements I have made are also made in that magazine. This must be simply a case of arriving at the same result from the same data. Actually, some of the facts used in the Fortune article were supplied, conversationally, by members of this staff.

Yours sincerely,

G. Gordon Brown  
Community Analyst

Approved:

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Hugo W. Wolter

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY  
GILA RIVER PROJECT  
RIVERS, ARIZONA

April 1, 1944

NOTES ON EVACUEE ATTITUDES

I. The Problem.

It is apparent to everyone that the nature of this center is undergoing a change. The Nisei are relocating in appreciable numbers or expecting inductions, with the result that the Issei will increasingly preponderate in the adult population. Such opinions as the community analysis section has been able to form may therefore be of some use in estimating the importance of certain social and cultural patterns, and are here given for what they are worth.

The materials upon which this memorandum is based are interviews, life-histories, current events, and commentaries upon these events.

Although the adult populations is increasingly Issei, it is not exclusively so, and the existence of adults of both generations must be taken as part of the situation. The aim of this memorandum is to note certain attitudes which are characteristic of the evacuees as a group, and to note in addition those attitudes which are characteristically Issei.

II. Attitudes resulting from Evacuation.

It is a commonplace that evacuation had certain effects upon the whole group. Any administrative officer is familiar with them. These effects are summarized below not only for convenience, but because the materials collected by community analysis amply confirm and sometimes expand our knowledge of their nature.

Evacuation was a shock to Issei and Nisei alike. The results of this shock have not yet disappeared, and may never be overcome in case of some thousands. The familiar grievances are property loss, loss of livelihood, educational deprivation, forced displacement and so on. These grievances are based upon real troubles, but the basic shock is the most significant factor. This comes out in dozens of interviews. It is the result of a violent disruption of a whole pattern of life with

loss of all the emotional sense of security that implies. The desire of many to return to California as soon as possible is a deep-rooted desire to restore that sense of security.

The consequences of the shock take many forms. One of the easiest to observe is resentment. In mass it is demonstrated by the large number of negative answers to question 28 on the army questionnaire (though other influences were also contributory to the result); by periodic organized or consistent passive resistance to government policies or procedures; and in the many known incidents of refusal of cooperation. Resentment is associated with the entire process of evacuation. Forced removal, loss, hardships in assembly centers and troubles in relocation centers are all emotionally entangled. Much of this resentment is directed against the WRA. In rational mood, many will admit that the WRA is not responsible for the fact of evacuation, for real or fancied abuses in assembly centers, for exclusion from California, for army orders and so on. But the WRA is the agency which is physically present. Its policies and procedures are directly seen. The members of its staff are the people with whom the evacuees must deal. So the WRA takes the blame for what has happened and for what is happening, regardless of its real virtues or defects.

A reaction similar to and related to resentment is a feeling of martyrdom. "We were told that this was to be our sacrifice for the war". They feel that they not only have suffered, but are still suffering. As martyrs they are entitled to special consideration. The government is now responsible for them, and rightly so. Hence, among other results, the difficulty of procuring sufficient personnel for certain undesirable tasks.

A feeling of martyrdom is not the only cause of the lack of initiative and response to need; loss of motivation is a very significant factor. Many of the culturally accepted motivations are no longer active. Economically, the basic necessities of life are cared for, whether the individual makes an effort or not. The additional money received for work is not always a sufficient inducement to work; certainly not when the work is hard or distasteful. More than the economic, however, other motives decrease in strength. There is not feeling that the future is being provided for, that real responsibility and initiative are theirs, that what they do really matters to their present or their future. Thus it happens that one of the most industrious and self-reliant of ethnic groups in this country has surrendered a great degree of this industry and independency. It has lost its sense of

responsibility and depends upon the Government.

Shock has also produced fears. These fears may take many verbal forms. There is fear of "outside." This is indicated not only by what is said inside the center, but in the initial actions of those who relocate. Secondly, there is fear of Americans. This is probably only another way of expressing fear of the "outside". Thirdly, there is fear of the future. "Our great and constant concern is what is to be the future of us and our children after this war". Basically, all fears may be reduced to a loss of any sense of security. If one fear is removed, another comes to the surface. All fears are the one fear; the different forms of this fear are merely convenient labels.

One manifestation of the present situation is a super-sensitivity. This is seen in their reactions to segregation. Any suggestion of social difference, of privilege, excites an inordinate response. Basically, of course, segregation exists and is accepted, resentfully or otherwise; the deprivation of privilege is a fundamental condition of life on a relocation project; but any accentuation of the condition, any reminder of its existence calls forth a reaction out of proportion to the immediate occasion. This sensitivity is particularly seen in work situations. A reprimand there becomes a grievance, and it may easily result in the loss of an employee.

Suspicion and distrust also exist as resulting attitudes. They are almost inevitable consequences of loss of security. And just as resentment is directed at the nearest target, the WRA, so is the WRA the object of distrust. This is shown in the innumerable rumors which circulate (though they have much decreased of late) and in the distortion of fact. It is one of the important, probably the most important bar to effective communication between the administration and evacuee. While there is the possibility of improving the mechanism of communication, that will only be a modifier of the fundamental difficulty. Communication will only become completely effective as evacuee attitudes change.

The last result of evacuation to be noted here is isolation. The evacuees are separated from the whole American scene not only physically but mentally. Their major interests are concentrated upon internal problems, upon their own wrongs and upon their own immediate plans. This makes their cooperation in public relations somewhat difficult. While we may consider ourselves fortunate that all major issues have had a satisfactory outcome, this has been achieved only at the expense of some internal discord.

These attitudes do not, of course, exist in the same degree in all people. Some are very little affected by them; others, previously affected, are undergoing change. They are, nevertheless, attitudes which must be considered in dealing with the group as a whole.

### III Issei Attitudes

Many Issei have been in this country for so long that it would be difficult to believe that they are not assimilated. But, while they may have become more Americanized than appears on the surface, they are Japanese, to some degree at least. This is the result of various factors to be mentioned below.

First, they are culturally identified with Japan. This is so because they were brought up and educated in Japan and their basic attitudes and values are culturally Japanese. Moreover, they consciously identify themselves with Japanese values. Their wishes, their form of family life, their social organization (to the extent they can maintain it) are built upon the belief that Japanese culture is superior and that they are a part of it.

Secondly, they have a sense of social solidarity. This was the case in California and it is maintained here. It manifests itself in marriage within the group, participation in common activities, mutual aid, and in making common cause against non-Japanese.

At the same time, there is much internal suspicion and dissension. This shows itself in the formation of factions and cliques, and in interminable squabbles. Much of the frustrated urge to self-assertion is given expression in attempts to establish petty prestige, or in belittling or reducing the prestige acquired by others of their group. A large number of clubs and societies are formed to create new presidencies, secretariate and similar offices; and these societies may be factions splitting off from other societies. One result is that leaders are hard to find. A man may be the recognized leader of one group; that is sufficient reason to cause opposition to him on the part of a rival group. This disunity weakens the groups as a whole and is probably partly responsible for certain types of administrative difficulties, notably those involving the acceptance of any unified policy.

The cultural identification with Japan, together with the sense of social solidarity might suggest that the evacuees are, after all, fundamentally dangerous to this country in time of war. This does not necessarily follow, and the

evidence does not indicate potential danger from them. The identification is cultural not political. There are some who believe, as an article of faith, that Japan will and must win the war. There are others who hope for a negotiated peace. But large numbers of Issei are not political. They do not care to dwell on the war; there will be unpleasant reactions no matter who is the victor. It is a profound tragedy to them, as a group, that the war started it all. They prefer to think of peace. Most of them emigrated from Japan before jingoistic militarists had assumed the measure of control they have since acquired, and their memories of Japan are of peaceful existence.

Cultural identification with Japan and social solidarity are the product of many factors. First, already noted, is the fact that the majority were educated in Japan and their basic way of thinking and feeling were already established. Upon their arrival, they were faced with a new and difficult language and with cultural concepts so different that some were never acquired. They thus tended to rely upon each other for moral and material support and the basis of solidarity was reinforced. This fact is clear from studies made here and from published accounts of pre-evacuation life. Their mutual dependence was reinforced by the segregation imposed upon them by the distrust and dislike they faced in California. Segregation had thus both inner and outer causes. Evacuation strengthened these attitudes because it marked them off as a different group, a group considered homogeneous, and a group suspected by the bulk of the Americans they knew. Evacuation thus retarded the process of Americanization of the Issei which might have been accomplished through their children. One further factor is the legal status of the Issei. They are not and cannot become citizens. This is a potent cause for the maintenance of cultural identity with Japan. If an individual forswears Japan he will be "like a man without a country": With modifications, this statement has been made to us many times.

Some attitudes shared by both Nisei and Issei are particularly intense for the Issei. Far more than their children, they fear Americans and fear the "outside". They have the additional handicap of language and of ingrained habits. These, they believe, not only put them at a greater disadvantage than that faced by the Nisei, but make them conspicuous objects for racial discrimination. Their suspicions of Government agencies may also be greater than those of the Nisei. They had already faced hardship and loss by legal enactment before evacuation intensified both. That it was the state of California rather than the Federal Government is, to many, irrelevant.

Some illustrative material is appended. The following quotation from an interview gives a clear statement of some Issei attitudes. The speaker is an Issei woman, age 43. "When they asked me 'which side do you want to win?' it is a delicate question. My children are American citizens. My destiny is to stay with them. On the other hand, American law will not permit me to become a citizen, regardless of my character. I am barred from being a citizen of this country under peculiar circumstances. Under these conditions, I don't want to be disloyal to the country to which I am indebted for my existence. At the same time, if I am disloyal to the country I belong to, then I will be a person without a country. So my feeling goes to peace and good will among both peoples.

There are certain attitudes which counteract some of those above noted. One, mentioned in the quotation, is devotion to children. Another is a kind of fatalist or stoic philosophy. A few brief statements are appended which illustrate this. It is an acceptance of what happens, an attempt to make the best of it, a dwelling on the more bearable aspects of the situation. Combined with these, there is also a degree of Americanization. While many Issei feel Japanese in America, they might feel quite differently in Japan. This is shown in their preference to remain here, the value they attach to many aspects of Americanism and their appreciation of what this country has meant to them. Without these factors, the number of those willing to cooperate with present policies would be much smaller. Thus, within the group, there are both extremes; those possessed fully of the attitudes designated here as "evacuee" and Issei; and those in whom these attitudes are profoundly modified by counter-influences. Judging by the various evidences at our disposal, the bulk of Issei occupy some position between these extremes.

#### IV Administrative Considerations

The acceptance of administrative policies will be, to some extent, dependent upon their accord with evacuee attitudes. The following are suggestions as to certain fields in which these attitudes will be particularly potent.

1. Relocation. While many considerations, economic, health and age, enter into the pros and cons of relocation, the basic issue is confidence. Against relocation are the attitudes of resentment, of martyrdom and its consequent attitude of dependency, of fear of outside, of loss of security. While some will relocate in spite of the existence of these attitudes, the majority will not. This suggests that

the main task of the WRA is not to have employment programs, or family resettlement programs (though these are essential) but to restore confidence and security. The paradoxical result is that the more harmonious the operation of this center and the more pleasant it is to live here, the better will be the prospects of relocation. This does not apply completely. The aged, the feeble and the sick will remain in any case, and the marginal cases will acquiesce in the comforts. But for the majority the restoration of confidence and security will work the other way. In a sense the members of the appointed staff are America to the people isolated here. There will be an increasing tendency to trust American as those representing America show themselves people to be trusted. "What we want is peace and harmony now, relocation later.

2. Community Government. As the membership on the Community Councils and other bodies of evacuee opinion becomes increasingly Issei, so will the problems of government change. It is hoped that this will be illustrated by a report on Community Government now in course of preparation, but a few preliminary notes may be made here. First, experience with parliamentary procedure is lacking, and working with the accepted forms of democratic procedure becomes slower and more cumbersome. Secondly, the role of the elected representative is not thought of in the same way Americans think it. As elected, the representative is believed to be a creature of the people, to express their wishes only, and he should not in any case impose restrictions upon them. Thirdly, distrust and suspicion of the WRA implies that the interests of the evacuees are felt to be at odds with those of the administration; the task of the representative is to fight for the people against the administration. The extent to which community government works is a measure of the extent to which these adverse attitudes have been modified.

3. Americanization. The Issei acquiesce, either cooperatively or passively, in the education program with all the Americanizing implied by it. Outside of that, it is possible to force the process of Americanization too fast, or, at least, too obviously, Identification with Japanese culture implied pride in it. If Americanization is believed to conflict with certain basic elements of Japanese culture it may excite some opposition on the part of the parents. Learning English, learning codes of behavior which facilitate economic and social relationships between Nisei and other Americans will be accepted for the practical advantages. Too great a pressure in other directions too great an outward insistence on Americanization as such in the abstract, may be taken as a slight to the Issei background, and may excite.

resentment or passive resistance.

4. Communication. Effective communication between two groups involves two things: an effective mechanism of communication, and a confidence in the source of the information and in the organs by which it is transmitted. Anything which is inimical to confidence impairs communication. The residents of this center have fears. These fears predispose them to all sorts of rumor and to distortions of objectively correct statements. Their fears are such that they can not fully trust any source or medium of information. In addition, they distrust the WRA. Hence any statement emanating from WRA will be doubted, disbelieved, or modified when orally transmitted from one individual to another. Hence communication is far from perfect. It is an indication of increasing confidence and diminishing fears that rumors are fewer, and distortions are less than they were six months ago. Communication will improve as these attitudes are modified. It will be of great assistance if a body of men, such as the community council, will, by effective participation toward common goals, increase its confidence in the administration, and, at the same time, be more trusted by the bulk of the population.

Some of the incidents and statements from interviews are given as illustrative.

I. The Anti-Atrocity Resolution.  
Evidence of Cultural Identity with Japan.

On January 27, 1944, the OWI released certain atrocity stories. The next day, emergency meetings of the two councils were called to adopt appropriate resolutions. The Butte Council delegated the Executive Board and three Issei members to draft a resolution based upon their discussion of the issue. As drafted and forwarded, it excited adverse reactions. A respected Issei member of the community said "But the Japanese can not have done such things." At the next meeting on February 7, two members of the council denounced its "hysterical" and "high school" tone, one of the two announced that his block had held a meeting and unanimously disapproved it. There was a large sentiment in the community against it. The terms of the resolution implied that the stories were true. The bulk of the Issei did not believe them to be true, merely propaganda. It was felt by the moderate Issei that the matter should not be talked about.

In Canal, the meeting of January 28 was adjourned without any action being taken: the ostensible ground of disagreement was the inaccuracy of the Japanese translation. At the next regular meeting, February, the English version, as adopted by Butte, was passed, but there was no agreement on a Japanese translation. The resentment against the action taken was such that one member of the Council resigned ( though he was later induced to withdraw his resignation.)

In general, the resolution aroused more resentment than any public issue had done for some months. One Nisei remarked: "It is unfortunate, but true, that many people believe reports received from Radio Tokyo ninety per cent true, reports from American radio sources ninety per cent false."

II. Pre-evacuation basis of resentment: Attraction to Japan.

February 19, 1944

Block 49, Age 63, Gardener, An Issei.

I have four nephews and some of them asked to come to the United States but I told them not to do so as here is prejudice against our race. They studied medicine and are doing well.

The locality where I was born was noted for democratic and cooperative way of living. There was no police nor warden. The local people handled affairs themselves. No criminal cases of record I remember while I live there as a youth.

III. Shock of Evacuation.

Block 40, Age 41, Male, Farmer, An Issei. The father is still in an interment camp and is an interesting farmer. I went to hear a life story of this well known farmer from his son. However the conversation went to diverse directions before I heard about the father's life.

My father was born in a fishing village, lost his father when he was six years old. I think he had tasted enough difficulties. When he was 14 years of age he was working as a kitchen helper among fisherman, so he had a very limited education. However he must have a quality to get ahead as he was a captain of a fisherman, so he had a very limited years of age. Our village was noted as a fishing district. He went to Phillipines but returned as he got sick. When he recovered he went to Hawaii, then to the mainland of the United States. With his brother and another partner he had a fishing boat and was fishing around San Pedro then around Monterey in California.

However he quitted fishing and went to Guadalupe and worked for the Union Sugar Co. as a laborer. There were many laborers who came from his native province. Gradually he became a leader and worked as a foreman then a book-keeper. Then he started to do farming on share-base. As there were many who were from same province, they helped him.

When I came over to this country he was farming about 400 acres on share base raising sugar beets to the Union Sugar Co. Acreage was gradually increased and in 1924 the scale was about 800 acres and raised lettuce as a side issue.

When the Pearl Harbor disaster happened and my father was taken away, my brother was there yet. The attorney was trying to have the release of my father. He was trying to arrange a farm inland. Younger Niseis were persuaded to follow him. Actual power was under his control. The shipping yard was turned over to the government.

When my father and the brother were taken away to internment camp at the time of the disaster, it was a great shock. Younger men who were handling business had no such previous experience to stand such a shock. My ability was premature also. We could not see what was going to happen. My father has a will power and has good determination. If we followed his we had a better solution!

If we can start up again we like to have such localities as Arizona or Texas. But some of people who will not receive direct benefit may have prejudice for the name "Japanese" and those who were hurt in the war and their relatives may have bitterness; but those who are well cultured and have principle may have no prejudice against us.

#### IV. Conflict of Sympathies

Block 55, Age 43, Female, Housewife, An Issei.

Regarding the Soya bean sauce sent by the Japanese Red Cross I am grateful. But that will not make me feel like to go back to Japan. As we are living here and children are our main concern, there is no such effect by the presents we received. There are some who expressed the feeling, the present is a matter of course, as we lost everything as the result of the Pearl Harbor incident.

When they ask me. "Which side you want to win?" It is a delicate question. My children are American citizens, my destiny is to stay with them. On the other hand, American law will not permit me to become a citizen regardless of my character. I am barred to be a citizen of this country under a peculiar circumstances. Under the condition, I don't want to be disloyal to the country I am indebted for my ex-

istence: at the same time if I am disloyal to the country I belong to, then I will be a person without country. ~~So I belong to, then I will be a person without country.~~ So my feeling goes to peace and good will among both people.

There are many Americans who are <sup>co</sup>critizing us and painting us dark which has no foundation and such acts are the root of all evil, the prejudice; which will breed the world condition as it is.

#### V. Attitudes produced by Evacuation

Block 36, Age 51, Manager of Trading Co. Male, An Issei.

There are not many personell who understand thoroughly how it is difficult and painful for old Isseis to readjust their lives to new conditions. Mr. Myer is probably the best man who understand it, but he can't do as he think best. Isseis have lost almost all they had and getting old, it is almost impossible to have new start.

How to bring the Niseis to normal life and normal thinking is an interesting study. Niseis are a small minority but a very interesting minority. Without their own faults what they have gone through is quite an interesting theme for the future of democracy.

#### VI. Comment on Discrimination

Block 55, Age 34, Farmer, Male, A Kibei Nisei.

People in Hawaii responded with better spirit because there was no discrimination. But we were treated with prejudice and morale is lower as a natural consequence. However if the mistake is recognized and reasonable remedies are adopted the morale will go up high.

VII. A Compensating Philosophy of Life.

Block 60, Age 73, Laborer, Male, An Issei.

I left Japan when I was 26, my motive was to become a ship building worker. I entered from San Francisco. But I had no chance as I could not join to the union. I went to Pennsylvania without success. Meantime I worked as a domestic worker and traveled around about 30,000 miles. I was 6 years in San Francisco, 18 years in New York, returned to San Francisco and stayed there one year, then again to New York and stayed there two years. Then I took a trip to Japan, married and came back with my wife, went to Alaska, stayed there six months, came back to Tacoma stayed there three years. Went to Los Angeles then to Santa Paula, stayed there three years, then went to Oxnard, there I spent as domestic worker.

I am 73 and my wife is 52, I am working here as the janitor in the block and my wife is working in the hospital. At my age the food tastes good and I have no worry. I feel I like to do most humble work but do it well.

I was interested to trace up the travels of St. Paul and his life was a great source of inspiration to me. To do good job which is assigned to me, regardless how the work is humble, may have good influence from St. Paul. My job is a janitor and to do clean work is essential. I can glorify God through my janitor's work.

At a time like this, it is useless to spend much energy for anything which you can't change. Do the best at your assigned work and take good care of the family. It is useless to complain for trifling things. Do not spend much time for war talks. You can't change it and your talk is useless. It's far better to attend own job faithfully. A man can enjoy his life if he attend his work well.

VIII. Minor Resentments; Cooperation; Philosophy

Block 40, Age 56, Farm Agent, An Issei.

For the final solution of the T.B. ward workers the Federal Government must work for satisfactory solution. Young nurses aides may relocate more and more and the numbers of patients will not decrease in proportion and workers will be harder to get for the ward.

As the people relocate and the budget is reduced, the adjustment becomes more difficult. Study of the budget and mutual understanding between the Administration and the evacuees become vital for smooth running of the center.

When evacuees desire is refused in every case there may develop such state as "non-cooperation".

It seems to me there are too many Caucasians in the center. Of course the evacuees appreciate good members but they think at the same time why some of their jobs are not turned to evacuees and save expense to meet the budget before they ask evacuee workers reduction.

In general the Evacuees' attitude is "Do not worry about the things which are not worth worrying." We have enough sense. We stood enough punishment without real cause and will stand false condemnation.

IX. Resentment caused by Evacuation, Internment and Loss.

Block 36, Male, Age 36

Father is interned, only son, previously farmer.

Has bitterness against the government but is still loyal to the United States. Reason for bitterness has been the internment of his father. He feels that his father is unjustifiably interned. When he inquired regarding charges against his father, he finds no reason. Those who have returned from internment camp state that they can see no reason for his detention.

There has been further reason for bitterness as he has just received a better stating that farm equipment of his father had to be requested for use as it has been "idle farm machinery". His bitterness is such that he does not

expect any remuneration or return for the equipment. He has supported his belief by hearing of the rumor that those automobiles which evacuees drove into Santa Anita and store there are now lost from government records or their respective owners. He feels that he has received an undemocratic treatment by the government.

To do justice to his viewpoints he does not wish to relocate unless he can obtain the release of his father.

#### X. Shock and Process of Recovery.

Block 58, Age 54, Florist, Male, An Issei

I was born in Niigata-Ken, a northern district of main land and I came over to this country after I have finished the high school there. I came through Canada to Seattle, then to Southern California.

I worked for a lemon and orange ranch. I stayed four years in Ventura County. Then went to Salt Lake, worked for the railway, became a gang foreman. Then return to Southern California I was a crew foreman for a fruit packing company I spent my time in such manner about seventeen or eighteen years. Then I started a florist store in Pasadena and stayed in that business ever since until the evacuation.

I was disappointed indeed when I had to evacuate to Tulare: everything looked dark. But gradually my view point has been changed. I see more brighter side now and feel like I have to start up again. There may not much chance during the war but after that at least is my feeling.

Helping Nisei and finding goodness among evils we have to stand up against. The period of pessimistic mood is over. What I can't accomplish, I hope my children will continue to carry on. My mood is something like waiting for spring in the later part of winter. It is cold and inactive but hope is in the future.

April 28, 1944