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May It Never Happen Again

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MAY IT NEVER HAPPEN AGAIN

In the Spring of 1942 some 110,000 ~~Asians~~ persons of Japanese ancestry were taken from their homes on the West Coast and incarcerated by order of the U. S. government. None of them had committed any acts of treason or espionage and, indeed, there was no evidence that any of them contemplated such activities. They had, however, been the object of venomous <sup>propaganda</sup> from politicians, political organizations and newspaper columnists. To give only one example, on January 9, 1942, ~~Harold~~ a columnist ~~in the~~ ~~San Francisco Examiner~~ stated: "Herd 'em ~~up~~ up, pack 'em off and give 'em the inside room in the <sup>g</sup> gadlands. Let 'em be pinched, hurt, hungry and dead against it. . let us have no patience with the enemy or with anyone whose veins carry his blood."

About 70 per cent of these people had been born and educated in the ~~the~~ United States and were either actual or potential American citizens. They were ~~called Nisei~~ known as Nisei, that is, second generation immigrants. About 30 per ~~cent~~ cent had been born in Japan and had been denied the right to apply for American citizenship by the Oriental Exclusion Act of 1924. They were known as Issei, that is, <sup>first</sup> ~~third~~ generation.

For ~~most~~ <sup>the</sup> of the Issei, ~~this~~ precipitous incarceration ~~resulted~~ resulted in an enormous economic loss. Most of them were obliged to sell their property at distress prices or gave it ~~away~~ away. Business men, unable to liquidate their interest or properties, ~~eventually~~ lost virtually everything.

Early in 1942 a ~~group~~ group of social scientists at the University of California at Berkeley received a grant to study, record, and analyze the changes in behavior and attitudes and the patterns of social adjustment and interaction of the people to whom these policies and regulations were applied. In <sup>June</sup> June of 1943 I became ~~of~~ one of the research assistants employed by this study. For some eight months I lived and worked in the



Gila Relocation Center in Arizona. In February of 1944 I was permitted to begin field research in the Tule Lake Center in Northern California, where these 18,000 Japanese who had been categorized as "disloyal to America" had been reconfined. My voluminous notes recorded at Tule Lake became a major source of data for THE SPOILAGE, (1946) and some twenty-five years later in DOING FIELDWORK I published a detailed account of my complex and often traumatic experiences at the Tule Lake Center.

In 1980, several colleagues urged me to interview and obtain the life histories of some of the Japanese Americans I had known at Tule Lake. I was reluctant to undertake this task because I knew that many of the people who had been confined in the camps did not wish to talk about their experiences. But after further thought I realized that my attitude was condescending. The Japanese Americans were the people who should



decide whether or not their memories of their experiences should be recorded.

✓ When I approached ~~some of the Japanese-Americans~~ <sup>people</sup> I had known at Tule Lake, I found that my initial apprehensions were well founded. While ~~nine~~ <sup>some</sup> of the ~~people I had known at Tule~~ <sup>Lake</sup> were willing to be interviewed, ~~most of them~~ <sup>others</sup> were very circumspect in their responses. Some refused. It was a Japanese-American who suggested that I interview any person who had been confined in Tule Lake who was willing to talk to me. As he explained, "They are still afraid, because they still do not trust the fact that the United States citizenship confers ~~no~~ immunity and ~~no~~ legal justice,... And so, to this day, you will find very ~~few~~ people reluctant to even grant an interview." With his assistance and that of other Americans of Japanese ~~Americans~~ <sup>descent</sup> I was able to obtain ~~seventeen~~ <sup>many</sup> additional interviews.

✓ As it turned out, talking to Japanese ~~Americans~~ <sup>internees</sup> whom I had never met at Tule Lake greatly increased my knowledge of the impact of the evacuation and detention. For during my work at Tule Lake in 1944 and 1945, I was rarely able to talk with young men and only occasionally with young women. I did not talk with or observe any of the children. However, in 1981 and 1982 most of the persons I approached had been in their teens or early twenties at the time of their incarceration. Four had been children. Their memories are often quite different from those of the people who were adults, and they add a new dimension to the impact of this experience. ~~Indeed, they do.~~

Of the twenty seven people who were willing to be interviewed, ~~Ten were~~ <sup>ten</sup> were women and ~~sixteen~~ <sup>sixteen</sup> were men. Seven were persons ~~who had been my friends and respondents at the Tule Lake Center.~~ <sup>and</sup> Twenty were persons I had not known until I spoke to them in 1981 ~~and~~ 1982. Two of the younger respondents preferred to respond to my questions in ~~w~~ writing. Five of the people I approached did not wish to be interviewed.



When I asked my respondents whether they would care to tell me anything about their life before the evacuation two of the men told me that they had been serving in the Army but, after Pearl Harbor, had been dismissed. One woman told me that she had attempted to enlist as a nurse in the Army ~~XXXXXXXX~~ "but they wouldn't let me in". Another young woman said that she had been working in the state capital in California// and that she enjoyed it very much. But shortly after Pearl ~~Harbor~~ Harbor she "received a letter saying that my presence was very upsetting to my co-workers because of my Japanese descent and that they were terminating my employment."

9 ~~\*\*\*~~ Probably the most severe trauma suffered by the Nisei<sup>2</sup> was the sense that their Constitutional Rights had been abrogated. When I asked my respondents how they felt when they were told that they were to be evacuated, they responded with passion and intensity. "I couldn't believe it!"

"We were stunned!" "I didn't think it was possible." A young man, then age 15, said: "I told my brother, 'Ben they'll never take us. We're citizens.' This was my honest belief."

During my stay in the camps my Nisei respondents rarely spoke of their feelings at the time of the evacuation. I knew, of course, that they were angry and bitter. But it was not until they talked to me in 1981 and 1982 that I was able to <sup>understand</sup> ~~accept~~ the heartrending and frightening truth expressed in the title of Morton Grodzins' work, Americans Betrayed.<sup>1</sup>

1. The University of Chicago Press, 1949.



told me that after Pearl Harbor

Respondents who were children or in their early teens ~~when they and their~~  
~~families were evacuated~~ recalled the severe trauma of being rejected by ~~their~~ <sup>they had been</sup> their  
 classmates at school <sup>and that</sup> ~~their~~ <sup>t</sup> They "were ~~le~~ left out of most activities "  
~~and "held at arms length by their teachers~~ and "held at arms length" by their  
 teachers. ~~One young man~~ <sup>a</sup> woman, then age 16, told me that their high school  
 principal had told them "not to come to school any more because we were Japanese-  
~~American~~ American." One man, then age 9, told me that ~~when he and his family~~  
~~left their home~~ ~~carrying overloaded suitcases~~ all of their  
~~neighbors stayed indoors~~ neighbors stayed indoors  
 his most vivid memory was leaving his home with his family. None of their neighbors  
 came out to <sup>say</sup> ~~say~~ "Good-bye." We felt like criminals."



Part One    Historical Background



1. Evacuation, Military Registration and Segregation,  
Identity and Ambivalence before Segregation.

Between March and June of 1942, most of the Japanese residing on the West Coast were evacuated to hastily organized, so-called Assembly Centers located outside of Military Area No. 1. Life in the converted horse stalls hastily constructed barracks was extremely uncomfortable. During the summer and fall of 1942 almost 110,000 Japanese Americans were moved from the Assembly Centers, from institutions and from home communities, and confined in ten large camps. These camps, which were called Projects or Relocation Centers, were located in isolated areas of California, Arizona, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, and Arkansas. As Spicer (pp. 62-3) cogently remarks:

The length of time that people spent in the Assembly Centers had important influences on their adjustment in the Relocation Centers. In general the longer the stay in the Assembly Centers, the more the Relocation Centers seemed at first like something of a release. There was a little more freedom of movement within the new places and a little less obvious restriction in the form of fences and guarding soldiers.<sup>1</sup>



For some five or six months the people confined in these isolated centers tried to work out some way of life. Though there were difficulties and crises, the Japanese Americans and the administrative staff began to make progress in the development of a sense of community.<sup>1</sup>



## Military Registration

✓ According to the program formulated by Milton S. Eisenhower, the first director of the War Relocation Authority (WRA), the evacuees were to remain in the relocation centers for the duration of the war.<sup>2</sup> Only a few evacuees, like Mr. Kodama, were permitted to leave the centers for brief periods of seasonal farmwork, and only after their credentials had been elaborately checked.

But when Dillon S. Myer assumed the directorship of the WRA he made strong efforts to liberalize this policy and permit more people to "resettle" in unrestricted areas of the United States. ✓ By November of 1942, Myer had decided to go all out for resettlement. Meanwhile the WRA officials had been pressuring the Army to reinstitute selective service procedures for those evacuees who were American citizens. By the end of January 1943, the WRA and the Army had worked out a plan. "Two registration forms were prepared in Washington, one for male citizens of Japanese ancestry (17 years of age and over) with the seal of 'Selective Service System' at the top... the other questionnaire form for female citizens and Issei males and females, was headed



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Apparently the Army and the WRA assumed that almost all the evacuees would answer these questions in the affirmative. The young male citizens would then be drafted and their families moved to civilian areas where they might contribute to the war effort. But their plan went awry. In many centers the presentation of the questionnaires resulted in an uproar. Spontaneous mass meetings were held at which some of the young people argued passionately that the only sensible policy was to express loyalty to the United States. Other Nisei were quick to point out the the intent of the questionnaire was to "draft us from behind the barbed wire." The Issei were also in a quandary, for if they renounced their allegiance to the emperor they would be people without a country. In some centers tension and hostility rose so high that the authorities arrested a number of young men and removed them to a separate detention center under the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice.

There was a wide variation in responses among residents of different relocation projects. In Tule Lake 42 per cent of all eligible persons refused to register or answered question 28 in the negative. In Granada only two per cent responded in the negative. Those who had answered in the negative or refused to answer came to be



called "disloyal" or "No-No's". Those who had answered in the affirmative were termed "loyals" or "Yes-Yes's".



## Segregation

...✓ The Japanese American evacuees were subjected to the military questionnaire in February of 1943. According to Spicer, et al., the experience had some constructive results. "Most of the centers were more in the nature of integrated communities after registration than they had been before." Since their arrival, people had been forming themselves into groups in which individuals found strength and support. Every center had begun to shape as a community." The crises of registration had given impetus to this development.<sup>5</sup>



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some of the "loyals" were removed from Tule Lake to other centers. Many, however, did not wish to move and ultimately some 6,000 "Old Tuleans" remained at Tule Lake; 2,000 of these were "disloyals" and 4,000 were "unauthorized."<sup>6</sup>



### Identity and Ambivalence Before Segregation

From September 18, 1943 onward, trainloads of "disloyals" were taken by train to Tule Lake. Several months before this segregation was initiated, I had begun my fieldwork at the Gila Relocation Center.

On July 3, 1943, I talked to an Issei friend who was struggling to make up his mind whether to become a segregant or not. In a long conversation, in which we thoroughly hashed over the pros and cons, this timid, cautious, and very conservative man suddenly sat up straight and cried out bitterly:

If I go back to Japan, regardless of whether Japan wins or America wins, I can live free from such worry as being considered a dangerous alien, and once in my life I may have the right to cast even one ballot as any human being should. But here, I can't do it. Socially, politically, and economically, I'm shut out. No matter how hard it is to live in Japan, maybe it will be a better place for the freedom of the individual.<sup>7</sup>

In August, Mr. Kurusu, a Kibei with whom I was discussing his reasons for becoming a segregant, told me: "At least we can't be discriminated against in Japan..."



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People don't seem to want us. We don't want to stay where they don't want us. We are not going to stand for any more of that stuff.<sup>8</sup>

Mr. Tsuruda, a Nisei in his late twenties, told me that he had no intention of going to Japan. But he had said "No-No" so that he might remain in camp and care for his elderly and ailing parents. He said:

"You know, what I'd really like to see is Japan win the war and then call it a draw. Just so that the Caucasians get knocked out of them that they're not so damned superior as they think they are." Accustomed to talking to the very cautious and circumspect "loyal" evacuees, I looked somewhat surprised at this bold statement. Mr. Tsuruda observed this, laughed and said, "What the hell! I'm going to Tule Lake. I can speak my mind. What have I got to be afraid of?"<sup>9</sup>



In some cases, arguments against the disloyal were well meant: respected older Issei who believed<sup>e</sup> that America would repent of its treatment of the Japanese Americans, and would, in any case, treat them less severely than the Japanese government, attempted to influence Nisei and Kibei not to become segregants. They emphasized the gravity of the decision and painted a realistic picture of the hardships which expatriates would inevitably meet in Japan. 210

On the other hand, many of the loyal, themselves by no means certain of the wisdom of their decisions, were quite blunt in their criticism of the disloyal. They accused them pointblank of trying to evade the draft and predicted that they would come to rue their decision bitterly. To this the potential transferees retorted that most of the loyal did not wish to be drafted either and that by pledging an allegiance to a country to which they did not feel "sincere loyalty" they were showing themselves to be opportunistic cheats -or in camp parlance- they were "trying to fool the United States government."

Some of the potential segregants began to idealize their position at the expense of the loyal, particularly those renegade disloyal who at first had said "No" and were now changing their answers to "Yes." A young Kibei said:

I despise those people who changed from "no" to "yes" because a thing like loyalty should not be played around with for the sake of personal convenience. Those who change are cowards and of no value to either country. . . How can a Kibei be comfortable in a U.S. uniform when his convictions lie elsewhere? I know what I'm doing. I'm satisfied in the knowledge that I'm sticking it out according to my convictions even if they take my life away. 211

Mr. K. Murikawa  
An older Nisei expressed himself still more forcefully:

The greatest majority of these so-called loyals are not truly patriotic. They've declared themselves loyal because of personal reasons. The greatest of which is to avoid the conscription into the Japanese Military Forces in the event when exchange of prisoners of war is speedily carried out. So they, considering themselves wise and safe, laugh at those who hastily renounced their loyalty to the country of their birth. (The) "No-Yes-No" group (those who changed their answers to the Military Questionnaire) is doubly despised by the true adherents of Japan and to their Emperor. They are neither Americans nor Japanese. They are men without a country. 212

1. Tamie Tsuchiyama, "Segregation" (Unpublished Manuscript), p. 22.

2. Ibid., p. 19.



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Such statements were, at first, voiced by the avowedly pro-Japanese individuals. It was not long, however, before they were echoed by the less determined, potential segregees and even persons who might admit to a trusted friend that although they had said "No-No", they did not intend to go to Japan. If taken at face value, they gave to the listener an impression of splendid and noble self-assurance. To the speaker they gave the reassuring <sup>u</sup>de-  
lusion that he belonged to a group which held honor above gross physical safety and comfort.

There may have been a significant latent meaning in these statements. Not only did the segregees project their draft avoiding motivations to the loyal, but with excoriating scorn and bitterness they attacked the overtly ambivalent loyal who swing from one side to the other. This would indicate a projection of self-hatred growing from their fear of their own ambivalence--an overwhelming desire to reassure themselves that they would hold to their decision by painting the people who changed their minds as persons of most despicable character.

Another device which some segregants employed to cope with the disturbing arguments of the loyal was simply to avoid social intercourse with them. Shortly after the War Relocation Authority announced that segregation would be carried out, a "loyal" Nisei woman told me:

It seems like this issue has broked apart the camp into two groups. My friends and acquaintances who want to be repatriated hardly speak to me anymore because I'm known for my American ways. People we thought were our friends won't talk to us now.<sup>13</sup>

On the other hand, some "loyals" did their best to keep in touch with their "disloyal" relatives.

Another phenomenon of the period immediately preceding the segregation was the appearance of a fantasy of future life in Tule Lake. Some of the potential transferees did what many anxious and insecure people have done before; they built a dream picture of a rosy future --a Utopia--in which all of their previous troubles would be wiped out.



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Part of this dream concerned the details of material life, which some transferees hoped would be comparable to the conditions in the internment camps under the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice. Rumors that the facilities of the internment camps were far superior to those found in the centers under the War Relocation Authority had long been current in the centers and some transferees, feeling that they were about to take a step which would put them on a par with internees, found comfort in the belief that they were about to share these imaginary privileges.

This attitude, however, carried implications which transcended mundane comforts. Some transferees began to assume that confinement in a special center would give them genuine status as Japanese nationals--in short, they would come under the protection of Japan and could make a clean break with America. In this new center, they also hoped, doubts would be wiped out. If the individual weakened in his resolve to be a "true Japanese," the stern and sharp action of the American government would help him make up his mind. Some potential transferees admitted to friends that they expected "it's going to be very strict."<sup>14</sup> Doubtless, ~~It is possible that~~ some of them unconsciously hoped that it would be strict.

A salient aspect of this fantasy was its great emphasis on anticipated in-group solidarity. Some persons adopted the belief with fanatical intensity and these were as likely to be ordinary folk as individuals with political ambitions.

None of the informants quoted below wished to become a leader and the first three statements were made by young girls.

All during the trip (to Tule Lake) all the people--all they talked about was how things were going to be in Tule Lake. There wouldn't be any more inu, no more "yes-yes." They were so glad when they saw the camp. . . . They came with such high hopes. <sup>15</sup>



We had expected just one group and had expected to run this camp as we wanted to. We had high hopes of that.<sup>16</sup>

We felt people with the same kind of mind would be assembled here.<sup>17</sup>

I hoped that people in here would have the same thoughts and decisions... I am deeply disappointed.<sup>18</sup>

When they came here they thought it was going to be a Japanese Utopia. The resentment that arose was brought on by their frustration.<sup>19</sup>

I suggest that when the informants quoted above spoke of "just one group," "the same kind of mind," "the same thoughts and decisions," they were also giving unconscious expression to one of their most pressing psychic needs: to have "just one mind" instead of a confused and tortured consciousness in which the "loyal American" conducted a bitter internal debate with the "true Japanese." Now, they hoped, the die was cast. They had said they were going to Japan. They were going to a place where all of their social life would be with people who were also committed to loyalty to Japan; they would no longer be subjected to influences tempting them to re-open the question in their minds; no longer would they suffer the misery of internal conflict.



Part Two    The Tule Lake Segregation Center



## 2. The Strike

At the Tule Lake Relocation Center, 42 percent of the residents had refused to answer the military questionnaire or had answered "yes-No". After the segregation, some 6,000 persons remained at Tule Lake. 2,000 of these were "disloyal" and 4,000 were unauthorized.<sup>1</sup> These persons soon became known as "Old Tuleans" as distinct "those who came from other camps."

In 1944-45 many "of the incoming segregants told me that they had been dismayed at the sight of the "man-proof fence" - crowned with barbed wire and guarded by watchtowers and armed soldiers - with which the authorities thought it necessary to surround the new segregation center, and by the impressive (but obsolete) tanks which had been placed so that the segregants could see them."<sup>2</sup> They were also dismayed at the quarters provided. Many of the vacant "apartments" (the single barrack rooms provided

for families) were extremely dirty, and some had been stripped of wall board and stoves by the Old Tuleans. Some rooms, presumed to be "vacant," were occupied by Old Tuleans who had moved into the vacated areas without administrative permission. The newcomers found almost all the facilities of their new home "inferior" to those at the centers from which they had come; the food was poor, the latrines and laundry rooms dirty,



even the weather was bad, and complaints were heard on all sides. The only facility that was judged "better" was the Co-operative Enterprises - the general stores or canteens popularly called "the Co-op."



Meanwhile, the project farm was continuing in operation, and segregants were transported every day by truck to labor in the fields. On 15 October (just two weeks after the first trainload of newcomers had arrived) one of these farm trucks turned over. Thirty men were injured, and one died within a few days. Many segregants were shocked and indignant, and those who had been serving as farm laborers refused to return to work. Acting with that speed which authorities and administrators always find so incredible, the people held block meetings and set up a *Daihyo Sha Kai* ("Representative Body"), chosen, in large part, from among the men who had attained prestige as leaders in the relocation centers. Faithfully reflecting the discontent of the population, this body decided to use the farm work stoppage as a means of mitigating or alleviating the people's grievances. In a remarkable explosion of parliamentary procedure, the *Daihyo Sha Kai* appointed numerous subcommittees (to investigate sanitation, the hospital, the schools, the food in the mess halls, the farm accident), and it also appointed a central committee of seven men (one for each ward), which was to organize the materials submitted by the investigating committees and present them to the administration. These seven men came to be known as the negotiating committee.

When it was announced that one of the injured farm laborers had died, several committees of segregants approached the administration and requested permission to hold a public funeral. Permission was refused. In defiance of this administrative veto a public funeral was ceremonially conducted on a platform stage



customarily used for outdoor entertainment. The administration countered by turning off the power to the public address system, and the funeral service could not be heard.

✓ "On 26 October the project director met with the negotiating committee of the Daihyo Sha Kai, listened to their list of grievances, and promised to do what he could to relieve the situation. Meanwhile, he was recruiting additional farm laborers from among the 'loyal Japanese' of nearby relocation centers to harvest the valuable crop. This, of course, deprived the strikers of their only important bargaining point. Many of the segregees regarded the strike breakers with particular hostility because they felt they were betraying their fellow Japanese. Subsequently, one of my respondents told me that a harvester had written, <sup>(u)</sup> Sore mitaka fuchusei mono <sup>(u)</sup> (This is what you get for being disloyal.)<sup>4</sup> on the heads of cauliflower given to the segregants.

X On November 1, Dillon Myer, the national director of the WRA, visited the center. Seizing this opportunity to appeal <sup>(u)</sup> directly to the highest authority, <sup>(u)</sup> the negotiating committee engineered a mass demonstration, during which several thousand segregants surrounded the administrative buildings. Most of the demonstrators behaved in an extremely orderly fashion. However, a



group of young Japanese enthusiasts entered the hospital and urged the Japanese staff to join the demonstration. When the chief medical officer - a generally unpopular man - ordered them to leave, they attacked him and beat him severely. Order was restored; the negotiating committee presented its list of grievances; Mr. Myer promised he would investigate the complaints and take justifiable action; and the crowd then dispersed quickly. That night, all over the country, newspapers carried headlines about the spectacular Jap riots at Tule Lake.



Three nights later (4 November) a fight broke out between a group of young Japanese and a few Caucasian WRA employees who, the Japanese thought, were attempting to transport food from the project warehouses to the strike breakers. According to the WRA report, the project director feared he was about to be kidnapped, and he turned the jurisdiction of the camp over to the Army. These events took place late at night and most of the residents did not know that anything unusual had happened. The next morning, therefore, about a thousand of the Japanese began walking as usual to their work in the administrative section (for only the farm workers had stopped working at this time). In the area between the administrative and the evacuee sections, they encountered a cordon of soldiers who could only assume that these converging Orientals were the vanguard of another demonstration. The would-be workers were met with a barrage of tear gas, and, bewildered and indignant, they fled to their quarters. The army then began to build a fence between the administrative area and the large section of the center where the segregants lived.



In 1944 and 1945 no respondent gave me a detailed account of the "incident" of November 5 and no one told me anything about the fight at the warehouse that took place on the night of November 4.<sup>1</sup> This may have been because I was rarely able to talk openly with young men in their late teens or early twenties. Many of my respondents, however, told me that they had attended the November 1 "demonstration", at which Dillon Myer had spoken, and that they had supported the Daihyo Sha Kai and the Negotiating Committee. The people who had come to Tule Lake from other centers repeatedly told me that the "Yes-Yes" and the "fence-sitters" (by which they meant many of the Old Tuleans) should be sent away from Tule Lake.

In August of 1944, ten months after the "November incident", an Old Tulean Issei, known for his pro-administrative views, told me how much he had disapproved of the strike and the Daihyo Sha Kai. When, however, I brought up the morning of November 5, he flew into a rage: "We got mad because the army came in with submachine guns and the tear gas. We were all willing to go to work but they wouldn't let us go. They took our civil rights away. That's what made us mad."<sup>6</sup>

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~~1. See Part II, pp. for statements made in 1981 and 1982.~~



3. Martial Law and the Stockade

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<sup>12</sup>  
BRIEF HISTORY - DECEMBER 6 TO DECEMBER 31

The Strike, the Stockade, and Martial Law

The evacuees were now completely cut off from the administration. Even telephone calls between the evacuee and the administrative area were not accepted. Finally, Mr. Tada, the evacuee chief of police and a member of the Executive Board of the Daihyo Sha Kai was able to reach Lieutenant Colonel Austin and arrange for meetings between the colonel and key members of the Daihyo Sha Kai, including George Kunitani. As a result of these negotiations, 90 hospital workers were permitted to pass through the army cordon and resume work. The Army, however decided to cut the coal crew from about 300 workers to seventy and a similar cut was proposed for the garbage crew. Thereupon, neither crew reported for work. The cold and hungry people began to complain and the negotiating committee exhorted them to refrain from violence.

They cautioned parents not to allow their children to make insulting remarks to the soldiers. They called upon the people to be sensible and prudent, not to congregate outside the barracks in groups of more than five, and not to destroy anything within the center.

After eight days of negotiation and the arrest by the Army of an "insolent" Nisei workman, Lieutenant Colonel Austin, told the committee that they were nothing but a pressure group. Nevertheless, the Colonel and the War Relocation Authority expressed willingness to hold a mass meeting on November 13 at which the army, high ranking administrators of the WRA, and the Negotiating Committee would make statements to the people.

~~1. According to Kunitani, December, Jan. 10, 1945~~

old  
3.8.10  
Jesse



The Daihyo Sha Kai met on the afternoon of November 12, the day before the scheduled mass meeting. The executive committee made a depressing report of its failure with the army and offered to resign. The delegates would not permit a resignation. A radical faction suggested that the mass meeting be cancelled and that the army be impressed with popular confidence in the Daihyo Sha Kai by means of a petition signed by the residents. Kunitani "knew that the Army would get mad if (the Daihyo Sha Kai) cancelled the mass meeting"<sup>1</sup> and opposed the first suggestion, but the delegates voted overwhelmingly against him. Accompanied by other members

22. Ibid. April 1945, p. 5.

of the committee, he left the meeting in anger.

The next day the people were notified at the breakfast mess that there would be no mass meeting that afternoon. No one, however, communicated this decision to the army or the WRA. Accordingly:

A few minutes before 2 p.m. Colonel Austin and Mr. Cozzens (the WRA Field Director in charge of the San Francisco Office) drove into the Japanese section down the main firebreak to the outdoor stage. Army units had moved into position earlier. As they reached the stage about thirty foot soldiers formed in a circle around the stage at a distance of about fifty feet from it. Soldiers at the front of the stage fixed bayonets. Scout cars and soldiers took up positions in and along the firebreak at a distance of about two blocks from the stage. Armored scout cars and jeeps patrolled the streets of the entire colony.<sup>23</sup>

Austin and Cozzens mounted the outdoor stage and delivered their speeches to the empty firebreak.



In his speech Colonel Austin stated that the Army had assumed control of the Tule Lake Center.

. . .to provide for the safety and welfare of every resident. . . .The providing of. . .essentials (food, shelter and warmth) shall be directed so that it shall benefit the greatest number, but in the manner as prescribed by the military. . . .I shall continue to welcome visits and suggestions from representative groups. . . . The sooner normal center operations. . . can be resumed, the better. . . .We will make the determination of the number who are to be employed.

✓ I know that the majority of you want peace and the opportunity to live unmolested by hoodlums and goon squads, as well as others who apparently lack respect for order. I expect to see to it that you have it. Those who instigated and participated in the disorders leading up to the Army's occupation shall be dealt with.<sup>4</sup>

He then read the following proclamation, which was later posted:

1. That between the hours of 7 p.m. and 6 a.m. all persons of Japanese ancestry, except as directed by the military, shall be within their place of residence. This shall not be interpreted to prevent access, however, to laundry and lavatory facilities.
2. No outdoor meetings or gatherings shall be permitted without express military approval.
3. Normal center operations shall be maintained, insofar as is practicable, under direct military control and in the manner prescribed by the military authorities.
4. Persons of Japanese ancestry desiring to engage in useful work at the center shall be accommodated as promptly as the situation permits.
5. No incoming or outgoing telephone or telegraph messages will be permitted without prior military approval.
6. Failure to observe strict adherence to all military regulations will result in disciplinary actions forthwith.
7. All persons of Japanese ancestry shall reside in apartments assigned by the WRA.<sup>5</sup>

Mr. Cozzens' prepared speech began with the sentence, "It is a pleasure to have an opportunity to meet with such a representative group of the Tule Lake Center." Whether he delivered this remark unchanged is not known.



At 2:13 p.m., Austin and Cozzens left the stage with their military escort. It was noted that some evacuees along their route "smiled, laughed, pointed and stared at the departing Army and War Relocation Authority people."<sup>6</sup>

The next day the Army ordered the arrest of the members of the Negotiating Committee, other leaders of the Daihyo Sha Kai, and members of the farm group. Kunitani and five other members of the committee escaped arrest by going into hiding.

On November 18, the army tried to convince the block managers that it was their duty to give up the hiding negotiators. The block managers refused. Thereupon, the army, on November 26, conducted a camp-wide search, ostensibly for "contraband", that is, hidden weapons, intoxicating liquor, and rice, from which sake could be made. "Small squads of soldiers searched every barrack, top to bottom. Boxes were examined. Space between the ceiling and roof was looked into. Floors were tapped. . . The Army confiscated all rice found in barracks."<sup>7</sup> Despite the thoroughness of this search, four of the five leaders were not found. The unapprehended, leaders, however, were finding their position unenable. After a dramatic final meeting of the Daihyo Sha Kai, on December 1, they gave themselves up to the FBI. They were placed in a separate stockade in two tents, which, at this time of year were bitterly cold. Later they were removed to the larger stockade where, by this time, about 190 other men were confined.<sup>8</sup>



On December 31 the men detained in the stockade began a hunger strike which lasted, "six days and two meals".<sup>9</sup> Tule Lake remained under martial law until the middle of January, 1945.

When I discussed the period of martial law with respondents in 1944 and 1945, some of them told me that they had maintained the strike because they had felt obligated to support their imprisoned representatives. Some spoke of giri.<sup>10</sup>

On January 8, 1945, an Issei, an Old Tulean, who had been the head of the block managers' organization at the time of the farm accident, told me:

The people started out to support the Daihyo Sha Kai and got to the point where they had to support it due to the leaders being taken into custody. They bore the responsibility on their conscience. They felt they represented the people.<sup>11</sup>

Others spoke of the hardships of unemployment, anxiety, insecurity and boredom.

A Nisei, the father of several children, told me:

During those dark moments of camp life many people with children had no shoes, no money, no clothing. Some of the children were beginning to go barefooted. The camp condition was critical.<sup>12</sup>

A Nisei girl:

Most of the people wanted to go back to their jobs. Some of them were getting really destitute and everybody was hoarding food as much as they could. Some families really got destitute about that time. Some had no money at all. They were just tired out.<sup>13</sup>



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A Nisei married man:

Criticism (of the strike) grew as status quo dragged on. People had no clothes. They tried to get their shoes fixed. . . .With the canteens and things, the people were going broke.<sup>14</sup>

A very young Nisei girl:

I just thought, 'What is this camp coming to?' After the Army came in I really felt like a prisoner. . . . All during the time when the Army was controlling the camp, naturally we were sad. There were no activities. Everything stopped. We had a curfew. Oh, it was a miserable life. . . . We got baloney for Thanksgiving.<sup>15</sup>

A bachelor Kibei wrote to a friend:

Everything seems and looks cold and still and melancholine. . . .Everything seems unchangeable like yesterday. . . . No parcel and no money order can send out and every letters has examined. Three Nisei who came from Hawaii to live in this block were arrested this morning at 3 a.m. If you will not hear from me for the quite few days in the future, you must understand that I am arrested. Don't forget that it will possible.<sup>16</sup>

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~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~4. Accommodation - January 1944 to May, 24, 1944

As I have ~~already~~ remarked many of the residents had become so miserable, discouraged, and depressed, that they were willing to consider abandoning the strike, even it meant yielding in matters of principle. The WRA was equally anxious to get rid of the Army and to reestablish a working relationship with the evacuees. In mid-December, project officials approached evacuees who were known to be critical of the Daihyo Sha Kai. Among these were certain influential block managers, and officers of the Cooperative Enterprises and the Housing Division. Most of the men were Old Tuleans. A committee of "40 responsible men" was formed. These men met with army and WRA representatives, and decided that a resolution for the abandonment of the strike and in favor of a general return to work be prepared. Seven men were chosen to make plans for a referendum. In this resolution they pledged themselves "to materialize" an equitable distribution of employment and to work for the release of persons detained in the stockade. The vote, by secret ballot, <sup>was</sup> ~~for~~ scheduled for the evening of January 11.



Of 8,713 ballots cast, 4,593 were against and 4,120 were in favor of "status quo", the term now commonly used for maintaining the strike. Thus, the return to "normalcy" was won by a plurality of 473.

The committee of seven men was officially recognized by the Army and the WRA administration as the body which would henceforth work with the WRA advisory council to improve the situation within the center. It became known as the Coordinating Committee.

Many people now returned to work after first having been "cleared" and accorded a pass which, on their way to work in the administrative section, they <sup>e</sup>were obliged to present to the sentry at the gate. On the other hand, almost half of the residents had voted to continue the strike and some of these <sup>o</sup>ntinued to assert <sup>h</sup>at the still-confined representatives had been betrayed and that <sup>1</sup>the Coordinating Committee, the men who had prepared the referendum, were "a bunch of inu."<sup>2</sup>

When I visited Tule Lake on February 2, and 3 of 1944, some of my Japanese American friends talked a great deal about what had happened to them during the demonstration and the strike. Some said that "the people now want peace" -- that they "wanted to be left alone". Others assured me that the center would not really settle down until the men in the stockade were released. When I asked them about the Coordinating Committee, some said they knew nothing about them. Others said that they must be inu.

I made another visit in March 14-23, and found my friends less anxious and less subdued than they had been in February. Many were more open and in their complaints about and criticisms of the WRA and the Coördinating Committee. Indeed, the boldness with which even moderate and "anti-status-quo" people denounced

~~J. Edgar Hoover et al. - perjury - co-informers.~~



the Committee surprised me. "That bunch is a bunch of inu," said a friend from Gila, "and Sasaki (the chairman) is the biggest inu of them all. He'll probably get his brains beat out one of these days."<sup>2</sup> When I had the opportunity to talk to Mr. Sasaki, the chairman, I asked him what the Coordinating Committee had accomplished in the six weeks since I had last seen him. "Nothing whatever," he said.

Mr. Sasaki, however, did give me a copy of the minutes of the meetings of the committee. These demonstrated that for two months the Japanese Americans on the committee had been entreating the Caucasian members to create more jobs, to speed up the "clearance" through which job seekers were supposed to pass, and to release at least some of the men confined in the stockade. These desperate requests were, for the most part, met only with promises.

I had an interesting experience on this visit. A friendly school teacher suggested that I attend her 11th grade class. The students, she told me, were going to hold a debate on the draft. I was held up at the gate for about 15 minutes because I did not have an escort. Finally, the corporal in charge said I could go in.

When I arrived at the classroom the debate was already in progress. I could not resist making notes and one of the students asked the teacher "who that lady was and what she was writing down". I explained the aims of the study and the class took a vote as to whether I might stay. The vote in my favor was unanimous. The following statements were made by the students.



The people say they're loyal; they ought to fight. But the people who want to relocate and want to establish homes, they didn't feel like getting drafted. If they thought they were going to be drafted, they would have stayed in camp.

If they do go to the Army, they will be the first to go to the front and they'll just be made fools of. They send the Negroes and the Japanese to the front first. (Applause)

They say they're fighting for America and for equal rights; but they (Caucasian people in U.S.) are violating these rights.

The U.S. should let them (Japanese Americans) work in factories.

If they go out from here shouldn't they fight for their families?

If they're dead, what do they have? If they go out and die, all right. But they put them in the front lines and they come home maimed and handicapped and discriminated against. What then?

If the Nisei are drafted in this way and come back crippled, I'm considering that people on the outside will give them another chance, like a dog with a bone. If they believe that much in this country, they should fight for it.

Sure, they'll fight, if they have equal rights!

They are not allowed in the Navy.

Why did they relocate under those circumstances?

Most of the Nisei who went out were money crazy.

If the boys really knew they'd have to go out to the Army, they wouldn't have gone out.

If they took the chance of going out, why did they take the chance? I heard a couple of fellows saying, 'We'll have to take the chance.'

5 If there any proof of segregation in the Army, I know many Japanese boys who went into the Army and were treated well by their fellow soldiers.

And I know (Japanese) soldiers - instead of officers putting stripes on them, they take them off. (laughter)



When the white man does something good they put stripes on him, but on the Nisei they take it off.

My friend went into the Army and passed the examination to take officer's training. They wouldn't let him (go up for training).

Since we've been talking about it, you tell me what good thing has happened to the Nisei. Nothing!

They went outside. . .

"In April I made another visit to Tule lake, this time for six days (12-17 April). I found the higher-ranking administrators in a state of crisis. Even the secretaries seemed tense and anxious. People who had never noticed me before called me into their offices and asked my opinions.<sup>13</sup> Since I had just arrived, I could not tell them much.

"Like many crises, this one had a fairly long history. Early in February, an underground "pro-status-quo" group, composed in large part of relatives of the stockade detainees, had written a letter to Attorney General Biddle and to the Spanish embassy, asking for permission to circulate a petition for the signatures of those residents who wished to go to Japan as soon as possible and who, meanwhile, wished to be "resegregated" in Tule Lake from those not so inclined.<sup>14</sup> This request was not so fantastic as might first appear, for,



at the time of the "November incident" the Negotiating Committee had raised the question: of the desirability of resegregation, involving the separation of "loyals" (1) or "fence-sitters" from the genuinely "disloyal" and (2) sincere repatriates for whom Tule Lake had been designed as a segregation center. Best agreed that "that is a (3) good idea and is something that will have to worked out." (5) 11) Moreover, during the period of martial law, the Army had fenced off a section of the center in which "trouble-making" families would, if necessary, be confined.

The authors of The Spoilage and Impounded People do not mention that the possibility of a resegregation was also considered by the Coordinating Committee. On February 3, 1944, I attended a meeting of the Advisory Board and the Coordinating Committee. (The Advisory Board consisted of seven of the higher ranking administrators.) At this meeting Mr. Sasaki reported that the majority of the members of the Coordinating Committee favored segregation "within the camp, the good from the bad." Mr. Black, Assistant Project Director in Charge of Community Management Division, objected to this proposal as follows: "Until we get the Manzanar people here, segregation will be too much of a load for housing. But the organization which succeeds yours can bring about the natural segregation you would like to have. I think



it might be done voluntarily - keep like-thinking people together. But housing cannot stand the strain now."<sup>6</sup>

In any case the letter requesting permission to circulate a petition was passed from the Attorney General to the Secretary of the Interior, thence to the national director of the WRA, and thence to Mr. Best, the project director at Tule Lake. Best who was about to leave the



project on official business, passed the letter on to Mr. Black, the assistant project director in charge of housing and social welfare. Black, who, it would seem, had some training in sociology, decided to allow not a petition but a survey, structured to obtain the names of the following two types of persons:

1. Persons and families who have applied for repatriation or expatriation, who wish to return to Japan at the earliest opportunity, and who wish to live in a designated section of the center among others of like inclination.

2. Persons and families who have not applied for repatriation or expatriation, who have reached no conclusion with respect to an early return to Japan, and who wish to live in a section of the center not specifically designated for persons and families of the first group.

Black took special pains to emphasize that this survey was to be made "with the entire liberty of choice resting with the subject interviewed." He added:

"It is further understood that the survey will be made without commitment on the part of the administration, either stated or implied, that the result of the survey will be made the basis of administrative action beyond that which is already established for housing adjustments through the Housing Office."

Gratified at having won this degree of recognition, the underground group disregarded the notion of a survey and Black's qualifying clauses and proceeding to approach the center residents with a draft of their original petition. The text urged all "who wish



resegregation because they desire the opportunity to board the exchange ship. . .to sign this petition of your own free will and judgment." Moreover, in their Japanese translation of Black's sentence, they conveyed the impression that the results of the petition would be made (to) the basis for further administrative action. <sup>10</sup> (Thomas and Nishimoto 1946: 231-32).

The circulation of the petition between 7 and 9 April threw many of the center residents into a state of great anxiety. The long-suffering <sup>members of the</sup> coordinating committee, whom Black had not consulted about the "survey," took this convenient opportunity to submit their resignations. Some of the administrators anticipated that another demonstration or "riot" might occur at any moment.

I made a round of visits and found that the Japanese were, on the whole, in far less panic than the administrators. Men who followed the center "politics" closely - like Kurihara, Higashi, or George Wakida, my ex-agitator friend from Gila, - had realized almost immediately that the people behind the petition represented what they called "would-be big shots," "people with a narrow point of view," or "a radical goon-squad business." George remarked that such people thought, if "they try to segregate two or three Japanese in this center, that make them very popular when they get to Japan." My outspoken friend Bob Tsuruda told me: "What do I care about Dai Nippon (the Great Japanese Empire)! I came here to lead a peaceful life until the war's over."

~~For further details see The Spoilage, pp. 231-2.~~



On the other hand, since the petition seemed to have administrative sanction, most of the people had, at first, been very <sup>concerned</sup> ~~worried~~. Some interpreted the petition as the first administrative step in another segregation, and they harangued me with rather incoherent assertions that the "loyal people" and those who did not really want to go back to Japan ought to get out of the center. Some added, "Trouble like this is occurring because there are too many inu."

Three or four days later, when I called on them again, they told me they had found out that the petition was not sanctioned by the administration and they <sup>e</sup> ~~w~~re much relieved.

Interestingly, almost every person to whom I spoke ignored the major point made in the petition - the issue of a resegregation within the center. What they emphasized instead was that <sup>it</sup> ~~they~~ "yes-yes people" (those who had stated that they were loyal to the United States) <sup>were not</sup> ~~should be~~ taken out of the center, or there would be serious trouble. As one friend remarked: "There's been a lot of talk about dog (inu) hunting with baseball bats. If there's any trouble here in the next five or six months, it's going to be because of keeping ~~they~~ yes-yes in camp." (Since so many people made this assertion, I asked Mr. Robertson how many yes-yes people there were in the center. He told me that it would be difficult to find out, because the administration had not kept records.) "11".

In the middle of May, 1944, I left the Gila Center and moved to Tule Lake. My expectations of turmoil and excitement were not fulfilled. "The WRA staff members were relaxed and optimistic. Mr. Robertson and Dr. Opler told me that the project director,



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Mr. Best, had been putting himself out to be agreeable to the colonists. There had been a half-holiday on the emperor's birthday, and the director had even thrown the first baseball at the game celebrating this event. Japanese school children had been permitted to visit the project farm, outside of the main barbed-wire fence. Most of the men in the stockade had been released, leaving only about twenty-five prisoners. The fence that had divided the Japanese "colony" into two sections (and had raised the hopes of the underground pro-resegregation group) had been torn down.

Most of the Japanese also were in good spirits. Some people told me with smiling irony that they were now getting one egg a day per person in the mess. They also told me that the "inu hate" was dying down and that people were forgetting the coordinating committee and Mr. Sasaki. Young people told me about the newly initiated entertainments and athletic events - movies, block entertainments, baseball, and basketball. But the best event of all was the removal of the fence. When the Japanese told me about this, their faces lit up."12

On May 14, Mr. Kurihara told me:

One good thing that has been done, they've taken the fence down, that has made the people feel better. If they would continue to tear the fences down, Mr. Best could regain part of the confidence which he wants on the part of the people.

On May 15 I received a letter from ~~June Iwchara~~ <sup>Miss Kuriatomi</sup>, a young woman who had been secretary to the Coordinating Committee. The letter had been sent to me at the Gila center and was dated May 7. In the letter she said:

Tule Lake Center continue to be subjected to many trifle discords, unrest, and disharmony, which



probably will never end. . . One consolation -  
remember the Ward 7 fence, it's been torn down.

On May 18 I visited my friends, Mr. and Mrs. Wakida. I recorded  
in my fieldnotes:

Wakida's wife and his mother had moved to the rear  
of the room, where they sat conversing and working  
behind screens while George and I talked. When I  
was ready to leave they came out and said their  
farewells. I remarked on the absence of the  
fence and Mrs. Wakida's face lit up as she explained  
how much more free they all felt.

I made two more social calls in ward 7 that afternoon. I noted:

At each home the residents remarked with joy on  
the removal of the fence. Many other people have  
commented on the fact that it has made the whole  
camp feel good and has had more effect than Mr.  
Best throwing baseballs. They usually add, "Now  
if they'd tear down some more of them it would be  
better yet."

"The only unhappy voice I heard was that of a soldier, loudly  
berating a Japanese worker because he was not wearing his large,  
red identification button in the proper manner. As I approached  
the gate to leave the center, many Japanese passed me on their  
way home from work, and the soldiers yelled at all of them: "Wear  
your button on the left lapel! Wear your button on the left lapel!"  
These buttons, two and a half inches in diameter, were part of  
a new army regulation requiring evacuee workers to carry a blue  
work card, an identification tag, and wear a numbered button on  
the left lapel. I was not able to find out why all of these items  
of identification were necessary."<sup>13</sup>

The Abortive Attempt to Nominate  
A Representative Committee

In late October of 1943, the Daihyo Sha Kai had proposed  
the election of a permanent representative committee. The  
Coordinating Committee had repeatedly suggested that a permanent



body be elected to replace the committee. On April 15, Mr. Robertson told me that approval for this procedure had finally come from Washington. On April 22, the authorization, which had come from Dillon Myer, was published in the Newell Star along with an invitation from Acting Project Director Black, to participate in planning the election. Black asked that an Arrangements Committee be formed to work out the final plans and supervise the election. There was no response to this invitation. Thereupon, on May 4 and again on May 8, Mr. Best, the Project Director, re-announced procedures for the organization of an Arrangements Committee and outlined elaborate plans for a camp-wide block nomination meeting to be held on May 18 and for an election to be held on May 22.<sup>14</sup>

On May 13 my friend Bob Tsuruda told me:

Nobody cares a thing about having a representative government. So far as I can see, nobody is going to break their neck trying to work up a few representatives for the block. They just don't care. Things are going along pretty well, so leave well enough alone.

On May 15, Mr. Higashi, another friend from Gila, told me:

They're going ahead with this representative committee. But I personally would really like to see the people in the stockade to be released. In my opinion getting new delegates for the representative committee will be pretty tough to organize. People say, 'What's the use? We put up representatives once again and they wouldn't recognize them.'

On May 20 I called on Dr. Opler. He told me that out of the seventy-four blocks in the center only seventeen had nominated representatives.

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~~102. See "The Spoilage," pp. 240-49.~~



During the next three days I made as many calls as I could. What people gave me, for the most part, were expressions of oblique or ironic satisfaction. They seemed to feel that they had put the administration down with considerable finesse. For the first and only time during my stay at Tule Lake I saw some people in really good spirits. A few of my friends laughed and joked with me and each other in the style that they had sometimes done in Gila. George Wakida gave me and several ladies a comic recital of what had happened in his block. At first there had been no quorum. Then the block manager had gone about begging people to come. so George went and, of course, was nominated. He declined the nomination, pointing out that as an ex-internee he was not permitted to engage in politics. By the time George had finished arguing, about ten people had left the meeting. Thereupon he pointed out that the quorum no longer existed, so that his nomination was not valid. I asked George whether his block manager would not get into trouble trying so hard to comply with an administrative suggestion. "Oh well," he said, chuckling, "he's an old man and is going to die soon anyway." The ladies laughed, and each began to relate with gusto how the nomination meetings in her block <sup>h</sup> had failed. But the hostess topped them all, for in her block the people had met and all shouted, "No, no, no, no, no, no!"

Bob Tsuruda, my cynical respondent from Gila pointed out that the suggestion to nominate representatives had come from the WRA and therefore "had a rank odor." Besides, people were catching on to the fact that block managers could act as liaison

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men between the people and the administration without standing in danger of being imprisoned in the stockade as agitators.

"You can't yank a liaison man for what he reports. The people are starting to realize it would be a smart thing to have a good block manager and let them do all the 'representing' because they can't be yanked."

An Issei friend said much the same thing: "If we elect more representatives, they will only put more people in the stockade. Everybody said, 'What the heck! We don't want to send any more people to the stockade.' "

Mr. Kurihara, on the other hand, was concerned over the failure of the nominations. He pointed out that the agitators - the fanatical resegregationists - would take credit for the debacle, whereas the fact was that the people were striking back at the administration.



The period of relative good spirits and relaxation that accompanied the removal of the fence, the improvement in the food, ~~xxx~~ the initiation of entertainments and ~~xx~~ athletic events, and the passive frustration of the ~~xxxxxx~~ administration's attempts to initiate the election of a permanent representative body was brought to a sudden ~~xxxxxx~~ end when, on May 24, ~~xxxxxx~~ Mr. Okamoto, a Japanese worker on the construction crew was shot at close range by an armed sentry. He died the next day.

During the six weeks following this tragic event, Tule Lake experienced an extreme outbreak of hostility toward inu ~~(informer)~~ (dogs, i. e. informers). Six men, suspected of being informers were ~~xxxx~~ assaulted and on July 3, Mr. Noma, the ~~xxxx~~ Head of the Cooperative Enterprises and a "Public Inu Number 1" was ~~xxxxxx~~ murdered.

The complex development of attitudes and events during this brief period of violence may be easier to understand if I retell the history of Tule Lake ~~xxx~~ in the light of statements and accusations people made about the inu before the shooting and death of Mr. Okamoto.<sup>1</sup>



When, in mid-November, the leaders of the Daihyo Sha Kai were arrested and confined in the stockade, many people believed that informers were to blame. Mr. Noma, head of the Co-op, came under especial suspicion "because he was observed frequently entertaining Army officers at his apartment and was exempted from the Army-imposed curfew."<sup>2</sup> When martial law was lifted, the members of the Coordinating Committee were "considered informers and Sasaki, its executive secretary, necessarily took the brunt of the blame for its activities."<sup>3</sup> The tie-up between the committee and the Co-op was also looked upon with suspicion. The Japanese American chief of police was also considered a "Public inu Number One" as were other members of the police force.

On January 28, the Coordinating Committee asked for and received the appointment of

30 men with WRA renumeration for the purpose of performing intelligence work which is to be used only for the advantage and benefit of the colony." At the same time the necessity of restricting meetings within the center was brought up, and on Mr. Black's suggestion the restriction was deemed unnecessary "since the creation of an intelligence unit should



alleviate the task to a certain degree by insinuating within these (meetings) investigators and spotting and identifying the nature of the meeting and possibly the leaders.<sup>4</sup>



The organization of this intelligence unit was approved by the administration, and the agents, known as "fielders" were placed on the WRA payroll. They kept a constant watch for "agitation" and "general unrest" as well as for complaints about mess halls, housing, and employment. 25

When I visited Tule Lake on February 1 and 2 of 1944, my conservative Kibei friend, Mr. Kurusu, (age <sup>30</sup>31), who was employed as a block manager, told me:

Honestly, I'd like this center back to normal conditions, but if I said that to the residents, they'd say I'm a dog (informer). Since I took office two-three men came over and threatened some of the block representatives.

His Issei wife, age <sup>27</sup>28, remarked:

The people are forgetting the United States now. They say, 'We are Japanese.'

9 On the next day I had a brief talk with Miss Kuratomi, secretary to the Coordinating Committee. She frankly told me that the Committee had been selected by the division heads and recognized by the project director. "The people have to take it or else." At the end of our talk she said, "The people say that we're inu," and that the camp <sup>is</sup> was full of inu and rats." I asked how a rat differed from an inu. Miss Kuratomi seemed reluctant to explain but said that a rat was a person who worked against the Japanese - only he was worse than an inu. He was more selfish. He got into the kitchen and ate the food.

9 Later in the day I called on another young Nisei whom I had known at the Gila Center. I asked her, if she would be willing to copy <sup>some documents</sup> the train lists for Dr. Thomas. She said she would think about it. The feeling against inu was still so strong that she felt that she had rather wait a couple of weeks and then start the work if things looked better.



IX I also as asked Mr. Kurihara, age 48, if he would write a paper for the study, expressing his view of the situation at Tule Lake

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In  
this paper, he said:

The Administration, in order to cover up its inability, employs many stool pigeons. This is the most dangerous thing it can do to create suspicion and disrupt the harmony of the center. If the information supplied is accurate, without personal prejudice or jealousy, the employment of spies may be justified, but almost in every case the contrary has been found to be true. On the worthless information of the so called spies, the authorities have acted, thereby not only causing fear and unrest throughout the camp but undue hardships and sufferings. This phase of the activities are very rampant here at Tule Lake. It must be corrected if repetition of the trouble is to be avoided.

If any suspicious character is reported by the scums of the Japanese Race, and trial to prove the guilt or innocence of the person apprehended is held, then I would say there exists at least a semblance of justice which will satisfy the residents. But so far I have not heard of any trial determining the guilt or innocence of the person arrested and yet the person accused is held in the Military Stockade undoubtedly as guilty.

#### Arrival of Segregants From Manzanar Relocation Center

In late February the "disloyal contingent" of segregants from the Manzanar Center arrived at Tule Lake. The Coordinating Committee and WRA tried very hard to make these new arrivals comfortable, assigning them to new barracks and even lighting fires in the apartments before they arrived. Mr. Sasaki, on behalf of the committee, welcomed the newcomers with a mimeographed appeal for cooperation:

None of us know how long will our stay in Tule Lake be. All Tuleans have been trying to make it a better place to live under the circumstances. Yet they have no other desire than to live in peace and happiness for the duration. Our ideal is Utopia. Ideal of Utopia may not be attained, however, we must strive to attain that goal as much as we can for ideal is like a North Star. Sailor never reaches North Star, yet without North Star he cannot come to the port.

We appeal to you, MANZANITES!! Now you are in the same boat with us. Let's make the best of it and lay up for the future happiness.



This appeal was immediately followed up by a counterblast from the underground supporters of the Daihyo Sha Kai. Working secretly, these "pro-status-quo" folk mimeographed a pamphlet in which they accused the WRA of refusing to clarify the status of the Nisei and thus of trying to convert disloyal segregants into loyals. The U.S. Army, they asserted, had employed a "suppressive policy" upon the segregants, using "even motor trucks and tanks and fired great number of ammunitions. During the incident over 200 innocent ones were picked up and every apartment was searched, for which even a mere child of three years of age was indignant." The "pro-status-quoers" claimed that the Army had withdrawn from the center because of a "stiff protest" by "the Imperial Government repeatedly," and they denounced the Coordinating Committee and the executives of the Co-op as participants in a "dark stream of sinister plot" to deceive the colonists and discredit the Daihyo Sha Kai, asserting that the committee and its supporters were "betrayers of the Fatherland," gamblers, bootleggers, and shameless egotists. Finally they claimed that the WRA had hired inu "with excellent salary" to help them "carry out their damnable policy."<sup>6</sup>



### The Inu In March 1944

In March 1944 I visited Tule Lake for ten days, (14-23). Some of the people with whom I spoke appeared to be more relaxed than they had been in February. When, on March 14, I called on Mrs. Kurusu, she did not mention the inu:

People went back to work very quietly. To tell the truth, I believe they've changed somewhat; but they don't say anything aloud. I believe they're going to give them (the Coordinating Committee) a fair



chance. . . There are still people in the stockade. Some fellows were taken from our block and haven't come back yet.

When I called on the Tsurudas, Mrs. Tsuruda told me happily that her husband was working at the mess, "as he has always wanted to do". However, Mr. Tsuruda's brother, Bill, age <sup>25</sup>~~21~~, and a very energetic young man, clearly wished to speak to me. At the end of our talk I asked him about the Coordinating Committee. He responded:

That bunch is a bunch of inus, and Sasaki (the chairman) is the biggest inu of them all. That Coordinating Committee - I don't know who elected them or not. Sasaki - people around here know about him. He used to head the Coop during the trouble (strike). . . Sasaki and the big shots got together and sold the WRA rice in the canteen to the people. They did this with rice and oranges. The money they got from that they divided among themselves.

They send out pamphlets. It's just a lot of <sup>of</sup> bolony. I know of a group that has been trying to get a lawyer or a bookkeeper to audit the Co-op books and investigate into it. We know graft like that is going on. Sasaki probably got word of it. It was getting hot under the seat, so he quit the Co-op.

Bill then gave me a copy of Mr. Sasaki's mimeographed appeal to the newly arrived segregants from Manzanar, saying:

That's the kind of paper an inu would write. That's really soft-soaping the people. That paper ought to be signed, "Inu Sasaki."

On the same day, my block manager friend, Mr. Nigashi, age <sup>24</sup>~~26~~, told me that a certain man, "let's call him X" had had attempted to discredit the Negotiating Committee of the Daihyo Sha Kai in November of 1943. "Then the Planning Board posted a bulletin saying, Mr. X is an inu."



~~IWA~~

~~877~~

If you work for the project here, you'd find he's the key man. He's standing pretty high now, and has the confidence of the Administration. (Other respondents subsequently told me that Mr. X was a "Public Inu No. 1".)

On March 15 I also visited Mr. Kurihara and asked him "if the inu he had remarked upon in his paper were as serious a danger as his statements implied." He answered:

The Adminsitration absolutely ought to refuse to listen to them. Any person accused by an so-called inu, if a trial is held and the inu presents the case before them all and shows the person was guilty, then I think it would help to discourage the inu. I believe the inu are working here with the Administration to a great extent.

It is known throughout the camp that the inu gave away the Negotiating Committee. They sell their soul for a few pennies. They make my blood boil.

When I asked Mr. Kurihara about the Coordinating Committee, he responded:

Among these seven are several people whose record is so black that I even flatly refuse to talk to them. My profession is a public accountant. I nearly sent him (Mr. Kami of the Coordinating Committee) to jail from defauding the company of \$40,000 dollars. There are others too. The Administration doesn't know their past. . . .Right now the Co-op is in a sad spot in this camp. . . Prices in some cases are so high it seems ridiculous. They have a mop - worth 15 cents, even today it could not be worth more than 25 cents at Woolworths. They are charging 55 cents.

8

On March 15 I also called on my <sup>Kibei</sup> friend George Wakida, a Kibei, age <sup>28</sup>29. George spent most of the visit telling me about the Seinen Kai, (Youth Organization) he was attempting to organize at Tule Lake. He then interrupted himself to remark, "This Seinen Kai, if we do good to the WRA, the people will think we're inu; if we don't we get stuck in the stockade." He further explained that he preferred that the Seinen Kai be independent of the WRA Community Activities Section, explaining, "All the wiser people stay back. If, as a supervisor for the CAS, if something happened,



I'm going to be the first one to get a two-by-four." These remarks about inu were made half-jokingly. As a young man who had been interned at Leupp, George, at this time, had an aura of prestige. No one was likely to call him an informer. He was, moreover, one of the few of my respondents who appeared to have no ambivalence about his intention to expatriate to Japan. He did expatriate and, in time, became Chairman of the Board of Tokyo Railway Company.<sup>7</sup>

On March 17 my friend, Mr. Kurusu, (age 30) told me: "My job is much easier every day. It gets easier and easier."

But at the end of our talk, he told me that four young men from his block had been put in the stockade. "They took a person and his three roommates here. Only the roommate was there the night of the incident. But his three roommates were just living with him. But a bachelor can't live by himself in one room. They keep taking people into the stockade."

On the following day, I had a talk with my friend, Mr. Tsuruda, age 28, in which we gossiped about some of the incompetent or stupid personnel - a favorite topic in the camps. But when I asked him what he thought of the "loyal people" he said: "A hundred percent of the inu are of the loyal bunch. I wouldn't be surprised



if Sasaki and that bunch are all loyal. There is a girl who works at my office. She acts like an inu. This is how I suspect. I told her, "You know, there are a lot of inu in camp." And she said, "Is that so? But it's better not to say anything." That's how I know. Now the natural reaction would be, Who are they?"<sup>8</sup>

On March 20 I approached Milton Sasaki, the Executive Secretary of the Coordinating Committee and his secretary, Miss Kuratomi. Both were very nervous and Mr. Sasaki looked as if he had aged ten years. He talked only in a whisper. Since I was aware of their reputation as inu, I suggested that they meet with me in my room in the administrative section. They agreed,



but suggested that they come at night, when there was less chance of their being seen. When they arrived, I asked Mr. Sasaki what the committee had accomplished in the six weeks since I had last seen him. He said, "Nothing whatever." I also asked him who the Sub-Coordinating Committee were, since I had seen this term in the minutes of the meetings. He replied:

We have fielders or undercover people. We had to put that word (Sub-Coordinating Committee) in the minutes. It was generous of the WRA to grant us that privilege.

He then told me that the real function of this sub-committee was to serve as bodyguards for members of the Coordinating Committee.

On March 22 I visited Mr. and Mrs. Wakida again. George spent most of our visit telling me about his difficulties in organizing a Seinen Kai. At the end of our talk he told me that Dr. Opler, the Community Analyst, had asked him to join his staff. But he had refused because he knew that if he worked for Dr. Opler he would be branded as an inu.

#### The Inu In April, 1944

When I arrived for my third visit to Tule Lake (April 12-17), I found the administrative staff in a state of crisis over the circulation of the resegregation petition (See p. 246-27). But when I talked to my Japanese respondents I found that they were, on the whole, less disturbed than the administrators. When I called on Mr. Kurihara, he made no mention of inu. Instead, he began our talk by stating prophetically:

Frankly speaking, you may convey to Mr. Robertson, that if there is any trouble here, the trouble will be against the Japanese only. . . I don't want to side with anybody, but the only thing to do is to get the Yes-Yes group out, or have the Army continually patrol the camp.



On the other hand, my block manager friend, Mr. Higashi, was excited and tense. He told me:

The majority of people want to live as Japanese. . . Some people want to go back to our country as soon as possible. We wish to be separated from the inus; that's the main point. . . .We want to get the inu out.

Mr. Higashi also gave me the name of the man he had called inu at our meeting of March 5, and added that this man had informed on the Negotiating Committee because of jealousy.

That evening I had a very confidential talk with Mr. Robertson, the Assistant Project Director in charge of Operations Division. He told me that he disapproved of Mr. Best's use of inu, and explained, "As long as the staff can't understand the colony, they are going to use informers."

On April 13, I talked briefly with a conservative and intelligent young Nisei woman, who told me:

The Yes-Yes should be taken out. That's what everybody is saying. In the first place, this place was for the disloyal Japanese. They (Yes-Yes people) have no place here at all. They'll cause trouble and would be called inu.

On April 13 Mr. Kurihara told me that he had not signed the resegregationist petition (see p. 24-7).

I objected to the petition. I couldn't sign it. I disapproved because I see their doings are from a very narrow viewpoint. Another point I objected - when that matter was brought up, no clear-cut explanation was made. It was given to the people in a haphazard manner. . . Many now regret signing the petition.

Mr. Higashi also expressed his doubts:

Outright support of the petition is not very strong . . . People believe the petition doesn't have anything to enforce it. I found that out. The main object is to segregate the Yes from the Nos. That's why I signed it. . . Trouble like this is occurring because there are too many inus.



On April 15, I was able to have a long visit with Bob Tsuruda (age <sup>28</sup>30). He was his usual talkative self. He told me that he had ignored the petition. "The guys believe the petition is a radical goon-squad business." While discussing the events of November 1943, he told me, "I voted for the general strike. I went radical that once. . . .I knew the status quo (partial strike) would be a lingering suffering for the whole damn colony." He believed that people had voted against the general strike because, "They got to thinking about the women and children. . . .They figured it would be awful to have to stand around and watch the kids cry." Then he said:

This last week there's been a lot of talk about dog (inu) hunting with baseball bats. If there's any trouble here in the next five or six months, it's going to be because of keeping the Yes-Yes in camp.

Period of Relaxation - May 15 to May 24

In the middle of May, 1944, I moved to the Tule Lake Center.

I found the staff members relaxed and optimistic and most of my Japanese friends were in good spirits. (See pp.27-32)



He then told me how he had told Mr. Provinse, the WRA Chief of Community Services that the Japanese should be given fair treatment.

The Japanese, when they are treated right, they are always so grateful. They are inspired by fairness, especially at a time like this.

But then he added:

Of course, there are a handful of incorrigible people. I myself am for it that they be sent away. But if I said so in camp I would be killed.

I concluded my notes for June 27 with the following remark:

Have heard an increasing number of remarks from Caucasians about Japanese quitting their jobs without giving a reason. This morning at the motor pool, I could not go into Klamath Falls because two drivers had quit without notice. Also I hear rumors from both Caucasians and Japanese that there are many beatings in camp which do not come to the attention of the authorities.

On June 28, nineteen Issei from Tule Lake were sent to the Santa Fe Internment Camp operated by the Department of Justice. Fifteen were taken from the stockade and four from the evacuee area.

On June 30, my Japanese secretary told me that she had heard that another man had been assaulted. Nobody knew exactly why he had been beaten up. I then called on my friends, the Wakidas, and found only Mrs. Wakida at home. She immediately began to tell me about the latest beating.

People are telling George that the man who was beaten didn't know why he was beaten. But some say there was a good reason for it. Both George and I think there's going to be a lot of trouble here since these men were sent to Santa Fe. Mr. \_\_\_\_\_ in this block was sent. . It's very mysterious. The people are very upset about the people being sent to Santa Fe.

There is a certain man working in the shoestore, an Old Tulean. He told me that the man who worked before him had taken so many thousands of dollars of the profits. We don't profit anything here.



On July 2 I called on Mrs. Iida. About the beating of Mr. Noma, she told me that some people were saying that they really had wanted to beat Noma's <sup>brother</sup>, the manager of the Co-op. But they thought that the brother should be beaten up too. She also remarked that the Co-op was getting more and more unpopular. She has been told several times, "If you say anything against the Co-op, you're going to be put in the stockade." I remarked that so far no one has been arrested for the assaults. She said, "They're too smart to get caught. The man who did turn himself over (the hammer assault) was crazy. That's why he gave himself up. And some people were saying that even the hammer assault was an inu beating. The old man had found out that his friend was acting like an inu."

I then called on Mr. Kurihara, I asked him why only third rate inu were being beaten. "You should know," he replied, "the big ones are too well guarded. But the guard will slip up some time." At this moment, one of Mr. Kurihara's friends who lived in the Manzanar section came into the room. Kurihara asked him, "How was it in Manzanar? Were there enough inus there to hold an election?"<sup>5</sup> The friend said that he didn't think anybody had been nominated in his block. "Who wants to be a legal inu?" he added.

By this time I had become very anxious. It seemed to me that the situation in camp was <sup>pathological</sup> and potentially very dangerous. That evening, in a state of desperation, I called on Mr. Robertson.

1. This was the proposed election of Ward Police Commissioners.



6. SHOOTING, BEATINGS, MURDER *lower cool*

On the evening of 24 May, a staff member knocked on my door and told me that a Japanese had been shot at close range by an armed sentry. Early the next morning I was able to speak with Mr. Robertson. He told me that one of his construction workers Shoichi Okamoto had been shot in the abdomen by a sentry - apparently at a range of less than three feet. He also told me that the Japanese construction crews had not come to work and that many other workers were not showing up.

After lunch I called on Mr. Kurihara. I did not feel comfortable about doing this, but I hoped that Kurihara would advise me whether or not it was proper or decent for me to visit people at this time. Kurihara was unusually gentle and serene, and I did not realize that he was in a state of shock. He said, "The people are very calm. . . Let's be cool and know more about it before we take any action. . . We must be fair. Mr. Best is not responsible. . . The Japanese could take it. They'll take it more than any other race."

I then inquired how the man was doing. Kurihara said that he was dead. His eyes filled with tears and he began to cry, repeating over and over again: "I wonder if there is a God."

I could think of nothing to say, so I expressed my sympathy and left.

I think I might have stopped visiting people had I not had an appointment with my secretary, a Nisei girl who lived in the same block as Kurihara. This young woman seemed so relieved to see me and so eager to tell me what people were saying that I concluded that she found my visit reassuring. Thereupon I called



on several other friends and was also well received. What I found was that my friends were not only shocked and angry, but afraid -- afraid that there might be another demonstration, that the soldiers might shoot them as they had shot Mr. Okamoto. Though they did not express it explicitly, the administrators shared this fear. If there was another demonstration, there would be more outrageous publicity about the "Jap riots", and the jurisdiction of the camp might again be given to the military.

On the next day I tried to talk to Mr. Tsuruda, but found only his wife at home. She said:

11 The people are angry about it. But we heard over the radio that Secretary Ickes said it was the soldier's fault. . . That made the people feel better. They were all angry around here but nobody knew what it was all about.

I then went to the Civic Organizations office where Miss Kuratomi was employed. She was shaking with rage and told me that she thought Mr. Best was trying to avoid responsibility. "It was Mr. Best's fault for bringing in the Military in the first place," she said. I called on Mr. Robertson and he told me that the Japanese had agreed to return to work if they could be assured of protection. He felt that Mr. Best had acted wisely, making announcements in the messhall, visiting Mr. Okamoto's family, and giving the workers all they asked for in the way of protection.

On May 27 I walked to Mr. Higashi's apartment but found him leaving for a block managers' meeting. I suggested that in the present situation it might be wise if I did not visit him. He looked very relieved and suggested we meet at some other place. I then went to Dr. Opler's office, where I met a young Japanese who, I knew, was on very good terms with Mr. Robertson. This young man told me that every time the Japanese see a soldier in



camp it makes their blood boil. He had interviewed the men who had witnessed the shooting and had written a report.

When Okamoto approached the gate, driving the truck the sentry waved at him. Okamoto interpreted this as a signal to stop. The soldier then approached him, cursed at him and ordered him to get out of the truck. Okamoto got out of the truck reluctantly. The soldier then ordered him to walk outside of the fence. Okamoto did so hesitantly and the soldier made as if to strike him with the butt of his rifle.

Okamoto raised his arms and the soldier shot him in the stomach at a range of three feet.

Okamoto screamed and fell to the ground writhing and clutching his stomach. The soldier reloaded his rifle and lighted a cigarette. The other Japanese looked on amazed. Then the soldier said, "Get the hell out of here or I'll shoot you too."

The young man assured me that if the soldier was not punished promptly and justly the results "will be terrible".

I dropped into Mr. Robertson's office to see if there was any news. He asked me in a quiet voice: "What do you think would happen if the Army whitewashed the whole thing and did not release the verdict for months?" I was by this time very upset. "If they do," I said, "or if the soldier is set free, November first and fourth will look like a picnic."

Later that afternoon I called on Mr. Tsuruda. He was very cordial but also very nervous. His fluent comments were interspersed with black humor, at which he himself laughed loudly.

Best has called a center-wide holiday on the day of the funeral (day not decided yet). They are also going to have a wake at the highschool. That's a darn good idea. It would be more or less ironical to give the fellow a military burial - being as he's a repatriate and a No-No. (laughter)

If WRA can prove to the people that the man who was shot was of no fault, and that they did their best to get justice, then things might quiet down. But if they exonerate the man completely, there's going to be a blow-off. They'll have to build a double fence around the administration section. . .

The smartest thing to do would be to give the man (the soldier) twenty years and send him to jail. Then pardon him after three or four years.



If the man is exonerated that will give the M.P.'s the impression that the lives of the Japs in here are not worth a hell of a lot. . . Heck, I might walk through that gate next morning and the guy will take a shot at me. I'm dead. That's not going to help me any. (laughter)

As I left, Mr. <sup>Tsurumida</sup> ~~Takouchi~~ told me that lid might blow off the camp in two hours and if that happened Mr. Robertson, Mr. Hayward (Bob's boss) and myself should come to his barrack. That would be the safest place for us.

That evening I talked briefly with Dr. Opler. He told me that the WRA office is "trying like hell to keep the Army from whitewashing this shooting."

On the morning of <sup>May</sup> ~~March~~ 28 I called on Mr. and Mrs. Wakida. Mr. Wakida talked freely about the shooting and stressed that the WRA's attempts to avoid responsibility were having a very bad effect on the people. "They think, 'If WRA's not responsible, that's bad. Who is responsible?'" He said he had a good deal of business to transact outside the fence but he wasn't going out. His wife remarked on the soldiers patrolling the camp with machine guns. "That didn't look good." Neither George nor his wife thought there was going to be any trouble. What could they do? They were only Japs. All they could do was take it.

I then visited Mr. Kurihara but he was so upset he did not wish to talk about the shooting. His only comment was: "It is a great shame to the Army of the United States."

When, however, I called on the Iida family in the afternoon I was well received. All the men of the family were at home, since it was Sunday and all the baseball games had been cancelled out of respect for Mr. Okamoto. The men interrupted their bridge



game to talk with me. Mr. Iida told me that everybody knew that his block (21) was full of "small citizens". But he didn't care. I could come to see him and they could call him an inu if they wanted to.

Another man said that the soldiers should stay out of camp. Every time one of them is seen in camp the people feel worse. "Everything depends on the verdict." Another asked if the soldier were given a heavy sentence and sent away to serve a light one, would the soldiers here know of this?

"If the verdict is for acquittal," said Mr. Iida, "the best thing the WRA could do to avoid trouble would be to remove the soldiers completely and tear down the fence." Another man was concerned because Mr. Best had seemed so eager to escape responsibility. If he had said that he safety of the people was his responsibility, the people would feel better.

Later that afternoon while I was writing up my notes, Mr. Robertson came to my room and told me that Mr. Best was wondering whether I should be asked to leave the project during this crisis. He explained that Mr. Best was under great stress and that some of the pressure to ask me to leave was coming from the Internal Security. He also warned me that his (Robertson's) mail was frequently opened when he received it and marked "Opened by Mistake".

At eight o'clock the next morning I went to see Mr. Best in his office and managed to impress him with my common sense and good will. I also told him that I did not plan to go into the colony for the next few days. At this he looked very relieved and said that would be a good idea. (Being young and reckless, I did not at this time appreciate the fact that Mr. Best was genuinely concerned with my welfare.)



After my talk with Mr. Best I stayed in my room for two days. But this solitude was very hard on me and I decided to see what I could learn in the administrative section. I talked briefly with two Nisei who were employed as secretaries. They had been very impressed by Mr. Okamoto's funeral. "At least 5,000 people were there," said one. Then the other young lady said worriedly, "It's going to be bad though if the soldier is acquitted. The people are just waiting to hear."

On June 4 I visited the Tsurudas. Bob was taking a nap when I arrived so I talked for about a half hour with his wife and her sister. To my surprise the women talked excitedly about the inu.

They had thought that when they came to Tule Lake they would be through with inus, but had found that there were more of them than ever. "Every place you look you can see one." Bob's sister-in-law said that you couldn't even have a small meeting anywhere but what some inu would go and report it to the Administration.

When Bob awoke, he talked at first about the stupidity of some of the Caucasian staff in the mess division. Then he spoke approvingly of the speech Mr. Best had made at Mr. Okamoto's funeral.

I will have to give the man credit. He really has done his best. He didn't lay it on too thick. Regardless of why he did it, the fact stands that he did do it. That's what you have to give the man credit for. It couldn't all have been prompted by selfishness.

Since my block manager friend, Mr. Kurusu, lived in a "tough block" I wrote him asking him if I might safely visit him. I had also asked him to write me a letter if he did not wish me to call. On June 6 I received a letter in which he said in part:

Thank you for your letter and sincere courtesy. I deeply regret that the tragic occurrence had to stop your visiting which I was expecting with great interest.



As far as I can observe the present existing public sentiment, I hope that probably there will be no public disturbance or see the slightest tendency of trouble or pressure group. However, it appears to me that the colonists have received considerable shock and a tendency of great anger toward thoughtless cruel barbaric in-human being attitude of the military police.

Other day we held the regular ward meeting and a block manager brought up the sincere hope of request by the people, concerning inhuman attitude of the military police toward the recent tragic incident that hereafter, the W.R.A. would guarantee and take proper measurement and caution for our safety and security especially employees of the center . . . Also I have confidence that the colony is eagerly waiting with great expectation for the official announcement of the truth.

✓ On June 6 two Caucasian teachers told me about "wild-cat" Japanese schools which are springing up in the camp. These schools, ✓ I was told, stress Japanese training of the most severe sort and refuse to come under the authority of the Japanese schools established with the consent of the WRA. The organizers are said to be Kibei of very pro-Japanese leanings. The curricula included + elaborate physical exercises. . . Another teacher told me that many ✓ of her students are dropping out of her classes. Their parents believe they should not attend the English school.

/ On June 8 I visited my friend George Wakida and found him m talking with one of his friends, Mr. Abo. Mr. Wakida soon began to talk about the inu.

What he couldn't understand, said he, was what these inu thought they were getting out of it. True, they might end up with three or four thousand dollars, but after the war nobody would have them; neither the Caucasians, nor the Japanese would associate with them. I said I doubted if inu were making that much money. "No", agreed Wakida, "They're probably doing it just for 16 a month." "Yes," added Mr. Abo, "they have an office now in 701." (This was the office of



Dr. Opler, the Community Analyst.) "How's that?" I asked. "It's run by a fellow named Popler," explained Mr. Abo. "He's a good guy but the fellows working for him are inu. Popler asked me to work for him, but I wouldn't do it for nothing. Not with those guys around."

On the shooting of Mr. Okamoto, Wakida opinioned that if the verdict was for acquittal it would be better to announce it at once, rather than let the people remain in this jumpy state of mind. He also gave me his version of the trouble in block 54. It seems as if Mr. Anzai, the warden who had protested about the Japanese morning exercises, was now being called an inu.<sup>1</sup> The evacuee head of the Internal Security Force, who had refused the block petition to dismiss Anzai and his friend, was also being called an inu.

On June 8, Mr. Kurihara told me that people's feelings about the shooting were quieting down. He was happy about a rumor that people in the camp might be permitted to take excursions to the nearby hills. But he also told me that some Japanese had questioned him because he was being visited by Mr. Robertson and by myself. He had told these questioners that his conscience was clear. "Having inu around," he explained, "keeps everybody on edge. Everybody suspects everybody else



and it leads to a great deal of hard feelings. It keeps the people in a constant state of tension."

On June 10 I called on my friend, Bob Tsuruda, and found him relaxed and sleepy. He was pleased that his boss, Mr. Hayward, had started a policy of having the Caucasian mess stewards "go in and have on<sup>e</sup> meal a day in the colony mess halls... They have to eat lunch in the colony every day except Saturday and Sunday."<sup>2</sup>



"One Caucasian steward," said Bob, "had tried to skin out of this by claiming that his stomach was bothering him." Bob made no mention of the shooting or the inu.

On the night of June 12, Masato Noma, the brother of Takeo Noma, the general manager of the Cooperative Enterprises was assaulted and beaten so severely that he had concussion of the brain. It was said that he might lose his eyesight. On the night of June 13, Mr. Anzai, the Issei police warden who had tried to stop the militaristic morning exercises in block 54, was beaten severely. It was said that his skull had been fractured.

On June 14 I called on Mr. and Mrs. Yamashita. (Yamashita was a well educated ex-internee, who, I knew, was an undercover advisor to the Resegregationists.) He began the interview by complimenting the administration for the "very marvelous way of . . . trying to calm the feelings of the residents. . . Mr. Best was wise in making the funeral so big. It made the people feel good - at the expense of the residents." Mr. Yamashita felt that the Administration should have paid for the funeral expenses.

I remarked that I had heard that Mr. Anzai had been beaten up. "He wasn't killed though," remarked Mrs. Yamashita in a disappointed tone. I then bluntly asked Mr. Yamashita what he thought of such beatings. Were persons not guilty of being inu being threatened and assaulted? He responded diffidently:

Knowing the Japanese as a race, knowing them for their courtesy and good behavior, I say that if anyone is beaten there should be a certain fundamental reason for it. I think the general opinion of the people was that these men were stealing goods supposed to be given to the colonists.



On June 14th or 15th the chief eyewitness of the Okamoto shooting was threatened but escaped a beating. Some people said that he must have been an inu, the theory being that he had given testimony unfavorable to Okamoto at the coroner's inquest.

On the evening of June 16 four staff members, three of whom were high-school teachers, called on me. They were very excited and distressed. They told me that Mr. Black had delivered the commencement address at the highschool and had said: "You perhaps have your own opinions and without doubt your parents have definite ~~conf~~<sup>✓</sup>ictions. But I am an American and as an American I can see the outcome of the war only as a complete military victory for the Allied Cause."

My informants said that from Black's initial statement that he was an American, there was a continuous heckling from the young men in the back of the room. At the end of Black's speech there was mixed applause and booing, applause from the parents in the middle section and booing from the young fellows in the back of the room. ✓ S

When I visited him on June 17, Mr. Kurihara said:

The beatings can be justified from various angles. The Japanese have grievances against the administration, but they know as a fact that they're helpless. Naturally, the only thing they can think of doing is how to get back at those who spy on them. I think these beatings will keep going on for quite a while. I think there will be at least half a dozen more. The Administration listens to the inu and not to the others. So such things happen.

This is one point you no doubt have noticed. These certain persons here beaten up, you'll find the majority of the people are enjoying it.



On the evening of June 17, a high school teacher told me that a number of young fellows had crashed the high school graduates' reception. The principal asked them to leave. They left, but later, it was found that:

they had gone into the boys' latrine, taken off all the moveable fixtures, and flushed them down the toilets. Some three inches of water had flooded the floor before this was discovered.

On June 21 a mentally deranged Issei attacked his roommate and another elderly man with a hammer, almost killing one of them.

On June 23 a Nisei girl assured me that this was not an inu beating. The attacker "must have been crazy", she said, "or he would not have gone to the hospital and told them what he had done."

But on July 2, Mrs. Iida told me that people were saying that the man who had been assaulted was an inu. "The old man had found out that his friend was acting like an inu."

On June 24 I called on my Resegregationist respondents, the Tsuchikawas. Mr. Tsuchikawa told me that Mr. Noma, the general manager of the Co-op had tried to bribe <sup>a certain</sup> Mr. Kira with a large sum of money in the hope that Kira would influence the segregants from Manzanar to join the Co-op. I found this statement interesting because I had heard rumors that Mr. Kira was the leader of a terrorist gang called "The Black Tigers".

I then went to the Tsurudas' apartment but found that Bob was not home. His wife suggested that I call on the next day. She appeared so anxious and upset that I asked her if anything was wrong. Looking from right to left she whispered, "I think everybody is nervous in here. This place gives me the willies."

Bob  
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When I called on Bob (June 25) he began the conversation by denouncing the Co-op.

I'm getting sick of the attitude of the people. They are always cutting each others throats. Take the "well-organized Co-op" for instance. Heretofore there had been a rumor that quite a few of the boys high up in the Co-op very nicely relocated with a big wad of dough. That's a nice thing to do to the poor Japs in here.

Noriko said:

I was in the Co-op yesterday when Sasaki came in. You know, we all turned the back to him. Every one of us. You could see how it was - Public Inu Number One.

Bob then astonished me by complaining about the "radicals" and the "pressure gang" and telling me that he was considering relocation:

When I came here I expected to find quite a different atmosphere. When the people realized they were here for the same reason, I expected that they would be willing to help a guy when he needed it. Instead, now if you've got five dollars they'll think of how they can get it away from you.

Some of the smartest people I know are getting disgusted. These are real intelligent people. They came here and expected to find a co-operative atmosphere and they're pretty well disgusted. Their remarks add up to something like this: "It's not a case now of whether I want to go back to the old country. It's a case of whether I can stay here long enough to go back to the old country and still retain my self-respect.

The trouble is they expect you to act like a damn radical and go out and kill every hakujin on the other side of the fence and when you don't act like that you are an inu. . . .It seems to me that Germany is going to pull a flopperoo. I wouldn't want to be here when that happens. I don't care if Japan has 17 kind of Yamato Damashii she isn't going to be able to buck fighting three big nations. . . .Believe it or not a fellow told me the other day that Japan was going to have a decisive victory and that the war would be over in seven days! A girl told me the other day, 'You're so thoroughly Americanized, I don't believe you belong here'. . . .A lot of the old men are getting goofier and goofier. They stand around in the latrines and mutter to themselves. I think they're losing their minds.



On the evening of June 25 I was present when two school teachers and a young statistician began a discussion of their problems. <sup>Miss Hobby</sup> ~~One teacher~~, who was in charge of the Japanese teachers who taught in the WRA day schools, told how she had met with them and had started a discussion of the Co-op. The young people had immediately begun to criticize the Co-op. The teacher suggested that they invite Mr. Runcorn, the new Co-op manager, to speak with them and answer these complaints.

After some consultation the evacuee teachers refused absolutely to do this. Miss Hobby pointed out that it was their duty as "leaders of the community" to take this action. But the young people remained unmoved. "We start that," said one of them, "and it'll be a two-by-fours for us."

When, on June 26, I called on Mr. Kurihara, he appeared nervous and ill at ease. I asked him what he thought about the proposed election of Ward Police Commissioners scheduled for the next day. He said he had not even heard of it. But he was of the opinion that it would be a resounding failure. Nobody with any self-respect would take the position because they would invariably be labeled as inu. When I asked him about the news of American advances in the Pacific, he said:

Those persons who will change their minds now are no good to either country. You'll find there are many of that kind. You know, only half the people here are registered to go to Japan. They just want to wait and see how it turns out. If Japan wins they want to go to Japan and if the United States wins they want to stay here. It's disgraceful. It makes me ashamed of the Japanese race. 4



He then abruptly shifted the conversation to Mr. Anzai, the police warden who was beaten on June 13. He told me that Mr. Anzai's children had not been able to get along with the other children in block 54. Then Anzai wanted to send his children to school in the next ward. But the teacher there found out about the children and refused. So in order to get back against the block Anzai commenced to point out people who should be sent to the stockade. I asked if the eleven men had been put in the stockade were denounced by Anzai. Mr. Kurihara said they were.

He tried to scare the people by telling them that he was going to send whoever wasn't behaving right to the stockade. He asked for it and he got it.

He then said desperately:

11 If the agitators and the spies get out of here we'll be united. But it wouldn't matter if we didn't have unity, so long as we have peace.

On the morning of June 27 a staff member told me that 19 of the Issei confined in the stockade were to be sent to the Santa Fe Internment Camp on the following morning. I called on Mr. Itabashi, a gentle and benevolent Issei who had written a long paper for me describing his first impressions of Tule Lake. He opened our conversation by talking about the Co-op:

The information I get from all over say that there are a few of the managers of the Co-op who have a close relationship with the WRA officials. They are getting graft out of the Co-op. The first thing I heard when I came to this camp was, "If you say anything against the Co-op here you'll be arrested." As long as the Co-op is carried on this way, some day another big trouble will happen.



time they were confined in ten large camps located in isolated areas of California, Arizona, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, and Arkansas.

In February of ~~1942~~ 1943 all of the ~~internees~~ <sup>1</sup> ~~internees~~ ~~eighteen years old or older were required to~~ answer a ~~questionnaire~~ ~~both male and female were~~

1. Or "evacuees" as the authorities preferred to call them.

~~answer a questionnaire administered by the Military.~~

~~The~~ ~~questionnaire~~ ~~administered by the Military.~~

~~The~~ ~~questionnaire~~ ~~administered by the Military.~~

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June 12 - Nms' brother  
13 police warden

21 military lawyer

29 - dentist #111

July 1? a public



Had a talk with Mr. Robertson in which I re-stressed the seriousness of public sentiment against the Co-op. Robertson said that he had talked to Runcorn (the WRA manager) and that Runcorn had recommended the immediate issuing of a dividend. Runcorn insisted the books were all right and that they are gone over every month by an outside accountant. Robertson said he had then recommended that the account be written up and published in an understandable form. Runcorn said he had not thought of that.

Robertson also told me that last night some members of the Resegregation group had approached ~~him~~ and told ~~me~~ that the removal of the Issei to Santa Fe was the last straw. They no longer could restrain their boys. Future attacks might not be restricted to beatings. There might be murder.

On the morning of July 4 I heard that the body of Mr. Noma, the General Manager of the Co-operative Enterprises, had been found on his doorstep with a knife pushed through his larynx to the base of his brain.<sup>6</sup>

On July 6 the results of the court-martial on the shooting of Mr. Okamoto were announced in the Newell Star. The sentry was acquitted.



PART THREE EVENTS AT TULE LAKE, JULY 1944 TO MAY 1945

7. Aftermath of Noma Murder

The news of the murder produced a state of panic. The people rushed to the Co-op to buy food. Many members of the Japanese American police <sup>force</sup> resigned. By mid-June the ~~staff~~ had dwindled from 117 to 73 men. The key officials of the Co-op resigned. Some were taken from their barracks by members of the Caucasian Internal Security and lodged in the administrative area. On July 24 several staff members told me that there had been a number of attempts at rape in the colony. I asked my friend Mr. Wakida about this and was told: "They say a girl was attacked in Block 69. She ran away screaming. The girls can't go to school (Japanese Night School). But now the boys (of the night school) are getting together and are leaving school with the girls."

Many of the Nisei were also deeply disturbed by the news of the American advances in the Pacific. On June 19, Mrs. Wakida, who taught in one of the Japanese schools, told me:

My students are asking me, "Sensei (teacher)", they say, "What would you think if I got leave clearance and got out of here?" They believe all they read in the papers. They say: "Saipan was taken, this place and that place was taken. Gee Whiz, what's going to happen to us?" I really don't blame them.

The pervasive sense of anxiety and insecurity were increased by events pertaining to the stockade. The Saiban-iin (Lawsuit Committee) had approached Ernest Besig, Director of the Northern California Branch of the American Civil Liberties Union on behalf of the imprisoned men. Besig arrived at Tule Lake on July 11, but



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he was not permitted to speak to the detainees except in the presence of a member of the WRA Internal Security. Nor was he allowed to complete his interviews, for, on July 13, he was told to leave the camp. A Caucasian informant told me:

The project attorney and I went into the colony the night of July 12. We met 48 people, .. almost all of them were related to the men in the stockade. Yoshino presided. He asked the project attorney to explain the "kicking out" of Besig. The project attorney said he hadn't been kicked out but had been requested to leave. The Administration could not allow anyone to interfere with the murder investigation.<sup>1</sup>

On July 19, the men in the stockade, most of <sup>whom</sup> ~~them~~ had been imprisoned for more than eight months, went on another hunger strike. On July 25, a Nisei girl told me, "One of the boys fainted in there today, about 6:30 p.m. and was taken to the hospital. That evening, about 7:30 p.m. I myself passed by the stockade,

One of the Caucasian police left the small station next to the stockade and walking to the gate shouted, "Mr. Kai, Mr. Kai, your wife is here to see you." After a while the door of one of the barracks opened and Mr. Kai staggered out the door being held open by another detainee. Kai walked slowly to the station where I saw his wife, his little son, and a baby.<sup>2</sup>

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~~1. Fieldnotes, July 14.~~

~~2. Fieldnotes, July 25, 1944~~



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Meanwhile the administration was desperately trying to recruit another police force. Finally they prevailed upon the block managers to ask the people in each block to elect two men who would serve as policemen in their block. Many blocks refused. Some blocks remained unpoliced for six months. On June 24, Mr. Wakida told me: "People would like an Internal Security, but nobody wants to run. They don't want to be an inu." On the same day, Mr. Itabashi, an Issei, told me: "In this camp no really able man will show his face because so many narrow minded fanatics are in camp that you can't honestly cooperate with the fanatics. Even your safety cannot be guaranteed."

At the end of July the new policemen, who were now called "wardens" met with the administration to formulate new policies. They "adopted a series of changes designed to insure that they would not be involved in any affair which might incur the displeasure of the residents." Whenever any infringement of law occurred which might remotely be connected with politics, or might conceivably offend the residents if action were taken, the wardens refused to act." <sup>x3</sup> The murdered<sup>R</sup> or murderers of Mr. Noma were never apprehended.

Meanwhile, the men detained in the stockade continued their hunger strike. On July 28, the Spanish vice-Consul came to the center on a routine inspection tour. When he was told of the strike, he pleaded with Mr. Best to free the detainees, but to no avail. On July 30 Ernest Besig of the ACLU returned to the project. He was not allowed to see the detainees, but he told their relatives that the contemplated habeas corpus proceedings would almost

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x. Thomas and Nishimoto, "The Spoilage," p. 281. For a detailed account of this situation, see "The Spoilage," pp. 277-81.



certainly result in the release of the imprisoned men. Between August 12 and August 24, all of the confined men were released.

Immediately after the murder of Mr. Noma, some respondents expressed approval and satisfaction. For example, on July 18, a young Nisei girl told me:

This might sound awfully heartless, but nobody has any sympathy for Noma. The whole camp feels that way. It had a lot to do with the Co-op and people felt he was really behind all the things going on with the administration and sending people to the stockade -- especially the more recent pickups.<sup>2</sup>

But on August 30, this girl told me:

I never understood why Mr. Noma had to be killed. My parents knew him and feel sorry for him. I can't feel one bit of this hate that made someone stab him. Nobody seems to know why he was killed. In camp there were so many rumors at that time. People believed what they heard was true. To prove its credibility they always said, "My friends say it." It makes almost everybody believe the story.

On September 12, another Nisei girl told me that she wished they would catch the murderer of Mr. Noma. She had felt so sorry for Mrs. Noma and the children.



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On July 28 I visited Mr. Yamashita, who was probably the most influential of the "behind the scenes" advisors to the Resegregationists. I asked him how the people felt about the death of Mr. Noma. In a profound tone Mr. Yamashita replied:

I think as soon as the attacks which ended with the murder (here Mr. Yamashita interrupted himself and added, 'temporarily ended for the time being') the effect on the oppressed minds of the people was to a more or less optimistic viewpoint. Especially since the action was successful and the <sup>a</sup>Administration was not able to find the attacker.

Mrs. Yamashita interrupted him, saying, "It was a perfect crime." Mr. Yamashita continued, "People were made very hopeful." After a pause, he added:

People were sorry for the victim, but the camp as a whole, if they did not rejoice for such a happening, when they thought that was the last resort or last step to be taken to let the public and the <sup>o</sup>Administration know that wrong-doing cannot continue forever. Deep thinking people do not think the choosing of this barbarous action is wise and think that it would be more or less criticized by the American public when it is known outside by the paper or radio. But the conditions of this camp were such that they were forced to use such a method. It was more or less in the atmosphere of the camp that they were forced to use such a method.



✓ 61  
8. RESEGREGATION AND RENUNCIATION OF CITIZENSHIP

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✓ During August, a rumor of an imminent resegregation swept the camp. This rumor was no doubt initiated by the resegregationists, who had written a letter to Dillon Myer in which they advocated the removal of themselves and other "disloyals" to another camp where they could wait for the exchange ship to Japan. There were many conflicting speculations about the probable destination of the "disloyal." On August 8, the cautious and conservative Mr. Kurusu told me: "For more than two weeks everybody is saying we might be segregated again. First they said we would be sent to Poston, then they said Alaska." His wife added:

They told me that they had heard it over the radio and seen it in the San Francisco Examiner that the people are going to be sent to Jerome. It is the disloyal people who are going to be moved.

On the same day an elderly Issei woman told me:

People heard it over the radio and the blocks were very upset. Children are crying. I have moved four times already and I don't want to move again. Jerome is bad, they say, too much rain.

An additional cause of anxiety and ambivalence was the issue of the renunciation of American citizenship. In July of 1944, Congress passed the Denationalization Bill. On July 13, the Newell Star reported that:

A new law dealing with relinquishment of their citizenship by American citizens has been passed by the Congress of the United States and signed by the President...